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H – 1123

International Court of Justice

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H-1123

INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL

No. 1

THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, THE FRENCH REPUBLIC, THE UNITED KINGDOM OF GREAT BRITAIN AND NORTHERN IRELAND, AND THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS

- against -

HERMANN WILHELM GOERING, et al

defendants

D O C U M E N T B O O K

In re: AGGRESSIVE WAR: EXECUTION OF THE PLAN TO INVADE CZECHOSLOVAKIA

ROBERT H. JACKSON
U. S. Chief of Counsel

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Of Counsel:

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Lt., USNR

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I

cC-2 Supreme Command of the Armed Forces. List of International Law incidents for the purpose of the Propaganda-handling, 1.10.38

C-136 Top Secret Fuehrer letter to the OKW, of 21,10.38, regarding three eventualities: Securing of Frontiers,- Liquidation of Czecho-Slovakia,- the Occupation of Memelland.

C-138 Letter of the OKW of 17.12.38 with Corollary to directives of 21.10.38

C-175 Letter of Reich-Minister for War of 24.6.37 with Directives for Unified Preparation of the Armed Forces for War 1-5

D-571 Letter of Mr. Newton to Viscount Halifax of 21.3.1939, regarding Czecho-Slovakia.

D-572 Letter of Consul Pares to Mr. Newton of 20.3.1939 regarding Slovakia

L-172 Page 5 of Document-Book "1933-1936 Preparation for Aggression".

375-PS Directives of the General Staff of the 5th Section)German Air Force) of 25.8.1938 regarding extended Case Green (Gruen - Code for Czechoslovakia). Estimate of the Situation with special consideration of the Enemy, 1-7

386-PS Notes on the Conference in the Reichskanzlei on 5 Nov. '37. 1-8

388-PS Fall "Grün", Czechoslovakia (pencil note). Appertaining to War-History Fuehrer's questions of 9 June 1938 and answers to them. Draft for the new directive. Mobilization measures. Occupation of Sudeten-German Territory. Coordinated Attack by Army and Air Forces on X Day 1-91

789-PS Conference with the Fuehrer, Nov.23,1939, to which all Supreme Commanders are ordered. 1-5

998-PS Deutsche Verbrechen gegen die Tschecho-Slowakei 1-8
German Crimes against Czecho-Slovakia. Czecho-Slovak official Report. London, September 1945 1-9

1301-PS Financing of the Armament 1-31

1439-PS Declaration concerning the German-Slovak Treaty of Protection concluded between the German Reich and Slovakia. 1-2

1536-PS Freudenthal Affair. Top Secret Letter of Reich Minister for Air and C-in-C of 12.8.1938. General Staff 5th Division. 1-5

1780-PS Translation from Excerpts from JODL's Diary. 1-

1874-PS Notes on the Conference between General Field-Marshal Goering and the Duce in the presence of Count Ciano. 15 April 1939 1-2

2360-PS Voelkischer Beobachter, Munich Edition, 31.1.1939. Excerpts from Adolf Hitler's speech.

2786-PS Exchange of letters Ribbentrop-Keitel. 4.3.1938

2788-PS Secret Notes on the Conference of 29.3.1938 in the Foreign Office on Sudeten-German Questoons. 1-3

2789-PS Letter of Konrad Henlein to von Ribbentrop, of 17.3.38

2790-PS Conference between the Fuehrer and Prof. Tuca and Karmasin, in the presence of the Reich Foreign Minister, in Berlin, on February 12th,1939.

2791-PS Excerpt of a letter of 23.8.1938 signed R (initial) regarding Czecho-Slovakia.

2792-PS Statement by and to Attolico, regarding the possibility of a German-Czech conflict 1-

2793-PS Confidential Protocol about the economical and financial collaboration between the German Reich and Slovakia

2794-PS Payments to Karmasin and his pro-German activities. 29.11.39 and 1.12,39 Memorandum & Notes.

2795-PS

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2795-PS Notes on the discussion between Ribbentrop and the Czecho-Slovak Foreign Minister Chvalkovsky in Berlin, on June 21st '39.

2796-PS Secret Note, dated Aug.23rd,1938, signed Weizsacker, regarding discussion between Hungarian Ministers Imredy and Kanya and, ~~xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx~~, Ribbentrop and Von Weizsacker German Ministers

2797-PS Note dated Berlin Aug.25th,1938 on Reichsminister's new talk with Hungarian Minister von Kanya.

2798-PS Conversation between the Fuehrer and the President of Czecho-Slovakia, Hacha on March 15th, 1939, in presence of the German and Czechoslovak Foreign Ministers 1-5

2800-PS Confidential note, dated Berlin July 18th,'38 regarding remarkw made by Attolico.

2801-PS Discussion between Goering and the Slovak Minister Dr. Durkansky

2802-PS Conference between the Fuehrer and the Slovak Prime Minister Tiso in Berlin on March 13,1939. 1-3

2815-PS Telegram in secret code dated Berlin March 13th 1939, addressed by Ribbentrop to German Embassy in Prague.

2816-PS Letter of Horthy, dated Budapest, 13.3.1939, expressing his thanks to "your excellency".

2826-PS "Boehmen and Maehren" (Bohemia and Moravia), official periodical of the "Reich's-Protector", published by State-Secretary, K.H.Frank, Prague. Copy of May 1941, page 179. 1-2

2853-PS Telegram of German Foreign Office of 24.9.'38 to German Embassy, Prague, on exchange of prisoners.

2854-P.S. Message of Foreign Office (German) of 17.9. regarding the possible arrest and execution of Czech subjects living in Germany.

2855-PS Secret message dated 16.9.'38 from German Foreign Office to Embassy (Prague) regarding arrest of 150 Czechs in Germany.

2856-PS Secret message dated 24 Sept. from Foreign Office to Embassy, Prague, regarding removal of 500/600 Reich-Germans

2858-PS Secret message of 19.9.38 from Foreign Office to Embassy Prague instructing to inform Kundt to induce Slovaks to ask immediate autonomy.

2859-PS Secret message converning notification of Karmasin of the sum at his disposal at theeembassy.

2860-PS Extract No.10 from the English Blue Book", regarding German-Polish relations and outbreak of hostilities between Great Britain and Germany,-German translation, and English text- on Sept.3rd, 1939.

2861-PS Extract N*12 of the "British Blue Book" concerning Sir N,Henderson's visit to Goering on May 27,'38. German translation of this Extract.

2862-PS No,126 of "Peace and War" U.S.Foreign Policy. Statement by Mr.Welles, of March 17,1939. English text and German translation thereof.

2863-PS Excerpt from a lecture by Henlein, "The fight for the Liberation of the Sudeten" delivered in Vienna on March 4th, 1941,-German translation and English text.

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C DOCUMENTS & D

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2906-P. Report on the reception of the Czecho-Slovak Foreign Minister Chvalkovsky by the Fuehrer on 21.1.39

2943-PS Extracts in German and in English of the French "Yellow Book" of events 1938-1939 leading to the War (~~in German~~) 1-15 and 1-13 (English).

3029-PS Affidavit in German with English translation thereof by NAJOCKS, Alfred Helmuth dated Nuernberg 2o.11.45.

3030-PS Affidavit in English by Alfred Helmuth Naujocks, dated Nov.20,1945 (in German) with English translation.

3036-PS Affidavit of Gottlob Berger, dated Nu ernberg, 22 Nov. 1945

3059-PS Secret memorandum dated Berlin 19.8.38 ~~regarding~~ signed Woermann and regarding request for increase of monthly allowa nce to the German-Sudeten Party

3060-PS Secret communication to Foreign Office, Berlin, dated Prague, March 16,1938 regarding instructions given to Henlein , on Sudeten-Germans' policy.

R-1oo Information and instructions given by Fuehrer to the Supreme Commander of the Army, on March 25, 1939. 1-2

R-133 Secret Note on a conference held in ~~Berlin~~ Westerland on July 25, 1939 with the General Field-Marshal 1-3

R-150 Excerpts from Plan Study 1938. Main Part III 1-5

Appendices: TC14-TC53

3061-PS Supplement No.2 to the Official Czechoslovak Report "German Crimes against Czechoslovakia", dated Nuernber g Dec.1st, 1945.

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PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT C 2
OFFICE OF U.S. CHIEF OF COUNSEL

Exhibit U.S.A. 90
Filed Dec. 3, 1945

Supreme Command of the Armed Forces
No. 1103.38 Most Secret Ausl. VI.

1.10.38

7 Copies
7th Copy

To:

OKH (Section 6. Army General Staff)
OKM (Naval War Staff, 1st Division for the attention of Min. Rat. Dv. Eckhardt)
Reich Minister for Air and Civ C. Air Force (Air Force General Staff for the attention of Reg. Rat. Dr. Mueller)
Foreign Office via the Foreign Office Representative (VAA)

Enclosed is a list drawn up by Section L of the OKW, of the violations of international law which may be expected on the part of fighting troops.

Owing to the short time allowed for the compilation, colums C 1 and C 2 had to be filled in directly here for the time being.

The branches of the Armed Forces are requested to send in an opinion here so that a final version may be drawn up.

The same is requested of the Foreign Office.

The Chief of the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces.

By Order

sgd. Burkner

3 Enclosures:

C 2

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M O S T S E C R E T

LIST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW INCIDENTS FOR THE PURPOSE OF PROPAGANDA HANDLING

I. OUR OWN MEASURES

(a) Incidents	(b) Example	(c) Attitude of the International Law (Gruppe Voelkenvecht)		(d) Explanation by propaganda minister
		(1) Judgement by international law	(2) Justification by the laws of warfare	
(1) Bombing or shelling attacks on localities where there are no military installations.		I) Art. 25 of the Hague Rules for Land Warfare of 1907 forbids attacks and firing on undefended towns, villiages, dwellings and buildings by whatever means. Bombing by aircraft is to be included in the special qualification "by whatever means		
1a) Bombing of extra-territorial buildings and areas	1a) In an air-raid on Prague the British Embassy is destroyed	Giving the supposit ion that no orders for the bombing of extra-territorial buildings and areas will be given by us under any circumstances, the actionin the case in question would have been carried out by mistake	An accident of this kind can best be explained publicly by the fact that the British Embassy is in the immediate vicinity of military installations, the bombing of which was an indispensible military necessity. If, therefore the British Embassy was hitby mistake, it is to be described as a regretable accident,	

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I. OUR OWN MEASURES

(a) Incident	(b) Example	(c) Attitude of the International Law Group		(d) Explanation by propaganda minister
		1) Judgement by Internation al Law 666	2) Justification by the laws of war	
			such as are unfortunately unavoidable in war. The German Government will pay compensation for the damage.	
2) Injuring or killing of subject os neutral states outside the actual war zone.	Englishmen or Frenchmen are injured or killed.	Since it must be assumed that the deaths or injuries were caused unintentionally by our troops, there is no question of a violation of international law.	the deaths and injuries caused unintentionally are to be excused as being unavoidable accidents which the events of war can cause even to non-belligerents. Compensation is to be guaranteed.	
) Bombingand shelling attacks on hospitals, military hospitals, churches, and cultral monuments.	3) The Hradschin is destroyed in an air raid on Prague.	Art. 17 of the Hague Rules for Land Warfare lays down that during seiges and bombardments all necessary steps mustbe taken to spare, as much as possible, any building dedicated to religious services, art, science, welfare, also historical monuments, hospitals and centers for sick and wounded provided that they are not at the same time being used for	It seems appropriate, in this case, to make a public announcement with the corresponding justification after the attack.	

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PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT C 2
Continued

I. OUR OWN MEASURES

(a) Incident	(b) Example	(c) Attitude of International Law Group		(d) Explanation by propaganda minister
		1) Judgement by International Law	2) Justification by the laws of war	
		military purposes. The elucidation of the last named reservation above is always very difficult and lengthy. Unless such a case is indisputably established, it cannot be judged by international law. Deliberate firing on protected buildings which are above suspicion is contrary to International Law in any case. Under the supposition that the Prague Hradschin, as the seat of government, is used for military purposes, which include, among other things, the maintenance of the military power of the Czech people, air attacks upon it are justified.		
4) Use of war weapons which can be employed under certain conditions or of new types of war weapons such as gas, flame throwers chemical warfare agents and bacteriological substances.	4) On account of a report that the Czechs have used gas, the firing of gas projectiles is ordered.	According to the declaration agreed to in June 1925 by 40 states, including Czechoslovakia, the employment of poison gases, chemical warfare agents, and bacteriological substances is expressly forbidden. Quite a number of states made the reservation to this declaration on the prohibition of gas warfare.	If the assertion, that the apponent - in this case the Czechs - used a prohibited gas in warfare, is to be believed by the world, it must be possible to prove it. If that is possible, the	

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PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT C 2
Continued

I. OUR OWN MEASURES

(a) Incidents	(b) Example	(c) Attitude of the International Law Group	(d) Explanation by the propaganda minister
		1) Judgement by International Law	Justification by the laws of war
		that they consider themselves exempt from the prohibition should the opponent use gas. Therefore, the burning question of who violated the prohibition first will always arise when the decision is made. Whether this can be established is doubtful.	firing of gas projectiles is justified and it must be given out in public that it can be proved that the enemy was the first to violate the prohibition. It is therefore particularly important to furnish the proof. If the assertion is unfounded or only partially founded, the gas attack is to be represented only as the need for carrying out a justified reprisal, in the same way did the Italians in the Abyssinian War. In this case, however, the justification for such harsh reprisals must also be proved.
5) Retaliatory measures against enemy civilians who take part in combat or are guilty of	5) Czech civilians, not recognizable as soldiers are caught in the act of sabotage (destruction of	If the inhabitants of an enemy territory under our occupation commit hostile acts against us or our allies, they are guilty of war treason,	If Czech civilians, who are not recognizable as soldiers, are seized, while committing the acts

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PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT C 2
Continued

I. OUR OWN MEASURES

(a) Incidents	(b) Example	(c) Attitude of the International Law Group		(d) Explanation by the propaganda minister
		1) Judgement by International Law	2) Justification by the laws of war	
espionage. (Passing of intelligence)	important bridges, destruction of food stuffs and fodder, are discovered looting wounded or dead soldiers and thereupon shot.	which must be judged by German law (Armed Forces Penal Gazette). The right to punish enemy civilians for committing hostile acts against the occupying power derives from Art. 43 of the Hague Rules for Land and Warfare which allows the occupying power to carry out public administration and expressly assigns to it the responsibility for the maintenance of public order and public life.	and crimes mentioned in the case 5b, and shot out of hand, this of retaliatory measure is justifiable and permissible under International Law only if the lives of our own troops were endangered. If offenders of this kind are taken prisoner, they may not simply be put against a wall, butmust be tried according to the decrees relating to the case. This procedure can take place briefly and summarily in the field. The experiences of the World War have taught us that this procedure offers, the enemy no opportunity of attack, whereas executions without trial are the best foundations for the enemy's propaganda. Encroachments actually made on our part will have to be explained either as the necessity for our	

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PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT C 2
Continued

I. OUR OWN MEASURES

(a) Incidents	(b) Example	(c) Attitude of the International Law Group		(d) Explanation by the propaganda minister
		1) Judgement by International Law	2) Justification by the laws of war	
			troops to defend themselves or by the assertion that the Czechs attempted to escape.	
6) Forcing of prisoners and civilians into employment in war work (road construction, digging trenches, production of munitions, employment in the transport service etc)	6) Captured Czech soldiers or Czech civilians are detailed to do road work or to load munitions.	Art. 31 of the agreement signed on 27 July 1929, concerning the treatment of prisoners of war, forbids the directing of prisoners of war into work which is directly connected with war measures. Enforcement to do such work is, in any case, contrary to international law. Prisoners of war and civilians may be employed in road building but not in the production of munitions	The use of such measures can be justified as a necessity of war, or with the assertion that the enemy acted in the same way first.	
7) Measures against the population connected with the requisitioning of billets, supplies of food stuffs, fodder and live-stock etc.	7) For military reasons it is necessary to requisition billets, food stuffs and fodder from the Czech population. As a result the latter suffer from want.	Art. 52 of the Hague Rules for Land Warfare allows the occupying powers to claim payment in kind and service from the communities and inhabitants of an occupied territory. These payments must be in relation to the resources of the country. Harsh oppression of the civil population is justified only if the occupying power is itself in need and must live. Oppression and the enforced delivery of goods unless they are a due military neccisty are not only contrary	Necessity is the only reason justifying excessive requisitioning of toilets and the deliveries of food stuffs and fodder. Mention that the troops are suffering from the same shortage would be appropriate. Moreover it must be added that women, children, and invalids will be provided for as far as possible.	

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I. OUR OWN MEASURES

PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT C 2
Continued

(a) Incidents	(b) Example-	(c) Attitude of the International Law Group.		(d) Explanation by the propaganda minister
		1) Judgement by Int ernational Law	Justification by the laws of war	
		to international law, they are also unworthy.		
8) Compulsory evacuation of the population from their homes.	8) Czech population is, for military reasons, compulsorily evacuated to the rear area.	According to Art. 43 of the Hague Rules for Land Warfare and if military necessity urgently required it. The removal of inhabitants to the rear of the operational zone is authorized by international law.	The most advisable justification is that the inhabitants must be protected against bombardment.	
9) Measures which affect religious and church life	9) Churches are used for military accomodation.	German soldiers will use churches as military accomodation for men and horses only in the most extreme cases of need.	If the urgent military necessity exist, justification under International Law is granted and must be given out in public with this as the reason. Experience has shown however, that the use of religious buildings for such purposes offers effective propaganda material to the enemy.	
10) Violation of neutral territorial rights by aircraft flying over or by bombing.	10) In the course of their duty, German aircraft fly over Polish territory where they are involved in an air battle with Czech aircraft.	According to Art. 1 of the 5th Hague Convention of 18 October 1907, the territory of neutral powers is <u>not to violated.</u> A <u>deliberate</u> violation by flying over this territory is a breach of International Law, if the neutral powers have declared.	An attempt at denial should first be made if it is unsuccessful, a request for pardon should be made (on the grounds of miscalculation of position to the Polish Government and compensation for damage guaranteed.	

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PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT C 2
Continued

I. OUR OWN MEASURES

(a) Incidents	(b) Example	(c) Attitude of the International Law Group		(d) Explanation by the propaganda minister
		1) Judgement by International Law	2) Justification by the laws of war	
		an air barrier for combat aircraft. If German planes fly over Polish territory this constitutes a violation of International Law, provided that this action is not expressly permitted.		
11) Measures of naval warfare which are part of the mine-U-boat war, the blockade and the war on merchant shipping (on the basis of material available to the Naval War Staff)	11a) Stationing of U-boats and war activity within the approaches to the Baltic or within neutral coastal water. b) Prize laws measures as part of the war on merchant shipping, which are objected to by the enemy anestor by neutral as contrary to international law. c) Use of armament by armed merchant ships. d) Announcement of declared areas.	No judgement by international law, of the questions listed here, can be made without concultation with OKM, as it is not known here, what measures are intended should the occasion arise.		
12) Measures aimed at stiffening the will to resist on the part of national minorities	12) Proclamations over the German radio to Hungarian, Slovak and Polish minorities who are opposed to the Czech Government.	The spreading of news by whatever means with a view to raising the moral forces of peoples in the enemy territories who are racially related or connected is included in the ruses of warfare.	Justification of our own measures is not necessary, in any case the opponents will reply with their own i.e. counter propaganda.	

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PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT C 2
Continued

I. OUR OWN MEASURES

(a) Incidents	(b) Example	(c) Attitude of the International Law Group		Explanation by the propaganda minister
		1) Judgement by Int ernational Law	2) Justification by the laws of war	
either foreign or of German origin in enemy countries (by the distribution of leaflets by air, proclamations, broadcasts, training and arming),		allowed under Art. 24 of the Hague Rules for Land Warfare.		

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PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT C 2
Continued

MOST SECRET

II. THE OPPONENT'S VIOLATIONS

(a) Incidents	(b) Example	(c) Attitude of the International Law Group		(d) Counter measures by the propaganda minister
		1) Judgement by International Law	2) Justification by the laws of war	
1) Bombing or shelling attacks on localities where there are no military installations.		Judgement by International Law as in Section I No. 1 c 1		
1a) Bombing of extra-territorial buildings and areas.	1a) In an air raid on Berlin, the French Embassy is destroyed	In no case are extra-territorial buildings military objectives, therefore according to Art. 27 of the Hague Rules for Land Warfare, they must be spared asfar as possible.	If it is at all possible, claim that the enemy carried out deliberate precision bombing and what is specially to be condemned is that the French Embassy contains valuable art treasures and that subjects of enemy states are staying there, having found asylum there. Moreover that the French Embassy made efforts to avert the conflict.	
2) Injuring or killing of subjects of neutral states outside the actual zone.	American Subjects are injured and killed in an air raid on Dresden.	Subjects of neutral statesoutside the actual war zone are protected by International Law.	It will be difficult to prove that the enemydid this with intent. The only other possible assertion is to that as the buildings and persons were clearly distinguishable by indications of American territory, or white flags, therewas no excuse for attacking them. There were no military objectives near the scene of the on-slaught.	

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PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT C 2
Continued

II. THE OPPONENT'S VIOLATIONS

(a) Incidents	(b) Example	(c) Attitude of the International Law Group		(d) Counter measures by the propaganda minister
		1) Judgement by the International Law	2) Justification by the laws of war	
3) Bombing and shelling attacks on hospitals, military hospitals, churches and cultural monuments.	3) In an air raid on Vienna, hospitals are destroyed and Red Cross personnel and patients killed.	Judgement by International Law as in Section I No. 3 c 1.	Accuse the enemy of having violated Art. 27 of the Hague Rules for Land Warfare by omitting to provide suitably for the protection of the hospitals in Vienna, which by day and night were marked sufficiently distinctly by the Red Cross. In this case also, the intention of precision bombing must be imputed as much as possible.	
4) Destruction of villages, settlements, agricultural areas, industrial and communications installations which serve no military purpose.	4) Detonators are placed in the Aussig Dam in order to destroy the surrounding area and the inhabitants by flooding.	Prohibition of international law exist only with regard to the destruction and removal of enemy property, other than in those cases where this destruction or removal is made urgent by the necessities of war. (Art. 23g of the Hague Rules for Land Warfare).	Such destruction as the blowing up of the Aussig Dam can only be branched as the most inhuman, senseless, and useless method of taking revenge on innocent people. Compare similar cases of barbaric action in the Hussite Wars and in the behavior of the Czech Legion in Siberia, 1918/1920.	
5) Use of war weapons which can be employed under certain conditions and of new types of war weapon such as gas, flame-throwers, chemical warfare agents and bacteriological substances.	When Czech troops withdrew from the Sudeten-German area, wells in many places are contaminated.	Judgement by International Law as in Section II par 5 C 1.	Making wells unfit for use by throwing in stable manure for example, is an authorized means of war, International Law forbids only the poisoning of wells. Contamination by bacteria, on which this example is apparently based, is forbidden by International Law both in the Hague Ruling for Land Warfare and in the Convention of 1925. A propaganda	

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II. THE OPPONENT'S VIOLATIONS

PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT C 2
Continued

(a) Incident	(b) Example	(c) Attitude of the International Law Group		(d) Countermeasures by the propaganda minister
		1) Judgement by International Law	2) Justification by the laws of war	
c) Underhands means of waging war, continuing the fight after the enemy hasapparently surrendered - camouflage by abuse of German or neutral national markings.	In Postelberg, Czech trucks and locomotives have been camouflaged by GermanNational markings and swastikas.	Underhand means of warfare as, for example, feigning death and shooting from the rear at advancing troops, showing white flags and firing with hidden machine guns on the approach of the unsuspecting enemy justify immediate reprisals without mercy. The misuse of the flag of truce, the national flag or of the military badges or uniforms of the opponent or of the Red Cross is forbidden. (Art. 23e Hague Rules for Land Warfare) but it becomes misuse only if enemy operatims are undertaken under the comouflage; these enemy operations also justify immediate reprisal measures. The camouflaging of Czech truchs and locomotives by German national markings and swastikas isnot contrary to international law. It becomes contrary thereto only if they are employed in enemy operations, under this camouflage.	attack is therefore justified. The enemy must be accused of employing unchivalrous means of warfare, and he will gain little advantage by means which are dishonorable and repugnant to an honest soldier.	

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PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT C 2
Continued

II. THE OPPONENT'S VIOLATIONS

(a) Incidents	(b) Example	(c) Attitude of the International Law Group		(d) Counter measures by the propaganda minister
		1) Judgement by International Law	2) Justification by the laws of war	
7) Maiming or killing of wounded, prisoners, defenseless persons, women and children.	When being taken into the Eger hospital, a seriously injured Sudeten-German motor cyclist shot by Czech soldiers, who said: "The German swine will die anywar."	Killing or injuring one's own subjects does not come under the judgement of international law-@ killing or injuring of defenseless persons, wounded and prisoners of enemy nationality is expressly forbidden by International Law.	In this case, propaganda can only be directed once more against Czech brutality in general. In addition it must be stressed that those injured and killed were subjects who belonged to Czech state only because they were forced to and whose return to the Reich had already been promised.	
8) Use of prisoners of war for war work (road construction, digging trenches, production of munitions, employment in transport service etc)	German prisoners of war are employed under guard as truck drivers for tranferring back raw materials of war.	Judgement by International Law as in Section I para. 8 C 1.	Discretion must be used in reproaches of this kind, for it is possible that similar accusations could be made against us by the opponent if the fact is to be made use of for propaganda purposes, all that can be asserted is that our prisoners wereemployed by the opponent for transporting munitions behind their front lines.	
9) Terrorism measures against national minorities aimed at surpressing and breaking their consciousness of nationality, their religious life, and church and cultural activities.	Officials of the Sudeten Party are arrested and abducted, their homes seized andlooted.	The oppression of one's own subjects in Czechoslovakia does not come under the judgement of International Law, but to the judgement of the Treaty of 1919 regarding t he protection of minorities. In every case, this would have to be consulted in the judgement of the case. In addition see concluding sentence of para. 7C2	The arrest and abduction of officials of the Sudeten Party and robbing and looting them can be branded only as outbreaks of Czech brutality. (similar outbreaks have already been employed for propaganda purposes).	

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PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT C 2
Continued

II. THE OPPONENT'S VIOLATIONS

(a) Incidents	(b) Example	(c) Attitude of the International Law Group		(d) Counter measures by the propaganda minister
		1) Judgement by International Law	2) Justification by the laws of war	
10) Compulsory evacuation of national minorities from their homes, and confiscating their food stuffs, fodder and live-stock etc.	Members of the Polish minority are compulsorily evacuated to the interior of the country in military transports.	A judgement from the standpoint of International Law does not come into the question.	Also, all that can be referred to in propaganda are Czech acts of brutality.	
11) Measures for inciting, arming, and taking control of the the civilian population (Franc-tireur war-fare)	In localities on the Czech-Silesian frontier summones to fight German troops are issued and arms distributed to the civilian population.	Measures for inciting one's own subjects, for arming and conducting guerilla warfare, are allowed. The national warning itself must nost exceed the limits prescribed by International Law (Art. 1 and 2 of the Hague Rules for Land Warfare) i.e. prescribed badges recognizable at a distance bearing arms openly etc.	In this case it would be appropriate to give warnings referring to the civilian warfare of August 1914 in Belgium, which caused the death of thousands of inhabitants. Cunning snipers without uniform and soldiers in civilian clothes, after pretending to be acquiescent, attacked soldiers on the march and in their billets and provoked the reprisals justified by such actions. For use in propaganda, it must be particularly stressed that the above-named conditions justifying a national uprising were not fulfilled and the outward identification marks of armed civilians were lacking.	

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PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT C 2
Continued

II. THE OPPONENT'S VIOLATIONS

(a) Incidents	(b) Example-	(c) Attitude of the International Group		(d) Counter measures by the propaganda minister
		1) Judgement by InternationalLaw	2) Justification by the laws of war	
12) Violation of neutral territorial rights by flying over or bombing it.	Czech airmen drop bombs on the German-Polish frontier destroying the town.hall in Lissa and a church in Rawitsch.	It is contrary to International Law for combat aircraft to fly over the territories of neutral power.	The violation of the neutrality of Polish territory and the destruction of non-military buildings of which the church in Rawitsch is specially protected by International Law, constitute a serious breach of International Law which must be correspondingly use to the full in propaganda. In addition it is necessary to point out that it was obviously a deliberate air raid.	
13) Slanderous propaganda by false reports on themeasures of the German command and on the combat elements, by accounts of atrocities in press reports, news picture broadcasts, etc.	The Melnik Radio Station spreads reports that dum-dum projectiles have been used by German troops Polish newspicture, show falso photographsof this.	Making the enemy co ntemptible is a stratagem of war allowed by international law, even if is so doing many lies and misrepresentations are made. The efforts made by different powers. Germany's amongst them, to form an international agreement to restrict the propaganda of war atrocities, failed in 1932	Remedy in this case is possible only by correcting the reports and better still by counter-attack, in which of course, we can also make use of the spreading of atrocity stories shows that nothing more can be done than to attempt to beat the opponent at his own game or get equal with him in some way or other.	

H1123-0021

H1123 - 0022

PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT C 2
Continued

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION
OF DOCUMENT NO. C 2

19 November 1945

I, CLAREBOULTER, P/O.WRNS. 59549, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; and that the above is a true and correct partial translation of Document No. C2.

CLARE BOULTER,
P/O, WRNS
59549

H1123 - 0023

Exhibit U.S.A. 104
Filed Dec. 3, 1945

PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT C-136
OFFICE OF U. S. CHIEF OF COUNSEL

TOP SECRET
By Officer Only

Berlin, 21 Oct 1938

The Fuehrer
and Supreme Commander of
the Armed Forces

10 copies
3rd copy

OKW L Ia No. 236/38 Top Secret

The future tasks for the Armed Forces and the preparations for the conduct of war resulting from these tasks will be laid down by me in a later Directive.

Until this Directive comes into force the Armed Forces must be prepared at all times for the following eventualities:

1) The securing of the frontiers of Germany and the protection against surprise air attacks.

2) The liquidation of the remainder of Czechoslovakia.

3) The occupation of the Memelland.

1.

Securing the Frontiers of Germany
and Protection against Surprise Air Raids

(Translation omitted)

* * * * * *

2.

Liquidation of the Remainder of Czechoslovakia

It must be possible to smash at any time the remainder of Czechoslovakia if her policy should become hostile towards Germany.

The preparations to be made by the Armed Forces for this contingency will be considerably smaller in extent than those for "Gruen"; they must however, guarantee a continuous and considerably higher state of preparedness, since planned mobilization measures have been dispensed with. The organisation, order of battle and state of readiness of the units earmarked for that purpose are in peace-time to be so arranged for a surprise assault that Czechoslovakia herself will be deprived of all possibility of organised resistance. The object is the swift occupation of Bohemia and Moravia and the cutting off of Slovakia. The preparations should be such, that at the same time "Grenzsicherung West" (The Measures of frontier defence in the West) can be carried out.

The detailed mission of Army and Air Force is as follows:

a. ARMY

The units stationed in the vicinity of Bohemia-Moravia and several motorized divisions are to be earmarked for a surprise type of attack.

C-136

Their number will be determined by the forces remaining in Czechoslovakia; a quick and decisive success must be assured. The assembly and preparations for the attack must be worked out. Forces not needed will be kept in readiness in such a manner that they may be either committed in securing the frontiers or sent after the attack army.

b. AIR FORCE

The quick advance of the German Army is to be assured by an early elimination of the Czech Air Force.

For this purpose the commitment in a surprise attack from peacetime bases has to be prepared. Whether for this purpose still stronger forces may be required can be determined from the development of the military situation in Czechoslovakia only. At the same time a simultaneous assembly of the remainder of the offensive forces against the West must be prepared.

3.

Annexation of the Memel District

(Translation omitted)

Signed: Adolf Hitler

Authenticated
/s/ Keitel

Distribution:

OKH 1st copy
RdL & ObdL 2nd copy
OKM 3rd copy
OKW (including stock)
4th to 10th copy

CERTIFICATE OF PARTIAL TRANSLATION
OF DOCUMENT NO. C-136

24 November 1945

I, Ludwig Hartman, T/4, 37446052, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; and that the above is a correct and true translation of Document C-136.

LUDWIG HARTMAN
T/4, 37446052

C-135

H1123-0024

H1123 - 0025

Exhibit U.S.A. 105
Filed Dec. 3, 1945

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT NO. C-138
OFFICE OF U.S. CHIEF OF COUNSEL

(Stampp-) Supreme Command of the Navy.
AI Op. 121 38
Received 20 XII 38
Enclosures -
TOP SECRET
Only through officers.

(Written by Officer)

OBERKOMMANDO DER WEHRMACHT BERLIN, 17.12.38
Nr. 248/38 WFA/L la. Top Secret
Superior Officers only. 10 Copies
4th Copy

Ref. (Letter of) the Fuehrer and Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces OKW No. 236/38 Top Secret S.O. only L.I a, dated 21/10.38

(Marginal Hand-written Note

1) Chief to
2) Chief in Office -A
3) (Remainder
4) undecipherable)

2. ~~COROLLARY TO DIRECTIVE OF 21.10.38.~~

Reference "Liquidation of the Rest of Czecho-slovakia" the Fuehrer has given the following addi-tional order:

The preparations for this eventuality are to continue on the assumption that no resistance worth mentioning is to be expected.

To the outside world too it must clearly appear that it is merely an action of pacification and not a warlike undertaking.

The action must therefore be carried out by the peace time Armed Forces only, without reinforcements from mobilisation. The necessary readiness for action, especially the ensuring that the most necessary supplies are brought up, must be effected by adjust-ment within the units.

Similarly the units of the Army detailed for the march in must, as a general rule, leave their stations only during the night prior to the crossing of the frontier, and will not previously form up systemati-cally on the frontier. The transport necessary for previous organisation should be limited to the minimum and will be camouflaged as much as possible. Necessary movements if any, of single units and particularly of motorised forces, to the troop-training areas situated near the frontier, must have the approval of the Fuehrer.

The Air Force should take action in accordance with the similar general directives.

For the same reasons the exercise of executive power by the Supreme Command of the Army is laid down only for the newly occupied territory and only for a short period.

Chief of the Supreme Command
of the Armed Forces.

KEITEL.

C-138

H1123 - 0026

Distribution

Supreme Command of the Army - 1 (Copy 1)
Reichminister for Air and C-in C
of the Air Force - 1 (Copy 3)
Supreme Command of the Navy - 1 (Copy 4)
OKW - 7 (Copies 2, 5 - 10)

(The document is initialed by Frick, Schaiewind and Raeder - Translator's note.)

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION
OF DOCUMENT NO. C-138 18 November 1945

I, S/Sgt. Leo Davenport, 32496587, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; and that the above is a true and correct translation of Document No. C-138.

S/Sgt Leo Davenport
32496587

C-138

H1123 - 0027

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT NO. C-138
OFFICE OF U.S. CHIEF OF COUNSEL

(Stampp-) Supreme Command of the Navy.
AI Op. 121 38
Received 20 XII 38
Enclosures -
TOP SECRET
Only through officers.

(Written by Officer)

OBERKOMMANDO DER WEHRMACHT BERLIN, 17.12.38
Nr. 248/38 WFA/L la. Top Secret
Superior Officers only. 10 Copies
4th Copy

Ref. (Letter of) the Fuehrer and Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces OKW No. 236/38 Top Secret S.O. only L,I a, dated 21/10.38

(Marginal Hand-written Note

1) Chief to
2) Chief in Office -A
3) (Remainder
4) undecipherable)

2. ~~COROLLARY TO DIRECTIVE OF 21.10.38.~~

Reference "Liquidation of the Rest of Czecho-slovakia" the Fuehrer has given the following additional order:

The preparations for this eventuality are to continue on the assumption that no resistance worth mentioning is to be expected.

To the outside world too it must clearly appear that it is merely an action of pacification and not a warlike undertaking.

The action must therefore be carried out by the peace time Armed Forces only, without reinforcements from mobilisation. The necessary readiness for action, especially the ensuring that the most necessary supplies are brought up, must be effected by adjustment within the units.

Similarly the units of the Army detailed for the march in must, as a general rule, leave their stations only during the night prior to the crossing of the frontier, and will not previously form up systematically on the frontier. The transport necessary for previous organisation should be limited to the minimum and will be camouflaged as much as possible. Necessary movements if any, of single units and particularly of motorised forces, to the troop-training areas situated near the frontier, must have the approval of the Fuehrer.

The Air Force should take action in accordance with the similar general directives.

For the same reasons the exercise of executive power by the Supreme Command of the Army is laid down only for the newly occupied territory and only for a short period.

Chief of the Supreme Command
of the Armed Forces.

KEITEL.

C-138

H1123 - 0028

Distribution

Supreme Command of the Army - 1 (Copy 1)
Reichminister for Air and C-in C
of the Air Force - 1 (Copy 3)
Supreme Command of the Navy - 1 (Copy 4)
OKW - 7 (Copies 2, 5 - 10)

(The document is initialed by Frick, Schaiewind and Raeder - Translator's note.)

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION
OF DOCUMENT NO. C-138 18 November 1945

I, S/Sgt. Leo Davenport, 32496587, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; and that the above is a true and correct translation of Document No. C-138.

S/Sgt Leo Davenport
32496587

C-138

PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT NO. C-175
OFFICE OF U S CHIEF OF COUNSEL

SEC-24.10/C-175

(Translated Extracts)

Top Secret

Berlin, 24.6.1937
S.O. only
(Stamp) Access only through an Officer.

The Reich Minister for War
and Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces.

No. 55/37 Most Secret, S.O. only L Ia

4 Copies
2nd Copy.

Subject: "Directive 1937/38"

Reference: W.A. 36/36 S.O. Only L Ia of 26.6.36.

(Ink note -
AI op. 34/37 Gkdos Chefs.
Received 25.6.)

Written by an Officer.

Outgoing documents of a fundamental nature, connected with this matter are to be written by an officer.

Enclosed "Directive for Unified Preparation of the Armed Forces for War" comes into force from 1.7.1937. At the same time the "Directive for the unified preparation for a possible war by the Armed Forces Office (W.A.) and the Army, Navy and Air Force" (W.A. 36/36 S.O. only L Ia of 26.6.36.) is superseded and is to be returned to the Armed Forces Office (L Ia) with covering letter by 10.7.37. (Marginal remark in ink: - Iop. 24/36)

I request you to let me know, by 1.9.37 the result of the deliberations which are to be instituted in accordance with part 3 of the directive.

v Blomberg

Distribution:

Ob.d.H. (C. in C. Army) 1 Covering letter (Copy 1), 1 Directive (Copy 1)
Ob.d.M. (C. in C. Navy) 1 " " (Copy 2), 1 " (Copy 2)
R.d.L. and Ob.d.L. (Reich Minister for Air and C.inC. Air Force)
1 Covering Letter (Copy 3) 1 Directive (Copy 3)
W.A. (L) (Ordnance Dept.) (6) 1 Covering letter (Copy 4) 2 Directives (Copies 4&5)

(Remark in ink): MI op. 34.37 Gkdos Chefs.

Page 1

The Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces,
55/37 Most Secret S.O. Only L Ia

Berlin, 24 June 37.

5 copies
Copy No. 2.
(Stamp)
Top Secret
Access Only through an Officer

Written by an Officer

(Ink note - AI op 34/37 Gkds Chefs)

C-175

H1123-0029

H1123-0030

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT NO C.175

Directive

For the unified preparation of the Armed Forces for war

(Valid from 1.7.37 until presumably 30.9.1938)

P.2

Contents

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Part 2.	Probable Wars (Kriegsfalle) (Strategic	9 to 17
Part 3.	Special Preparations Concentrations)	18 to 22

P.3

Part 1

P.4

General Guiding Principles

1). The general political situation justifies the supposition that Germany need not consider an attack from any side. Indications of this are, in addition to the lack of desire for war in almost all nations, particularly the Western Powers, the lack of preparedness for war of a number of States and of Russia in particular.

The intention to unleash a European War is held just as little by Germany.

Nevertheless the politically fluid world situation, which does not preclude surprising incidents, demands constant preparedness for war on the part of the German Armed Forces.

a). to counter attacks at any time

b). to make possible the military exploitation of politically favorable opportunities should they occur.

Preparations of the Armed Forces for a possible war in the Mobilization Period 1937/38 must be made with this in mind. They must therefore be arranged to meet various possibilities and are subdivided into:

a). General preparations (vide Section 2)

b). Work, in the form of plans for strategic concentration, on hypothetical wars (Kriegsfalle) which, owing to their probability stand high on the list. In this, subordinate establishments should also play a part. (See Section 3)

c). Special preparations in the shape of dissertations and deliberations which are generally confined, however, to the High Commands (Special preparations vide Section 4).

2). General preparations cover the following:

a). The permanent preparedness of the German Armed Forces for mobilization, even before the completion of rearmament and full preparedness for war.

b). Further work on "Mobilization without public announcement" in order to put the Armed Forces in a position to be able to begin a war suddenly which will take the enemy by surprise both as regards strength and time of attack.

c). Work on the transport of the bulk of the serving army from East Prussia to the Reich.

C-175

d). Preparatory measures in case German territory is violated suddenly by a foreign power with hostile intent...."

(Full details follow of limits of authority of Local Commanders in this event)

P.6 "3). Among the probable wars (Kriegsfalle) for which concentration plans are being drafted are:

I). War on two fronts with the main struggle (Schwerpunkt) in the West (Strategic Concentration "Rot")

II). War on two fronts with the main struggle in the South East (Strategic Concentration "Grün")

For details, see Part 2 of the Directive.

4). Special preparations are to be made against the following eventualities:

I). Armed intervention against Austria (Sonderfall Otto) - (Ink note - dealt with)

P.7 II). Warlike complications with Red Spain (Sonderfall Richard)

III). England, Poland, Lithuania take part in a war against us. (Sonderfall "Erweiterung - i.e. Extension of - Rot/Grün")"

The following paragraphs state that the assumption is to be made that Germany will have no allies at first anyway, and that liaison must be carried out between branches on the basis of this directive which covers only the opening stages of a war.

P.8 "The Directive for the conduct of war itself and the designation of war aims which depend on the political and thus also on the general military and economic situation at the beginning of a war, will come through me from the Fuehrer and Supreme Commander.

I Blomberg"

P.9 "Part 2.

Probable Wars (Kriegsfalle)"

(Strategic Concentrations)

"I). War on Two Fronts with the main struggle in the West. (Strategic Concentration "Rot")"

Suppositions regarding the attitude of various countries are detailed. The opening of war may be in the nature of a surprise attack by the French Army and Air Force.

The German Armed Forces must be prepared to employ their main strength in the West. Details of tasks of (a) Army, (b) Navy and (c) Air Force are given.

"II). (The whole of II is crossed out in pencil, and a handwritten note reads - "II is superseded by Ob.d.W. 94/37 dated 7.12.37" - translator's note)

War on two fronts with the main struggle in the South East (Strategic Concentration "Grün")

1). Suppositions. The war in the East can begin with a surprise German operation against Czechoslovakia in order to parry the imminent attack of a superior enemy coalition.

C-175

H1123-0031

The necessary conditions to justify such an action politically and in the eyes of international law must be created beforehand."

Possible enemies and neutrals are then detailed.

P.15 "2). The task of the German Armed Forces is to make their preparations in such a way that the bulk of all forces can break into Czechoslovakia quickly, by surprise, and with the greatest force, while in the West the minimum strength is provided as rear cover for this attack.

The aim and object of this surprise attack by the German Armed Forces should be to eliminate from the very beginning and for the duration of the war, the threat by Czechoslovakia to the rear of the operations in the West, and to take from the Russian Air Force the most substantial portion of its operational base in Czechoslovakia. This must be done by the defeat of the enemy armed forces and the occupation of Bohemia and Moravia."

Section 3 details the tasks of Army, Air Force and Navy.

P.18 "Part 3.

P.19 Special Preparations.

The following 'special cases' are to be considered inside the High Commands generally without consulting outside authorities.

I). (The whole of I is struck out and there is a marginal note - "superseded".)

Sonderfall "Otto"

"Armed intervantion in Austria in the event of her restoring the Monarchy."

The object of this operation will be to compel Austria by armed force to give up a restoration.

Making use of the domestic political dissension of the Austrian people, there will be a march to this end in the general direction of Vienna and any resistance will be broken."

"Otto" is to be prepared as an isolated action although "Grün" may develop from it.

P.20

II). Sonderfall "Richard"

"Warlike complications with Red Spain".

In the Spanish Civil War lies the danger that, through accidental or provoked incidents, conflict may arise between Germany and Red Spain which can lead to a state of war between the two governments.

Preparatory deliberations to meet this eventuality are to be instituted only by the Navy. For the Army and Air Force it will remain a matter of assisting White Spain with material and personnel, as has been the procedure up to now. Sections of the Air Force may possibly be placed under the command of the Navy.

P.21

III). Sonderfall "Erweiterung Rot/Grün.

The military and political starting point used as a basis for strategic concentration plans "Rot and Grün" may be rendered more acute if either England, Poland or Lithuania, or all three countries mentioned, join the side of our opponents from the beginning of the war.

Thereon our military position would be worsened to an unbearable, even hopeless, extent. The political leaders will therefore do everything to keep these countries neutral, above all England and Poland.

H1123-0033

Nevertheless deliberations are to be instituted by way of supplement to the strategic concentration plans "Rot" and "Grün" to meet the eventuality of the failure of this intention of the political leadership.

The following premises are to be the basis for the deliberations:

a). England
England will employ all her available economic and military resources against us. She will at first support France with sea and air forces and eventually try to win Belgium and possibly Holland too as bases.

P.22 b). Poland
That Poland should take part in an opening of hostilities against us, if possible at the side of Russia, is, in view of the present political situation, more than improbable. Should it nevertheless come to this, then Poland's land concentration against Germany would take place in a form which is, in essence, known to us, in order to gain first of all East Prussia and, in conjunction with Czechoslovakia, Silesia.
With her Air Force she will, in addition to using parts of it against East Prussia, take part in a joint Czech and Russian attack against the Reich, and at sea she will cooperate with the Russian Fleet to cut communications between East Prussia and the Reich.

c). Lithuania
Lithuania will, above all, serve the Russian Air Force as an advanced base. An attack on land need only be reckoned with in combination with Poland or after the arrival of Russian Army forces in Lithuania.

- -

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION
OF DOCUMENT NO C-175

18 November 1945

I, BETTY D. RICHARDSON, P.O., hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the German and English languages; and that the above is a correct and true translation of Document No. C-175.

BETTY D. RICHARDSON
P.O.

C-175

H1123 - 0034

Exhibit U.S.A 112
Filed Dec. 5, 1945

BRITISH NO. D-571
OFFICE OF U.S. CHIEF OF COUNSEL

Further Correspondence Respecting Czechoslovakia

(15869)

[C 3925/7/12]

No. 22

Mr. Newton to Viscount Halifax - (Received March 24.)

(No. 129)
My Lord,

Prague, March 21, 1939.

I HAVE the honour to inform you of an account which I have just received of the events leading up to the declaration of the independence of Slovakia. Hitherto, to me in Prague at any rate, these events have been shrouded in obscurity. The following report, which has been given to me by a reliable friend with excellent sources of information, shows how involuntary was the declaration of independence, and throws a further lurid light on the gangster methods employed by the Reich to obtain its ends in Czecho-Slovakia.

2. On M. Sidor's return to Bratislava, after he had been entrusted with the Government in place of Mgr. Tiso, Herr Buerckel, Herr Seyss-Inquart and five German generals came at about 10 p.m. on the evening of Saturday, the 11th March, into a Cabinet meeting in progress at Bratislava, and told the Slovak Government that they should proclaim the independence of Slovakia. When M. Sidor showed hesitation, Herr Buerckel took him on one side and explained that Herr Hitler had decided to settle the question of Czecho-Slovakia definitely. Slovakia ought, therefore, to proclaim her independence because Herr Hitler would otherwise disinterest himself in her fate. M. Sidor thanked Herr Buerckel for this information, but said that he must discuss the situation with the Government at Prague.

3. Early on the following Sunday morning Mgr. Tiso requested that a meeting of the Cabinet should be held at 8 a.m. M. Sidor agreed, but said that the meeting must not take place in the building ordinarily used because that was guarded by the German Ordner and was also too close to the bridge across the Danube. The Cabinet accordingly met in his private apartment, when M. Sidor proposed that the Government should move to Trnava, since Bratislava was too much under German control. The chief of police, M. Klinovski (who has since been appointed Slovak Minister at Warsaw), thereupon reported that he could not accept responsibility for this move, as the road to Trnava was guarded by the German Ordner. At the same time news was received that an attempt against M. Sidor was in preparation, so the Cabinet went to hold their meeting in the offices of the newspaper Slovak.

4. Mgr. Tiso attended there, and said that he had received a telegram by the hand of Herr Buerckel inviting him to go at once to see the Führer in Berlin. He had to accept this invitation because Herr Buerckel had informed him that otherwise the two German divisions on the other side of the Danube would occupy Bratislava and the Hungarians would be authorised to seize not only Ruthenia, as had already been agreed to by Berlin, but also Eastern Slovakia. Mgr. Tiso explained that he proposed to leave by train early Monday morning and did not, therefore, expect to be back before Tuesday evening. This would have given time for Prague and Warsaw to be consulted, but so soon as Mgr. Tiso arrived in Vienna that day in preparation for an early departure the following morning, he was escorted into an aeroplane and informed that he was to proceed in it to Berlin at once, as Herr Hitler awaited him.

H1123-0035

5. While the Cabinet was in session on the following Monday afternoon Mgr. Tiso telephoned to them in German saying that he was speaking in Berlin from the office of the Führer, who was attended also by Herr von Ribbentrop, Baron von Neurath and General Brauchitsch. He had orders to request the Cabinet to summon a meeting of the Slovak Parliament for the following Tuesday morning at 10 a.m. So soon as he was satisfied that his message had been understood he rang off. Mgr. Tiso must have returned by aeroplane during the night, as he arrived back in Bratislava at 4 a.m. on Tuesday morning. He told the Slovak Ministers that he had been received first by Herr von Ribbentrop and then by Herr Hitler. Herr von Ribbentrop had informed him that Herr Hitler was considerably roused because M. Sidor's Government appeared to be co-operating with the Czechs. This was contrary to the intention of the Vienna Award, which had been based on the principle of nationality and therefore of Slovak independence. The Führer, concluded Herr von Ribbentrop, will tell you the rest. Herr Hitler subsequently expressed himself somewhat as follows:-

> "At Munich I did not take Bohemia and Moravia into the German territorial sphere ('Lebensraum'). I left the Czechs only another five months, but for the Slovaks I have some sympathy. I approved the Award of Vienna in the conviction that the Slovaks would separate themselves from the Czechs and declare their independence, which would be under German protection. That is why I have refused Hungarian demands in respect of Slovakia. As the Slovaks appear to be agreeing with the Czechs it looks as though they have not respected the spirit of the Vienna Award. This I cannot tolerate. To-morrow at mid-day I shall begin military action against the Czechs, which will be carried out by General Brauchitsch" (who was present and to whom he pointed). "Germany," he said, "does not intend to take Slovakia into her 'Lebensraum,' and that is why you must either immediately proclaim the independence of Slovakia or I will disinterest myself in her fate. To make your choice I give you until to-morrow mid-day, when the Czechs will be crushed by the German steam-roller."

Herr Hitler then dismissed Mgr. Tiso, saying that he could arrange any other matters with his staff.

6. While Mgr. Tiso was informing the Slovak Cabinet of these communications at about 8 a.m. on the Tuesday morning, the Deputies began to assemble. Meanwhile, it was found that communication with Prague had been interrupted. At the meeting of the Deputies Mgr. Tiso read the text of the law proclaiming the independence of Slovakia, which had been given to him by Herr von Ribbentrop already drafted in Slovak. When the Deputies wanted to discuss the matter the leader of the German minority, Herr Karmasin, warned M. Sidor that the German occupation of Moravska-Ostrava would begin that day at noon, and that he should be careful lest Bratislava suffered similar treatment. The Government thereupon left the decision to the Deputies, who protested in dismay and great distress at this treatment, but finally decided that they had no option but to vote in favour of the declaration of independence.

7. I have sent a copy of this despatch to His Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires in Berlin.

I have, &c.
BASIL NEWTON.

H1123-0036

Exhibit U.S.A. 113
Filed Dec. 5, 1945

BRITISH NO. D-572
OFFICE OF U.S. CHIEF OF COUNSEL

Further Correspondence Respecting Czechoslovakia

(15869)

[C 3973/19/18] Enclosure in No. 23.

Consul Pares to Mr. Newton.

(No.10) Bratislava, March 20,1939

Sir,

I HAVE the honour to report that whatever may have been the origins of the crisis which led up to the declaration of Slovak independence last Tuesday - and there are many persons who are convinced that the Czech coup on the night of Thursday, the 9th March, was the result of German prompting - it has been obvious here that Germany played the most important part in the development of events after the crisis had begun. On the afternoon of Friday the German party held a large meeting here in which the speakers bitterly attacked the Prague "Bolshevists." The sympathy of the party with the Hlinka guard, then in opposition to the Government of Sivak and Teplansky, was openly displayed by hanging out the flag of the Hlinka guard from the balcony of the headquarters of the German party between those of the German party itself. Yesterday one of the semi-official organs of the Government, Slovenska Pravda, printed a leading article in which it was frankly stated that Karmasin was with Dr. Tiso, Durcansky, Sidor and one of Mach's close associates during the first discussions held by the Slovak autonomists on Friday morning after the Czech coup. How little the Slovak population of Bratislava interested itself in the first day's events was indicated by the small number of persons who took part in the first demonstrations during the afternoon. The participants were an evil-looking rabble of the lowest possible type equipped with heavy poles, and the speakers who addressed them from the balcony of the Slovak National Theatre were little better. During the evening the Hlinka guard organised processions composed of less disreputable elements, mainly students and young men.

2. Besides affording Durcansky a refuge in Vienna and allowing him to incite the Hlinka guard to revolt against Sidor's Government in a speech broadcast by the Vienna wireless station, the German party are believed to have protected Murgas in their headquarters when he was fleeing from the Government's agents. The car of the German Consul here is said to have been used to convey Durcansky to Vienna in order to enable him to escape arrest when crossing the bridge-head into Germany. On Saturday, when Sidor's Government was trying to reconcile the various Opposition groups, the German party did their utmost to weaken him by refusing to recognise the Government, and by assisting its opponents in the Hlinka guard, with publicity for their denunciations and incitements to disobedience. During the afternoon arms and ammunition, believed to be of German type and brought over the bridge and even across the river were distributed to the German organisation F.S. (Freiwilliger Schützdienst) who then occupied the principal Government building together with some members of the Hlinka guard. An English journalist who visited the building said that the proportion of Germans to Slovaks was about twelve to one. An endeavour was also made by the German party to arrange a strike in local factories as I have heard from the manager of a mill here, but without success.

3. But it is doubtful if these efforts to create confusion and assist the Germanophil extremists would alone have produced results. The decisive factor was undoubtedly Dr. Tiso's visit to Berlin. I have talked with several Slovak-officials, and also with one of Dr. Tiso's intimate advisers, and have been given to understand that the

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proposals made by Herr Hitler were practically an ultimatum. Dr. Tiso was told that if Slovakia did not declare her independence Germany would leave her to the tender mercies of Poland and Hungary. It is certain that on Monday night, before the Slovak Diet met, German journalists, who doubtless obtained their information from the best sources, were announcing that the decision regarding Slovak independence could not be altered by the paltry deliberations of the Slovak Diet. Sano Mach, in a speech delivered the same evening, practically promised that Slovak independence would be declared the next day. I have even heard that there was no debate in the Diet since the Deputies felt that they had no choice but to accept the terms offered them. A speech made by Dr. Tiso last Sunday, in which he said that his journey to Berlin "saved Slovakia from certain ruin," appears to confirm the interpretation of events given above.

4. The reception given to the declaration on Tuesday by the people of Bratislava was lukewarm indeed. There were no manifestations of joy and the townsfolk went about their normal business as if nothing had happened. This lack of interest was already apparent on the previous evening when I had listened to Mach's speech. The majority of the audience who collected to hear Mach announce that independence would be declared were Germans and some of the Slovaks present actually grumbled to themselves or heckled. In all, the crowd cannot have numbered more than 1,500 persons, which is a small figure for such an occasion in a town of 150,000 inhabitants. The methods by which the meeting was summoned are interesting. Sano Mach had been brought back from his confinement in Moravia by members of the German party and immediately after his return he had a conversation in my hotel with two of Karmasin's principal advisers. The leaflets announcing that he and Tuka would speak in the evening were printed in Slovak, but bore the name of a German firm of printers in Bratislava.

5. The German party has been implicated in one at least of the explosions which occurred on Monday evening after Mach's speech. The municipal commission which conducted the official enquiry found that the bomb used was of German manufacture, and a member of the German party who lives in Engerau across the river was arrested in connexion with the outrage.

6. A week after the declaration of independence the inhabitants of Bratislava are still unable to show great enthusiasm for the present state of affairs. The general impression is one of apathy or pessimism. The apprehensions caused by the appearance of German troops in Slovakia have not yet been delayed. Last Saturday night a manifestation was arranged at which Tuka and Mach spoke. Apart from the school children and members of the youth organisations of the Hlinka Guard, who were ordered to appear, the attendance was small. Most of the crowd seemed to have come out of curiosity which seem to have been quickly dispelled since in half an hour nearly all those who were free to go away had disappeared, leaving about 3,000 behind.

7. I noticed that Sidor, who has practically resigned from the Cabinet, and is viewed with extreme disfavour by the Germanophils, received a far warmer ovation at this meeting than even Mach or Dr. Tiso. His name was not included on the list of speakers announced beforehand, but he spoke just before the end. The crowd demanded that he should not be made to leave Bratislava, but the truth seems to be that though he wanted to go north to Zilina he was ordered to remain by the Government.

8. The real power in the Government seems to be in the hands of a very small group. All the recent negotiations in Vienna have been carried on by a small consortium composed of Tuka, Durcansky and Mach who is not even a member of the Cabinet. Dr. Tiso usually goes with them, but it seems doubtful whether his voice counts for very much.

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The Cabinet, as constituted at first, seemed to be a Cabinet of concentration and reconciliation, but Sidor has now withdrawn and Sivak, who must certainly be equally if not more compromised in the eyes of his extremist colleagues, does not attend the meetings of the Cabinet very frequently. Pruzinsky is reported to be persona non grata with the Germans. The result is that the Germanophils now have the upper hand.

9. There are indications that this group may be embarking on a policy which will cause some embarrassment to the Polish and Hungarian Governments. Mach in his speech on Saturday night made some references to the Slovaks now living in Hungary, while yesterday's Slovak prints a telegram sent to Murgas by the commune of Javorina (occupied by Poland last November) in which he is entreated to set them free at once.

I have, &c.
P. PARES.

DOCUMENTS

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I. Review

1. The fact that the National-Socialist movement and its struggle for internal power were the preparatory stage of the outer liberation from the bonds of the Dictate of Versailles is not one on which I need enlarge in this circle. I should like however to mention at this point how clearly all thoughtful regular soldiers realize what an important part has been played by the National-Socialist movement in re-awakening the will to fight ("WEHRWILLEN"); in nurturing fighting strength ("WEHRKRAFT") and in rearming the German people. In spite of all the virtue inherent in it, the numerically small REICHSWEHR would never have been able to cope with this task, if only because of its own restricted radius of action. Indeed, what the Führer aimed at - and has so happily been successful in bringing about - was the fusion of these two forces.

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2. The seizure of power in its turn had meant in the first place the restoration of fighting sovereignty ("WEHRHOHEIT") (conscription, occupation of the Rhineland) and re-armament with special emphasis being laid on the creation of a modern armoured and air arm.

3. The Austrian "Anschluss", in its turn, brought with it not only the fulfilment of an old national aim but also had the effect both of reinforcing our fighting strength and of materially improving our strategic position. Whereas up till then the territory of Czechoslovakia had projected in a most menacing way right into Germany (a wasp waist in the direction of France and an air base for the Allies, in particular Russia), Czechoslovakia herself was now enclosed by pincers. Its own strategic position had now become so unfavourable that she was bound to fall a victim to any attack pressed home with rigour before effective aid from the WEST could be expected to arrive.

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This possibility of aid was furthermore made more difficult by the construction of the WEST WALL, which, in contra-distinction to the MAGINOT Line, was not a measure based on debility and resignation but one intended to afford rear cover for an active policy in the EAST.

4. The bloodless solution of the Czech conflict in the autumn of 1938 and spring of 1939 and the annexation of Slovakia rounded off the territory of Greater Germany in such a way that it now became possible to consider the Polish problem on the basis of more or less favourable strategic premises.

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5. This brings me to the actual outbreak of the present war, and the question which next arises is whether the moment for the struggle with Poland - in itself unavoidable - was favourably selected or not. The answer to this question is all the less in doubt since the opponent - after all not inconsiderable in himself - collapsed unexpectedly quickly, and the Western Powers who were his friends, while they did declare war on us and form a second front, yet for the rest made no use of the possib lities open to them of snatching the initiative from our hands. Concerning the course taken by

NOTE: Entire Document L-172 is in Document Book for "1933-1936: Preparation for Aggression."

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PS DOCUMENTS

Exhibit U.S.A. 84
Filed Dec. 3, 1945

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 375-PS
OFFICE OF U S CHIEF OF COUNSEL

General Staff of the 5th Section
(German Air Force)
(Genstb. 5. Abteilung)
No. 28/38. TOP SECRET (G-2)
For Commanders only (CHEF-SACHE)

Berlin, 25 August 1938

THROUGH OFFICER COURIER ONLY

TOP SECRET

Subject: Extended Case Green (GRUEN - code for Czechoslovakia)
Estimate of the Situation with Special Consideration of the Enemy.

A) Initial Political Situation:

1) The basic assumption is that France will declare war during the Case Green.

It is presumed that France will only decide upon war if active military assistance by Great Britain is definitely assured.

2) The Soviet Union will probably side immediately with the Western Powers.

3) It is not expected for the moment that other states will intervene against Germany.

The Dutch-Belgian area assumes in this connection much more importance for the prevention of the war in Western Europe than during the World War. This mainly as an advanced base for the air war.

4) The United States of America will immediately support the fight of the Western Powers with strong ideological and economic means.

5) Italy, Nationalistic-Spain, Hungary and Japan are regarded as benevolent neutrals.

B) Initial Military Situation:

1) The French-Czechoslovakian treaty provides for military assistance only in the case of an unprovoked attack. At least an agreement of the French and British views as to the legal aspect has to be achieved. If only for political reasons we have to consider the 2nd day as the earliest possible day of war on a European scale. In case of a 24 hour ultimatum it would be the 3rd day.

2) It is further assumed that the actual commencement of hostilities will only take place after the French armed forces have been tactically deployed. That means within the fourth to eighteenth day. This to

a) use the deployment as a means of political pressure,
b) and to be able to deploy the troops undisturbed.

3) The war aim of the Entente Powers is to be considered as the overcoming of Germany through attacking its war economy. With other words through a long war.

4) The following are possible methods of operation for the French army:

a) to man and hold the Maginot-line,
b) to march into Belgium and the Netherlands at the beginning of the war with the aim of occupying the Ruhr-territory.

All suppositions support the first alternative.

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5) The French Air Force will probably attack both economic and German Air Force targets as well as military and communication objectives. Thus no concentrated effect will be achieved at any one place.

6) The French Navy will probably cooperate through operations with the British sea power to supplement the North Sea blockade. The aim will be the maintenance of naval predominance in the Atlantic and the Western Mediterranean.

7) The British Air Force is assumed to be committed from English bases against the Rhine-Westphalia industrial area and the North Sea ports. Sooner or later the Belgium-Dutch neutrality will be violated.

A camouflaged aircraft reporting network in Belgium and the Netherlands has to be taken into account from the first day of the war. No transfer to France on the part of the British Air Force need be expected at the beginning of the war. Equally it is held to be out of the question for any large parts of the British armed forces to be transferred to France.

8) Provision seems to have been made for the use of North French ground organizations during the course of the war at least by part of the attacking British Air Forces.

The existence of a relatively large number of civilian airfields in Belgium and the Netherlands seem to indicate the intention of moving advanced elements of the air defences of London (light fighters and reconnaissance aircraft) into this area after a while.

9) Thanks to the expected neutrality of Eire, the active participation of Soviet Russia will be largely restricted to the prosecution of the war in the Baltic.

Furthermore, air attacks against East Prussia and the Baltic coast are to be anticipated and occasional raids on Berlin are regarded as possible.

10) The basic assumption in respect to our own prosecution of the war is that two war plane air forces will be available in the West at the beginning of hostilities. There will be five war plane air forces in all after three to four weeks. The aim will be to bring about a decision by the defeat of the Western powers.

C) Task of the German Air Force:

The German Air Force has at present not all the forces necessary to seek a decision by attacking the enemy's war economy with the aid of the navy. The prime responsibility of the German Air Force in the present situation must be to help the armed forces immobilized opposite a fortified front to achieve operational freedom.

D) Enemy War Plane Forces:

1) The French Air Force will have on the 1st October some 640 war planes in the front line units on French home territory of which not more than 120 to 150 attain a modern standard of performance. Available reserves total about 320 obsolete war planes.

There are another 150 obsolete war planes in North Africa for use in colonial war or against Southern Italy.

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It is assumed that the French home war plane units will be deployed for the most part in the known areas of Eastern France at the beginning of the war. They will be employed against various targets (air force targets, industrial and communications targets, military installations, Army targets) in the operational area as well as in depth according to the capabilities of their personnel and equipments.

Any transfer of more than insignificant forces to Czechoslovakia is regarded as outside the range of practical possibilities, as is the concentrated commitment of large formations against the armies fighting in Czechoslovakia.

2) The British war plane force will consist of some 850 war planes on October 1st of which 300 to 350 can be regarded as modern. The majority of the front line aircraft as well as some 200 to 300 reserve aircraft can be described as only conditionally serviceable in the face of modern defences.

Due to their inadequate range the present British war plane formations are not in a position to carry on a vigorous air war from their home bases only without violating sovereign Dutch or Belgian territory.

Even if Dutch and Belgian neutrality is ignored only the modern war planes need be taken into account as a serious threat to the Ruhr.

A transfer of British Air Forces to Northern France is to be expected at the eatliest, after several weeks of war.

If the French Army Command decides to march through Belgium and the Netherlands the immediate influx of British fighters into this area becomes probable.

Heavy attacks against the North Sea ports by carrier based aircraft need not be reckoned with:

a) because the equipment and training of these aircraft is designed to fit them for specific naval tasks;
b) because aircraft carriers, due to their vulnerability, will be committed in the North Sea only for very pressing reasons, which do not exist in this instance.

On the other hand occasional attacks by coastal aircraft forces against targets on the North Sea coast are feasible and probable.

D) Enemy Aircraft Industries:

1) The first aircraft put into mass production as a result of the expansion of French military aircraft industry during the years 1934 to 1938 are at present rolling off the assembly lines. At the moment the aero-engine factories are lagging behind with deliveries.

In August 1938 forty single-engined and thirty twin-engined military aircraft were delivered to the French Air Forces. It must be assumed that these figures will be increased during the coming months to 100 aircraft a month, 50 single-engined and 50 twin-engined.

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A further moderate increase in production is possible and to be expected from spring 1939 on.

2) In Great Britain existing plants have been extended since 1936 with the aid of State funds and the effect on the armament situation will begin to make itself felt increasingly from 1939 on. If the present plans will be observed the program will be completely carried out by 1941.

Present production (August 1938) is estimated at some 200 aircraft of all types (Commercial and military aircraft) a month. It must be noted that the import of training aircraft and long-range reconniassance aircraft from the United States and Canada is intended.

3) North American aircraft industry (United States and Canada) is at the moment fully occupied. No notable expansion has yet taken place but is possible. A possible expansion would have no pratical effects in 1939.

250 aircraft of all types (commercial and military) a month for the home and foreign market may be stated as the present prodocution rate. Appreciably more aircraft engines are manufactured.

F) Position with regard to preparation of target data:

1) It is proposed to supply units on or before 5th October with the following target data for France:

a) Air Force (airfields, air parks and equipment depots, airforce fueldumps). About 90% of existing installations are included.

b) Fuel Supply.
100% of the refineries are included and 60% of the total storage capacity (including the above-mentioned Air Force fuel dumps).

c) Ammunition Supply.
An estimated 70% to 80% of the total productive capacity of explosive and gunpowder factories and 17 large supply dumps (main ammunition depots and ammunition depots, Army and Air Force) are included.

d) Power Supply.
All the large power plants are included.

e) Key Industries.
In particular the Paris aero-engine industry has been included.

f) Targets in the Paris area.

Further target data, particularly for essential industrial targets, are accumulating currently.

In addition, command authorities will receive maps of the tactical situation and of target groups on or before the above-mentioned date.

2) Basic target maps of British ground organization (airfields) are approximately 90% ready. They have been passed on to Air Force Group 2 for printing and for the adding of sectional excerpts of maps. They have been ordered to be ready by 15 September.

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As far as essential industrial targets are concerned, work has been carried out on the food and crude oil supply systems and docks in the London and Hull areas (basic target maps, sector maps, partially covered also by aerial and ground panoramas).

These will be reproduced after the ground organization targets have been printed. They cannot be expected to be ready before 20 October.

Tactical maps and target maps of London and Hull will be issued to the command authorities prior to the end of September.

3) The basic target maps of the Air Force objectives for Belgium and the Netherlands are ready for printing. Reproduction and distribution (including sector maps) will probably be possible only during October.

4) In general it must be emphasized that contrary to Czechoslovakia there are relatively very few aerial photographs of Western European targets available.

G) Recommandations for our own Prosecution of the Air War.

1) A negative answer must be given to the question as to whether it is appropriate to postpone the massed commitment of our striking power until the spring. The balance of force would probably have altered by that time to our disadvantage due to further progress of French and British aircraft industry and imports from North America.

2) From a climatological point of view the autumn offers our forces greater prospect of success than the enemy, due to our relatively good training in instrument flying.

3) As our forces must be regarded as small, even if we accept the figure of 5 air forces as a basis, the task can only be fulfilled by concentrated blows directed against the enemy's weakest points.

For this purpose choice of targets must be made with the greatest care and must be restricted to the decisive points.

4) As long as only 2 air forces are available prosecution of the war on the basis of gaining time is advisable. This is seen in attacks against the enemy air forces in the airfields where they are deployed in Eastern France, with a view to prevent complete aerial predominance by the enemy.

Attacks on Paris should only be carried out as a reprisal, especially as the air defences in and around Paris are strong. Such attacks must however be possible at all times.

Direct cooperation with the Army is only considered desirable if the enemy deploys or advances in such strength as to endanger the Western German fortifications by a break through or outglanking.

Support for the Army will be supplied in this case by attacks:

a) against transports, troop concentrations and movements,
b) against enemy war planes, should these cooperate with his armed forces in great numbers.

Should there be danger of a penetration of the Western fortifications, a further measure would be to concentrate fighter forces scattered in the West on the decisive ground front.

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Attacks against objectives in the British Isles are to be regarded as unjustifiable in view of the small numbers of our combat forces.

Should the enemy ramin on the defensive in the ground war and withdraw with his war plane forces to the West there will be no urgent reason for us to commit our own forces. In this case it would seem better to save our forces until reinforcements arrive.

5) As soon as strong forces are freed for the prosecution of the war in the West, operations in the air must be directed without delay at reaching a decision.

It would seem possible to achieve this end by attacking:

a) fuel refineries and dumps;
b) gunpowder and high explosive factories, main ammunition depots and ammunition depots;
c) the most important parks handling imports which are also centers for the transfer and reshipment of fuel and ammunition.

Thus the enemy's fuel and ammunition supply system for his ground and air forces would be paralyzed or at least curtailed to an intolerable degree.

Assuming that the individual groups of targets are one after the other successively attacked until eliminated it would appear that by the use of 5 air forces a sufficient measure of success could be achieved to enable the Army to break through the enemy's fortified front.

No large-scale operations against targets in the British Isles could be carried out in addition to this task.

Everything should however be prepared to make reprisal attacks against London possible at any time.

Considering the strength of the air defences in and around London success in such attacks is only likely if strong forces are committed.

In addition occasional harassing attacks against targets in South and Southeast England may be worthy of consideration, particularly if the weather enforces a lull in France. A secondary aim of such attacks would be to pin down strong defence forces in Great Britain.

6) Should still stronger war plane forces - at least 3 air forces - be available after the French targets had been successfully attacked, they might be committed to advantage in attacks against the food supply of Great Britain, notably of London. It must however be emphasized that it is only regarded as possible to achieve decisive successes if considerably stronger forces are committed and if the western ports are also subjected to air attacks.

:) Requests to Armed Forces Supreme Command, Army and Navy:

1) The use of the Condor Legion against the refineries in Bordeaux and possible against those in Marseilles would valuably supplement our attacks of the French fuel supply system.

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2) The ammunition situation has to be rendered precarious for the enemy as soon as possible. Therefore the armed forces should accompany the air attacks against the ammunition supplies with synchronized offensive thrusts. Special attention should be directed towards the ammunition supplies stored in the Maginot line itself and accessible to air attack.

3) The Navy should hamper imports through the French Atlantic ports to as great an extent as is compatible with its other tasks and the forces available. Especially for some 2-3 months at the beginning of the attack against the fuel supply of France.

4) Belgium and the Netherlands would, in German hands, represent an extraordinary advantage in the prosecution of the air war against Great Britain as well as against France. Therefore it is held to be essential to obtain the opinion of the Army as to the conditions under which an occupation of this area could be carried out and how long it would take. In this case it would be necessary to reassess the commitment against Great Britain.

signed: For: WOLTER

1 inclosure

Distribution:
Chief of German Air Force Operations Staff
General Staff/5th Section (Draft)

1. copy with 1 inclosure
2. copy with 1 inclosure

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CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION
OF DOCUMENT No. 375-PS

4 November 1945

I, FRED NIEBERGALL, 2nd Lt Inf,O-1335567, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; and that the above is a correct and true translation of Document No. 375-PS.

FRED NIEBERGALL
2nd Lt Inf
O-1335567

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TRANSLATION DOCUMENT 386-PS
OFFICE OF U S CHIEF OF COUNSEL

Berlin, 10 Nov 1937

NOTES on the Conference in the Reichskanzlei
on 5 Nov 37 from 1615 - 2030 hours

Present: The Fuhrer and Reich Chancellor
The Reichsminister for War, Generalfeldmarschall v. BLOMBERG
The C-in-C Army, Generaloberst Freiherr von FRITSCH
The C-in-C Navy, Generaladmiral Dr. h.c. RAEDER
The C-in-C Luftwaffe, Generaloberst GOERING
The Reichsminister for Foreign Affairs Freiherr v. NEURATH
Oberst HOSZBACH

The Fuhrer stated initially that the subject matter of today's conference was of such high importance, that its further detailed discussion would probably take place in Cabinet sessions. However, he, the Fuhrer, had decided NOT to discuss this matter in the larger circle of the Reich Cabinet, because of its importance. His subsequent statements were the result of detailed deliberations and of the experiences of his 4½ years in Government; he desired to explain to those present his fundamental ideas on the possibilities and necessities of expanding our foreign policy and in the interests of a far-sighted policy he requested that his statements be looked upon in the case of his death as his last will and testament.

The Fuhrer then stated:

The aim of German policy is the security and the preservation of the nation and its propagation. This is consequently a problem of space.

The German nation disposes of 85 million people, which, because of the number of individuals and the compactness of habitation, form of homogeneous European racial body, which cannot be found in any other country. On the other hand it justifies the demand for larger living space more than for any other nation. If no political body exists in space, corresponding to the German racial body, then that is the consequence of several centuries of historical development, and should this political condition continue to exist, it will represent the greatest danger to the preservation of the German nation (Volk-stum) as its present high level. An arrest of the deterioration of the German element in AUSTRIA and in CZECHOSLOVAKIA is just as little possible as the preservation of the present state in GERMANY itself. Instead of growth, sterility will be introduced, and as a consequence, tensions of a social nature will appear after a number of years, because political and philosophical ideas are of a permanent nature only as long as they are able to produce the basis for the realization of the actual claim of existence of a nation. The German future is therefore dependent exclusively on the solution of the need for living space. Such a solution can be sought naturally only for a limited period, about 1 - 3 generations.

Before touching upon the question of solving the need for living space, it must be decided whether a solution of the German position with a good future can be attained, either by way of an autarchy or by way of an increased share in universal commerce and industry.

Autarchy: Execution will be possible only with strict National-Socialist State policy, which is the basis; assuming this can be achieved the results are as follows:

A. In the sphere of raw materials, only limited, but NOT total autarchy can be attained:

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1. Wherever coal can be used for the extraction of raw materials autarchy is feasible.

2. In the case of ores the position is much more difficult. Requirements in iron and light metals can be covered by ourselves. Copper and tin, however, can NOT.

3. Cellular materials can be covered by ourselves as long as sufficient wood supplies exist. A permanent solution is not possible.

4. Edible fats - possible.

B. In the case of foods, the question of an autarchy must be answered with a definite "NO".

The general increase of living standards, compared with 30 - 40 years ago, brought about a simultaneous increase of the demand an increase of personal consumption even among the producers, the farmers, themselves. The proceeds from the production increase in agriculture have been used for covering the increase in demands, therefore they represent no absolute increase in production. A further increase in production by making greater demands on the soil is not possible because it already shows signs of deterioration due to the use of artificial fertilizers, and it is therefore certain that, even with the greatest possible increase in production, participation in the world market could NOT be avoided.

The considerable expenditure of foreign currency to secure food by import, even in periods when harvests are good, increases catastrophically when the harvest is really poor. The possibility of this catastrophe increases correspondingly to the increase in population, and the annual 560,000 excess in births would bring about an increased consumption in bread, because the child is a greater bread eater than the adult.

Permanently to counter the difficulties of food supplies by lowering the standard of living and by rationalization is impossible in a Continent which had developed an approximately equivalent standard of living. As the solving of the unemployment problem has brought into effect the complete power of consumption, some small corrections in our agricultural home production will be possible, but NOT a wholesale alteration of the standard of food consumption. Consequently autarchy becomes impossible, specifically in the sphere of food supplies as well as generally.

Participation in World Economy. There are limits to this which we are unable to transgress. The market fluctuations would be an obstacle to a secure foundation of the German position; international commercial agreements do NOT offer any guarantee for practical execution. It must be considered on principle that since the World War (1914-18) an industrialization has taken place in countries which formerly exported food. We live in a period of economic empires, in which the tendency to colonize again approaches the condition which originally motivated colonization; in JAPAN and ITALY economic motives are the basis of their will to expand, the economic need will also drive GERMANY to it. Countries outside the great economic empires have special difficulties in expanding economically.

The upward tendency, which has been caused in world economy, due to armament competition, can never form a permanent basis for an economic settlement, and this latter is also hampered by the economic disruption caused by Bolshevism. It is a pronounced military weakness of those States who base their existence on export. As our exports and imports are carried out over those sea lanes which are ruled by BRITAIN, it is more a question of security of transport rather than one of foreign currency, and this explains the great weakness in our food situation in wartime. The only way out, and one which

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may appear imaginary, is the securing of greater living space, an endeavor which at all times has been the cause of the formation of states and of movements of nations. It is explicable that this tendency finds no interest in GENEVA and in satisfied States. Should the security of our food position be our foremost thought, then the space required for this can only be sought in Europe, but we will not copy liberal capitalist policies which rely on exploiting colonies. It is NOT a case of conquering people, but of conquering agriculturally useful space. It would also be more to the purpose to seek raw material producing territory in Europe directly adjoining the Reich and not overseas, and this solution would have to be brought into effect in one or two generations. What would be required at a later date over and above this must be left to subsequent generations. The development of great world-wide national bodies is naturally a slow process and the German people, with its strong racial root, has for this purpose the most favorable foundations in the heart of the European Continent. The history of all times - Roman Empire, British Empire - has proved that every space expansion can only be effected by breaking resistance and taking risks. Even setbacks are unavoidable; neither formerly nor today has space been found without an owner; the attacker always comes up against the proprietor.

The question for GERMANY is where the greatest possible conquest could be made at lowest cost.

German politics must reckon with its two hateful enemies, ENGLAND and FRANCE, to whom a strong German colossus in the centre of EUROPE would be intolerable. Both these states would appose a further reinforcement of GERMANY, both in EUROPE and overseas, and in this opposition they would have the support of all parties. Both countries would view the building of German military strongpoints overseas as a threat to their overseas communications, as a security measure for German commerce, and retrospectively a strengthening of the German position in Europe.

ENGLAND is NOT in a position to cede any of her colonial possessions to us owing to the resistance which she experiences in the Dominions. After the loss of prestige which ENGLAND HAS suffered owing to the transfer of ABYSSINIA to Italian ownership, a return of EAST AFRICA can no longer be expected. Any resistance on ENGLAND's part would at best consist in the readiness to satisfy our colonial claims by taking away colonies which at the present moment are NOT in British hands, e.g. ANGOLA. French favors would probably be of the same nature.

A serious discussion regarding the return of colonies to us could be considered only at a time when ENGLAND is in a state of emergency and the German Reich is strong and well-armed. The Fuhrer does not share the opinion that the Empire is unshakeable. Resistance against the Empire is to be found less in conquered territories than amongst its competitors. The British Empire and the Roman Empire cannot be compared with one another in regard to durability; since the Punic Wars the latter did not have a serious political enemy. Only the dissolving effects which originated in Christendom, and the signs of age which creep into all states, made it possible for the Ancient Germans to subjugate Ancient ROME.

Alongside the British Empire today a number of States exist which are stronger than it. The British Mother Country is able to defend its colonial possessions only allied with other States and NOT by its own power. How could ENGLAND alone, for example, defend CANADA against an attack by AMERICA or its Far Eastern interests against an attack by JAPAN.

The singling out of the British Crown as the bearer of Empire unity is in itself an admission that the universal empire cannot be maintained permanently by power politics. The following are significant pointers in this re[illegible]

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a) IRELAND's tendency for independence.

b) Constitutional disputes in INDIA where ENGLAND, by her half-measures, left the door open for Indians at a later date to utilize the nonfulfillment of constitutional promises as a weapon against BRITAIN.

c) The weakening of the British position in the FAR EAST by JAPAN.

d) The opposition in the MEDITERRANEAN to Italy which - by virtue of its history, driven by necessity and led by a genius - expands its power position and must consequently infringe British interests to an increasing extent. The outcome of the ABYSSINIAN War is a loss of prestige for Britain which Italy is endeavoring to increase by stirring up discontent in the MOHAMMEDAN world.

It must be established in conclusion that the Empire cannot be held permanently by power politics by 45 million Britons, in spite of all the solidity of her ideals. The proportion of the populations in the Empire, compared with that of the Motherland is 9:1, and it should act as a warning to us that if we expand in space, we must NOT allow the level of our population to become too low.

France's position is more favorable than that of ENGLAND. The French Empire is better placed geographically, the population of its colonial possessions represents a potential military increase. But FRANCE is faced with difficulties of internal politics. At the present time only 10 per cent approximately of the nations have parliamentary governments whereas 90 per cent of them have totalitarian governments. Nevertheless we have to take the following into our political considerations as power factors:

BRITAIN, FRANCE, RUSSIA and the adjoining smaller States.

The German question can be solved only by way of force, and this is never without risk. The battles of FREDERICK THE GREAT for SILESIA, and BISMARCK's wars against AUSTRIA and FRANCE had been a tremendous risk and the speed of PRUSSIAN action in 1870 had prevented AUSTRIA from participating in the war. If we place the decision to apply force with risk at the head of the following expositions, then we are left to reply to the questions "when" and "how". In this regard we have to decide upon three different cases.

Case 1. Period 1943-45. After this we can only expect a change for the worse. The re-arming of the Army, the Navy and the Air Force, as well as the formation of the Officers' Corps, are practically concluded. Our material equipment and armaments are modern, with further delay the danger of their becoming out-of-date will increase. In particular the secrecy of "special weapons" cannot always be safeguarded. Enlistment of reserves would be limited to the current recruiting age groups and an addition from older untrained groups would be no longer available.

In comparison with the re-armament, which will have been carried out at that time by the other nations, we shall decrease in relative power. Should we not act until 1943/45, then, dependent on the absence of reserves, any year could bring about the food crisis, for the countering of which we do NOT possess the necessary foreign currency. This must be considered as a "point of weakness in the regime". Over and above that, the world will anticipate our action and will increase counter-measures yearly. Whilst other nations isolate themselves we should be forced on the offensive.

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What the actual position would be in the years 1943-45 no one knows today. It is certain, however, that we can wait no longer.

On the one side the large armed forces, with the necessity for securing their upkeep, the ageing of the Nazi movement and of its leaders, and on the other side the prospect of a lowering of the standard of living and a drop in the birth rate, leaves us no other choice than to act. If the Fuhrer is still living, then it will be his irrevocable decision to solve the German space problem no later than 1943-45. The necessity for action before 1943-45 will come under consideration in cases 2 and 3.

Case 2. Should the social tensions in FRANCE lead to an internal political crisis of such dimensions that it absorbs the French Army and thus renders it incapable for employment in war against GERMANY, then the time for action against CZECHOSLOVAKIA has come.

Case 3. It would be equally possible to act against CZECHOSLOVAKIA if FRANCE should be so tied up by a war against another State, that it cannot "proceed" against Germany.

For the improvement of our military political position it must be our first aim, in every case of entanglement by war, to conquer CZECHOSLOVAKIA and AUSTRIA simultaneously, in order to remove any threat from the flanks in case of a possible advance Westwards. In the case of a conflict with FRANCE it would hardly be necessary to assume that CZECHOSLOVAKIA would declare war on the same day as FRANCE. However, CZECHOSLOVAKIA's desire to participate in the war will increase proportionally to the degree to which we are being weakened. Its actual participation could make itself felt by an attack on SILESIA, either towards the North or the West.

Once CZECHOSLOVAKIA is conquered - and a mutual frontier, GERMANY-HUNGARY is obtained - then a neutral attitude by POLAND in a German-French conflict could more easily be relied upon. Our agreements with POLAND remain valid only as long as GERMANY's strength remains unshakeable; should GERMANY have any setbacks then an attack by POLAND against EAST PRUSSIA, perhaps also against POMERANIA, and SILESIA, must be taken into account.

Assuming a development of the situation, which would lead to a planned attack on our part in the years 1943-45, then the behavior of FRANCE, POLAND and RUSSIA would probably have to be judged in the following manner:

The Fuhrer believes personally that in all probability ENGLAND and perhaps also FRANCE have already silently written off CZECHOSLOVAKIA, and that they have got used to the idea that this question would one day be cleaned up by GERMANY. The difficulties in the British Empire and the prospect of being entangled in another long-drawn-out European War, were decisive factors in the non-participation of ENGLAND in a war against GERMANY. The British attitude would certainly NOT remain without influence on FRANCE's attitude. An attack by FRANCE without British support is hardly probable assuming that its offensive would stagnate along our Western fortifications. Without England's support, it would also NOT be necessary to take into consideration a march by France through Belgium and Holland, and this would also not have to be reckoned with by us in case of a conflict with France, as in every case it would have as consequence the enmity of Great Britain. Naturally, we should in every case have to bar our frontier during the operation of our attacks against CZECHOSLOVAKIA and AUSTRIA. It must be taken into consideration here that Czechoslovakia's defence measures will increase in strength from year to year, and that a consolidation of the inside values of the Austrian army will also be effected in the course of years. Although the population of Czechoslovakia in the first place is not a thin one, the embodiment of Czechoslovakia and Austria would nevertheless constitute the conquest of food for 5-6 million people, on the basis that a compulsory emigration of 2 million from Czechoslovakia and of 1 million

from Austria could be carried out. The annexation of the two States to Germany militarily and politically would constitute a considerable relief, owing to shorter and better frontiers, the freeing of fighting personnel for other purposes and the possibility of re-constituting new armies up to a strength of about 12 Divisions, representing a new division per 1 million population.

No opposition to the removal of Czechoslovakia is expected on the part of Italy; however, it cannot be judged today what would be her attitude in the Austrian question since it would depend largely on whether the Duce were alive at the time or not.

The measure and speed of our action would decide Poland's attitude. Poland will have little inclination to enter the war against a victorious Germany, with Russia in its rear.

Military participation by Russia must be countered by the speed of our operations; it is a question whether this need be taken into consideration at all in view of Japan's attitude.

Should Case 2 occur - paralyzation of France by a Civil war - then the situation should be utilized at any time for operations against Czechoslovakia, as Germany's most dangerous enemy would be eliminated.

The Fuhrer sees Case 3 looming nearer; it could develop from the existing tensions in the MEDITERRANEAN, and should it occur he has firmly decided to make use of it any time, perhaps even as early as 1938.

Following recent experiences in the course of the events of the war in Spain, the Fuhrer does NOT see an early end to hostilities there. Taking into consideration the time required for past offensives by Franco, a further three years duration of war is within the bounds of possibility. On the other hand, from the German point of view a 100 per cent victory by Franco is not desirable; we are more interested in a continuation of the war and preservation of the tensions in the Mediterranean. Should Franco be in sole possession of the Spanish Peninsula it would mean the end of Italian intervention and the presence of Italy on the Balearic Isles. As our interests are directed towards continuing the war in Spain, it must be the task of our future policy to strengthen Italy in her fight to hold on to the Balearic Isles. However, a solidification of Italian positions on the Balearic Isles can NOT be tolerated either by France or by England and could lead to a war by France and England against Italy, in which case Spain, if entirely in white (i.e. Franco's) hands, could participate on the side of Italy's enemies. A subjugation of Italy in such a war appears very unlikely. Additional raw materials could be brought to Italy via Germany. The Fuhrer believes that Italy's military strategy would be to remain on the defensive against France on the Western frontier and carry out operations against France from Libya against North African French colonial possessions.

As a leading of French-British troops on the Italian coast can be discounted, and as a French offensive via the Alps to Upper Italy would be extremely difficult and would probably stagnate before the strong Italian fortifications, French lines of communication by the Italian fleet will to a great extent paralyze the transport of fighting personnel from North Africa to France, so that at its frontiers with Italy and Germany, France will have at its disposal solely the metropolitan fighting forces.

If Germany profits from this war by disposing of the Czechoslovakian and the Austrian questions, the probability must be assumed that England - being at war with Italy - would not decide to commence operations against Germany. Without British support a warlike action by France against Germany is not to be anticipated.

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TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 386-PS
Cont'd.

The date of our attack on Czechoslovakia and Austria must be made dependent on the course of the Italian-English-French war and would not be simultaneous with the commencement of military agreements with Italy, but of full independence and, by exploiting this unique favorable opportunity he wishes to begin to carry out operations against Czechoslovakia. The attack on Czechoslovakia would have to take place with the "speed of lightning" (blitzartig schnell).

Feldmarshall von Blomberg and Generaloberst von Fritsch in giving their estimate on the situation, repeatedly pointed out that England and France must not appear as our enemies, and they stated that the war with Italy would NOT bind the French army to such an extent that it would NOT be in a position to commence operations on our Western frontier with superior forces. Generaloberst von Fritsch estimated the French forces which would presumably be employed on the Alpine frontier against Italy to be in the region of 20 divisions, so that a strong French superiority would still remain on our Western frontier. The French would, according to German reasoning, attempt to advance into the Rhineland. We should consider the lead which France has got in mobilization, and quite apart from the very small value of our then existing fortifications - which was pointed out particularly by Generalfeldmarschall von Blomberg - the four motorized divisions which had been laid down for the West would be more or less incapable of movement. With regard to our offensive in a South-Easterly direction, Feldmarschall von Blomberg draw special attention to the strength of the Czechoslovakian fortifications, the building of which had assumed the character of a Maginot line and which would present extreme difficulties to our attack.

Generaloberst von Fritsch mentioned that it was the purpose of a study which he had laid on for this winter to investigate the possibilities of carrying out operations against Czechoslovakia with special consideration of the conquest of the Czechoslovakian system of fortifications; the Generaloberst also stated that owing to the prevailing conditions he would have to relinquish his leave abroad, which was to begin on 10 November. This intention was countermanded by the Fuhrer who gave as a reason that the possibility of the conflict was not to be regarded as being so imminent. In reply to the remark by the Minister for Foreign Affairs, that an Italian-English-French conflict be not as near as the Fuhrer appeared to assume, the Fuhrer stated that the date which appeared to him to be a possibility was summer 1938. In reply to statements by Generalfeldmarschall von Blomberg and Generaloberst von Fritsch regarding England and France's attitude, the Fuhrer repeated his previous statements and said that he was convinced of Britain's non-participation and that consequently he did not believe in military action by France against Germany. Should the Mediterranean conflict already mentioned lead to a general mobilization in Europe, then we should have to commence operations against Czechoslovakia immediately. If, however, the powers who are not participating in the war should declare their disinterestedness, then Germany would, for the time being, have to side with this attitude.

In view of the information given by the Fuhrer, Generaloberst Goering considered it imperative to think of a reduction or abandonment of our military undertaking in Spain. The Fuhrer agreed to this in so far as he believed this decision should be postponed for a suitable date.

The second part of the discussion concerned material armament questions.

(Signed) HOSZBACH

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION
OF DOCUMENT NO. 386-PS

18 November 1945.

I, EVE GLAZIER, P/O, W.R.N.S., 37371, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages, and that the above is a true and correct translation of Document No. 386-PS.

EVE GLAZIER
P/O, W.R.N.S.
37371.

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TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 388-PS
OFFICE OF U S CHIEF OF COUNSEL

APPERTAINING TO WAR HISTORY

(pencil note)

S.O. Only

"FALL GRÜN"

CZECHOSLOVAKIA

388-PS

H1123 - 0056

ITEM 1

- - - ? of the Fuehrer: (semi-illegible)

1). Does MUSSOLINI regard his work as completed or not.

a). if so, close future boundary of Czechoslovakia West then wait and see. "Return with the bag empty."

b). if not, then the "Empire" of Africa. Impossible without German help. Czechoslovakia is a preliminary condition. "Return with Czechoslovakia in the bag."

2). MUSSOLINI, who is no illusionist, can definitely assess Germany's military potentialities. Therefore he will suit timing of his aims with that.

3). Against France and England problem of Czechoslovakia can be settled only if still allied with Italy. France and England will not intervene. (Only to overcome the four-week re-grouping period.)

4). Living under a common fate. (Example, 1805 and 1806)

5). State of Armament: comparisons relative but in our favor:

a). Deliveries of ores: France -- 600,000 tons
Germany - 2 million tons.

b). Britain has been arming for 9 months. Launching not for 2 years.

c). Out of date air force equipment.

6). No general staff conferences of the various branches of the Armed Forces. Would have to retract permission to the Army. Only through Supreme Command. Very important that actual intentions be kept secret.

7). Arming progressing too slowly: Guns not only for constituted units, but also in reserve for replacement. Fortifications. Range of guns.

8). Replacement of officers doubtful.

* * *

Schm

(M. Schmundt's writing and initialled by him)

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ITEM 2

S.O. Only

Berlin, 22 April 1938

BASES OF THE DISSERTATION ON "GRUEN"

Summary of discussion between Fuehrer and General KEITEL of 21 April:

A. Political Aspect

1). Strategic surprise attack out of a clear sky without any cause or possibility of justification has been turned down. As result would be: hostile world opinion which can lead to a critical situation. Such a measure is justified only for the elimination of the last opponent on the mainland.

2). Action after a time of diplomatic clashes, which gradually come to a crisis and lead to war.

3). Lightning-swift action as the result of an incident (e.g. assassination of German ambassador in connection with an anti-German demonstration).

B. Military Conclusions

1). The preparations are to be made for the political possibilities 2) and 3). Case 2). is the undesired one since "Gruen" will have taken security measures.

2). The loss of time caused by transporting the bulk of the divisions by rail - which is unavoidable but should be cut down as far as possible - must not impede a lightning-swift blow at the time of the action.

3). "Separate thrusts" are to be carried out immediately with a view to penetrating the enemy fortification lines at numerous points and in a strategically favorable direction. The thrusts are to be worked out to the smallest detail (knowledge of roads, of targets, composition of the columns according to their individual tasks). Simultaneous attacks by the Army and Air Force.

The Air Force is to support the individual columns. (e.g. divebombers: sealing off installations at penetration points, hampering the bringing up of reserves, destroying signal communications traffic, thereby isolating the garrisons.)

4). Politically, the first 4 days of military action are the decisive ones. If there are no effective military successes, a European crisis will certainly arise. Accomplished Facts must prove the senselessness of foreign military intervention, draw Allies into the scheme (division of spoils!) and demoralize "Gruen".

Therefore: bridging the time gap between first penetration and employment of the forces to be brought up, by a determined and ruthless thrust by a motorized army.(e.g. via Pi past Pr) (Pilsen, Prague).

5). If possible, separation of transport movement "Rot" from "Gruen". A simultaneous strategic concentration "Rot" can lead "Rot" to undesired measures. On the other hand it must be possible to put "Fall Rot" into operation at any time.

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C. Propaganda

1). Leaflets on the conduct of Germans in Czechoslovakia (Gruenland).

2). Leaflets with threats for intimidation of the Czechs (Gruenen).

Schm

(initialled by Schmundt)

Written by an officer

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ITEM 2

22 April

A). POLITICAL POSSIBILITIES

1). Sudden surprise attack out of clear sky not possible. World opinion can produce critical situation. Would be thinkable only for ultimate conflict without the threat of other opponents.

2). Action after a period of tension and constant aggravation of the situation.

3). Action as the result of an incident. (example)

B). MILITARY NECESSITIES

Cases 2 and 3 can be considered. In case 2 "security measures" will be taken. Duration of transporting by rail to be looked into.

1). Invasion by columns ready to march at points which lie in/a direction, strategically important. (Permanent fortifications must be known, columns assembled to suit particular situations, roads reconnoitred.) Simultaneous attack by Luftwaffe,,cooperation with Luftwaffe, isolation of garrisons of the fortifications, cutting of communications.)

2). "Dead Space" in first 4 days prior to actual operation must be avoided under all circumstance. Must be bridged through motorized army. Penetrating via PILSEN. Hamper mobilization.

3). Separation of transport movement "Rot" and "Gruen",

a). in order not to aggravate "Rot",

b). but also so as not to arrive late, if necessary.

Basic Principle : Create Accomplished Facts so that

a). help comes too late - other powers do not intervene

b). Allies take part (like wolves also want something out of it)

c). State collapses from within.

Propaganda: Directions to Germans
Threats to others

Submit: 1). Fortifications (strength in detail)

2). Distribution of nationalities within Wehrmacht.

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ITEM 3

MOS 1 16/5 0925 -
Supreme Command of the Armed Forces

ZEITZLER

Most Secret - 1) Which divisions on the "Gruen" frontiers ready to march within 12 hours, in the case of mobilization?

2) What is the final day of mobilization?

SCHMUNDT

MOS 1 1930 MELDAU MBZ

(the same also in Schmundt's handwriting)

- - - - - - - - -

MOS No. 2 1115 -

MBZ 02 16/5 1114 -

Major Schmundt, Armed Forces Adjutant to the Fuehrer -

Most Secret to Question 1

12 of them - in garrisons

to Question 2

Third day - Please state time of receipt. Teleprint left my room at 1110 - NN

ZEITZLER Oberstleutnant on the General Staff

- - - - - - - - -

MOS 03 16/5 1155

OKW for Oberst leutnant Zeitzler - Most Secret

1). Teleprint received 1115

2). Please send the numbers of the divisions.

Schmundt

(the same also in Schmundt's handwriting) 1159 MOS 03 Wagner?

- - - - - - - - -

MBZ 04 16/5 1302 -

Major Schmundt Armed Forces Adjutant to the Fuehrer -

Most Secret to message 1155 7, 17, 10, 24, 4, 14, 3, 18, 28, 8, armored and mountain.

Zeitzler Oberstleutnant on the General Staff.

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ITEM 4

MBZ 05 17/5 1505

TO MAJOR SCHMUNDT ARMED FORCES ADJUTANT TO THE FUEHRER - MOST SECRET
IN ANSWER TO OBERST LEUTNANT ZEITZLER AND WITH REGARD TO MAP OF FORTIFICATIONS:

FORTIFIED CONSTRUCTION CONSISTS OF FAIRLY LARGE NUMBER OF STEEL AND CONCRETE FORTIFICATIONS AS WELL AS LIGHT, MEDIUM AND HEAVY MG EMPLACEMENTS TO CLOSE GAPS BETWEEN FORTIFICATIONS. NUMBER OF STEEL AND CONCRETE FORTIFICATIONS VARIES FROM ONE TO NINE PER KILOMETER. POSITIONS CONSTRUCTED CONSIST OF LIGHT, MEDIUM AND HEAVY MG EMPLACEMENTS AND AN OCCASIONAL STEEL AND CONCRETE FORTIFICATION IN BETWEEN. NUMBER OF MG EMPLACEMENTS VARIES FROM TWO TO NINE PER KILOMETER. BLOCK CONSTRUCTION CONSISTS OF LIGHT, SOMETIMES MEDIUM AND HEAVY MG EMPLACEMENTS AT MAIN ROADS AND THOROUGHFARES. DEFENSIVE POTENTIALITIES: STEEL AND CONCRETE FORTIFICATIONS BULLET PROOF AGAINST ALL KNOWN CALIBRES. LIGHT MG EMPLACEMENTS BULLET PROOF AGAINST ALL CALIBRES UP TO 10.5 CM., MEDIUM MG EMPLACEMENTS BULLET PROOF AGAINST CALIBRES UP TO 10.5 CM., HEAVY MG EMPLACEMENT BULLET PROOF AGAINST CALIBRES UP TO 21.00 CM., SOMETIMES AGAINST THE LARGEST CALIBRES.

ZEITZLER OBERSTLEUTNANT ON THE GENERAL
STAFF

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ITEM 5

MOST SECRET

Berlin, 20 May 1938
Tirpitzufer 72.76

Chief of the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces
L Ia No. 38/38 S.O. Only

S.O. Only
access only through Officer

Schm (initialled by Schmundt)

My Fuehrer!

Effective 1 October 1938 (beginning of the new mobilization year for the army) new strategic directives must be issued, whose political bases and stipulations you, my Fuehrer, yourself intend to make.

For the meantime, however, it is necessary that the "Gruen" section of the strategic directives be replaced by a new version that takes into account the situation which has arisen as a result of the incorporation of Austria into the Reich and the newly-suspected intentions of the Czech General Staff.

A draft of this kind is attached. It has not yet been discussed with the Commanders in Chief. I intend to do this only after this draft in its fundamental ideas has been approved by you my Fuehrer, so that it can then be resubmitted to be signed.

Heil, my Fuehrer

(signed) Keitel

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ITEM 5 written by an officer

L Ia to No. 38/38 S.O. Only

Berlin, 20 May 1938

MOST SECRET
S. O. Only
access only through officer

DRAFT

for

3 Copies
1st Copy

THE NEW DIRECTIVE "GRUEN"

(Provisional) - pencil note

1). Political Prerequisites:

It is not my intention to smash Czechoslovakia without provocation, in the near future through military action. Therefore inevitable political developments within Czechoslovakia must force the issue, or political events in Europe create an especially favorable opportunity and one which may never come again.

2). Political Possibilities for the Commencement of the Action:

An invasion without suitable obvious cause and without sufficient political justification cannot be considered with reference to the possible consequences of such an action in the present situation.

Rather will the action be initiated either:

a). after a period of increasing diplomatic clashes and tension, which is coupled with military preparations and is made use of to push the war-guilt onto the enemy. Even such a period of tension preceding the war however will terminate in sudden military action on our part, which must come with all possible surprise as to time and extent, or

b). by lightning-swift action as a result of a serious incident, through which Germany is provoked in an unbearable way and for which at least part of the world opinion will grant the moral justification of military action.

b). is militarily and politically the more favorable.

3). Conclusions for the Preparations of "Fall Gruen"; which must take into account the possibilities mentioned in 2 a). and 2 b)..

a) For Armed War it is essential to create-- already in the first 4 days - a military situation which plainly proves to hostile nations eager to intervene, the hopelessness of the Czechoslovakian military situation, and gives the nations with territorial claims on Czechoslovakia an incentive to immediate intervention against Czechoslovakia. In such a case the intervention of Poland and Hungary against Czechoslovakia can be expected, especially if France, due to Italy's clearly pro-German attitude fears, or at least hesitates, to unleash a European war by her intervention against Germany.

It is very probable that attempts by Russia to give military support to Czechoslovakia are to be expected. If concrete successes are not achieved as a result of the ground operations during the first few days, a European crisis will certainly arise.

b). The Propaganda War must, on one hand, intimidate Czechoslovakia by threats and reduce her power of resistance, on the other hand,

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give instructions to the national minorities for supporting the Armed War and influence the neutrals into our way of thinking.

c). The Economic War has the task of employing all means at the disposal of economy to hasten the final collapse of Czechoslovakia.

The opening of the Economic and Propaganda war can precede the Armed War. I myself will determine the date.

Z (initialled at end by Zeitzler)

For paragraphs 4)., 5)., and 6). see under ITEM 11

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ITEM 6

Questions on "Gruen"

1). Peace-time strength of divisions prepared for march readiness.

2). Strength of mobile divisions.

3). Composition of 2nd Armored Division in the case of mobilization.

4). Strength, possibilities and composition of a motorized unit (motorized divisions) to be used for independent thrust.

5). When can the field units be equipped with 15 cm. mortars?

6). What calibres andhow large a number of artillery pieces are available for combatting fortifications suchas fortresses?

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ITEM 6

L Ia

Berlin, 23 May
MOST SECRET

Questionnaire of 23 May

1). Peace-time strength of divisions prepared for march readiness.

Strength of a peacetime division : 14,000 men
Strength of a division made ready to march: 14,000 men
(but composition is different from that of a peacetime division, i.e. some men are left out and others included).

2). Strength of mobile divisions.

Strength of a mobile division : 17,000 men

3). Composition of the 2nd Armored Division in the case of Mobilization.

In the case of mobilization the 2nd Armored Division is composed of 1 rifle brigade, one tank brigade and divisional troops.

The rifle brigade has one Infantry regiment motorized of 2 battalions and one motorcycle rifle Battalion.

The tank brigade has two tank regiments of two battalions.

The Divisional Troops will include 1 Artillery Regiment motorized of 2 light Battalions, 1 Reconnaissance Battalion motorized, 1 Anti-Tank Battalion, 1 Engineer Battalion motorized, and 1 Signal Battalion motorized.

Altogether the 2nd Armored Division (mobile) has 807 light Machine guns, 250 heavy Machine guns, 18 light mortars, 12 heavy mortars, 8 light Infantry howitzers, 48 Anti-Tank guns, 122 2 cm. guns. 16 37 cm. guns, 16 7.5 cm. guns and 24 light field howitzers.

4). Strength, possibilities and composition of a motorized unit (motorized divisions) for independent thrust.

In the case of mobilization, C-in-C Army is in command of the motorized units. C-in-C Army must therefore be questioned as regards any new employment.

Altogether the 1st, 2nd and 3rd Armored Divisions (rapid march readiness is intended) 4 motorized divisions and the light division (for the moment not yet intended for rapid march readiness; presumably from 1 October).

5). When can the field units be equipped with 15 cm. mortars?

Mobilization of the infantry guns (= 15 cm. mortars) planned only for the fall, as ammunition for them will only then be available. For training purposes nearly all corps except the 3 corps have the heavy infantry guns at the moment without live ammunition, however.

6). What calibres and how large a number of artillery pieces are available for combatting fortifications such as fortresses?

Only 21 cm. howitzers. Altogether 23 (of which 8 are in East Prussia)

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with 16,000 rounds (of which 4,000 in East Prussia).

(In Schmundt writing): In general, single experimental artillery piece (guns).

Z (initialled by Zeitzler)

- - - - - - - - -

On next page the questions are put again plus, the following additional questions):

7). What do the individual types of Czechoslovakian permanent frontier fortifications look like? Profile?

8). Is cooperation between infantry and bombers assured for attacks against enemy strongpoints etc.?

9). Can the construction of fortifications in the West, in the form of MG strong points and road blocks, be hastened by the employment of work columns of the Inspector of Road Construction?

10). What progress has been made in the howitzer (Moerser) programme? What progress has been made in the coversion of heavy naval guns?

* * *

(Next three pages contain the first 6 questions above and answers to them in a teleprint message, beginning: "I am answering several questions which the Fuehrer put to me during conferences. I request that you report the answers to the Fuehrer."

388-PS

H1123 - 0068

ITEM 8

1). INFORM GENERAL KEITEL: THE FUEHRER IS GOING INTO "GRUEN" IN DETAIL. BASIC IDEAS NOT CHANGED. SURPRISE ELEMENT TO BE EMPHASIZED MORE. CONFERENCE WITH PARTICIPANTS WILL TAKE PLACE AFTER RETURN, AT THE LATEST. CONFERENCE HERE NOT OUT OF THE QUESTION. RETURN PROBABLY BEGINNING NEXT WEEK.

2). INFORM COLONEL GENERAL VON BRAUCHITSCH AND GENERAL KEITEL:

A). THE FUEHRER, IN CONNECTION WITH HIS CONSIDERATIONS ON 1), HIMSELF SUGGESTED THE HOLDING OF MANOEUVERS TO PRACTISE TAKING FORTIFICATIONS BY SURPRISE ATTACK. I THEN REPORTED THAT C-IN-C ARMY WAS PLANNING A CORRESPONDING TRAINING EXERCISE FOR SEPTEMBER. THE FUEHRER THINKS THAT MOMENT TOO LATE. HE HIMSELF WILL DISCUSS THIS WITH C-IN-C ARMY.

B). THE FUEHRER REPEATEDLY EMPHASIZED THE NECESSITY OF PRESSING FORWARD GREATLY THE FORTIFICATION WORK IN THE WEST

(NOTE FOR K KPT V PUTTKAMER: PLEASE DESTROY TEXT OF 1). AND 2). AFTER USE)

388-PS

H1123 - 0069

ITEM 9

REICH WAR MINISTRY/ NAVAL SIGNAL SERVICE

MOST SECRET

CANARIS REPORTS ON EVENTS OF THE NIGHT: NO SPECIAL OCCURRENCES. THE MOBILIZATION MEASURES ORDERED IN CZECHOSLOVAKIA CONTINUE. THE FOLLOWING HAVE BEEN DRAFTED: CLASSES 1913 AND 1914 COMPLETE AND SPECIALISTS ONLY FROM CLASSES 1894 TO 1911 LEAVING OUT CLASSES 04, 06, 09. I SHALL KEEP YOU FURTHER CONTINUALLY INFORMED. I CONSIDER IT NECESSARY THAT THE FUEHRER INFORM HIS C'S-IN-C OF HIS INTENTIONS SOON. HAVE YOU ANY FURTHER QUESTIONS?

388-PS

H1123 - 0070

ITEM 10

ILLEGIBLE

H1123-0071

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 388-PS
(cont.)

ITEM 11

Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces
OKW No. 42/38 Most Secret S.O. Only L I

Berlin, 30 May 1938
Copy of the 4th Copy

S.O. Only

3 Copies
1st Copy

Access only through Officer

Written by an Officer

By order of the Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces, Part 2, Section II of the directive on the unified preparations for war of the Armed Forces dated 24 June 1937 (Ob.d.W. No. 55/37 g.kdos Chefsache L Ia) ("Two-Front-War with main effort in the South-East - strategic concentration 'Gruen'") is to be replaced by the attached version. Its execution must be assured as from 1 October 38 at the latest.

Alterations in the other parts of the directives must be expected during the next few weeks.

by order

Chief of the Supreme Command
of the Armed Forces

1 Appendix

sgd. Keitel

To:	C-in-C Army	Copy 1
	C-in-C Navy	Copy 2
	C-in-C Air Force	Copy 3
OKW Section L		Copy 4 - 5

Certified a true copy

Zeitzler

Oberstleutnant on the General Staff

388-PS

H1123-0072

ITEM 11

MOST SECRET

Appendix to: Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces
OKW No. 42/38 Most Secret S. O. Only L Ia
dated 30.5.38.

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Written by an Officer

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Access only through Officer

II. Two front war with main effort in the South East
(strategic concentration "Gruen")

1). Political Prerequisites.

It is my unalterable decision to smash Czechoslovakia by military action in the near future. It is the job of the political leaders to await or bring about the politically and militarily suitable moment.

An inevitable development of conditions inside Czechoslovakia or other political events in Europe creating a surprisingly favorabe opportunity and one which may never come again may cause me to take early action.

The proper choice and determined and full utilization of a favorable moment is the surest guarantee of success. Accordingly the preparations are to be made at once.

2). Political Possibilites for the Commencement of the Action.

The following are necessary prerequisites for the intended invasion:

a). suitable obvious cause and, with it
b). sufficient political justification,
c). action unexpected by the enemy, which will find him prepared to the least possible degree.

From a military as well as a political standpoint the most favorable course is a lightning-swift action as the result of an incident through which Germany is provoked in an unbearable way for which at least part of world opinion will grant the moral justification of military action.

But even a period of tension, more or less preceeding a war, must terminate in sudden action on our part - which must have the elements of surprise as regards time and extent - before the enemy is so advanced in military preparedness that he cannot be surpassed.

3). Conclusions for the Preparation of "Fall Gruen".

a). For the Armed War it is essential that the surprise element as the most important factor contributing to success be made full use of by appropriate preparatory measures, already in peacetime and by an unexpectedly rapid course of the action. Thus it is essential to create a situation within the first four days which plainly demonstrates, to hostile nations eager to intervene, the hopelessness of the Czechoslovakian military situation and which at the same time will give nations with territorial claims on Czechoslovakia an incentive to intervene immediately against Czechoslovakia. In such a case, intervention by Poland

H1123-0073

ITEM 11

and Hungary against Czechoslovakia may be expected, especially if France - due to the obvious pro-German attitude of Italy - fears, or at least hesitates, to unleash a European war by intervening against Germany. Attempts by Russia to give military support to Czechoslovakia mainly by the Air Force are to be expected. If concrete successes are not achieved by the land operations within the first few days, a European crisis will certainly result. This knowledge must give commanders of all ranks the impetus to decided and bold action.

b). The Propaganda War must on the one hand intimidate Czechoslovakia by threats and soften her power of resistance, on the other hand issue directions to national groups for support in the Armed War and influence the neutrals into our way of thinking. I reserve further directions and determination of the date.

4). Tasks of the Armed Forces.

Armed Forces Preparations are to be made on the following basis:

a). The mass of all forces must be employed against Czechoslovakia.

b). For the West, a minimum of forces are to be provided as rear cover which may be required, the other frontiers in the East against Poland and Lithuania are merely to be protected, the Southern frontiers to be watched.

c). The sections of the army which can be rapidly employed must force the frontier fortifications with speed and decision and must break into Czechoslovakia with the greatest daring in the certainty that the bulk of the mobile army will follow them with the utmost speed. Preparations for this are to be made and timed in such a way that the sections of the army which can be rapidly employed cross the frontier at the appointed time at the same time as the penetration by the Air Force before the enemy can become aware of our mobilization.*

For this, a timetable between Army and Air Force is to be worked out in conjunction with OKW and submitted to me for approval.

5). Missions for the branches of the Armed Forces

a). Army: The basic principle of the surprise attack against Czechoslovakia must not be endangered by the inevitable time required for transporting the bulk of the field forces by rail nor the initiative of the Air Force be wasted. Therefore it is first of all essential to the army that as many assault columns as possible be employed at the same time as the surprise attack by the Air Force. These assault columns - the composition of each, according to their tasks at that time - must be formed with troops which can be employed rapidly owing to their proximity to the frontier or to motorization and to special measures of readiness. It must be the purpose of these thrusts to break into the Czechoslovakian fortification lines at numerous points and in a strategically favorable direction, to achieve a breakthrough or to break them down from the rear. For the success of this operation, cooperation with the Sudeten German frontier population, with deserters from the Czechoslovakian army, with parachutists or

(* - * passages between asterisks occur only in this version not in Item 5)

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H1123 - 0074

ITEM 11 (cont.)

airborne troops and with units of the sabotage service will be of importance. The bulk of the army has the task of *frustrating the Czechoslovakian plan of defense, of preventing the Czechoslovakian army from escaping into Slovakia, of forcing a battle,* of beating the Czechoslovakian army and of occupying Bohemia and Moravia speedily. To this end a thrust into the heart of Czechoslovakia must be made with the strongest possible motorized and armored units using to the full the first successes of the Assault columns and the effects of the Air Force operations. The rear cover provided for the West must be limited in numbers and quality to the extent which suits the present state of fortifications. Whether the units assigned this will be transported to the Western frontier immediately or held back for the time being will be decided in my special order. Preparations must however, be made to enable security detachments to be brought up to the Western frontier even during the strategic concentration "Gruen". *Independent of this, a first security garison must be improvized from the engineers at present employed in constructing fortifications and from formations of the Labor Corps. The remaining frontiers as well as East Prussia, are to be Reichly weakly protected. But, alway depending on the political situation, the transfers by sea, of a part or even the bulk of the active forces of East Prussia, into the Reich must be taken into account.

b). Air Force. While leaving a minimum of defensive forces in the West, the Air Force is to be employed in bulk in a surprise attack against Czechoslovakia. The frontier is to be flown over at the same time as it is crossed by the first section of the army. (see 5a) The most important task of the Air Force is the destruction of the Czechoslovakian Air Force and their supply bases within the shortest possible time, in order to eliminate the possibility of its employment as well as that of Russian and French air forces, should the occasion arise, against the strategic concentration and penetration of the German army and agains the German "Lebensraum." Next to this the crippling of enemy mobilization, of the direction of the government and Armed Forces, as well as the delaying of the strategic concentration of the Czech Army by attacks on communication installations, mobilization and government centers can be of considerable importance to the initial successes of the army. At points in the frontier area where stronger sections of the Czechoslovakian Army *or the depth of the defensive system* might make the success of the sudden breakthrough of the German Land-attack questionable, the employment of adequate bomber forces must be assured. Czechoslovakian industrial installations are to be spared as far as the course of operations permits. Retaliatory attacks against the population will be carried out only with my permission. Centers of air defense are to be created throughout BERLIN, the central German industrial area and the RUHR area,* and gradually prepared even now in an inconspicuous fashion.*

c). Navy. The Navy will assist the army operations by employing the DANUBE-flotilla. For this purpose the flotilla will be under the orders of C-in-C Army. As regards the conduct of naval warfare at first only those measures are to be taken which appear to be necessary for the careful protection of the North Sea and the Baltic against a sudden intervention in the conflict by other states. These measures must be confined to the absolutely necessary extent. Their inconspicuousness must be guaranteed. It

(* - * Passages between asterisks represent additions to the version in ITEM 5)

ITEM 11 (cont.)

is of decisive importance that all actions, which might influence the political attitude of the European Great Powers unfavorably, be avoided.

6). Tasks of the War Economy:

In war economy it is essential that in the field of the armament industry a maximum deployment of forces is made possible through increased supplies. In the course of operations, it is of value to contribute to the reinforcement of the total war- economic strength - by rapidly reconnoitring and restarting important factories. For this reason the sparing of Czechoslovakian industrial and works installations - insofar as military operations permit - can be of decisive importance to us.

7). *All preparations for sabotage and insurrection will be made by OKW. They will be made, in agreement with and according to the requirement of the branches of the Armed Forces, so that their effects accord with the operations of the Army and Air Force.*

signed ADOLF HITLER

Certified copy

signed Zeitzler

Oberstleutnant on the General Staff

(* - * Passages between asterisks represent additions to the version in ITEM 5)

388-PS

H1123-0075

H1123 - 0076

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 388 PS
(cont'd.)

ITEM 12

L I a H

Berlin, 9 June 1938.

SHORT SURVEY OF ARMAMENT OF THE CZECH ARMY

1. SMALL ARMS

Armed uniformly with Mauser Rifle, Model 24, calibre 7.92 mm (similar to German Rifle 98). Also grenade launcher for rifle grenades is attached to the rifle.

2. MACHINE GUNS

Light MG Z.B. 26, wieht 9 Kg, 20 round magazine.

Heavy MG, temporarily the MG "Schwarzlose" which has been improved in range. Super-heavy MG, 20 mm MG, Oerlikon system has been introduced (especially for active air defence), other models are being tested.

3. MORTARS

8.1cm Stokes-Brandt, range 3000 m.

9cm light Skoda mortar, model 17, range 1200 m.

14cm medium mortar, model 18, range 2500 m.

26cm heavy mortar, model 17, range 2700 m.

4. INFANTRY GUNS FOR ANTI-AIRCRAFT AND ANTI-TANK DEFENSE

Several models are being tested, some of them twin barrel guns. Calibre 37 - 40 mm and/or 66 - 70 mm.

5. ARTILLERY PIECES

a. Light and Mountain Artillery:

8cm field gun, model 17, range 10 km

8cm field gun, model 30, range 13.5 km (can also be used as an AA gun)

10cm light field howitzer, model 14/19, range 10 km.

7.5 Mountain gun, model 15, range 7 km.

10cm Mountain howitzer, model 16/19, range 10 km.

b. Heavy Artillery:

10.5cm gun, model 35, range 18 km.

15cm howitzer, model 14/16, range 8 km.

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ITEM 12

15cm howitzer, model 25, range 12 km.

15cm gun, model 15/16, range 20 km.

24cm gun, model 16, range 36 km.

21cm howitzer (Mörser) gun, model 18, range 10 km.

30.5cm howitzer (Mörser) gun, model 16, range 12.4 km.

Also in use are French 15.5cm howitzers.

c. A A Artillery

9cm AA-gun, model 12/20 (stationary), range 12 km.

8.35 cm AA-gun, model 22/24 horizontal range 18 km, vertical range 12 km.

7.65cm AA-gun, model 35, horizontal range 16 km, vertical range 11 km.

6.6cm AA-gun, model is being tested.

Z (Initialled by Zeitzler)

388-PS

H1123-0078

ITEM 13

L I a

Berlin, 9 June 1938

MOST SECRET

FUEHRER'S QUESTIONS ON 9 JUNE 1938

388-PS

H1123 - 0079

ITEM 13

Berlin, 9 June 1938

MOST SECRET

2 copies

1st copy

Question 1: Armament of the Czech Army?

Answer:

Arming and equipping of the Army with new means of war is progressing, thanks to the excellent production capacity of the Czech armament industry.

The armament was built up from the weapons of the old Austrian Army. It is slowly and steadily being modernized.

In Detail:

Artillery: Light field artillery. At present the old armament from the Austrian Army predominates.
Mountain Artillery: the same.
Medium artillery. New armament predominates.
Heavy artillery, old armament predominates.
Infantry Weapons: The following are available:
a uniform new infantry rifle; a uniform new light MG;
a uniform old improved heavy MG.
Equipment of heavy infantry weapons (AT-guns, Infantry Howitzers, Mortars) and tanks is modern, but still incomplete.

A new modern AA-gun has been introduced, but is not yet available in sufficient numbers.

Reserves of weapons and ammunition seem to be guaranteed.

SUMMARY: The Czech Army must be considered up to date as far as armament and equipment are concerned.

Z (Initialled by Zeitzler)

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H1123 - 0080

ITEM 13

L I a

Berlin, 9 June 1938

MOST SECRET

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Question 2: How many battalions, etc. are employed in the West for the construction of emplacements?

Answer:

Up to now the following have been employed on fortifications:

The 30th Infantry Battalion

The 10th Infantry Howitzer Company

The 12th Anti-Tank Company

The 10th Battery

The 30th 1/3 Engineer Battalions

In addition:

The 78th German Labor Service Battalion , and later the 190th German Labour Corps battalion.

In addition, the Commander of Army Group 2 (General Adam) has the authority to draw still further troops from his 4th Corps for the construction of emplacements if he deems it necessary.

Z (Initialled by Zeitzler)

(Pencilled notes by Schmundt):

Number of troops

Production possibilities

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H1123 - 0081

ITEM 13

L I a

Berlin, 9 June 1938

MOST SECRET

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Question 3: Are the fortifications of Czecho Slovakia still occupied in unreduced strength?

Answer:

The troops have been withdrawn to some extent from the fortifications and are housed in local billets. The fortifications themselves are guarded. The barriers at the frontiers are opened.

Z (Initialled by Zeitzler)

388-PS

ITEM 13

L I a

Berlin, 9 June 1938

MOST SECRET

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Question 4: Frontier protection in the West?

Answer:

In the West as at the other frontiers, the first frontier protection is undertaken by the VGAD, then the Frontier Guard. This protection by the Frontier Guard is directly at the frontier. At the same time as the Frontier Guard at the frontier, the fortification installations, which lie further back, receive security garrisons (reserve personnel).

Strength of the Frontier Guard on the Western Frontier:

15,200 men with 1,250 light MG's.

For further details on the frontier guard see appendix.

Z (Initialled by Zeitzler)

388-PS

H1123-0082

ITEM 14

L I a

Berlin, 18 June 1938

S. O. Only

Access only through Officer

1. DRAFT FOR THE NEW DIRECTIVE

(1st copy)

In three parts.

388-PS

H1123-0083

H1123 - 0084

ITEM 14 MOST SECRET 4 copies
1st copy

Written by an officer.

S. O. Only

Access only through Officer

Part 1

GENERAL GUIDING PRINCIPLES

1. There is no danger of a preventive war by foreign states against Germany.

Germany has not committed herself to any military alliances which would automatically force Germany into a warlike conflict of foreign powers.

The immediate aim is a solution of the Czech problem by my own, free decision; this stands in the foreground of my political intentions. I am determined to use to the full every favorable political opportunity to realize this aim.

Thereby, friends, interested parties and enemies can be called upon to take part in this scheme and other powers can remain indifferent even though they could not be previously placed with absolute certainty in one of these categories.

However, I will decide to take action against Czechoslovakia only if I am firmly convinced as in the case of the occupation of the demilitarized zone and the entry into Austria that France will not march and therefore England will not intervene.

2. The preparations of the Armed Forces must cover:

a) thorough preparation of the action against Czechoslovakia ("Fall Gruen"). See Part 2.

b) Maintenance of the previous "Fall Rot" (strategic concentration with the main effort against the West.) See Part 2.

c) Special preparations, mainly in the form of studies and deliberations within the Supreme Commands. See part 3.

d) Preparatory measures, in case German territory is suddenly and abruptly violated with hostile intent by a foreign power. See number 3.

H1123-0085

ITEM 14

3. If in the midst of peace, German territory is suddenly and abruptly violated with hostile intent by a foreign power, armed resistance will be offered without any special order.

Therefore, the branches of the Armed Forces must empower their competent Commanders on the frontier or on the coast to take on their own authority, all measures necessary to repulse the enemy attack should such a case occur. (See Reich Defense Law (RVG) para. 2).

In no event, however, may the German Reich frontier be crossed by troops or aircraft, nor any foreign territory violated, without my order.

It will not be considered a violation of German territory (see 1st sentence of this number) if single sentries or patrols cross the frontier unintentionally and accidentally or through the overeagerness of a subordinate commander, or if aircraft fly over the frontier due to faulty navigation, or warships sail in our German territorial waters with obviously no hostile intentions.

4. This directive concerns the uniform preparation for war and the general strategic considerations applying to the outbreak of the war. It will be augmented as necessitated by the various strategic concentrations by regulations dealing with matters of Special Administration and War Economy.

The directives necessary for the prosecution of the war itself will be issued by me from time to time.

K (Initialled by Keitel)

Z (Initialled by Zeitzler)

388-PS

H1123-0086

ITEM 14

Written by an officer MOST SECRET 4 copies
1st copy

S. O. only

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Part 2

STRATEGIC CONCENTRATIONS

1. Action against Czecho-Slovakia ("Fall Gruen")

The directive, issued as OKW Nr 42/38 Most Secret S. O. only L I dated 30 May 1938, remains in force. Regulations dealing with special matters, Administration and War Economy relative to "Fall Gruen" are still to be issued.

2. Two Front War with the main effort in the West ("Fall Rot")

Since even a war against us started by the Western Nations must, in view of the situation today, begin with the destruction of Czecho-Slovakia, the preparation of strategic concentration for a war with the main effort by the Army and Air Force against the West, is no longer of primary importance.

The preparations made to date for the event ("Rot"), however, remain in effect. They contribute, as far as the Army is concerned, towards camouflaging and screening the other strategic concentration and serve, in the case of the Luftwaffe, as a preparation for the shifting of the main effort from the East to the West, which may, under certain circumstances, suddenly become necessary. They also serve as preliminary work for future possibilities of war in the West.

It is left to C in C Army to decide how far the Army strategic concentration "Rot", prepared by OKH for the beginning of the new mobilization year 38/39, will be issued to subordinates.

The tasks which arise for the Navy in "Fall Rot" will be the same as those should "Fall Gruen" be extended to include the Western European nations. The naval preparations are therefore to be continued with the previous objective.

J
K (Initialled by Keitel and Jodl)

388-PS

H1123 - 0087

ITEM 14

Written by an officer

2. DRAFT

MOST SECRET Berlin, 7 July 38

2 copies
1st copy

S. O. only

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Part 3

CONSIDERATIONS

I. In connection with "Gruen".

How the political situation will develop during the execution or after the conclusion of "Gruen" cannot be predicted. Therefore the Armed Forces will confine themselves to the preparation of the measures given in Part I, Number 3, to "Fall Gruen" and "Fall Rot". However, it seems expedient to make at least theoretical considerations and calculations for several possible eventualities, to avoid being mentally unprepared. These considerations would have to cover:

a) What would have to be done if other nations intervened against us during the execution of "Gruen" - contrary to our expectations.

b) What should be done after the conclusion of "Gruen".

To a)

If, during the execution of "Gruen", France intervenes against us, the measures provided in "Fall Gruen" come into force. The primary essential in this connection is to hold the Western fortifications, until the execution of the action "Gruen" permits forces to be freed. Should France be supported by England, in this it will have small effect at first on the land-war. It is the duty of the Air Force, the Navy, and the OKW (War Economy Staff, Defense, Armed Forces Communications), however, to carry out farsighted deliberations in their sphere.

Among the Eastern powers, Russia is the most likely to intervene. This, in the beginning at any rate, will probably consist of reinforcement of the Czech Air Force and Armament. However, the decision must not be neglected concerning what measures are to be taken if Russia were to come to the point of starting a Naval and Air war against us or even wish to penetrate into East Prussia, through the border states.

In the case of a penetration by Poland, we must hold the Eastern fortifications and East Prussia, using the Frontier Guard and other formations, until the conclusion of the action "Gruen" once more gives us freedom of movement.

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To b) If the action "Gruen" takes place still during this Mobilization year, we must be in the position after the conclusion of "Gruen" to put a provisional strategic concentration quickly into force.

In connection with the latter, further to what was said in part 1, number 3, it is of primary importance to safeguard the German frontiers, including the new addition by the Armed Forces, and still have the bulk of the Field Forces and the Air Force at our disposal. It would have to be possible to put such a future strategic concentration, "Frontier Protection," into force separately for the various frontiers.

II. Independent of "Fall Gruen"

Germany will not refrain from occupying the Memel-territory by a lightning blow in the case of a Polish-Lithuanian conflict occurring. The deliberations on this eventuality must cancel the directive issued 18 March 1938 (OKW Nr 472/38 g. Kdos L Ia).

III. General

The branches of the Armed Forces are still allowed to deliberate further on the matter contained in Section I) and II). These however, may be carried out only as theoretical studies within the Supreme Commands without the participation of subordinate authorities.

Z

K (Initialled by Keitel and Zeitzler)

H1123-0089

ITEM 16

Supreme Command of the Armed Forces
No. 1233/38 Most Secret L Ia

Berlin, 22 July 1938

MOST SECRET

2 Copies
1st Copy

To:

Major Schmundt or deputy

I enclose a conference report. Your attention is requested.(e.g. the remark of Chief OKW).

Chief of the Supreme Command
of the Armed Forces

by order

signed Zeitzler

Submitted to the Fuehrer on 1.8.

Schm (pencil note by Schmundt)

Stamp:
Adjutants' Office of the
Armed Forces to the Fuehrer
and Reich Chancellor
Recd. 26? July 1938 App. 1
No. 82/38 Most Secret

388-PS

H1123 - 0090

ITEM 16 pencil note: Maj. Schmundt
1 copy 3rd
report to
Fuehrer

L Ia
to L No. 1233/38 Most Secret

Berlin, 12 July 1938

2 Copies
1st Copy

Conference Notes

K (initialled by Keitel)

MOST SECRET

OKH issues new manoeuvre intentions for 1938. Reason for alteration: development of the Western fortifications and spreading of the foot-and-mouth-disease.

Details:

1). Of the previously intended training manoeuvres, the following remain:

Fall exercise for the I Army Corps
Training exercise for the XI Army Corps
Fortress warfare exercise for the 1st Army Group Command

2). New training manoeuvres:

a). Fighting for fortifications

b). Coordination with the Air Force

c). Cooperation between ground attack, airplanes and field units commencing 1 August in the exercise area

d). Mobilization exercises for the Staffs

e). Supply and communications control

f). Chemical defense and cleansing of contaminated areas

3). Training Manoeuvres for armored divisions:

1st Armored Division up to 24 October at GRAFENWOHR, Corps HQ of the XVI Army Corps will also be there

2nd Armored Division remains in Austria

3rd Armored Division up to 24 September in KOENIGSBRUECK, from 25 September near BRESLAU West of the ODER

4). Training Manoeuvres for motorized divisions ready to march:
exercise
2nd motorized Division in area A, from 28 September, in NEUHAMMER

29th motorized Division in exercise area B

20th motorized Division in exercise area C

13th motorized Division in exercise area D

1st light Division in exercise area E

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ITEM 16 (cont'd)

Commencement of the exercises not before 12 September, the end 24 November.

5). Terrain exercises for units ready to march:

These take place in the following Wehrkreise:

II, III, IV, V, VI, VII, VIII, IX, X, XI, XIII, XVII,

commencement of Terrain exercises: 20 September

6). Training manoeuvres for the mountain divisions composed as on mobilization.

2nd Mountain Division in area STEYR - PICHL - WEGER
3rd Mountain Division in area SEMMERING - BRUCK
commencement of exercises: 26 September, End: 24 November

7). Training Manoeuvres for Training Divisions (Reserve Divisions):

a). 15 August to 13 September:
Training Division VII Army Corps (69th Division) Field units
Exercise Area NEUHAMMER,
Training Division IX Army Corps (52nd Division) Field units
Exercise Area GROSSBORN,
Training Division III Army Corps (68th Division) Field units
Exercise Area JUETERBOG.

b). 9 September to 24 November:
Training Division IV Army Corps (56th Division) Field units
Exercise Area OHRDRUF
Training Division VIII Army Corps (62nd Division) Field units
Exercise Area SENNE
Training Division XIII Army Corps (73rd Division) Field units
Exercise Area MUENDINGEN
Training Division XII Army Corps (79th Division) Field units
Exercise Area WAHN
From about 24 September these 4 divisions will train West of the RHINE.

8). New dispositions:

a). Truck Regiment 616, 20 September to 24 October disposition by III Army Corps.

b). Army Artillery:

6 battalions: 15 August to 3 September disposition and training
11 battalions: 9 September to 24 October disposition and training.

Of these, beginning 24 September:

5 battalions, to Reserve divisions West of the RHINE
6 battalions to Terrain exercises of troops "ready to march"

c). Engineer Battalions:

3 Engineer Battalions, 9 September to 24 October, disposition and training.

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H1123 - 0092

ITEM 16 (cont'd)

of these 2 battalions, 20 September, to terrain training of troops "ready to march"
1 battalion, from 20 September to Reserve Division West of the Rhine.

d). Artillery Intelligence Regiments:

4 battalions and 2 Telephone communications companies (motorized)
9 September to 24 November.

Disposition and training; from 28 September, the battalions will be situated in the neighborhood of BRESLAU, GRAFENWOEHR , NEWHAMMER, INGOISTADT.

9). Employment of Engineer Battalions on the Western fortifications:

Employment of Engineer Battalions extended for no longer than 3 weeks, also 7 Engineer battalions will be added.

10). Reich Party Rally and Harvest Festival:

Participation remains as intended.

11). Foreign Military Delegations:

The foreign Military Delegations as well as foreign military attaches will be invited to attend the fall exercises of the I Army Corps.

Z (initialled by ZEITZLER)

388-PS

H1123 - 0093

ITEM 17

Chief Section L — Written by General Staff Officer

MOST SECRET

S.O. Only — Berlin, 24 August 1938

access only through Officer

1 Copy

TIMING OF THE X- ORDER AND THE QUESTION OF ADVANCE MEASURES

The Luftwaffe's endeavor to take the enemy air forces by surprise at their peace-time airports justifiably leads them to oppose measures taken in advance of the X-order and to the demand that the X-order itself be given sufficiently late on X minus 1 to prevent the fact of Germany's mobilization becoming known to Czechoslovakia on that day.

The army's efforts are tending in the opposite direction. It intends to let OKW coordinate all advance measures between X minus 3 and X minus 1, which will contribute to the smooth and rapid working of the mobilization. With this in mind OKW also demands that the X order be given not later than 1400 on X minus 3.

To this the following must be said:

Operation (aktion) Gruen will be set in motion by means of an "incident" in Czechoslovakia which will give Germany provcation for military intervention. The fixing of the exact time for this incident is of the utmost importance.

It must come at a time when weather conditions are favorable for our superior air forces to go into action and at an hour which will enable authentic news of it to reach us on the afternoon of X minus 1.

It can then be spontaneously answered by the giving of the X order at 1400 on X minus 1.

On X minus 2 the Navy, Army and Air Force will merely receive an advance warning.

If the Fuehrer intends to follow this plan of action, all further discussion is superfluous.

For then no advance measures may be taken before X minus 1 for which there is not an innocent explanation as we shall otherwise appear to have manufactured the incident. Orders for absolutely essential advance measures must be given in good time and camouflaged with the help of the numerous manoeuvres and exercises.

Also, the question raised by the Foreign Office as to whether all Germans should be called back in time from prospective enemy territories must in no way lead to the conspicuous departure from Czechoslovakia of any German subjects before the incident.

Even a warning of the diplomatic representatives in PRAGUE is impossible before the first air attack, although the consequences could be very grave in the event of their becoming victims of such an attack (e.g. death of representatives of friendly or confirmed neutral powers.)

388-PS

H1123 - 0094

ITEM 17 (cont'd)

If, for technical reasons, the evening hours should be considered desirable for the incident, then the following day cannot be X day, but it must be the day after that.

In any case we must act on the principle that nothing must be done before the incident which might point to mobilization, and that the swiftast possible action must be taken after the incident. (X-Fall)

It is the purpose of these notes to point out what a great interest the Wehrmacht has in the incident and that it must be informed of the Fuehrer's intentions in good time - insofar as the Abwehr Section is not also charged with the organization of the incident.

I request that the Fuehrer's decision be obtained on these points.

J 26/8

Notes:

Submitted on 30.8

The Fuehrer will act on these lines.

On 31.8 Col. v. S. Jodl notified. Schm 31.8 Col. Jodl

(initialled by Jodl)

388-PS

H1123-0095

ITEM 18

CONFERENCE

on 3 September 38
at the BERGHOF

Present: The Fuhrer
Generaloberet v. Brauchitsch
General of Artillery Keitel
Major Schmundt

I.

Gen. Ob. v. Brauchitsch — Reports on the exact time of the transfer of the troops to "exercise areas" for "Gruen". Field units to be transferred on 28 Sept. From here will then be ready for action. When X Day becomes known, field units carry out exercises in opposite directions.

Fuhrer — Has objection. Troops assemble field units a 2-day march away. Carry out camoflage exercises everywhere.

? — OKH must know when X-day is by 1200 noon, 27 September.

II.

The Fuhrer — Expresses different opinion on employment of troops for "Gruen". Aspects for the 2nd Army (OS) are smallest. Strongest Cz. fortifications there. Waste of troops; thrust in the 10th Army area, however, is promising. Roadblocks prepared everywhere in addition also in 2nd Army area. No reason for hinderance. The Czechs will stop opposite 2nd army and keep assault army ready east of PRAGUE. A thrust against it into the heart of Cz. is to be made. Thrust in the 14th army area will fail because of means of transport. Therefore assemble all mot. and arm'd divisions with 10th army and employ in the thrust. Once we are through there, the South front, which is built up opposite our 12th army in 3 defense lines, will collapse. An army in the heart of BOHEMIA will bring about the decision. Possible repetition of VERDUN in case of 2nd army. An attack there would mean bleeding to death for a task which cannot be accomplished.

v. Brauchitsch — Has objections because of the state of the mot. divisions, supply and untrained leaders.

388-PS

H1123 - 0096

ITEM 18

The Fuhrer: The course now planned corresponds to Cz. expectations. Opposite the 10th Army the enemy is not always in concrete emplacements. Possibility here of drawing in the Henlein people (uniforms). The line here is very far back. Cooperation between 10th and 12th armies. We must add motorized units to army. As formerly the "Prussian Cavalry." How else can we gather experiences? Decisive is the coordination of equal speeds. Breakthrough in sector of 2nd army not so rapid, so that a tactical success can be turned into a strategic one. The Fuhrer gives orders for the development of the Western fortifications: improvement of advance positions around AACHEN and SAARBRUCKEN. Construction of 300 to 400 battery positions (1600 artillery pieces). He emphasizes flanking action.

Certified.

SCHMUNDT, Major on the General Staff
BERGHOF, 4 Sept 1938

* * *

(In Schmundt's writing)

388-PS

H1123-0097

ITEM 19

S. O. Only

MOST SECRET

DISCUSSION
Nuremberg, 9 Sept to 10 Sept, 2200 to 0330.

Present: Fuhrer
General oberst v. Brauchitsch
General Halder
General Keitel
Major Schmundt
Hauptmann Engel
Hauptmann v. Below (?)

General Halder states reasons for operational plan "Gruen".
Mission: to prevent retreat of Cz. Army from Moravia - Bohemia area. To beat army. To bring about rapid decision. Mission can be accomplished by pincer attack in the direction of OLUMUTZ and BRUUN to be undertaken by 2nd and 14th Armies. Difficult transport situation in Austria. Therefore main effort in 2nd Army area. Cz. frontier can only be lightly held. Withdrawal certain on part of Cz forces. Several defensive lines favorable by terrain will delay second thrusts and allow time to be gained for a Cz retreat, and so retain a rear position. This is to be avoided. The Bohemian Moravian heights which will confront the attacker in the last phase will favor probable Cz line of action. The pincer attack makes a "rear attack" from behind these heights possible. This operation will definitely succeed. Reserves at first mainly local. Further reserves near and south of Prague. Opponent won't have time to form further reserves. Opponent does not possess closed armoured forces. They are distributed and consist of light units.

2nd Army. Weaknesses opposite its sector recognized. Installations only partly completed. Mostly lack armd cupolas. There are great gaps. Olumutz will be reached on the second day. OPPA is no obstacle, can be crossed by tanks as well as Inf. No armd forces opposing. FREUDENTAL only 35 men garrison? So-called light motorized forces on right flank are no danger. Consist party of Mounted units and will be engaged by adjoining Army. Were the attack, against expectations, to fail, then under no circumstances "bleed to death" before the position. Strategic concentration to be flexible. Rear sections will then be brought up to the points where success has been achieved. Cz fears the GLAZ mountain area. Only demonstrations to be staged in this area; there will be a tie up of Cz forces. To provide cover eastwards tanks will be valuable.

On the rest of the mountain front: 4th (9 ?) Corps, and in the frontier sector demonstrations must be staged to tie up forces.

12th and 14th Armies will work together. Their columns must necessarily support one another during the thrust and cause the front to collapse. Bohemia only weakly occupied at frontier: 1 Division to 120 kms. Operation therefore promising. After the thrust in a northerly direction 12 Army forces east and "races" for Brunn. The enemy will not be able to employ reserves according to plan.

10th Army faces PILSEN RIEGEL which is strongly fortified. Bad roads. Tanks must break through here and establish bridgeheads for following up forces. Forces of the next wave will be brought up by truck units. After the 3rd and 4th Mobilization day 6 further divisions will be brought up to the 2nd and 3rd line and can be employed where success is in the balance.

388-PS

H1123 - 0098

ITEM 19

The Fuhrer: We should not plan the action on the operations as we desire them, but take into consideration the probable course of action pursued by the enemy. With regard to his course of action two factors are decisive:
1. At the time of our rearmament between 1934 and 1938 our opponent must have endeavoured to secure himself against a tearing of the East-West Communication, in his case probably between TRAPPAU and NIKOLSBURG. Against us this would imply the building of fortifications on the Upper Silesian frontier. In the South an agreement with Austria would achieve a defense north of the Danube, or an advance to the DANUBE to protect the Southern flank.
2. The latter is no longer possible. Therefore, as a result of the situation created in March 1938, it is all the more probable that they have increased their fortifications opposite our 2nd army. The enemy must hold there - otherwise there is no sense in holding the remaining front. Hence here the best regiments and fortifications are to be expected. Holding of the front facing the 2nd Army will decide the "To be or Not to be" of Cz. There is no doubt that the planned pincer movement is the most desirable solution and should take place. But its success is nevertheless too uncertain for it to be depended on. Especially as a rapid success is necessary from a political point of view. The first 8 days are politically decisive, within that week a far-reaching territorial gain must be achieved. Our artillery (210cm Howitzers) not adequate against fortifications. Where an attack is expected the element of surprise is ruled out. Besides from experience difficult to refrain from an action that achieves only part-success. More and more units are thrown into breaks and bleeding-to-death which one wanted to avoid, sets in (VERDUN!!) Tanks are used up and are not available for the subsequent territory-gaining operation. The consequence is that motorized divisions have to advance without tanks. ("Tables Turned")
Also the objectives of the motorized units are not too far-removed and can be gained without fighting, so that they could be equally well gained by infantry troops. The motorized divisions will not be able to influence a decision to any extent. It is the task of motorized forces to bridge areas free of the enemy. Where an attack opens up a large, free space the commitment of motorized forces is justified. Compare with the use of army cavalry at the beginning of the 1914 war. It is catastrophic for tanks to have to stop and wait for infantry. This contradicts all laws of logic. In the 14th army sector fortifications can only have been begun since March. Hence, thrust toward BRUNN will be easier. 2nd Pz Div can therefore be left there. However, this division should operate with the 29th motorized division. Therefore the 29th must not arrive on the evening of the 2nd day. The 2nd Pz must constitute the advance column of the 29th Div (Mot.) Are the road conditions suitable for the 29th? The 13th Division, which has no prospects of success as a Mot. division with the 12th Army, is to be transferred to the REICHENAU Army together with 2nd Motorized Div. Thus 2 chances for victory will be created.
If pincer movement has no success, 10th Army will open way for 12th Army, bringing strong forces into the heart of the country. If both operations are successful, this means the end of Cz. In place of the two motorized divisions it is preferable to mobilize two further divisions which are to be brought up in trucks and buses. For the 10th Army the turn Northeast toward PRAGUE may become necessary.

General Oberst v. BRAUCHITSCH: Employment of motorized divisions was based on the difficult rail situation in Austria and the difficulties in getting other divs. (ready to march) into the area at the right time. In the West vehicles will have to leave on the 20th of Sept., if X-Day remains as planned. Workers leave on the 23rd, by relays. Specialist workers remain according to decision by Army Command 2.

388-PS

H1123-0099

ITEM 19.

The Fuhrer: Doesn't see why workers have to return home as early as X-11. Other workers and people are also on the way on mobilization day. Also the RR cars, they will stand around unnecessarily later on.

General Keitel: Workers are not under the jurisdiction of district commands (Bezirks Kdos.) in the West. Trains must be assembled.

v. Brauchitsch: 235,000 men RAD (Labour Service) will be drafted. 96 Construction Bns will be distributed (also in the east). 40,000 trained laborers stay in the West.

Fuhrer: Trained men should be distributed among newly formed divisions on 2nd line.

BRAUCHITSCH: Will be investigated. Implies change of mobilization orders if war orders already in the hands of the people.

General Construction Inspector Dr. Todt(late brought into the conference): Delays in unloading of material through slow changeover in timetable of RRs only from 15 September. Transports must be in their appointed positions by X minus 11. Air zone to take 2nd place to the Infantry zone. Build battery positions.

Certified

/s/ SCHMUNDT

Major on Gen. Staff

388-PS

H1123-0100

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 388-PS
(cont'd)

ITEM 20

Schm (initialled by Schmundt)

Nuremberg, 10 September 1938

Stamp
Office of the Armed Forces
Adjutant attached to the
Fuehrer Reich Chancellor
Received 19 September 1938

The Fuehrer and Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces

TOP SECRET

1). The whole RAD organization comes under the command of the Supreme Command of the Army effective 15 September.

2). The Chief of OKW decides on the First commitments of this organization in conjunction with the Reichs Labor Leader (Reichsarbeitsfuehrer) and on assignments from time to time to the Supreme Commands of the Navy, Army and Air Force. Where questions arise with regard to competeney he will make a final decision in accordance with my instructions.

3). For the time being this order is to be made known only to the departments and personnel immediately concerned.

(signed) ADOLF HITLER

Supreme Command of the Armed Forces
No. 2038/38 Most Secret WFA/L IIc

T 9.9

Distribution:

C-in-C of the Army
Reich Minister for Air and C-in-C of the Air Force
C-in-C of the Navy
Reichsminister of the Interior
for the attention of Ministerial Director Dr. Danchwerts
Head of Reich Labor Service through Adwin Office (VOA)

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388-PS

H1123-0101

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 388-PS
(cont'd)

ITEM 21

Berlin, 14 September 1938

Supreme Command of the Armed Forces
No. 2044/38 Most Secret WFA/L IIc

12 Copies

Stamp
Office of the Adjutant of the Armed Forces attached to the Fuehrer and Reichs Chancellor
Received 19 Sept. 1938
Reg. No. 198/35
Despatched Schm
Clerk (initialled by Schmidt)

SUBJECT: Employment of Reich Labor Service for Manoeuvres with Wehrmacht.

I. Effective 15 September the following units will be under command of the C-in-C of the Army

1). The RAD forces of the light road construction battalions.

2). Those parent units of construction troops which are to be formed from personnel from 2 Gau Commands, 21 RAD Group Commands, and 91 RAD Battalions of Wehrkreis. HQs VII, IX and XIII, and set up at Army Group HQ 2 (Heeresgruppenkommando) for the purpose of carrying out exercises within the areas of Wehrkreis HQs V and XII.

3). a). The staff of Labor Gau W (Arbeitsgaustab) and the section and group staffs of the RAD employed on the construction of the Western fortifications and also RAD Battalions with the exception of those branches of the RAD attached to the Reich Minister for Air and the C-in-C of the Air Force (compare Section 8).

b). Labor Gaus XXI, XXIV, XXV, XXVI, XXVII, and XXXII come under the Supreme Command of the Army only in matters affecting the defence of the country. Those RAD units from these Labor Gaus employed at the moment for purposes of the Country's Kultur etc. will retain these tasks for the time being, Labor Service for Girls (AWJ) is excepted from coming under the control of the Supreme Command of the Army.

c). It must be borne in mind, when allotting military tasks to those sections of the RAD named in a). and b). above, that in accordance with Appendix 7 to the Army Mobilization Plan for Deputy Gau Commands, Deputy Group Commands and Guard Units will remain with the RAD if and when mobilization takes place.

4). The C-in-C of the Army and Reichs Labor Leader are requested to discuss all details under 1. and 3 direct.

II). 5). Light road construction battalions are training-units of the Army. Their members are regarded as having been drafted into the Armed Forces for manoeuvre purposes and are soldiers.

6). The members of remaining formations as per 2 and 3 who have been taken exclusively from the RAD will remain RAD leaders or men until mobilization.

But it is possible that they will have to be attached to the Army for administration or that the army must furnish money if difficulties are encountered in prompt payment of the men.

The C-in-C of the Army and the Reich Labor Leader are requested to settle details by direct agreement.

H1123-0102

ITEM 21 (cont'd)

7). In case of mobilization the regulations laid down in Appendix 7 of the plan for the mobilization of the army come into effect automatically and apply also to those exercise formations for which there have up to now been restrictive regulations with regard to their coming fully under the command of the Army.

III). 8). Those RAD staffs and Battalions made over to the Luftwaffe, in the Limes area will be under command of the Reich Minister for Air and the C-in-C of the Air Force beginning September 15. The same regulations apply in essence to them.

The Chief of the Supreme Command
of the Armed Forces

By Order

Signed Keitel

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HOFMANN

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388-PS

H1123-0103

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 388-PS
(cont'd)

ITEM 22

MOST SECRET

Berlin, 16 September 1938

Supreme Command of the Armed Forces
WFA No. 194/38 Most Secret S.O. Only L Ia

7 Copies
5th Copy

S.O. Only

19.9.38
Schm

Access only through Officer

Subject: Preparations on part of Reichsbahn etc.

The Reichsbahn must provide trains of empty trucks in great numbers by September 28 for the carrying out of mobilization exercises. This task now takes precedence over all others.

Therefore the train-loads for the LIMES-job will have to be cut down after September 17 and those goods loaded previous to this date unloaded by September 20.

The Supreme Command of the Army (5th Division of the Army General Staff) must issue further orders after consultation with the authorities concerned.

However, in accordance with the Fuehrer's directive, every effort should be made to continue to supply the materials in as large quantities as feasible even after 20th September 1938, and this for reasons of camouflage as well as in order to continue the important work on the Limes.

Reports should be submitted on what can be done in this direction.

Chief of the Supreme Command
of the Armed Forces

signed Keitel

Distribution:

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General Inspector for Roads	1 (Copy 3)	Oberest on the General Staff

Major Schmundt

5

388-PS

H1123-0104

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 388-PS
(cont'd)

ITEM 24

Berlin, September 16, 1939

MOST SECRET

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Supreme Command of the Armed Forces
No. 2120/38 Most Secret WFA/ L IIc

Stamp
Office of the Armed Forces Adjutant attached to the Fuehrer and Reich Chancellor
Rec. 19th Sept. 1938,
Enclosures
Reg. No. 199138
Despatched
Clerk

Schm (initialled by Schmundt)

Subject: Employment of the Reich Labor Service (RAD)

1). The following RAD forces will receive military training in accordance with the instructions of the C-in-C of the Army:

From the area of the IInd Army Korps (AKs)	7 Battalions
IIIrd	2 Battalions
IVth	31 Battalions
Vth	1 Battalion
VIth	78 Battalions
VIIth	1 Battalion
IXth	65 Battalions
Xth	84 Battalions
XIth	33 Battalions

For the time being these battalions are still part of the RAD in matters regarding personnel, administration, and discipline.

2). The C-in-C of the Army and Reich Labor Leader are requested to settle all details by direct agreement.

For the Chief of the Supreme
Command of the Armed Forces

By Order

Jodl

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388-PS

H1123-0105

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT ~~388-PS~~
(Cont'd)

ITEM 25

(Handwritten note) MOST SECRET S. O. ONLY

LAST NIGHT CONFERENCE TOOK PLACE BETWEEN FUHRER AND OBERSTLEUTNANT KOECHLING. DURATION OF CONFERENCE 7 MINUTES. LT. COL KOECHLING REMAINS DIRECTLY RESPONSIBLE TO OKW. HE WILL BE ASSIGNED TO KONRAD HENLEIN IN AN ADVISORY CAPACITY. HE RECEIVED FAR-REACHING MILITARY PLENARY POWERS FROM THE FUHRER. THE SUDETEN GERMAN FREE CORPS REMAINS RESPONSIBLE TO KONRAD HENLEIN ALONE. PURPOSE: PROTECTION OF THE SUDETEN GERMANS AND MAINTENANCE OF DISTURBANCES AND CLASHES.
THE FREE CORPS WILL BE ESTABLISHED IN GERMANY. ARMAMENT ONLY WITH AUSTRIAN WEAPONS. ACTIVITIES OF FREE CORPS TO BEGIN AS SOON AS POSSIBLE.

(Pencil Note) 1045, 18 Sept 38
radioed to Capt.
Engel, Berlin.

388-PS

H1123-0106

ITEM 26

(Handwritten note) MOST SECRET S. O. ONLY

(In ink)
18.9
38
1030
vb

GERMAN 2nd ARMY - COSEL - 7 Inf. Div's, 1 Armd Div, 1 Inf Div on trucks, 1 Light Div, of these the following arrive on 1st X day: Two-thirds of one Inf Div, 1 Armd Div, and 1 Inf Div on trucks.

On 2nd X Day: one-third of one Inf Div.
On 3rd X Day: 1 Inf Div
On 4th X Day: 1 Inf Div
On 5th X Day: 2 Inf Divs from 7th day on 1 Inf Div and one light Div.

8th Army: - FREIBURG - 4 Inf Divs. The following is the timetable for arrival:
On 2nd X Day: two-thirds of one Inf Div
On 3rd X Day: one-third of one Inf Div
On 4th and 5th X-Day: One Inf Div each day.
4th Army Corps - Herrenhut, 2 Inf Divs of which one will arrive on the 1st day, the other on the 3rd day.

10th Army:- SCHWANDORF - 3 Inf Div's, 1 Armd Div, 1 Light Div, 3 Mot Inf Divs. They will arrive as follows:
On 1st X Day: 1 Inf Div and 1 Armd Div. 1 Light Div, 2 Mot Inf Divs.
On 2nd X Day: 1 Inf Div., 1 Mot Inf Div.
On 4th X Day: 1 Inf Div.

12th Army:- PASSAU - 7 Inf Div's, 1 Mountain Div, 1 Inf Div on trucks, Regt.. They arrive as follows:
On 1st X Day: 1 Inf Div, 1 Mountain Div.
On 2nd X-Day: 2 Inf Div, 1 Inf Div on trucks
On 4th X Day: 2 Inf Div's.
On 7th X Day: 1 Inf Div.
On 8th X Day: 1 Inf Div.

14th Army: - VIENNA - 1 Inf Div, 2 Mountain Div's, 1 Armd Div, 1 Light Div, 1 Mot Inf Div. N N Mot (?) They will arrive as follows:
On 1st X Day: one-third of one Inf Div, 1 Armd Div, 1 Mot. Div.
On 2nd X Day: 2/3 of one Inf Div, 1 Light Div.
On 3rd X Day: 2 Mountain Divs.

END

Reich War Ministry / Naval Communication Service

MOST SECRET 18.9

Renewed attention is called to strictest observance of secrecy regarding following message. Noted. Message begins -
(There follows a repetition of the above telegram in its exact form.)

Any questions?

388-PS

H1123-0107

ITEM 27

Army Appointments Held

Army Group Command:	C-in-C: Gen. of Inf Adam CofS : Gen. of Inf Wietersheim G-3 : Lt. Co. Muller
1st Army HQ:	C-in-C: Ge. of Arty Beck CofS : Maj. Gen. v. Apell G-3 : Col. v. Greiffenberg
2nd Army HQ:	C-in-C: Gen. v. Rundstedt CofS : BrigGen v. Salmuth G-3 : Lt.Col.Hasse
3rd Army HQ:	C-in-C: Ge.Arty v. Kuechler CofS : Brig.Gen.Hollidt G-3 : Lt.Col.Wagner
4th Army HQ:	C-in-C: Gen. (for special duties) v. Hamerstein CofS : Maj.Gen. Viebahn G-3 : Lieut.Col. Metz
5th Army HQ:	C-in-C: Gen. of Inf Liebmann CofS : Brig. Gen. v. Sodenstern G-3 : Col. Duvert
7th Army HQ:	C-in-C: Gen. of Inf (for special duties) Baron Zeutter v. Lotzen CofS : Brig. Gen. Modl G-3 : Col. v. Witzleben
8th Army HQ:	C-in-C: Gen. v. Bock CofS : Brig. Gen. Felber G-3 : Col. Hauffe
10th Army HQ:	C-in-C: Gen. of Arty v. Reichenau CofS : Brig. Gen. Bernard G-3 : Col. Dostler
12th Army HQ:	C-in-C: Gen. Ritter (for special duties) v. Leeb CofS : Maj Gen. v. Lewinsky, known as v. Manstein G-3 : Lt. Col. Blumentritt
14th Army HQ:	C-in-C: Gen. of Inf List CofS : Maj Gen. Ruoff G-3 : Col. Wohler

388-PS

ITEM 29

Chief, OKW

Berlin, 21 Sept 1938

If the Czech Government accepts terms:

a. Cession of Sudeten German territory

b. Plebiscite in Czech-German territories,

The following military measures are to be considered:

1. The withdrawal by the Czechs from this territory of troops, police and Gendarmerie and other military units.
2. The immediate surrender of arms in these territories.
3. The immediate surrender of all fortifications in the areas with all arms and equipment.
4. The immediate evacuation of fortifications by the military outside the above territories.
5. The withdrawal of all military power behind a security line, which will include the fortifications under (4).
6. The right of the German Wehrmacht to use all public transportation and communications, especially the railroads, for military purposes.
7. The right to fly over the above territories and to maintain Air security up to the security line.
8. The occupation of territories to be ceded including the adjoining railroad junctions, communications installations, towns, airfields, etc. inland beyond the last fortification line.
9. Pacification and security of the Plebiscite Areas by:
   a. German Police (originally)
   b. International Police (later for plebiscite)
10. Demobilization of the entire Czech armed forces in the remaining area of the country, discharge of all reserves, etc.
11. Immediate discharge of all Sudeten-Germans in the armed forces from the whole of Czechoslovakia to be sent home into Sudeten-Germany.
12. Closing down of entire armament industry until after the end of all negotiations.

388-PS

H1123-0108

H1123-0109

ITEM 29

13. a. Prohibition of any new fortifications and field fortifications opposite the security line.

    b. Destruction of all existing fortifications which are situated beyond the future German borders.

14. Demand further cession of territory on military grounds, namely the Prossburg bridgehead, the area northwest of Pilsen, the Eger sector west of the Elbe to Laun.

15. Security line must be 25 km from the territory being ceded to Germany or the territory being put to the vote. (See number 5).

16. Cessation, immediately, of all military Intelligence work against Germany. Violation will be considered breach of neutrality.

17. Immediate pardon and release of all Germans and Sudeten-Germans, convicted of espionage.

18. Transfer of all Czech Air Force personnel to their peace time garrisons and prohibiting of all military flying operations.

19. Prohibition of destruction or sabotage of any military installations, including ground installations of the Air Force, in the territories to be ceded.

20. The closing down and handing over to the German armed forces of all radio transmitters of a military, official or private nature in the areas to be ceded.

21. The handing over of all Railroad networks including rolling stock , undamaged.

22. The handing over of all Public Utilities (power houses, gas works, etc.) undamaged.

23. No materials of any kind to be transferred (such as raw materials, provisions, livestock, etc.)

24. Prohibition of import of war equipment of any kind.

25. Demobilization of Danube patrol and security vessels.

388-PS

H1123-0110

ITEM 30

Bayreuth 134

Pencil Note: Written by Schmundt: Not sent off. Sehm

HEADQUARTERS OF THE SUDETEN-GERMAN FREE CORPS

Herr Benesch has dissolved the Sudeten-German Party and believes that he will thus be able to destroy the unity of the Sudeten-German radical group and to deal the death blow to the Sudeten-Germans. Konrad Henlein knew the answer to this. He issued a call on 17.9.38 for the formation of a Sudeten-German Free Corps. Within a few hours, thousands of Sudeten-Germans had already rallied to the colors all along the border. Thousands who were burning to fight for their tortured homeland were forced, to their great disappointment, to remain at their places of work, because it was impossible, in such a short period of time, to induct, equip and arm the masses of enthusiastic volunteers. For even in the first few hours after the appeal, (probably the first instance in the History of the Free Corps) shock troops of the Free Corps began, in extremely daring operations, to secure the escape of their countrymen who had been hounded out of their homeland by their torturers.

Since 19 Sept. - in more than 300 missions - the Free Corps has executed its task with an amazing spirit of attack (defense)* and with a willingness often reaching a degree of unqualified self-sacrifice. The result of the first phase of its activities: more than 1500 prisoners, 25 MG's and a large amount of other weapons and equipment, aside from serious loses in dead and wounded suffered by the enemy (The Czech Terrorists)*.

Thousands of members of the Sudeten-German Free Corps stand shoulder to shoulder on the frontiers of Germany. They are inspired by but one desire: The freedom of the homeland within Adolf Hitler's Greater Germany.

For Konrad Henlein

The Chief of Staff

*The superimposed corrections represent actual ink corrections on the original manuscript.

H1123-0111

Adj to the Fuhrer

(Note in pencil)

28/7
Schm.

Item 31

Supreme Command of the Armed Forces Berlin 27.9.1938

MOST SECRET 1920 hours.

WFA/L No. 2305/38 Most Secret II 45 copies
16th copy

The Fuhrer has approved the mobilization without warning of the five regular west divisions (26th, 34th, 36th, 32, and 35th). The Fuhrer and Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces has expressly reserved the right to issue the order for employment in the fortification zone and the evacuation of this zone by workers of the TODT organization.

It is left to the OKH -- to assemble as far as possible first of all the sections ready to march and subsequently the remaining sections of the divisions in marshalling areas behind the western fortifications.

CHIEF OF THE SUPREME COMMAND
OF THE ARMED FORCES.

Signed. Keitel

Distribution: II.

C 000473

388-PS

H1123-0112

Stamp:
Office of the Armed Forces
Adjutant attached
To the Führer and
Reich Chancellor
Recd. 3 Oct 1938
Reg. No. 259/38 Most Secret

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 388 PS
cont.

pencil note: Adjutant to the Fuehrer

Item 32

Supreme Command of the Armed Forces
No. 2288/38 Most Secret WFA/L II

Berlin 27 Sept 1938

Subject: Mobilization Measures:

Most Secret

To : The Deputy Führer via Administrative Offices (J)
The Reichsfuhrer SS and Chief of German Police Express
attn: S.S. Oberführer. 47 copies
18th copy

As a result of the political situation the Führer and Chancellor has ordered mobilization measures for the Armed Forces, without the political situation being aggravated by issuing the mobilization (X) order or corresponding code-words.

Within the framework of these mobilization measures it is necessary for the Armed Forces authorities to issue demands to the various Party authorities and their organisations, which are connected with the previous issuing of the Mobilization order, the advance measures or special code names.

The special situation makes it necessary that these demands be met (even if the code word has not been previously issued) immediately and without being referred to higher authorities.

OKW requests that subordinate offices be given immediate instructions to this effect so that the mobilization of the Armed Forces can be carried out according to plan.

Following are several examples of cases where previous mobilization measures were delayed and a recurrence of which might seriously endanger the mobilization of the Armed Forces:

1) The SA in Wehrkreis XI refused to give up equipment requisitioned by the Armed Forces in accordance with mobilization regulations, because mobilization has not yet taken place.

2) Billets which were prepared for troops under mobilization regulations were not evacuated because mobilization has not taken place. (NSKK-School KREISCHWITZ - SILESIA).

3) Police authorities refused to give up Police Radio Stations for the A/C reporting network, although the A/C reporting service had already been called up.

The Supreme Command of the Armed Forces further requests that all measures not provided for in the plans which are undertaken by Party Organisations or Police units as a result of the political situation, be reported in every case and in plenty of time to the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces. Only then can it be guaranteed that these measures can be carried out in practice.

The Chief of the Supreme Command
of the Armed Forces.

KEITEL

Further:
Distribution II

388-PS

H1123-0113

23.9.38

Item 33

MOST SECRET

MEMORANDUM

At 1300 September 27 the Führer and Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces ordered the movement of the assault units from their exercise areas to their jumping-off points.

The assault units (about 21 reinforced regiments, or 7 divisions,) must be ready to begin the action against "Grün" on September 30, the decision having been made one day previously by 1200 noon.

This order was conveyed to General Keitel at 1320 through Major Schmundt. (pencil note by Schmundt)

388-PS

H1123-0114

Stamp: Office of the Armed Forces Adjutant initialed Schm.
Attached to the Fuhrer and Reich Chancellor

Recd: 3 October 1938

Req. No.: 261/38 Most Secret

Item 34

Adj. to the Führer

Berlin, 28 Sept 38

Supreme Command of the Armed Forces.
No. 2310/38 Most Secret L I a

45 copies
16th copy.

MOST SECRET

To define spheres of responsibility on the Cz-German frontier, the following orders are issued:

Through mobilization of the frontier guard (Grenzwacht) responsibility has shifted entirely onto the army, that is onto the competent general staff corps. All the units operating on the frontier are subordinate to them.

No new units of police, customs or party may be shifted into the immediate frontier area without the knowledge of the army headquarters concerned, nor may units already in the area be reinforced without such knowledge. In addition no one may cross the frontier without the knowledge of the army headquarters.

For the Henlein Free Corps and units subordinate to this the principle remains valid, that they receive instructions direct from the Fuhrer and that they carry out their operations only in conjunction with the competent general staff corps. The advance units of the Free Corps will have to report to the local commander of the frontier guard immediately before crossing the frontier.

Those units remaining forward of the frontier should -- in their own interests -- get into communication with the frontier guard as often as possible.

As soon as the army crosses the Cz border the Henlein Free Corps will be subordinate to the OKH. Thus it will be expedient to assign a sector to the Free Corps even now which can be fitted into the scheme of army boundaries later.

388-PS

H1123-0115

The frontier guard has orders only to protect the German frontier, and not to take part in operations on the other side of the border. Any support to the Free Corps by the frontier guards anywhere over the frontier is prohibited.

Chief of the Supreme Command of the
Armed Forces

Keitel

Distribution II
plus:
Reich Minister of the Interior
Reich Finance Minister
Deputy of the Fuhrer
S.A. Hqs.
Reichsführer SS
Reich Labour Service

Volunteer Corps Henlein (Oberstlt Köchling)

(The following 2 pages are an exact duplicate: Copy 33

388-PS

H1123-0116

Stamp: Office of the Armed Forces Adjutant
Attached to the Fuhrer and Reich Chancellor

Recd: 3 October 1938 (pencil noted: Adjutant to the Fuehrer)

Req. No: 262/39 Most Secret

Item 35 Berlin, Sept 28, 1938

Supreme Command of the Armed Forces
No. 2315/38 Most Secret WFA/L II

MOST SECRET.

Re: Advance Measures Pertaining to Mobilization Plan (Army) Special Appendix 5

Following advance measures may be carried out:
On the Franco-German border (WEHRKREIS V and XII)

1. Special Group Siegfried, Kz9148 -- preparation of organization for the reception of refugees.
2. Special Group Siegfried, Kz9145 -- Preparation of employment of district offices and staffs of collecting areas for the discharging of reservists.

Chief of the Supreme Command of the
Armed Forces

(Signed) Keitel

Distribution II

388-PS

H1123-0117

Stamp: Office of the Armed Forces Adjutant
Attached to the Fuhrer and Reich Chancellor

Recd: 3 Oct. 1938 pencil note: Adjutant to the Fuehrer

Req. No: 260/38 Secret Schm.

Item 36

Supreme Command of the Armed Forces. Berlin, Sept 28, 1938
No. 2335/38 Most Secret WFA/L II

45 copies
16th copy

Subject: 4 SS-Totenkopf Batallions subordinate to the C in C Army.

To : Reichsfuhrer SS and Chief of the German Police. MOST SECRET
(SS Central Office) (36 copies)

By order of the Supreme Command of the armed forces the following Bn's of the SS Deaths Head organization will be under the command of the C in C Army with immediate effect.

II and III Bn. of the 2nd SS-Totenkopf Regiment Brandenburg at present in Brieg (Upper Silesia)

I and II Bn. of the 3rd SS-Totenkopf Regiment Thuringia at present in Radebeul and Kotzenbroda near Dresden.

C in C Army is requested to deploy these Bn's for the West, (Upper Rhine) according to the Fuhrer's instructions.

These SS-Totenkopf units now operating in the Asch promontory (I and II Bn of Oberbayern Regiment) will come under the C in C Army only when they return to German Reich territory, or when the Army crosses the German-Cz. frontier.

It is requested that all further arrangements be made between C in C Army and Reichsfuhrer-SS. (SS Central Office)

For the Chief of the Supreme Command
of the Armed Forces.

Jodl

Further:

Distribution II

388-PS

H1123-0118

L II b

Item 37

28.9.38.

MEMORANDUM

SA-General Herzog answers question of Adjutant's Office, Chief of Staff of the SA, 1600:

Reichsfuhrer SS, on the 26th of Sept., issued order to Chief of Staff of Sudeten German Free Corps Ref. Diary 38/Most Secret according to which the Volunteer Corps would come under the command of the Reichsfuhrer SS in case of German invasion of the Sudeten German territory.

The order was signed by Berger, SS-Colonel.

J. (initialled by Jodl)

388-PS

H1123-0119

ITEM 38

Stamp - as usual
Recd 3 Oct 1938
Req No. 263/38 MOST SECRET

Adjutant to the Fuhrer

Supreme Command of the Armed Forces
No. 2385/38. Most Secret. L I a

Berlin 30.9.38
1600 hrs

120 Copies
16th copy

MOST SECRET

Subject: Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces No. 2371/38 Most Secret. OKW/WFA L I a dated 30.9.38

SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS NUMBER 2 TO DIRECTIVE NO I.

1. Attachment of Henlein Free Corps:

The Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces has just ordered that the Henlein Free Corps in its present composition be placed under command of Reichsfuhrer-SS and Chief of German Police.

It is therefore at the immediate disposal of OKH as field unit for the invasion, but is to be later drawn in like the rest of the police forces for police duties in agreement with the Reichsfuhrer SS.

The instructions OKW No. 2310/38 Most Secret of the 28th Sept (last paragraph but one) and OKW No. 2371/38 Most Secret of Sept 30 are amended accordingly.

2. Rate of Exchange for the Cz. Krone:

The following rate of exchange will apply for all transactions and payments: 100 Cz. Kronen - 10.00 Marks (1 Cz. Krone - 10 Rpfg)

THE CHIEF OF THE SUPREME COMMAND
OF THE ARMED FORCES

Distribution III
and Special Distribution
(including Henlein Volunteer
Corps and Reichsfuhrer SS
through OKW/L II)

Keitel

388-PS

H1123-0120

TRANSLATION
(COR

ITEM 39

Stamp:
Recd 3 Oct 1938
Req No 265/38 Most Secret

Adj. to the Fuhrer

Berlin, 30 Sept 1938

The fuhrer and Supreme
Commander of the Armed Forces

OKW No. 2367/38 Most Secret
WFA/L I A

Most Secret
60 copies
16th copy

DIRECTIVE #1

Subject: Occupation of territory separated from Czechoslovakia.

1. The sectors separated from Cz will be occupied by the Armed Forces as follows:

The sector marked I to be occupied on the 1st and 2nd of Oct, the sector marked II on Oct 2 and 3rd, the sector marked III on Oct. 3, 4 and 5, the sector marked IV on Oct. 6 and 7th. The remaining area up to Oct 10.

The extent of the area I-IV is shown on the attached map. The extent of the remaining areas will be announced later.

2. The Armed Forces will have the following tasks:

The present degree of mobilized preparedness is to be maintained completely, for the present also in the West, Order for the rescinding of measures taken is held over.

The entry is to be planned in such a way that it can easily be converted into operation "Grun".

The depth of the territories to be occupied daily depends on the details of the evacuation, which are being settled by the international committee.

a. Army: First of all the following units are available for the invasion:
Training Bn's.
Motorized and Armoured Units
Adolf Hitler 35 Bodyguard Regiment
I and II Bn's of SS Deaths Head Regiment (Oberbayen)
Henlein Free Corps
All combat action on the part of the Volunteer Corps must cease as from 1st October.

b. Air Force:
Those ground installations (including supply and signal installations) situated in the separated areas are to be occupied immediately and prepared for the use of our own units. Flying units can be transferred if this becomes necessary for the air defense of the territory yielded or for the possible switch to "Fall Grun" in accordance with fig. 2. Flights over territory not yet cleared for occupation by German troops must be avoided at all costs. Flak must be assigned to those objectives which cannot be protected by Flak under the command of the Army.

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H1123-0121

ITEM 39

3. Those units of the Armed Forces intended for the occupation of sector I must cross the former Czech-German frontier by 1200 noon Oct 1st.

4. Armed resistance in the area cleared for occupation must be broken. Czech soldiers and other armed personnel found within the sector are to be disarmed and taken prisoner. The boundary of the sector against the Czechs is not to be crossed under any circumstances. Hostile action against the Czechs on or beyond this boundary is to be avoided.

5. The conduct of the field units must be based on the realization that they are occupying a territory whose population, after being harrassed for years, looks upon the German Armed Forces as Liberators.

6. The German frontier guard will remain on the former German-Czech frontier, as before.

7. The securing of the boundaries of the sectors against the area still in Czech hands is sole responsibility of the army.

For the Chief of the Supreme Command
of the Armed Forces

KEITEL

Distribution: III

H1123-0122

ITEM 40

Stamp:
Recd 3 Oct 1938
Req No 264/38 Most Secret

Adj. to the Fuhrer

Berlin, 30 Sept 1938

The Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces
OKW No. 2371/38, Most Secret, WFA/L I a

Most Secret

Special Orders No. 1 to Directive No. 1

Subject: Occupation of territory ceded by Cz.

1. Operational Area of the Army:

The area to be newly occupied will be at first an operational area of the Army. In it the Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces will have full powers and authority to delegate these powers to the C-in-C's of the armies.

The Commanders exercising these full powers can publish laws, institute special courts and issue directives to offices valid for the operational area with the exception of the highest Reich authorities, the highest offices of the State of Prussia, and the executive board of the NSDAP. This authority to issue regulations has priority over regulations issued by other Superior authorities.

2. Units under Command of Army:

a. The units of the military SS and SS Totenkopf Regiment intended for the occupation of the sector remain under OKH control.

b. The Sudeten German Volunteer Corps comes under the control of OKH. The Bn's of the Volunteer Corps are to be employed in the direction of their native territory wherever possible. They retain their present armament. Provisioning to be guaranteed through the army Hqs. Members of the Free Corps do not come under the military penal code. The Hqs of the Free Corps after occupation of territory III, is to be transferred from Bayreuth to Eger.

c. The Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces, in cooperation with Reichsfuhrer SS and at the request of Army Hqs will direct Police Forces and Gestapo forces for the support of Secret Field Police forces in the occupied areas. As required for Military Police duties, the Special Police (SdP) will be drawn in as much as possible.

3. Taking over of Military Accommodation and RR Installations:

a. All military installations, barracks and property will be turned over in the occupied Sudeten German territories by OKH in so far as they were up to now the property of the Cz. army. By OKL if they were property of the Cz. Air Force (including civil aviation.)

b. The Chief of Transport System will make arrangements with the Reich RR's regarding the taking over of rail installations.

4. Signal Communications:

a. The Army will be at liberty to use the postal communication facilities within the area to be occupied. Requirements of the Luftwaffe are to be assured through the Field Signal Units under the command of the OKH attached to the Army Hqs. Depending on the situation, the most important communication installations are to be put into operation as soon as possible, secured and screened against Cz.

H1123-0123

ITEM 40

Special emphasis must be laid on the effective silencing and confiscation of all transmitting installations. Official, private and permanent radio installations of the Cz army are to be secured through OKH, those of the Cz Air Force through OKL.

5. Customs Frontier Guard

After the crossing of the Reich frontier by the troops, the securing of the old frontier is the responsibility of the Customs Frontier Guard (Zollgrenzschutz); the Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces will put the necessary personnel from the Frontier Guard at their disposal.

The customs regulation of the forward line of the area to be occupied, will be determined by the Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces in conjunction with the Inspector General of Customs. Liaison officials are still at the disposal of Corps Headquarters acc. to #16 of the regulations governing the VGAD. Shipments to Wehrmacht offices as well as members of the Wehrmacht are not subject to customs regulations.

H1123-0124

6. Application of Laws:

a. Compensation laws are to be employed on both sides of the border. Public buildings are to be used mainly for billets. Requisitioned articles do not become the property of the armed forces. Compensation for services rendered in cash (German currency)

b. Special regulations will be issued with regard to the introduction of the German Penal Code in the occupied areas.

7. Mobilization Measures among Civilian Population:

Mobilization measures will not be taken among civilian personnel. But all authorities have been asked to carry out quickly demands made by armed force authorities.

The following measures are especially requested in order to guarantee the tasks of the armed forces.

a. Reichs Postal Ministry

Securing of direct tele-communications in the areas BRESLAU, DRESDEN, WÜRZBURG, NURNBERG, MUNCHEN, VIENNA, BERLIN. Establishing of Special Emergency networks. Furnishing of items to the armed forces to whatever degree they may be required. (Compare, Mobilization Book (Z) Section IX No. 3501, 3503, 3532). Fulfilling staff requirements as regards the restoring of signal networks in occupied areas.

b. Ministry of Propoganda:

Dispatch of commissioners to the chiefs of civil administration in the operational area. Prohibition of the publication of military news of any kind in the press (compare Mobilization Book (Z) Part V No. 1758 - and 1600)

8. Organisations of the Party:

The Fuhrer's Deputy has been asked to inform the party organisations that OKH must furnish permission if party units are to be brought into the Sudeten area.

9. Economic Directives:

Any confiscation of values or balances at credit institutions (Kredit instituten) in the Sudeten German area is prohibited. Requisitioning is also prohibited. Suppling of the armed forces with food, forage and fuel is to be carried out from the Reich. The following rate of exchange applies for all transactions and payments: 100 cz. krones=9,00 RM (1 Cz. Kr = 9 Rpfg) (the underlined crossed out!)

(pencil note: will be published this afternoon)

10. Payment of the armed forces

For the parts of the armed forces operating, pay as applicable in accordance with the peacetime regulations for large-scale maneuvers will go into effect after leaving garrisons or assembly areas. All additional costs arising through the operation are to be deleted under chapter VIII E 20 (OKW Treasury)

11. Administrative Directives:

The army hqs will administer the occupied areas on their own responsibility. The C D Z with their special staffs are at their disposal in an advisory capacity (compare H. Dv. 90. No. 20 etc.)

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H1123-0125

12. Supply Installations:

For the maintenance and putting into operation of supply installations OKW Admin.Staff will attach the following to the Army/H.Q.'s

Army H.Q.	Tech Hq	To	App	Time of Arrival
12	13	LANDAU/ISAR	10.1	2000
10	4	PLAUEN	10.2	2000
8	3	GORLITZ	10.1	2000
2	8	LAMSDORF(SW/OPPELN)	10.5	2000

13. Propaganda Companies:

Propaganda companies are to be used. Amendments as regards attachment made necessary through the peaceful entry will be conveyed verbally.

Chief of the Supreme Command of the
Armed Forces

KEITEL

DISTRIBUTION: III
and Special Distribution

H1123-0126

Stamp: Office of the Armed Forces Adjutant attached to the Fuhrer and Reichs Chancellor

pencil note: Adjutant to the Fuhrer

Recd: 3 Oct. 1938

Req.No: 266/38 Most Secret

Item 41

Berlin 30.9.38

Supreme Command of the Armed Forces
WFA/L No. 2150/38 Most Secret IV a.

200 copies
153rd copy

MOST SECRET

Subject: OCCUPATION OF SUDETEN-GERMAN TERRITORY

1. The Fuehrer and Reichs Chancellor has ordered that Sections of the Armed Forces march into the Sudeten-German territory, beginning 1 October, 1938. There will be no general mobilization of the Armed Forces (OR case "X"). Units already mobilized, will, for the timebeing, remain at their present posts.

2. Coincident with the crossing of the Reich frontier, the Commander in Chief of the Army will assume full powers in the territory to be occupied together with authority to transfer this power to the C's in C of the Armies.

The Commander in Chief can, exercise these powers, and pass laws, install special courts, and give directives to the appropriate departments and offices functioning in the area of operations, valid for the operational area with the exception of the highest Reich authorities or officers of the State of Prussia and the Executive Board of the NSDAP. In all other cases, the right of issuing directives has priority over directives from higher superior authorities. The area of operations will be extended forward according to the area to be occupied. The shifting of the rear frontier of the operational area will be ordered separately.

3. Mobilization measures will not be enforced in the civil sphere. However, all authorities are requested to carry out immediately the demands of the armed force authorities. To guarantee completion of the tasks of the armed forces the following measures are especially desired:

H1123-0127

Item 41

a. Reich Postal Ministry

Securing of direct tele-communications in the districts of the Communications Hqs, Breslau, Dresden, Wuerzburg, Nuernberg, Muenchen, Vienna and Berlin.

Establishing of Special Communications networks. Furnishing of equipment to armed forces in whatever degree may be required (see Mob. Book (Z) Part IX, No. 3501-03-32).

Furthermore it is requested that staff requirements as regards restoring communication networks in the occupied area, be met.

b. Propaganda Ministry:

Dispatch of commissioners to the Chiefs of Civil on the administration operational area. Prohibition of the publication of military news of any kind in the press. (Compare Mob Book (Z) part V, 1758 & 1600)

c. Reichsbank:

Issue of Mobilization money supplies without fiduciary monetary tender is authorized. (Compare Mob Book (Z) part XVIII, Nr 8031)

4. Application of Laws:

a. There will be a special directive as to the introduction of the German Criminal Code into the occupied territory.

b. The Army Compensation Law (Wehrleistungsgestz) will be in force on both sides of the frontier. Public buildings will be used as billets primarily. Requisitioned articles will not become property of the armed forces. Payment for services rendered will be made in cash (German currency)

5. Economic Directives:

Any confiscation of valuables or balances at Credit Institutions (Kredit Instituten) is prohibited in the Sudeten-German area. Requisitioning is also prohibited. Supplies of food, forage and fuel for the armed forces will be drawn from the Reich. The following rate of exchange is effective for all transactions and payments:

100 Czech kronen - 10.00 RM (1 Czech krone -- 10 Pfg)

388-PS

H1123-0128

Item 41

6. Payment of the Armed Forces:

For parts of the armed forces operating, pay as applicable in accordance with the peace-time regulations for large-scale maneuvers, effective from time of departure from areas or garrisons.

7. Customs Frontier Guard

After the crossing of the Reich Frontier by the troops, the security of the old frontier will be taken over by the Customs-Frontier Guard at whose disposal the supreme commander of the armed forces will put the necessary personnel.

The supreme command of the armed forces will arrange the guarding of the front lines of the area to be occupied (as to collection of duties) with the Inspector General of Customs. The Liaison officials according to Nr 15 of the regulations pertaining to the VGAD will continue to be at the disposal of the Corps Hqs.

Shipments to armed forces authorities as well as members of the armed forces are not subject to customs inspection.

8. Administrative Directives:

The armed Hqs will administer the occupied areas on their own responsibilities. The CdZ with their staff of experts are at their disposal in an advisory capacity (see H. Dv 90, Nr 20 etc). In all matters of a police nature, the Reichsfuehrer SS is to be consulted.

The Chief of the Supreme Command of the
Armed Forces

(signed) Keitel

Distribution: Overleaf

388-PS

ITEM 41

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H1123-0130

ITEM 41

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388-PS

H1123-0131

TRANSLATION OF DOC. NO. 388 PS
cont.

Item 42 — 200 copies, 153rd copy — Berlin, 30.9.38

(STAMP-)
Office of the Armed Forces Adjutant attached to the Führer & Reich Chancellor
Rec. 3 Oct 1938

Supreme Command of the Armed Forces
L. No. 2385/38 Most Secret IVA

Subject: Occupation of the Sudeten-German area.

Enclosures: Reg.No. 267138
Dispatched -
Clerk

1. By order of the Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces, the occupation of the Sudeten-German areas by the Armed Forces will be executed in a manner which will allow a changeover to military operations at any time.

   For the advance of the troops to coincide with the withdrawal of the Czechs, particularly in the fortified zones, and on account of the possibility of local resistance, it is necessary for the march in to be arranged in a way suited to the conduct of military operations.

2. The military occupation also necessitates the settling of economic conditions in the Sudeten-German area. Assimilation can only be brought about gradually. For this transition period the rate of exchange has been fixed at 100 Czech crowns to 10.00 ReichMarks so as to enable the retail trade to function. It is a pre-condition of this temporary settlement, however, that, until a final settlement is made with regard to economics and currency, and in order to avoid placing the Sudeten-German population at a disadvantage, only those things are bought in the open market which come in the category of goods which fill the immediate needs of life. Any exploitation of the present economic situation is a serious offense.

3. For the above stated reasons, travel into the Sudetenland from the old Reich will be confined to those officials and authorities who have been given specific tasks in the Sudeten-German area. It is requested that all civil authorities and all organizations of the Party be instructed without delay that it is essential to obtain the previous approval of the military authorities charged with the exercise of executive power (C-in-C of the Army, Army HQ) for the transfer of departments and units of any kind into the Sudeten-German area which is under military authorities.

The Chief of the Supreme Command of the
Armed Forces

Keitel

(Distribution for Item 42 identical to that of Item 41)

Item 43 is handwritten notes too illegible to translate.

388-PS

Item 44

Berlin, 1st October 1938

Supreme Command of the Armed Forces
No. 2400/38 Most Secret LIa

150 copies
18th copy

Top Secret

(Stamp-)

Office of the Armed Forces Adjutant attached to the Führer & Reich Chancellor.
Rec. Oct.3rd 1938, Encl.2-30
Reg.No. 268338 Secret
Dispatched -
Check -

MOST SECRET

SPECIAL ORDERS NO.3 to DIRECTIVE No.1

Parts of the Army Employed.

In addition to the Sections of the Army whose employment has been approved (See Directive 1, Section 2a), the following units will also be used for the occupation:

Command (Generalkommando) III

10th Inf Regiment (4th Inf Div)

The Chief of Supreme Command of the Army
By direction
Jodl

Distribution: III
and special distribution

Item 45

Army Teleprint Network

	Received from	Pass to	Date	Time	Re.No.	by
Teleprint) Office) Notes)	HDZG 9.10	Dept Klimisch (?)	9.10			Schm.(?)

by Joe (?)

Delay notes:

Telegram HBZG 12 9110 1304 Priority notes:
Tel.No. of Sender:

TO LT. COL. SCHMUNDT * FUHRER'S TRAIN * (FUHRERZUG)

1. IF THE OCCUPATION OF ZONE 5 IS CARRIED OUT TODAY ACCORDING TO PLAN AND WITHOUT INCIDENT OKW INTENDS TO DISSOLVE V.G.A.D. IN THE WEST AS FROM 10.10 AND TO BRING THE 5 SERVING DIVISIONS BACK TO THEIR HOME STATIONS..

2. ACCORDING TO TELEGRAM RECEIVED HERE POPULATION OF IGLAU VERY WORRIED AND EXCITED. COMMUNISTS THERE ARE ARMED. FOREIGN OFFICE HAS BEEN INFORMED. OKW SUGGESTS EMPLOYMENT OF ENGLISH LEGION, IF IT IS BROUGHT UP IN THIS AREA , FOR PROTECTION OF THE GERMANS.. FUHRER'S CONSENT REQUESTED FOR 1 AND 2 ....

signed KEITEL

(Ink Notes:-) Telephoned this from Opera House in Saarbrucken at 2100 10.9 to Capt. Bayle. Fuhrer agreed to points 1 and 2. In connection with 2: if the lives of Germans threatened, troops to march in after short warning.

SCHMUNDT
Lt.Col.

388-PS

H1123-0132

H1123-0133

Item 46

TRANSLATION OF DOC. 388 PS cont.

The C-in-C of the Army

Berlin W 35 October 10th, 38

Tirpitzufer 72-76
Tel.

11.10.38

1800 hours Schm.

My Fuhrer!

I have to report that the troops will reach the demarcation line as ordered, by this evening. In so far as further military operations are not required, the order for the occupation of the country which was given to me will thus have been fulfilled. The guarding of the new frontier line will be taken over by the reinforced frontier supervision service (Grenzaufsichtsdienst) in the next few days.

It is thus no longer a military necessity to combine the administration of the Sudetenland with the command of the troops of the army under the control of one person.

I therefore ask you, my Fuhrer, to relieve me with effect from October 15, 1938, of the charge assigned to me - that of exercising executive powers in Sudeten German territory.

Heil my Fuhrer,

VON BRAUCHITSCH

(Handwritten Note:) Submitted to Fuhrer 11 Nov. Agreed.

388-PS

H1123-0134

TRANSLATION OF DOC. NO. 388 PS
cont.

Remarks of teleprint office

Army Telegraph Network

Pass to	Date	Time	R.No.	by
Received from HQZ6 10.10 1930	Schmundt's Dept.	10.10	1940	Schm.

Delay notes

Item 47

Note of Priority
Tel.No. of Sender

Telegram

SECRET
HBZG No. 17 1915 Schm.

TELEGRAM TO FUHRER'S TRAIN, LT.COL. SCHMUNDT

IF EVENING REPORT SHOWS THAT OCCUPATION OF ZONE FIVE HAS BEEN COMPLETED WITHOUT INCIDENT OKW INTENDS TO ORDER FURTHER DEMOBILIZATION

PRINCIPLE: 1) To SUSPEND OPERATION "GRUN" BUT MAINTAIN A SUFFICIENT STATE OF PREPAREDNESS ON PART OF ARMY AND LUFTWAFFE TO MAKE INTERVENTION POSSIBLE IF NECESSARY.

2) ALL UNITS NOT NEEDED TO BE WITHDRAWN FROM THE OCCUPIED AREA AND REDUCED TO PEACETIME STATUS, AS POPULATION OF OCCUPIED AREA IS HEAVILY BURDENED BY THE MASSING OF TROOPS.

3) TO DISSOLVE TRUCK REGIMENTS AS A MATTER OF URGENCY, IN THE INTERESTS OF ECONOMY.

4) IN THE WEST - GRADUAL REVERSAL OF ALL MOBILIZATION MEASURES WITHOUT PREJUDICE TO THE WORK ON THE LINES.

5) INTENTION OF THE C-IN-C OF THE ARMY TO RELINQUISH HIS EXECUTIVE POWERS ON 10.15

FUHRER'S CONSENT REQUESTED

OKW

Item 47

Fuhrer's decision:

1--Agreed
2--Suggestion to be made on the 13th Oct in Essen by Gen Keitel. Decision will then be reached.
3--Agreed
4--Agreed
5--Agreed

NB. Notice of 5 to be sent by 6th Division

Relayed to Lt. Colonel Zeitzler at 2300, 10.11

SCHMUNDT

Lt.Col.
(in Schmundt's writing)

(Next page contains illegible notes)

388-PS

H1123-0135

Item 47

10.10.38
What is in the Zone?

5 1 (motorized)
1 (light)
1 armoured
1 mountain
1 div.

For special duties 1 mountain
3 div
1 truck transport regt.

4 3 motorized div
1 light
1 armoured
2 div
Liebstandarte

3. 4 div
Germania

1 1 armoured
3 div

13 div
4 div (motorized)
3 armoured
2 mountain
2 light

24 divisions

(notes in Schmundt's writing

388-PS

H1123-0136

TRANSLATION OF DOC. 388 PS cont.

Army Telegraph Network

Notes of Telegraph Office	Received	Pass to	Date	Time	R.No.	by
	from HOZG 11.10.10.45	Lt.Col. Schmundt	11.10			Schm.

by Schm.
Note of delay

Item 47

HBZG 008 1040 Note of Priority
Tel.No. of Sender

TO THE ARMED FORCES ADJUTANT ATTACHED TO THE FUHRER AND SUPREME COMMANDER OF ARMED FORCES. THE C-IN-C THE ARMY REGARDS HIS DUTIES AS POSSESSOR OF EXECUTIVE POWERS IN THE SUDETEN GERMAN AREA AS FINISHED AS FROM 10.15. AND SUGGESTS THAT THE ADMINISTRATION BE TAKEN OVER ON THAT DATE BY REICH COMMISSAR HENLEIN, PROVIDING THAT FURTHER MILITARY OPERATIONS ARE NO LONGER NECESSARY. PERSONAL LETTER OF THE C-IN-C TO THE FUHRER HAS BEEN DESPATCHED.

OKH 6th Div. (Five)

General Staff of the German Army

11.37/38

388-PS

H1123-0137

Item 48

(Ink note)

1. If advance orders, times can be shortened. Regrouping of armies.

2. If Hungary, small degree of preparedness. 2 brigades between Pressburg and Budapest. 1 brigade east of Friedl.

(Rest of note impossible to decipher completely)

H1123-0138

TRANSLATION OF DOC. NO. 388 PS
cont.

Notes of the telegraph office) Army Telegraph Network

Received from HBZC 11.10.1955. Pass to Lt.Col. Schmundt Date 11.10 Time 2030 R.No. by Joe

1)4 Mot. Div. 1 B'n ready to march (?) 1 Arm'd Brig.

by Schm.

Notes re delay

24
+5
29 (Uncipherable note)

Note of priority:
Tel. No. of Sender

Item 48

TOP SECRET
HBZG 13 1930.11.10
Lt. Col. Schmundt

Question 1: WHAT REINFORCEMENTS ARE NECESSARY IN THE PRESENT SITUATION TO BREAK ALL CZECH RESISTANCE IN BOHEMIA AND MORAVIA?

Answer: ARMY SUGGESTS: ARMY GROUP 5: Nothing

ARMY GROUP FOR SPECIAL DUTIES: 1 Arm'd Brig., 2 Mob. Div.

ARMY GROUP 4: Nothing
ARMY GROUP 3: 1 Mobile Division
ARMY GROUP 1: 1 Division ready to march and 1 Mobile Division

B) LUFTWAFFE: EMPLOYMENT NECESSARY OF ALL FORCES PROVIDED TO DATE OKW BELIEVES THAT IT WOULD BE POSSIBLE TO COMMENCE OPERATIONS WITHOUT THESE REINFORCEMENTS IN VIEW OF THE PRESENT SIGNS OF WEAKNESS IN CZECH RESISTANCE.

Question 2: HOW MUCH TIME IS REQUIRED FOR THE REGROUPING OR MOVING UP OF NEW FORCES?

Answer: A) Army: FOR REGROUPING: 2 days. FOR MOVING UP OF NEW FORCES FROM THE REICH 4 to 5 DAYS (INCLUDING MOBILIZATION)

B) Luftwaffe: OPERATIONAL DUTY POSSIBLE ANY TIME

Question 3: HOW MUCH TIME WILL BE REQUIRED FOR THE SAME PURPOSE IF IT IS EXECUTED AFTER THE INTENDED DEMOBILIZATION AND RETURN MEASURES?

Answer A) Army: IN THE SOUTHEAST ABOUT 10 to 11 DAYS.--IN THE EAST 9 to 10 DAYS.

B) Luftwaffe: AFTER RETURN OF FLYING UNITS TO PEACE TIME AIRFIELDS AND THEIR DEMOBILIZATION - THE AA GUNS WHICH ARE READY FOR ACTION AND THE GROUND ORGANIZATION BEING LEFT AS THEY ARE - LENGTH OF TIME IN SOUTHEASTERN AREA 12 HOURS IF WEATHER FAVORABLE. AFTER DEMOBILIZATION IS COMPLETE SEVERAL DAYS, IN ANY CASE LESS THAN IN THE CASE OF THE ARMY.

388-PS

H1123-0139

Question 4: HOW MUCH TIME WOULD BE REQUIRED TO ACHIEVE THE STATE OF READINESS OF OCT. 1st?

Answer: Army: 6 days. If the reserves are called up by radio, 3 days at least.

Luftwaffe: AIR DEFENSE WEST, BEFORE COMMENCEMENT OF REORGANIZATION, WILL BE READY FOR OPERATIONS IN 24 hours

(signed) KEITEL

H1123-0140

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 388 PS
(Con'd)

Berlin, Oct 12th, 1938

Item 49
LI a

3 copies
1st copy

REFLECTIONS

Of the Supreme Command of the Army on the withdrawal of Forces from the Sudeten-German Area

PRESENT STRENGTH

ARMY GROUP	NO. OF DIVS.	DIV NOS EARMARKED FOR WITHDRAWAL	NO OF DIV TO BE WITHDRAWN	STRENGTH AFTER WITHDRAWAL
Army Group Command 5	5 1/3	1/3 44, 2 Mtn, 3 Mtn, 29th Mot, 4 Light, 2nd Armoured	3	1 1/3 2 1/3
Army Group Command for Special Duties	4 1/3 plus 1 SS Regt)	1/3 5th, 7th, 9th, 45th, 1st Mtn.	1 1/3	3 1
Army Group Command 4	7 (plus 1 SS Regt)	10th, 24th, 2nd (Mot), 13th (Mot), 20th (Mot), 1st Light, 1st Arm'd.	2	4 2
Army Group Command 3	3 (plus 1 SS Regt)	4th, 3rd, 18th	2	2 1
Army Group Command	4	8th, 28th, 30th, 3rd Arm'd.	1	3 2
TOTAL	22 2/3 (Plus 3 SS Regts)		8 1/3	14 2/3 (Plus 3 SS Regts)

Namely:	Namely:	Namely:
11 2/3 Inf Div	3 1/3 Inf Divs	8 2/3 Inf Div
3 Mtn Divs	2 Mtn Divs	1 Mtn Div
3 Mot Divs	1 Mot Div	2 Mot Divs
3 Light Divs	1 Light Div	1 Light Div
3 Armd Divs.	1 Arm'd Div	2 Arm'd Divs

7 1/3

388-PS

ITEM 50

REICH WAR MINISTRY/NAVAL INTELLIGENCE SERVICE

MOST SECRET

Received
on 17.10 from kg
at 1535 by (Indecipherable)
Notes re delay
MBZ 0 61
Telegram from MBZ 045 17/10 1525
Lt. Colonel Schmundt

Space for Receipt Stamp

OKW suggests that by 20 October about half of the Army forces still remaining in Sudeten-German Territory (14 1/3 Divs and 3 SS Regiments) should be moved out, as otherwise the orderly discharging of the old age group at the end of October - this is necessary for the building up of the Army - and the reassignment of the recruits will not be possible by 10/11. (Involved are the: 2nd Arm'd Div, 1st Mountain Div., 7th Div, 13th Motorized Div, 20th Motorized Div, 18th Div and 3rd Arm'd Div) Fuhrer's decision requested to-day.

Signed Keitel

(Note at bottom in Schmundt's handwriting:)

The Fuehrer has given his consent 17 Oct.

By telephone, 1905 hours, 17 Oct. to Capt. Vogel,
Section L, OKW.

Schmundt, Lt. Col.

388-PS

H1123-0141

H1123-0142

ITEM 51

The Fuehrer and Supreme Comdr of the Armed Forces

Berchtesgaden, 18 Oct. 1938

Despatched 19 X 38 M

TO THE C-IN-C OF THE ARMY

GENERAL VON BRAUCHITSCH, BERLIN

The occupation of the Sudeten-German territory has been completed, the operation being carried out by sections of the Army, the Air Forces, the Police, the military SS (SS Verfugungstruppe), the SS and SA.

Placed under protection of the armed forces, 3½ millions of German compatriots have returned to the Reich once and for all.

The Civil Administration is taking over charge of them on 21 Oct 1938. Simultaneously I relieve you of your right to exercise executive power, while acknowledging the understanding cooperation of all departments.

Along with our Sudeten German compatriots, the entire German people express their gratitude to those who participated in the liberation of the Sudeten-Land.

(signed) Adolf Hitler

Berchtesgaden, 18 Oct 1938.

(signed) Schmundt,

Lieutenant Colonel, G. S. C.

The Armed Forces Adjutant attached to the Fuehrer and Reich Chancellor.

After Delivery:

To the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces

I request that publication in the press be initiated from there

388-PS

H1123-0143

TRANSLATION OF DOC. NO. 388-PS
Continued

Item 51.

1st Draft

To

The C - in - C of the Army

The occupation of the Sudeten - German territory had been completed according to plan, the operation being carried out by sections of the Army, Air Force, and police. Thus 3½ million German compatriots have returned to the Reich once and for all, and have been placed under the protection of the Armed Forces.

You have borne the responsibility for the occupation of the country and the care of the population from the day when the army marched in, and now I approve your proposal to release you from your authority to exercise executive power in the Sudeten-German area, date of expiry being October 20th 1938.

My thanks to all those who participated in the liberation of the Sudetenland, for the order and discipline, the social understanding and devoted readiness to help with which they have done their duty.

J.

(Handwritten note)

The military SS (SS VERFÜFUNGSTRUPPE), the SS and SA

- - - -

2nd Draft

(Exact repeat of Item 51 followed by handwritten note)

Signed Adolf Hitler (unknown hand)

388-PS

ITEM 52

Supreme Command of the Armed Forces
No. 2560/38 MOST SECRET L I a

Berlin, Oct. 18th, 1938

1300 hours

(Stamp)
Office of the Armed Forces Adjutant
attached to the Fuhrer & Reich Chancellor
Recd. 20 Oct. 1938
Req. No. 297/38 Most Secret
Despatch Clerk W

60 copies
Copy

MOST SECRET

Directive No. 4

The Fuehrer has ordered:

1. That about half of the forces of the Army still remaining in Sudeten-German territory be shipped back to their peace time bases.

2. That those parts of the Luftwaffe which are under the command of the Army be shipped back and returned to the C-in-C of the Air Force. The withdrawal of other parts of the Luftwaffe operating in Sudeten Germany will be effected by the C-in-C of the Air Force.

Chief of the Supreme Command of
the Armed Forces

Keitel

Distribution: III

388-PS

H1123-0144

H1123-0145

ITEM 53

REICH WAR MINISTRY/NAVAL INTELLIGENCE SERVICE

MOST SECRET

Received at 1040 by (Indecipherable) Initials Space for Receipt Stamp
Notes re delay
MBZ 066
Telegram from MBZ 050 21/10 1030

LIEUTENANT COLONEL SCHMUNDT:

(SECRET) - OKW REQUESTS THE FUEHRER'S APPROVAL TO THE FOLLOWING DECREE: ON THE 20TH OF OCTOBER THE REICH LABOUR SERVICE CEASES TO BE UNDER THE COMMAND OF THE SUPREME COMMAND OF THE ARMED FORCES, WITH THE EXCEPTION OF THE RAD FORCES OPERATING IN THE AREA OF THE WESTERN FORTIFICATIONS. THE CHIEF OF THE SUPREME COMMAND OF THE ARMED FORCES REGULATES THE CONDITIONS OF EMPLOYMENT FOR THESE SECTIONS IN ACCORDANCE WITH MY DIRECTIVES, & AGREEMENT WITH THE REICHS LABOR LEADER. OKW NR 2690/38 Secret WFA/L two of 20 Oct 38 JODL

Handwritten: Consent given, 21 Oct 38.

Passed to Colonel Jodl's

Ante-Room at 1400

Sch 22/10

388-PS

H1123-0146

ITEM 54

MOST SECRET

TOP SECRET

Only through officer

Conference Notes

L I a

Berlin, 27.9.38

4 copies
1st copy

Time of Attack "Grun"?
(Z v. A Grun.)

COORDINATED TIME OF ATTACK BY ARMY AND AIR FORCES ON X DAY

As a matter of principle, every effort should be made for a coordinated attack by Army and Air Forces on X Day.

The Army wishes to attack at dawn, i. e. about 0615, it also wishes to conduct some limited operations in the previous night, which however, would not alarm the entire Czech front.

Air Force's time of attack depends on weather conditions. These could change the time of attack and also limit the area of operations. The weather of the last few days, for instance, would have delayed the start until between 0800 and 1100 due to low ceiling in Bavaria.

If the Luftwaffe were to attack at the time desired by the Army no tactical surprise of the enemy's air force would be achieved and it would necessitate certain changes in the method of attack (height of flight level). Consequently, from the outset the Luftwaffe has desired a later hour of attack on the part of the Army. Even so, there would be no definite guarantee of a well-timed coordinated attack of both Forces, as bad weather conditions on the day of attack might postpone the commitment of the Air Force on X Day in part or altogether.

If an early hour of attack on the part of the Army is regarded as indespensable, a simultaneous attack by the Air Force, - desirable as it may be, may possibly have to be dispensed with.

H1123-0147

ITEM 54

Thus it is Proposed:

Attack by the Army - independent of the attack by the air force - at the time desired by the Army (0615) and permission for limited operations to take place before then, however, only to an extent that will not alarm the entire Czech front.

The Luftwaffe will attack at a time most suitable to them.

(J)

388-PS

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 789-PS
OFFICE OF U S CHIEF OF COUNSEL

Penciled note: Duplicate

Nov. 23, 1939, 1200 hours. Conference with the Fuehrer, to which all Supreme Commanders are ordered. The Fuehrer gives the following speech:

The purpose of this conference it to give you an idea of the world of my thoughts, which takes charge of me, in the face of future events, and to tell you my decisions. The building up of our armed forces was only possible in connection with the ideological (weltanschaulich) education of the German people by the Party. When I started my political task in 1919, my strong belief in final success was based on a thorough observation of the events of the day and the study of the reasons for their occurrence. Therefore, I never lost my belief in the midst of set-backs which were not spared me during my period of struggle. Providence has had the last word and brought me success. On top of that, I had a clear recognition of the probably course of historical events, and the firm will to make brutal decisions. The first decision was in 1919 when I after long internal conflict became a politician and took up the struggle against my enemies. That was the hardest of all decisions. I had, however, the firm belief that I would arrive at my goal. First of all, I desired a new system of selection. I wanted to educate a minority which would take over the leadership. After 15 years, I arrived at my goal, after strenuous struggles and many set-backs. When I came to power in 1933, a period of the most difficult struggle lay behind me. Everything existing before that had collapsed. I had to reorganize everything beginning with the mass of the people and extending it to the armed forces. First reorganization of the interior, abolishment of appearances of decay and defeatist ideas, education to heroism. While reorganizing the interior, I undertook the second task: to release Germany from its international ties. Two particular characteristics are to be pointed out; secession from the League of Nations and denunciation of the disarmament conference. It was a hard decision. The number of prophets who predicted that it would lead to the occupation of the Rhineland was large, the number of believers was very small. I was supported by the nation, which stood firmly behind me, when I carried out my intentions. After that the order for rearmament. Here again there were numerous prophets who predicted misfortunes, and only a few believers. In 1935 the introduction of compulsory armed service. After that militarization of the Rhineland, again a process believed to be impossible at that time. The number of people who put trust in me, was very small. Then the beginning of the fortification of the whole country especially in the west.

One year later, Austria came, this step also was considered doubtful. It brought about a considerable reinforcement of the Reich. The next step was Bohemia, Moravia and Poland. This step also was not possible to accomplish in one campaign. First of all, the western fortification had to be finished. It was not possible to reach the goal in one effort. It was clear to me from the first moment that I could not be satisfied with the Sudeten-German territory. That was only a partial solution. The decision to march into Bohemia was made. Then followed the erection of the Protectorate and with that the basis for the action against Poland was laid, but I wasn't quite clear at that time whether I should start first against the east and then in the west or vice-versa. Moltke often made the same calculations in his time. Under pressure the decision came to fight with Poland first. One might accuse me of wanting to fight and fight again. In struggle I see the fate of all beings. Nobody can avoid a struggle if he does not want to lose out. The increasing number of people requires a larger living space (Lebensraum). My goal was to create a logical relation between the number of people and the space for them to live in. The struggle must start here. No people can get away from the solution of this task or else it must yield and gradually die out. That is taught by history. First migration of peoples to the southwest, then adaptation of the number of people to the small space by emigration. In the last years, adaptation of the people to insufficient space, by reducing the number of births. This would lead to the death and weakening of the blood of the people. If a people chooses that course all their weaknesses are mobilised. One yields to the force of the outside and uses this force against one's self by killing of the child. This means the greatest cowardice, decimation of the number, and loss of value. I decided a different way: adaptation of the living space to the number of people. One acknowledgement is important. The state has a meaning only if it supports the maintenance of its population potential. In our case 82 millions of people were concerned. That means the

greatest responsibility. He who does not want to assume this responsibility is not worthy of belonging to the mass of the people. That gave me the strength to fight. It is one eternal problem to bring the number of Germans to a proper relationship to the available space. Security of the needed space. No calculated cleverness is of any help, solution only with the sword. A people unable to produce the strength for fight, must withdraw. Struggles are different than those of 100 years ago. Today we can speak of a racial fight. Today we fight for oilfields, rubber, treasures of the earth, etc. After the peace of Westphalia Germany disintegrated. Disintegration, impotence of the German Reich was determined by decree. This German impotence was removed by the creation of the Reich when Prussia realized her task. Then the opposition between France and England began. Since 1870 England has been against us. Bismarck and Moltke were certain that there would have to be one more action. The danger at that time was of a two-front war. Moltke was at times in favor of a preventive war. To take advantage of the slow progress of the Russian mobilization. German armed might was not fully employed. Insufficient sternness of the leading personalities. The basic thought of Moltke was the offensive. He never thought of the defense. Many opportunities were missed after Moltke's death. The solution was only possible by attacking a country at a favorable moment. Political and military leadership always declared that it was not yet ready. In 1914 there came the war on several fronts. It did not bring the solution of these problems. Today the second act of this drama is being written. For the first time in 67 years it must be made clear that we do not have a two-front war to wage. That which has been desired since 1870 and considered as impossible of achievement has come to pass. For the first time in history we have to fight on only one front, the other front is at present free. But no one can know how long that will remain so. I have doubted for a long time whether I should strike in the east and then in the west. Basically I did not organize the armed forces in order not to strike. The decision to strike was always in me. Earlier or later I wanted to solve the problem. Under pressure it was decided that the east was to be attacked first. If the Polish war was won so quickly, it was due to the superiority of our armed forces. The most glorious appearance in history. Unexpectedly small expenditures of men and materiel. Now the eastern front is held by only a few divisions. It is a situation which we viewed previously as unachievable. Now the situation is as follows: The opponent in the west lies behind his fortifications. There is no possibility of coming to grips with him. The decisive question is: how long can we endure this situation? Russia is at present not dangerous. It is weakened by many incidents today. Moreover, we have a pact with Russia. Pacts, however, are only held as long as they serve the purpose. Russia will hold herself to it only so long as Russia considers it to be to her benefit. Even Bismarck thought so. Let one think of the pact to assure our back. Now Russia has far reaching goals, above all the strengthening of her position in the Baltic. We can oppose Russia only when we are free in the West. Further Russia is striving to increase her influence on the Balkans and is striving toward the Persian Gulf. That is also the goal of our foreign policy. Russia will do that which she considers to benefit her. At the present moment it has retired from internationalism. In case she renounces this, she will proceed to Pan-Slavism. It is difficult to see into the future. It is a fact that at the present time the Russian army is of little worth. For the next one or two years the present situation will remain.

Much depends on Italy, above all on Mussolini, whose death could alter everything. Italy has a great goal for the consolidation of her empire. Those who carry this idea are fascism and the Duce, personally. The court is opposed to that. As long as the Duce lives, then it can be calculated that Italy will seize every opportunity to reach her imperialistic goal. However, it is too much to ask of Italy, that it should join in the battle before Germany has seized the offensive in the west: Just so Russia did not attack until we had marched into Poland. Otherwise Italy will think that France has only to deal with Italy, since Germany is sitting behind its West Wall. Italy will not attack until Germany has taken the offensive against France. Just as the death of Stalin, so the death of the Duce can bring danger to us. Just how easily the death of a statesman can come I myself have experienced recently. The time must be used to the full, otherwise one will suddenly find himself faced with a new situation. As long as Italy maintains this position then no danger from Jugoslavia is to be feared. Just so is the neutrality of Rumania achieved by the position of Russia. Scandinavia is hostile to us because of Marxistic influences, but is neutral now. America is still not dangerous to us because of its neutrality laws. The strengthening of our opponents by America

H1123-0149

is still not important. The position of Japan is still uncertain, it is not yet certain whether she will join against England.

Everything is determined by the fact that the moment is favorable now, in 6 months it might not be so anymore.

As the last factor I must name my own person in all modesty: irreplaceable. Neither a military nor a civil person could replace me. Assassination attempts may be repeated. I am convinced of the powers of my intellect and of decision. Wars are always ended only by the destruction of the opponent. Everyone who believes differently is irresponsible. Time is working for our adversary. Now there is a relationship of forces which can never be more propitious, but can only deteriorate for us. The enemy will not make peace when the relationship of forces is unfavorable for us. No compromise. Sternness against ourselves. I shall strike and not capitulate. The fate of the Reich depends only on me. I shall deal accordingly. Today we have a superiority such as we have never had before. After 1914 our opponents disarmed themselves of their own accord. England disregarded the construction of her fleet. The fleet is no longer sufficiently large to safeguard the shipping lanes. Only two modern new constructions: Rodney and Nelson. New construction activity only in the cruisers of the Washington class, which were, however, an unsatisfactory type. The new measures can become effective only in 1941. In the Abyssinian war England did not have enough strength to occupy the Tana Sea. At Malta, Gibraltar and London little anti-aircraft protection. Since 1937 a renewal of rearmament. At present however, only a small number of divisions, which must form the nucleus of new divisions. Material for the army being gathered together from all over the world. Not before next summer is a positive action to be expected. The British army has only a symbolic meaning. Rearmament in the air is proceeding. The first phase will end in the spring of 1940. Anti-aircraft has only guns from the last war. A German flyer is safe from English anti-aircraft fire at 6000 meters altitude. The navy will not be fully rearmed before one to two years (1 - 2 Jahren). I have the greatest experience in rearmament and I know the difficulties which must be overcome therein.

After 1914 France reduced the length of service. After 1914 decrease of military might. Only in some special branches are we inferior. Only the French Navy was modernized. In the time after the war the French army deteriorated. There were no changes until Germany rearmed and announced her demands.

In summary:

1) The number of active organizations in Germany is greatest.
2) Superiority of the Luftwaffe.
3) Anti-aircraft beyond all competition.
4) Tank corps
5) Large number of anti-tank guns, five times as many as 1914 machine guns.
6) German artillery has great superiority because of the 10.5 gun.
7) French superiority in howitzers and mortars does not exist.

Numerical superiority, but also the value of the individual soldier is greater than for the others. I am most deeply pained when I hear the opinion that the German army is not individually as valuable as it should be. The infantry in Poland did not accomplish what one should have expected from it. Lax discipline. I believe that the soldiers must be judged in their relative value in comparison with the opponent. There is no doubt that our armed forces are the best. Every German infantryman is better than the French. Not the exhiliration of patriotism but tough determination. I am told that the troops will only advance if the officers lead the way. In 1914 that was also the case. I am told that we were better trained then. In reality we were only better trained on the drill field, but not for the war. I must pay the present leadership the compliment that it is better than it was in 1914. Mention of the collapse while storming Liege. There was nothing like this in the campaign in Poland.

Five million Germans have been called to the colors. Of what importance if a few of them collapse. Daring in the army, navy and Luftwaffe. I can not bear it when one says the army is not in good shape. Everything lies

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in the hands of the military leader. I can do anything with the German soldier if he is well led. We have succeeded with our small navy in clearing the North Sea of the British. Recognition of the small navy, especially the High Command of the Navy.

We have a Luftwaffe which has succeeded in safeguarding the entire living space of the Germans.

The land army achieved outstanding things in Poland. Even in the West it was not shown that the German soldier is inferior to the French.

Revolution from within is impossible. We are superior to the enemy numerically in the West. Behind the Army stands the strongest armaments industry of the world.

I am disturbed by the stronger and stronger appearance of the English. The English are a tough enemy. Above all on defence. There is no doubt that England will be very much represented in France at the latest in six to eight months.

We have an Achilles heel: The Ruhr. The progress of the war depends on the possession of the Ruhr. If England and France push through Belgium and Holland into the Ruhr, we shall be in the greatest danger. That could lead to the paralizing of the German power of resistance. Every hope of compromise is childish: Victory or defeat! The question is not the fate of a national-socialistic Germany, but who is to dominate Europe in the future. The question is worthy of the greatest efforts. Certainly England and France will assume the offensive against Germany when they are armed. England and France have means of pressure to bring Belgium and Holland to request English and French help. In Belgium and Holland the sympathies are all for France and England. Mention of the incident at Venlo: The man who was shot was not an Englishman, but a Dutch General Staff officer. This was kept silent in the press. The Dutch government asked that the body of the Dutch officer be given up. This is one of their greatest stupidities. The Dutch press does not even mention the incident anymore. At a given time I shall use that to motivate my action. If the French army marches into Belgium in order to attack us, it will be too late for us. We must anticipate them. One more thing. U-boat, Mines, and Luftwaffe (also for Mines) can strike England effectively, if we have a better starting point. Now a flight to England demands so much fuel that sufficient bomb loads cannot be carried. The invention of a new type mine is of greatest importance for the Navy. Aircraft will be the chief mine layers now. We shall sow the English coast with mines which cannot be cleared. This mine warfare with the Luftwaffe demands a different starting point. England cannot live without its imports. We can feed ourselves. The permanent sowing of mines on the English coasts will bring England to her knees. However, this can only occur if we have occupied Belgium and Holland. It is a difficult decision for me. None has ever achieved what I have achieved. My life is of no importance in all this. I have led the German people to a great height, even if the world does hate us now. I am setting this work on a gamble. I have to choose between victory or destruction. I choose victory. Greatest historical choice, to be compared with the decision of Friedrich the Great before the first Silesian war. Prussia owes its rise to the heroism of one man. Even there the closest advisers were disposed to capitulation. Everything depended on Friedrich the Great. Even the decisions of Bismarck in 1866 and 1870 were no less great. My decision is unchangeable. I shall attack France and England at the most favorable and quickest moment. Breach of the neutrality of Belgium and Holland is meaningless. No one will question that when we have won. We shall not bring about the breach of neutrality as idiotically as it was in 1914. If we do not break the neutrality, then England and France will. Without attack the war is not to be ended victoriously. I consider it as possible to end the war only by means of an attack. The question as to whether the attack will be successful no one can answer. Everything depends upon the favorable instant. The military conditions are favorable. A prerequisite however, is that the leadership must give an example of fanatical unity from above. There would not be any failures if the leaders always had the courage a rifleman must have.

Individual acknowledgements: The enemy must be beaten only by attack. Chances are different today than during the offensive of 1918. Numerically we can use more than 100 divisions. With respect to men, reserves can be supplied. The material situation is good. Moreover that which is not

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TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 789-PS
(cont.)

ready today must be ready tomorrow. The whole thing means the end of the World War, not just of a single action. It concerns not just a single question but the existence or non-exsistence of the nation.

I ask you to pass on the spirit of determination to the lower echelons

1) The decision is irrevocable.
2) The only prospect for success, if the whole armed forces are determined.

The spirit of the great men of our history must hearten us all. Fate demands from us no more than from the great men of German history. As long as I live I shall think only of the victory of my people. I shall shrink from nothing and shall destroy everyone who is opposed to me. I have decided to live my life so that I can stand unshamed if I have to die. I want to destroy the enemy. Behind me stands the German people, whose morale can only grow worse. Only he who struggles with destiny can have a good intuition. In the last years I have experienced many examples of intuition. Even in the present development I see the prophecy.

If we come through this struggle victoriously - and we shall come through victoriously - our time will enter into the history of our people. I shall stand or fall in this struggle. I shall never survive the defeat of my people. No capitulation to the outside forces, no revolution from the interior forces.

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION
OF DOCUMENT NO 789-PS

3 October 1945

I, FRED NIEBERGALL, 2nd Lt Inf, O-1335567, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; and that the above is a true and correct translation of document 789-PS.

FRED NIEBERGALL
2nd Lt Inf
O-1335567

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Exhibit U.S.A. 91
Filed Dec. 3, 1945

PARTIAL-TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT NO.998-PS OFFICE OF U S CHIEF OF COUNSEL

Deutsche Verbrechen gegen die Tschecho-Slowakei

Tschechischer offizieller Bericht fuer die Anklage und den Prozeß gegen die deutschen Hauptkriegsverbrecher durch den Internationalen Militaer-Gerichtshof, eingesetzt laut Uebereinkommen der 4 Großmaechte vom 8.August 1945.

London, September 1945
(Seite 9 bis 18)

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(4) Das Haupt-Werkzeug: Die Sudetendeutsche Henlein Bewegung

a) Deutsche National-Sozialistische Arbeiter Partei (DNSAP)

Grundlegende Teile der national sozialistischen Weltanschauung stammen von den tschechischen Deutschen KNIRSCH, KREBS und JUNG, die im Mai 1918 in Boehmen die Deutsche National-Sozialistische Arbeiter Partei wieder errichtet hatten (DNSAP). Hitler's spaetere Partei war die National-Sozialistische Deutsche Arbeiter Partei (NSDAP).

In staendiger Verbindung mit den National-Sozialisten im Reich, gruendeten die deutschen National-Sozialisten in der Tschecho-Slowakei eine Vereinigung, die sie "Volkssport", Sport fuer's Volk fuer junge Maenner ueber 21 Jahre, nannten und die ganz genau die Sturmabteilungen (S.A.) des Reichs nachahmte.

Hartkoepfige junge Maenner des "Volkssports" gingen bis zum Aeussersten.

In 1932 wurden seine Anfuehrer des geplanten, bewaffneten Aufstandes im Solde einer auslaendischen Macht angeklagt und wegen Verschwoerung gegen die Republik, indem sie offen die 21 Punkte des Programms Hitler's unterstuetzten, dessen erster die Vereinigung aller Deutschen innerhalb eines Großdeutschen Staates verlangte, verurteilt.

Dieser Vorfall wurde weitgehend gegen die sogenannten Aktivisten (Deutsche Parteien, die mit den Tschechen zusammenarbeiteten) ausgenuetzt, die beschuldigt wurden, es mit den Tschechen zu halten und nichts fuer die Durchsetzung deutscher Rechte zu tun. Diese Vorgaenge fielen mit der Machtuebernahme Hitler's zusammen.

Spaet im Jahre 1933 kam die National-Sozialistische Partei in der Tschechoslowakei ihrer Aufloesung

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eine freiwillige Liquidierung zuvor und mehrerer ihrer Anfuehrer entkamen ueber die Grenze. Dies rief in der deutschen Presse und Rundfunk einen Ausbruch von heftigen Drohungen gegenueber der Tschechoslowakei hervor.

Waehrend eines Jahres wurde die Nazi-Taetigkeit in der Tschechoslowakei unterirdisch fortgesetzt.

b.) Deutsche Heimatfront.

Am 1.Oktober 1934 gruendete Konrad HEINLEIN, der "unpolitische"Turnlehrer des deutschen Turnverbandes in der Republik, die "Deutsche Heimatfront".

Er leugnete jedwede Beziehung zu der frueheren deutschen National-Sozialistischen Partei in der Tschechoslowakei oder irgendwelcher Verbindungen der "Deutschen Heimatfront" mit der Nazi-Partei in Deutschland. Er weigerte sich sogar, die deutsche Heimatfront nach den Grundlinien einer Partei zu organisieren, obwohl er sie gemaeß dem Nazi "Fuehrer-Prinzip" aufbaute, wobei er selbst der "Fuehrer" der "Heimatfront" wurde. Er versuchte aber eine Tarnung; er wies den Pan-Germanismus zurueck und bestand darauf, daß Faschismus und National-Sozialismus in gleicher Weise an der tschechischen Grenze ihre "raison d' etre" (die Grundlage fuer ihre Existenz" verloeren; er erklaerte sich gegen eine Abaenderung des Versailler Vertrages, gab seinen unbedingten Respekt fuer die individuellen Rechte und Freiheiten bekannt und vertrat den Standpunkt mit Nachdruck, daß die Treue der "Sudetendeutschen" zum deutschen Volk und zu gleicher Zeit zum tschechischen Staate sich nicht gegenseitig ausschloeßen.

c). Die "Sudetendeutsche Partei" (SDP.)

Das tschechische Wahlsystem ist auf die Parteivertretung begruendet. Deshalb aenderte HENLEIN die "Deutsche Heimatfront" zur "Sudetendeutschen Partei", um an den allgemeinen Wahlen fuer die National-Versammlung im Mai 1935 teilnehmen zu koennen.

Die wirtschaftliche Notlage, infolge der Handelskrise, erhoehte die Empfaenglichkeit der deutschen Bevoelkerung der Tschechoslowakei fuer den neuen deutschen Messias und Henlein errang einen gewaltigen Sieg ueber alle anderen deutschen Parteien.

Die Henleiniston hatten 44 Sitze in der Abgeordnetenkammer der National-Versammlung gewonnen, als die Wahlresultate bekannt gegeben wurden. Henlein schickte ein Telegramm an den Praesidenten Masary, worin er seine Loyalitaet beteuerte.

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(Cont.)

(5) Die Politik und Taktik der "Sudeten-
) deutschen Partei".

a) 1935-1936: Nach fuer die Demokratie"

Henlein stellte sich weiter als Freund der Demokratie vor, besonders in London in 1935 in "Chatham House" wo er Vortraege im "Koeniglichen Institut der Internationalen Politik" (Royal Institute of International affairs) hielt. Dort sagte er, dass er das totale Prinzip ablehne und eine "ehrliche Demokratie" billige. "Wir moechten solch eine Demokratie wie Masaryk empfehlt, " betonte er. Er lehnte "National-Sozialismus" oder "Hitlerismus" ab als eine Lehre, die nicht zur Ausfuhr geeignet sei. Er wies den Anti-Semitismus zurueck.

b) 1937: Fuer totale Autonomie der Sudetendeutschen, jedoch immer noch im Rahmen der Tschechoslowakischen Republik.

In 1937 schlug Henlein einen etwas lauteren Ton wie frueher an, indem er eine "vollkommene Sudeten-Autonomie", ohne diese zu definieren, verlangte. Die "Sudetendeutsche Partei" legte dem Parlament Entwurf-Vorschlaege vor, welche nicht viel weniger als die Bildung eines Staates innerhalb eines Staates verlangten. Das ganze Dokument, obwohl in einem gemaeßigten Tone gehalten, war schon auf totalen Prinzipien gegruendet.

c) 1938: Fuer den National-Sozialismus und fuer die Eingliederung der Sudeten Gebiete in das Deutsche Reich.

Nach der Besetzung Oesterreichs (Maerz 1938) jubelten die Henleinisten oeffentlich. Fast alle deutsche"Aktivistenparteien" wurden jetzt ins Henlein Lager gejagt, so dass der Kampf gegen die "Sudetendeutsche Partei" nur den Deutschen Sozialdemokraten und den Kommunisten ueberlassen wurde. Der Terror der Henleinisten nahm zu. Sie verstaerkten ihren Kampf gegen den "Bolschewismus". Offene antisemitische Propaganda fing in der Henlein Presse an.

Am 24.April 1938 kam HENLEIN mit seinem "Karlsbad Programm" heraus, veroeffentlicht in seiner Rede an dem Parteikongress in Karlovy vary. In jeder Zeile davon konnte nicht so sehr Mr. HENLEIN Stimme, als die Stimme seines Meisters gehoert werden. In dem Karlsbad Programme wurde, unter anderem, das Recht der Sudetendeutschen sich zur "Deutsche Politische Philosophie" in anderen Worten, zum National-Sozialismus, zu bekennen, beansprucht.

Im Mai 1938, besuchte HENLEIN Hitler in Berlin und kehrte, nachdem er die Anweisungen seines Herren erhalten hatte, nach London zu seiner alten Intrigantentaetigkeit gegen die tschechoslowakische Republik zurueck.

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Die oertliche Wahlen zur Regierung im Mai 1938, die von Henleins Anhaengern breiteste Propaganda, unverhuellten Terror , bedenkenlosen von Gebrauch von Geldmitteln, Bestechung von Wahlmaennern usw, gut vorbereitet ergaben 80 bis 90 % Stimmen fuer HENLEIN. So stand fast die ganze Bevoelkerung hinter HENLEIN.

Die Tschechische Regierung fuhr fort mit HENLEIN zu verhandeln, aber am 14. September - 2 Tage bevor HITLER in seiner Nuernberger Rede gegen "Diesen Benesch" donnerte und ihn der "Tortur und planmaessigen Ausrottung" der Sudetendeutschen bezuechtigte , liess er seine Maske fallen, floh ins Reich und erklaerte im Rundfunk,:" Wir wollen heim ins Reich." und klagte die "hussistisch -bolschewistischen Verbrecher in Prag " an.

K.H. FRANK der von Oberst Dr. Ecer am 30. Mai 1945 in Wiesbader vernommen wurde, erklaerte, dass 90% der Sudetendeutschen dem Schlagwort "Heim ins Reich" standen.

Nur ein paar Leute wussten, dass Henlein schon seit 1933 von HITIER besoldet wurde.

(d) "Sudetendeutsche Partei"wird eine Nazipartei

Nach Muenchen trat die "Sudendeutsche Partei" in den an Deutschland abgetretenen Gebieten , geschlossen der Nazipartei des Reichs bei. In den noch nicht besetzten teilen der Republic , konstituierte sich die "Sudetendeutsche Partei" als "Nazionalsozialistische deutsche Arbeiterpartei in der Tschechoslowakei."

Nach der vollstaendigen Besetzung(am 15 Maerz 1939) von Boehmen und Maehren wurde auch diese Partei ein Bestandteil der Nazipartei.des Reichs. (Ueber ihre Taetigkeit nach Muenchen siehe Abschnitt 7).

(e) Ein Zugestaendnis durch Henlein

In einer Rede, die er am 4. Maerz 1941 in Wien hielt, und die in den offiziellen Na zizeitungen veroeffentlicht wurden, erklaerte, HENLEIN: "Um uns vor einem tschechischen Angriff zu schuetzen, waren wir gezwungen, zu luegen und unsere Zugehoerigkeit zum Nazionalsozialismus zu verleugnen. Wir wuerden es vorgezogen haben, offen fuer den Nazionalsozialismus einzutreten. Es ist jedoch zweifelhaft, ob wir in diesem Falle unsere Aufgabe, die Tschechoslowakei zu zerstoeren, haetten erfuellen koennen."

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6.) System und Methoden der Nazi Vorkriegsinfiltration.

(a) Saat von Zwistigkeiten

Die Studien - und Forschungsgruppe der Nazi Partei wurde seit langer Zeit unterwiesen, nicht nur enge Zusammenarbeit mit der deutschen Minderheit in der tschechoslowakischen Republik zu schaffen, sondern auch Anhaenger von der slowakischen Antonomistenbewegung zu gewinnen. Lange vor dem oesterreichischen Anschluss im Maerz 1938 waren Nazi Kreise nicht nur in enger Beruehrung mit slowakischen verbannten Verraetern (die meistens unmittelbar von ungarischen Irredentisten beschaeftigt wurden), sondern sie versuchten auch mit Hlinkas Slovakischer Volkspartei (die Slowakische Katholische Volkspartei des verstorbenen Msgr. Andreas Hlinka). in Beruehrung zu kommen. Als der Verraeter Bela Tuka (der spaetere Ministerpraesident der unabhaengigen "Slowakei werden sollte) vor Gericht gestellt wurde in 1929 wegen Spionage und Hochverrat, wurde ihm nachgewiesen, dass er Verbindungen mit den Nazis unterhalten hatte.

Die Nazi Partei hatte bezahlte Agenten in den hoeheren Stab der Hlinka Partei. Ihre Aufgabe war es, jede Verstaendigung zwischen den slowakischen Antonomisten und den slowakischen Parteien in der Regierung in Prag unmoeglich zu machen.

Als K.H. Frank von Oberst Dr. B. Ecer am 30ten Mai 1945 in Wiesbaden verhoert wurde, bestaetigte er die enge Zusammenarbeit zwischen der Sudetendeutschen Partei (unter Fuehreung von Konrad Henlein; s. Einzelheiten in Abschnitt 4 und 5) und der Slowakischen Volkspartei.

(b) Spionage

Kriegsspionage wurde von Mitgliedern der deutschen Minderheit fuer Deutschland betrieben. Die Republik musste in 1936 das "Gesetz zur Beschuetzung der Republik" von 1923 ergaenzen um mit der weitvorbereiteten verraeterischen Taetigkeit der Henleinisten und der Reichsdeutschen jenseits der Grenze fertig zu werden. Die von der Polizei entdeckten Plaene der Henleinisten zeigten, dass die Henlein Nazis in jedem Gebiet Listen von allen deutschen Demokraten, Sozialisten und Kommunisten, sowie von Tschechen aller Parteien aufgestellt hatten und dass sie geplant hatten, dieselben aufzufangen und bei der vorausgesehenen Ankunft der Reichswehr zu verhaften.

(c) Mord, Terror, Antisemitismus.

Die Nazis schickten ihre Terroristen und Moerder unmittelbar aus dem Reich nach der Tschechoslowakei; so wurden die Nazi-Gegner, Professor Theodor Lessing und Ing. Fromis die nach 1933 aus Deutschland gefluechtet und in der Tschechoslowakei Obdach gefunden hatten , von Nazi Agenten in der Tschechoslowakei ermordet; Lessing in 1933 und Formis in 1935. Die Nazis im Reich schickten ihre Gestapo in die Grenzgebiete um tschechische Staatsbuerger ueber die Grenze nach Deutschland zu schleppen. Sie schickten auch Geld und Waffen zu den Henleinisten die immer wieder Zwischenfaelle hervorriefen um nur die Unruhe aufrecht zu erhalten. Sie griffen Gendarme, Zollbeamte und andere Staatsbeamte an , die immer wieder Verluste erlitten. Die Henleinisten terrorisierten die nicht-Henleinistische Bevoelkerung und ermordeten politische Gegner in mehreren Faellen. Antisemitsche Propaganda wurde in der Henlein - Presse durchgefuehrt und verursachte den Boykott gegen juedische Rechtsanwaelte, Aerzte, Geschaeftsleute, Geschaefte, usw.

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(d) Propaganda

Zersetzende Propaganda kam von Deutschland , besonders durch den deutschen Rundfunk. Dr. Goebbels begann die "Das Nest des Bolschewismus"- Hetze gegen die Tschechoslowakei und die Luege von den"Russischen Einheiten und Flugzeugen in Prag", usw. Die Nazis im Reich leiteten die Fluesterpropaganda der Henleinisten und erhielten in dieser Weise einen staendigen Zustand von Hoher Spannung im Nervenkrieg aufrecht.

Die Henleinisten verbreiteten die Nazi Weltanschauung mehr oder weniger oeffentlich in der deutschen Bevoelkerung durch ihre Presse und Schriften und schmuggelten gesetzwidriges Nazi Schrifttum von Deutschland in die Grenzgebiete.

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Hauptquartier in Deutschland

Die Nationalsozialisten unterhielten in Stuttgart eine "Auslands-Organisation der NSDAP" fuer Propaganda in anderen Laendern, in Zusammenarbeit mit der deutschen Bevoelkerung dieser Laender. Diese Organisation wurde von Gauleiter Bohle geleitet, der die Verwaltung des "Gau-Ausland" unter sich hatte. Es wurde ein umfassendes Programm mit wissenschaftlichen Eindringungsmethoden ausgearbeitet. In der Tschechoslowakei war die "Sudetendeutsche Partei" die fuenfte Kolonne, die als Werkzeug fuer die deutsche Durchdringung benuetzt wurde. (Siehe Teil 4 und 5).

f) Nationalsozialisierung der deutschen Einrichtungen in der Tschechoslovakischen Republik.

Die Henleinianer (Henlein Anhaenger) drangen systematisch, Schritt fuer Schritt, in das ganze Leben der deutschen Bevoelkerung der Tschechoslovakei ein.

Alle Einrichtungen wurden nach und nach "Gleichgeschaltet", das heisst, alle Gesellschaften, soziale und kulturelle Vereine usw. wurden vorwiegend von Henleinisten beherrscht. Sportklubs, Fussball, Athletik, Ruderklubs,etc. soie feteranen Verbaende, Chorgesellschaften und Landtagsreformvereine wurden "erobert". Beinahe alle Theater im deutschen Teil der Tschechoslovakei, sowie alle deutschen Orchester wurden von den Nationalsozialisten "erobert".

Selbstverstaendlich waren die Henleinianer sehr daran interessiert so viel wie moeglich, im wirtschaftliche Einrichtungen einzudringen und Bakdirektoren, Fabrikbesitzer, Geschaeftsfrimen, usw. auf ihre Seite zu bringen. In Faellen, in denen die Eigentuemer oder Direktoren juedisch waren, versuchten sie die Mitarbeit des gesamten Buero- und Fabrikpersonals der Einrichtungen zu sichern.

g) Befehle aus Berlin

Die Henleinianer waren staendig in Verbindung mit ihren deutschen Gebietern.

Wenn die Judendeutschen reichsdeutsche Festlichkeiten, Saengerfeste, Turnfeste und Versammlungen, die Leipziger Messe usw. besuchten, so war dies oft nur der Vorwand unter welchem Zusammenkuenfte veranstaltet wurden, in denen die ansaessigen Angehoerigen der fuenften Kolonie unterrichtet und zu frischen Taten angefeuert wurden.

Wenn immer Hitler in seinem Nervenkrieg gegen die Tschechoslovakei Vorfaelle brauchte, wurden dieselben vom Henlein Leuten beschleunigt besorgt.

Als ein Beispiel unter vielen, zitieren wir Sir Nevine Henderson, der in seinem Buch "Versagen einer Mission", London im April 1940 ueber das Zusammentreffen von Chamberlain und Hitler in Berchtesgaden am 15. September 1938 schweigt:

" ---- es gab einen dauernden Strom von deutschen Pressetelegrammen ueber Vorfaelle im Sudetenland. Ich kann mich an eines erinnern, dassmitteilte, dass 40 Deutsche, in einem Zusammenstoss mit tschechischen Gendarmen irgendwo getoetet worden seien. Ein britischer Beobachter von denen eine Anzahl bereits in der Tschechoslovakei vorhanden waren, der sofort ausgesandt wurde, um die Tatsachen des Falles festzustellen, machte daraufhin ausfindig, dass es sich tatsaechlich nur um einen Todesfall handelte.".

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Henderson fuegt hinzu, dass dies ein typisches Beispiel fuer die Methode, um welcher Nachrichten uebertrieben und tatsaechlich gefaelscht wuerden, waere.

(7) Verstaerkte Taetigkeit der Henlein Nazis

nach Muenchen

Nach Muenchen wurde Henlein Stellvertreter KUNDT der Fuehrer der deutschen Minderheit, die noch innerhalb der verstuemmelten Republik verblieben war, und er errichtete ruecksichtslos moeglichst viele, kuenstliche"Brennpunkte der deutschen Kultur". Deutsche von den Gebieten, die an Deutschland abgetreten worden waren, erhielten den Befehl von Berlin, ihre Studien an der deutschen Universitaet in Prag fortzusetzen und sie zu einem Zentrum angriffslustiger Nationalsozialisten zu machen. Die Regierung, die nach Muenchen folgte, hatte der deutschen Minderheit in Prag und anderen tschechischen Teilen des Landes zu erlauben "sich voellig frei, gemaes den Naziteorien, zu entwickeln und ihre politische Taetigkeit nicht zu verbieten".

Es ist selbstverstaendlich, dass jene "politische Taetigkeit" nur das Ziel verfolgte, den tschechischen Widerstand gegen Deutschlands Anordnungen zu untergraben und schwaechen.

Die Henlein Leute arbeiteten mit der GESTAPO zusammen, die vom Reiche kommend sich in die Republik durchfilterten.

Die Presse war, via facti, einer Zensur unterworfen die von den Deutschen ausgeuebt wurde. Deutsche amtliche Angestellte die vor dem Muenchener Abkommen Mitglieder der SDP (Sudetendeutsche Partei) geworden waren, erreichten bestimmenden Einfluss in ihren Aemtern und halfen an der Durchsetzung der tschechoslovakischen oeffentlichen und privaten Institutionen mit Nationalsozialisten.

(8) Schlussfolgerung

Die Abtrennung des Sudetengebietes war der Todesstoss fuer die wirtschaftliche Unabhaengigkeit der Tschechoslovakei. Die Grenzen die ihr durch die Vertraege von Muenchen und Wien aufgedrungen wurden, durchschnitten ihre Eisenbahnlinien an vielen Stellen, wodurch jewede strategische Verteidigung des zerstueckelten Landes unmoeglich gemacht und wodurch es bald darauf als Opfer einem deutschen Angriff preisgegeben wurde.

Henlein's fuenfte Kolonie in der Tschechoslovakei, nahm, wie oben geschildert, einen grossen Anteil, indem sie Hitler in der Erreichung seines Zieles unterstuetzte.

Wie Henlein sich ausdrueckte (siehe Abschnitt 5, (e): "Wir wuerden es vorgezogen haben den Nationalsozialismus oeffentlich zu unterstuetzen. Jedoch ist es zweifelhaft, ob uns die Aufgabe, die Tschechoslovakei zu zerstoeren gelungen waere, wenn wir das getan haetten."

CERTIFICAT OF TRANSLATION
OF DOCUMENT 998-PS

29 November 1945.

I DAVENPORT LEO, S/Sgt., 32496587 hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; and that the above is a true and correct translation of Document 998-PS.

LEO DAVENPORT
S/Sgt.
32496587.

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GERMAN CRIMES AGAINST CZECHOSLOVAKIA

Czechoslovak Official Report for the Prosecution and Trial of the German Major War Criminals by the International Military Tribunal established according to the Agreement of the Four Great Powers of August 8th, 1945.

London, September, 1945

(At Page 9)

* * * * *

(4) The Chief Instrument: The Sudeten-German Henlein Movement

(a) Deutsche Nationalsozialistische Arbeiter Partei (DNSAP).

Fundamental parts of the national socialist ideology derived from the Czechoslovak Germans KNIRSCH, KREBS and JUNG who, in Bohemia in May 1918, had reconstituted the German National Socialist Workers' Party (Deutsche Nationalsozialistische Arbeiter Partei DNSAP). HITLER's party to come was the Nationalsozialistische Deutsche Arbeiter-Partei NSDAP.

In permanent contact with the National Socialists of the Reich the German National Socialists in Czechoslovakia founded an organization called "Volksport" (People's Sport for youths over 21, modelled exactly on the Storm Troops (S. A.) of the Reich.

Headstrong youths of the "Volksport" sailed nearest the wind. In 1932, its student ring-leaders were charged with planning armed rebellion on behalf of a foreign power and sentenced for conspiring against the Republic, for having openly endorsed the 21 points of HITLER's programme, the first of which demanded the union of all Germans in a Great German State.

This incident was greatly exploited against the so-called Activists (German parties co-operating with the Czechs), who were accused of complacence to the Czechs and failure to vindicate German rights. It coincided with HITLER's accession to power.

Late in 1933, the National Socialist Party in Czechoslovakia forestalled its dissolution by voluntary liquidation, and several of its chiefs escaped across the frontier. This caused in German press

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and radio an outburst of violent threats against Czechoslovakia.

For a year the Nazi activity in Czechoslovakia was continued but underground.

(b) Deutsche Heimatfront.

On October 1st, 1934, Konrad HENLEIN, the "unpolitical" gymnastic instructor of the German Gymnastic Federation (Turnverband) of the Republic, established the "German Home Front" (Deutsche Heimatfront). He denied any relation to the late German National Socialist Party in Czechoslovakia and any connection of the "German Home Front" with the Nazi Party in Germany as well. He even refused to organize the German Home Front on party lines, although he built it up on the basis of the Nazi "Fuehrerprinzip" (principle of leadership), and himself became the "Fuehrer" of the "Heimatfront". But he attempted a camouflage: he rejected pan-Germanism, he insisted that Fascism and Nazism alike lost their natural "raison d' etre" at the Czechoslovak frontiers; he declared himself against the revision of the Versailles Treaty, he professed the unconditional respect for individual rights and liberties, he argued with great fervour that loyalty of the "Sudeten Germans" to the German nation and at the same time to the Czechoslovak State were not mutually exclusive.

(c) The "Sudetendeutsche Partei" (SDP).

The Czechoslovak election system is based on Party representation. HENLEIN, therefore, changed the German Home Front into the "Sudetendeutsche Partei" (Sudeten Germans' Party), for the purpose of participation in the General Elections of May 1935 for the National Assembly.

Economic distress owing to the trade crisis increased the susceptibility of the German population in Czechoslovakia for the new German Messiah and HENLEIN won a resounding victory over all other German parties.

When the election results were made known - the Henleinists won 44 seats in the Chamber of Deputies to the National Assembly - HENLEIN sent a loyalty telegram to President Masaryk.

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(5) The Policy and Tactics of the "Sudetendeutsche Partei".

(a) 1935 - 1936: Still "for Democracy".

HENLEIN continued to present himself as a friend of democracy especially in London where he lectured in 1935 at Chatham House in the Royal Institute of International Affairs. He stated there that he refused the totalitarian principle and that he was in favour of "an honest democracy". "We want a democracy such as is recommended by Masaryk", he emphasized. He denied "Nazism" or "Hitlerism" to be a doctrine "suitable for exportation", he rejected anti-Semitism.

(b) 1937: For complete Autonomy of Sudeten Germans but still within the framework of the Czechoslovak Republic.

In 1937 HENLEIN struck a somewhat shriller note than before demanding, without defining "complete Sudeten autonomy". The "Sudetendeutsche Partei" laid draft proposals before Parliament amounting to little short of creating a state within a state. The whole document, though moderately worded, was already based on totalitarian principles.

(c) 1938: For Nazism and for Incorporation of the Sudeten Areas into the German Reich.

After the occupation of Austria (March 1938) the Henleinists openly jubilated. Nearly all German "Activist parties" were now stampeded into the Henlein camp leaving the fight against the "Sudetendeutsche Partei" only to the German Social Democrats and Communists. The terrorism of the Henleinists increased. They intensified their campaign against "Bolshevism". Open anti-Semitic propaganda started in the Henlein press.

On April 24th, 1938, HENLEIN came into the open with his "Karlsbad Programme", set forth in his speech made to the Party Congress in Karlovy Vary. In every line of it could be heard not so much Herr HENLEIN himself as his master's voice. In the Karlsbad Programme among others the right of the Sudeten Germans to profess "German political philosophy" in other words, National Socialism, was claimed.

In May 1938, HENLEIN visited HITLER in Berlin and after obtaining his master's instructions was back in London at his old

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game of intriguing against the Czechoslovak Republic.

The Local Government elections in May 1938 - well prepared by the Henleinists by vast propaganda, opened terrorism, unscrupulous using of money, bribery of electors, etc., - showed 80-90% of votes for HENLEIN. So almost the whole German population stood behind HENLEIN.

The Czech Government continued to negotiate with HENLEIN, but on September 14th, - two days before HITLER fulminated in his Nuremberg speech against "this Benes" and accused him of "torturing" and planning the "extermination" of the Sudeten Germans - he threw off his mask, fled to the Reich declaring on the wireless: "We want to go home to the Reich", and denouncing "the Hussite Bolshevik criminals of Prague."

K. H. FRANK, interrogated by Colonel Dr. B. Ecer on May 30th, 1945, at Wiesbaden, stated that the slogan "Heim ins Reich" (Homewards to the Reich) was backed by 90% of the Sudeten Germans.

Few people knew before that HENLEIN went on HITLER's pay roll already in 1933.

(d) "Sudetendeutsche Partei" changed into a Nazi Party.

After Munich the "Sudetendeutsche Partei", in the areas ceded to Germany, entered as a whole into the Reich's Nazi Party. In the not yet occupied parts of the Republic, the "Sudetendeutsche Partei" constituted itself as "Nationalsozialistische deutsche Arbeiter-Partei in der Tschechoslovakei" (German Nazi Party in Czechoslovakia).

After the total occupation (March 15th, 1939) of Bohemia and Moravia this party too became part of the Reich Nazi Party. (About their activity after Munich see Section 7.)

(e) HENLEIN's Admission.

In a speech made on March 4th, 1941, in Vienna, published in official Nazi papers, HENLEIN stated: "In order to protect ourselves against Czech interference, we were compelled to lie and to deny our

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allegiance to the National Socialist cause. We should have preferred advocating National Socialism openly. However, it is doubtful whether in doing so, we would have been able to perform the task of destroying Czechoslovakia."

(6) System and Methods of Nazi Pre-War Infiltration.

(a) Seeds of Discord.

The Nazi Party's study and research groups had long been instructed not only to establish close cooperation with the German minority in the Czechoslovak Republic, but also to win over adherents from the Slovak autonomist opposition. Long before the Austrian Anschluss in March 1938, Nazi circles were not only in close contact with Slovak traitors living in exile (most of whom were directly employed by the Hungarian irredentists), but also tried to establish contacts in the organizational machinery of Hlinka's Slovak Peoples' Party (the Slovak Catholic Peoples' Party of the late Monsignor Andrew HLINKA). When the traitor Bela TUKA (later to become Prime Minister of "independent" Slovakia) was tried for espionage and treason in 1929, the evidence established the Nazi connections with him.

The Nazi Party had paid agents among the higher staff of the Hlinka Party. Their task was to render impossible any understanding between the Slovak autonomists and the slovak parties in the Government of Prague.

K. H. FRANK, interrogated by Col. Dr. B. Ecer on May 30th, 1945, at Wiesbaden, confirmed the close cooperation between the "Sudetendeutsche Partei" (Sudeten German Party, headed by Konrad HENLEIN; details see Sections 4 and 5) with the Slovakian Peoples' Party.

(b) Espionage.

Military espionage was conducted by members of the German minority on behalf of Germany. The Republic had to amend in 1936 the "Act for Protection of the Republic" of 1923 to cope with the wide-spread treason activity of the Henleinists and of the Reich Germans from beyond the frontier.

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Plans of Henleinists discovered by the police showed that the Henlein Nazis had, in every district, compiled lists of all German democrats, socialists and communists as well as of Czechs of all parties, and were planning to round up and arrest them on the anticipated arrival of the Reichswehr.

(c) Murder, terrorism, anti-Semitism.

The Nazis from the Reich sent directly to Czechoslovakia their terrorists and murderers; thus the anti-Nazis, Professor Theodor Lessing and Ing. Formis who escaped after 1933 from Germany and were given refuge in Czechoslovakia, were murdered in Czechoslovakia by Nazi agents, Lessing in 1933 and Formis in 1935. The Nazis from the Reich sent their Gestapo into the border districts to drag Czechoslovak citizens across the border to Germany. They also sent money and arms to the Henleinists who time and again provoked incidents in order just to keep permanent unrest. They attacked gendarmes, customs officers and other State officials who time and again suffered casualtics. The Henleinists terrorized the non-Henlein population and in several cases murdered political foes.

Anti-semitic propaganda was carried through in the Henlein press and boycott set in against Jewish lawyers, doctors, tradesmen, shops, etc.

(d) Propaganda.

Disruptive propaganda came from Germany especially through the German broadcasts. Dr. GOEBBELS launched "The-Nest-of-Bolshevism" campaign against Czechoslovakia and the lie of "Russian-troops-and-air-planes-in-Prague", etc. The Nazis from the Reich directed the whispering propaganda of the Henleinists thus maintaining a permanent state of high tension in the war of nerves.

The Henleinists spread more or less openly the Nazi ideology among the German population through their press and publications and smuggled illegal Nazi literature into the border regions from Germany.

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(e) Headquarters in Germany.

The Nazis entertained in Stuttgart the "Ausland-Organisation der NSDAP" for German propaganda in other countries in cooperation with the German population of those countries. This organization was headed by Gauleiter BOHLE, who had the task of administering the "Gau Ausland" (district: foreign countries). A comprehensive system with scientific methods of penetration was worked out. In Czechoslovakia the tool of German infiltration through Fifth Columns was the "Sudetendeutsche Partei" (see Sections 4 and 5).

(f) Nazification of German Institutions in the Czechoslovak Republic.

The Henleinists penetrated systematically step by step into the whole life of the German population of Czechoslovakia.

All institutions underwent gradually "Gleichschaltung", i. e., the prevailing domination of all Associations, social and cultural centres, etc., by the Henleinists. Sport societies, football, light athletics, rowing clubs, etc., were "conquered", just as associations of ex-service men, choral societies or associations for diet reform.

Nearly all theatres in German parts of Czechoslovakia were "conquered" by the Nazis, and all German orchestras as well.

It goes without saying that the Henleinists were greatly interested in penetrating into as many economic institutions as possible and to bring over to their side the directors of banks, the owners or directors of factories, commercial firms, etc. In cases of Jewish owners or directors they tried to secure the cooperation of possibly the whole clerical and technical staff of the respective institutions.

(g) Orders from Berlin.

The Henleinists entertained permanent contact with their German masters.

Attendance of Sudeten Germans at Reich German celebrations, Saengerfeste (Choral Festivals), Gymnastic Shows and Assemblies, the Leipzig Fair, etc., were often the pretext for organized meetings to instruct the native Fifth Columnists and to inspire their activity.

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Whenever HITLER, in his War of Nerves against Czechoslovakia, needed incidents, the Henleinists supplied them promptly.

As one instance of many we quote Sir Nevile HENDERSON who reports in his book "Failure of a Mission", London, April 1940, the meeting of CHAMBERLAIN and HITLER in Berchtesgaden on September 15th, 1938:

> ". . . there was a constant influx of German Press telegrams about incidents in the Sudeten lands. One, I remember, reported that forty Germans had been killed in a clash somewhere with Czech gendarmes. A British observer, of whom there were already a number in Czechoslovakia, and who was immediately sent to verify the facts of the case, subsequently ascertained that there had, in fact, been one death."

Henderson adds that it was a typical example of the method of exaggeration and actual falsification of news.

(7) Intensified Activity of the Henlein Nazis after Munich.

After Munich HENLEIN's deputy KUNDT became the leader of the German minority still left inside the mutilated Republic and created unscrupulously as many artificial "focal points of German culture" as possible. Germans from the districts handed over to Germany were ordered from Berlin to continue their studies at the German University in Prague, and to make it a centre of aggressive Nazism. The post-Munich government had to allow the German minority in Prague and other Czech parts of the country "to develop freely in conformity with the Nazi theories and not to prohibit its political activity."

It goes without saying that that "political activity" pursued only the aim to undermine and to weaken the Czechs' resistance against the commands from Germany.

The Henleinists cooperated with the Gestapo from the Reich infiltrating into the Republic.

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The press was, via facti, subjected to censorship exercised by Germans.

German civil servants who, before Munich, had become members of the SDP, attained dominating influence in their positions and assisted the Nazi infiltration into Czechoslovak public and private institutions.

(8) Conclusion.

The separation of "Sudetengebiet" was the death blow for the economic independence of Czechoslovakia. The frontiers imposed on her by the Agreement of Munich and Vienna cut her railway lines at many places, thus making impossible any strategic defence of the mutilated country, which soon fell a victim to the German aggression.

HENLEIN's Fifth Columns in Czechoslovakia as described above, had their big part in assisting HITLER to achieve his aim.

As HENLEIN put it (see Section 5, (e)): "We should have preferred advocating National Socialism openly. However, it is doubtful whether in doing so we would have been able to perform the task of destroying Czechoslovakia."

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Exhibit U.S.A. 123
Filed Dec. 5, 1945

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1301-PS
OFFICE OF U.S. CHIEF OF COUNSEL

Financing of the armament

The following explanations take as their premise the fact, that the execution of the armament program is by its speed and extent the mission of German policy, that everything else therefore must be subordinated to this purpose, unless the neglect of other questions would endanger the main goal. Even after 16 March 1935, the difficulty continues to exist, that one cannot attempt the influencing of the German people by propaganda for support of the armament, without endangering internationally our position. The financing of the armament program, already almost impossible, is being made especially difficult by that.

Further, another prerequisite must be presented. The printing press can only be used for the financing of armament to the extent which the maintenance of money value allows. Each inflation increases the prices of foreign raw materials, and increases the prices within the country; thus it is a snake, which bites its tail. The fact that our armament had to be camouflaged completely until 16 March 1935, and for the biggest part even afterwards, has led to that, that the printing press has already been made use of at the start of the armament program; whereas it would have been natural to put it at the final point of the financing. Of the 3775 millions in the portfolio of the Reichsbank plus 866 millions set aside in bills of exchange=total of 4641 millions, the bills of exchange to finance armament represent 2374 millions (status of 30 April 1935). The Reichsbank has invested most of the German mark sums, available to its administration and belonging to foreigners, in armament bills of exchange. Thus our armament was partly financed with the property of our political opponents. Also used for the financing of the armament program were the 500 millions RM, which came together through the Reich loan placed at the savings banks in Jan 1935. In the regular budget the following amounts were provided for the armed forces: fiscal year 1933/34 RM 750 millions, fiscal year 1934/35 RM 1100 millions, fiscal year 1935/36 RM 2500 millions.

The sum of the deficits of the budgets increase since 1928, according to the estimate 1935/36, up to 5 to 6 billions RM. At present this total deficit is already being financed by short-term credits from the money market. Thus it already burdens in this amount the possibilities of use of the public market for armament. The Reich Minister of Finance is justified in saying in his budget explanations: "Since an annual deficit.....is an impossibility permanently, since one cannot count with certainty an increased tax income, covering the deficit and other previous debts; since on the other hand only a balanced budget offers a secure basis for our great future task in the armament policy, fundamentally and consciously--a budget policy must be followed, which will solve the problem of financing of armament by organic and planned decrease of other expenses, not only from the point of view of income, but also of expenses, that means saving."

How urgent this demand is can further be construed from the fact that an unending number of tasks were attacked and are in the process of execution by state and party, all of which cannot be covered by the budget but by subscriptions and credits, which must be raised besides the regular taxes by business. This simultaneous existence of various budgets, which however all serve a more or less public purpose, present the greatest obstacle to the gaining of a clear picture of the financing possibilities of armament. A whole series of ministries and numerous agencies of the party have their own budget in addition to their share of the Reich budget, and thus accordingly income and expense possibilities, which, although they are based on the financial sovereignty of the state, are not subordinated to the control of the Minister of Finance and thus also not to the control of the cabinet. Exactly

as in the field of politics, the too far reaching delegation of legislative authority to individuals in Germany has led to the condition of many states within the state, thus the condition of parallelism and divergence (Nebeneinander and Gegeneinander) of numerous state and party agencies has absolutely a disasterous effect on the financing possibility of armament. If in this field, no concentration and no unified control is introduced finally, one must fear the worst for the solution of the almost impossible task of financing of armament.

Thus the following tasks result:

1) A commissioner must at first determine all sources and incomes, which are derived from Reich, State and Party funds, as well as from profits of public or party enterprises.
2) Then, a commission, appointed by the FUHRER must investigate how these funds were used up to now, and how much can be taken from these funds in the future from their present purpose, and made available to the financing of armament.
3) The same commission has to examine the assets of all public and official party organizations, how the assets have been invested, and to what extent these assets can be utilized for the financing of armament.
4) The Reichministry of Finance is to be commissioned to investigate the possibilities of an increased tax income by the introduction of new taxes or the increase of existing tax rates.

The financing of armament previously by the Reich Bank was a necessity under the existing political conditions, and the political success has proved the correctness of this action. However now, other methods of financing of armament must be attempted under all conditions. With that, all not absolutely necessary expenses in other fields must be refrained from, and the entire, actually small, financial power of Germany must be concentrated on this one goal, the financing of armament. Whether the financial problem will succeed with this method of approach, is as yet doubtful, but without such concentration it will fail with certainty.

Memorandum 9.III.1936
on the supply situation in the field of fuels and its effect on the Wehrmacht.

The simultaneous throttling and blocking of foreign sources of liquid fuel has caused an increasingly critical situation of supply of the German market since the beginning of the year 1936.

This situation calls for a description of the serious effects on the preparedness for action of the Wehrmacht and of the extraordinary measures which necessitate a decision in this matter.

The supply of the Wehrmacht is based on the home production, the reserves which can be made available in case of mobilization and the foreign imports which still for some time must fill the present gaps of supply.

I. The German production.

The anticipating measures taken during the last 2 years by the Reich Cabinet to increase the home production of fuel, will not bring about an essential improvement of the supply situation during the current year because of the time required for factory construction and the uninterrupted increase of demand, but cannot bring an appreciable relief until the year 1938. The list in enclosure 1 of the requirements in case of mobilization and of the supply of these requirements by production, as well as the graphs added to the other enclosures, show the influence to be expected from the German production on the entire supply.

The expanding German production favors mainly light fuels, especially fuel for airplanes, and in addition, oil for airplane engines. As to the other kinds required by the Wehrmacht in case of war, we cannot expect any improvement for the time being; as to heating oils it may be anticipated that the situation will deteriorate. The development of new processes (Uhde and Pott), the extent of which will shortly permit an opinion, offers certain possibilities of auxiliary supply which do not appear on the graphs, because the extent of the production possible until 1938 cannot yet be foreseen.

The inadequacy of the supply on the basis of home production is a fact which cannot be eliminated during the next 2-3 years, even with the greatest efforts and in spite of the planning started for additional expansion of production.

II. Reserves.

To assure the requirements of the Wehrmacht it becomes necessary to bridge the supply gaps by reserves. For the first period of mobilization the Wehrmacht relies on the reserves of business, especially of great importing corporations, which also in peace time consider stored reserves for about 3 months as indispensable for smooth distribution. The Wehrmacht ought to be enabled to count on the amount of these reserves remaining constant.

Beyond that the Wehrmacht accumulates its own reserves in large storage houses so that considerable national reserves will be available as buffers in case of supply difficulties.

III. Dependency of the overall supply on imports.

The obstacles to importing encountered to a large extent during the last weeks, and which have been brought about by an accumulation of economic-political events in foreign trade,

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endanger not only the maintenance of industrial reserves but also the continuation of the storage policy of the Wehrmacht. They shake the very foundations of the motorization program of industry and consequently also of Wehrmacht mobilization of mechanized vehicles to the extent planned for the case of war.

In particular large gaps have been opened:
1) due to the Russian prohibition of exporting petroleum, by which the benzol-association supplying about 20% of the German market got into considerable difficulties.
2) due to suddenly considerably increased demands of the Rumanians, who offer fuel only in exchange for foreign bills proper (Bardevisen) and/or at greatly increased prices in marks. The contribution of Rumanian imports to the supply of German requirements was 40% during the last year. The firm Olex which contributes 11% to the German market has already been forced, due to the obstruction of Rumanian deliveries, to decrease its business considerably and will face a close-down of its market supply if relief is not procured before June 1936. Due to this reduction of imports similar stoppages are to be expected by the other great organizations of distribution during the same period.

IV. Means to secure the supply.

In considering how to meet the situation the following devices are unbearable for the Wehrmacht:

1) Reduction of mechanized traffic because this would, in addition to precarious economic and psychological effects, bring about a throttling of German motorization, which in view of the requirements of the Wehrmacht in case of war, would be a shock to mobility and supply of replacements.
2) Just as undesirable is to be considered the diminishing of reserves. The industrial reserves constitute the basis for mobilization, which has to rely on firm figures which remain about constant. As a decrease of reserves has already started, the further development in this direction is to be counteracted immediately. Aid from the reserves of the Wehrmacht cannot be granted because these modest quantities being ultimate reserves cannot be diminished under any circumstances.

Consequently, only the following means are to be considered:
1) Conceding to the Rumanian demands of paying imports in marks on a considerably raised price-basis.
2) Additional payments in foreign bills proper (Bardevisen) of imports from Anglo-Saxon countries.
3) Investigation to what extent an improvement can be achieved by accelerating or expanding the facilities for German production.

The first course has been followed by the authorization to negotiate new contracts on the basis of the Rumanian demands. Adequate and punctual delivery to the market, however, is not yet assured hereby.

Re.2.) Foreign bills (Devisen) for the minimum of the indispensable import requirements can probably be obtained only by reduction of import of other necessities. The narrow limits of the presently assured raw materials for armament do not allow for a decrease of such imports which are indispensable for the Wehrmacht. In particular we cannot do without the necessary quantities of metals required by the Wehrmacht for current procurements.

Re.3.) As a result of investigations made, essential changes cannot be expected at a date within sight.

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V. Uniform management of the petroleum industry.

During the last few months the Wehrmacht has repeatedly emphasized the unavoidable call for a uniform and planned steering of the entire German petroleum industry. The present dangerous situation of the German fuel industry puts this necessity again into the spotlight. The lack of stern guidance in the present moment must lead to severest damages to the public and the defense of the country. The duty of a management according to plans of the petroleum industry must be in the first line to avert the permanent threat to mechanized traffic and the preparedness of the Wehrmacht for action lying in the extensive dependency on forces outside of the German sphere of control.

Enclosure 1 to "memorandum on the supply situation in the field of fuels and its effect on the Wehrmacht" of 9 March 36.

	Mob. requirements		Supply of requirements by production	
	1936 t/Jahr	1938 t/Jahr	1936 %	1938 %
Light fuels for car engines	900 000	1 530 000	43	60.5
Light fuels for airplane engines	460 000	600 000	39	61.5
(illegible), Fuel oil	650 000	1 280 000	11.6	22
Healing oil	800 000	1 200 000	30.6	22
Lubricating oil for car engines	80 000	150 000	22.5	23
Lubricating oil for airplane engines	35 000	55 000	-	22

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IIa Needed raw materials 4/28/1936

(with consideration of the program for the supply of ammunition, amounting to 200 million marks (Mil. RM.)
(for the months of April 1936 to March 1937 = 12 months)

supply needed, submitted to R.Wi.Min. (letter of 1/13/36)

copper	5400 t/month	(without plate VIII)
lead	2300 t/month	" " "
zinc	3100 t/month	" " "

supply needed, considering the 200 Mill.-plan.

copper	5850 t/month	(without plate VIII)
lead	3350 t/month	" " "
zinc	4020 t/month	" " "

Therefore the additional need amounts to

copper	450 t/month
lead	1050 t/month
zinc	920 t/month

Raw materials needed by parts of the Armed Forces
(for the months of April 1936 to March 1937)

opper	4830	670	175	175	5850
ead	2750	280	300	20	3350
inc	2420	160	260	1180	4020

Secret

Raw materials needed by the armed forces during the years 1935 and 1936

aw materials		need.1936	t/month 1935
ron and steel			
ron ore	Fe	130 000	80 000
anganese ore	Mn	7 000	4 000
romium	0,5 C	220	88
	0,5 C	160	86
lfram		80	15
lybdanum		40	8
anadium		3	1
antalum		2	0.5
licon		400	250
on-iron metals			
pper		7 500 1)	4 670
ad		6 500 2)	3 520
ckel		275	174
n		150	89
nc		3 100 3)	1 830
uminum		2 720	1 900
timone		55	25
dmium		10	0.62
rcury		20	12
balt		10	3

te: 1) for cables 2100 t/months; starting on 1 Apr.36 possibly only 6000 t/month, including 2100 t/ for cables;

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(Note: 2) for cables 4200 t/months; starting 1 Apr.36 7800 t/month which means 5500 t/month for cables;

3) from this amount: sheet-zinc in the limits of the quota of the association of zinc-rolling-mills 340 t/month; starting 1 Apr.36 possibly only 4700 t/month including sheet-zinc.

Raw materials	need.1936	t/month 1935
Leather goods (economy)		
skins and pelts	1 300	1 400
natural tanning matter	800	860
wood		
special foreign timber	170	150
grain, fodder & further agricultural products		
linseed	1 500	1 900
coal and salt		
oil coke* (and Pitch coke)	1 700	1 300

*of these 1500 t/month to produce the aluminum needed by the armed forces.

various goods		
diamonds, amounting to a value of	RM. 15 000-/month	11 000 RM
cane	200	160
mica	18	15
magnesite	1 200	1 000
rubber and asbestos		
rubber	280	150
asbestos (spinasbest)	100	70
fat for industrial purposes		
glycerine	165	120
petroleum oils		
gas for plane engines	7 000	4 000
light fuel f. motor vehicles	3 000	1 500
lubrication oil f. plane engines	700	200
lubrication oil f. motor vehicles	500	150
gas-oil, (diesel)	7 500	1 200
heating oil	15 000	6 000

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TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1301-PS
Continued

Copy

Berlin, 15 May 1936

Prime minister General (Generaloberst) Göring
Raw material and Foreign exchange staff

Top Secret

To the Reichminister of war
Generalfeld marschall von Blomberg

Enclosed, a record of the conference of the council of ministers of 12 May 1936 in the afternoon is forwarded.

By order
/s/ Löb
Lt. Col. in the General Staff

Top Secret

Record
of the council of ministers on 12 May 1936 1700 hours

Chairman: Prime minister General GÖRING.
Reichminister of War Generalfeld marschall von BLOMBERG.
Reichsbank President and acting Reich and Prussian minister for Economy Dr. SCHACHT
Reichminister of Finance Graf Schwerin von KROSIGK
Prussian minister of Finance Prof. Dr. POPITZ
As the recording secretary Lt. Col. in the General Staff LÖB

Minister Schacht: shows the development up to now when two years ago, the decision for rearmament was made, it was decided to carry out the financing mainly outside the means of the Reichministry of Finance. This meant the commitment of the last reserve from the very beginning. A decision which did not seem without hazards. The memorandum of 3 May 1936 says the same thing.

In the course of the last two years, the program was increased more and more in its extent and speed. Thus the requirements to the Reichsbank were increased steadily.

It would be necessary to create, as basis for financing, a steady, prosperous economy, and therefore renounce the execution of other, partially irrational ideas and aims of the party. The psychological prerequisite was not disturbed by the party as such, but by many individual groups of the party, again and again; personal attacks against Dr. Schacht and thus against the economy followed. Dr. Schacht has emphasized again and again, that one must follow a cultural and legal policy, which will save economy alone. However one must not describe it as greedy and selfish from the beginning.

Also money theories of the most variable kind have been published repeatedly, thus causing anxiety for the economy; to counteract this was practically impossible, as the propaganda machine of the party did not permit this.

Despite all this, Dr. Schacht continued to work, because he stands with unswerving loyalty to the Führer, because he fully recognizes the basic idea of national socialism and because at the end, the disturbances, compared to the great task, can be considered irrelevant. Previously, approximately 11 billions marks besides the budget have been raised for rearmament and unemployment without shaking the rates of exchange and currency; the rate of interest could be lowered.

The Fuhrer has repeatedly emphasized in personal talks and cabinet meetings, that the speed of rearmament must be kept up until the spring of 1936. This was agreed to and carried out.

Prime minister Göring: has never heard about this time limitation.

Minister Schacht: The main question for the further execution of the program is, how much money can be gotten out of business. Some 4 billion can be consolidated annually by long term loans, but 9 billion cannot be asked for; the possibility of making

available depends on the development of the money market. Full concentration of the money market through the Reichsbank is necessary.

If the Reichsbank should have to issue more notes than could be born by the currency, one must reach back to other factors.

Dr. Schacht will never be part to an inflation; the Führer also has decided in this sense. The danger of such a development is imminent. If a road is to be taken, which contains this danger, Dr. Schacht would like to drop out on time, so that he does not disturb the new course.

Dr. Schacht considers it impossible, that prices can be fixed by the state, if the same money policy is continued.

Prime minister Göring: What is the basis of currency with the Reichsbank?

Minister Schacht: This question has nothing to do with the gold standard. It is a question of something imponderable, to recognize the time of which must be left up to a fine sensitivity. If by a surplus of money, the danger of devaluation of the mark exists, the state can and must take action from the financial side by taxes etc. Considering the material factor, it must be determined, that we are dependent for numerous goods on foreign countries. Even small percentages as a whole have considerable effect. In many cases, the necessity for import is caused by trade political relations; therefore the raw-material situation may not only be viewed and attacked from the production within Germany. The foreign relations must not be decreased all of a sudden. For instance the negotiations with STANDARD and SHELL were carried out on this basis.

Prime Minister Göring: When substitutes (ersatzstoffe) are sufficient in quantity, we shall no longer need the import, which presents us such difficulties.

Minister Schacht: In a series of cases, to be able to carry out the import, work from within Germany was utilized for compensation, for instance tankers for oil import corporations.

However it is especially required that nothing be said about intentions and measures of this field in public, so as not to aggravate the importers.

Prime Minister Göring: If the Führer has expressed himself in this direction, he did it to counteract the increasing possimism in the country in respect to this field.

Minister Schacht: In any case, all anxiety must be prevented. Foreign exporters have already shown less readiness to deliver against certificates of foreign exchange, since they apparently have no more confidence in the cashing of these certificates.

Prime Minister Göring: Our raw material situation is generally known to the world. The article published in the papers on 28 April 1936 did not contain anything secret. Actually the confidence abroad should have been increased by this publication, because generally the opinion was held abroad, that Dr. Schacht was protected by the Prime Minister against the party.

Minister Schacht: The situation at present is thus:

Some 64 million marks are already claimed by reembursement.

We must buy especially crude rubber and textiles; we have practically no crude rubber. Cellulose wool is not an adequate substitute, especially not for export goods.

The necessity for the closing down of manufacturing plants will soon result from this accordingly.

It must be decided whether the available gold should be all spent at the present speed or whether it should already be slowed down.

Swedish ores are still available for about 3 months. The export to Sweden becomes more difficult, and thus the import possibilities decrease.

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Prime Minister Göring: is of the opinion that our export to Sweden continues, so that one can further count on import.

Minister Schacht: The raw material supply of Germany amounted at the beginning of the war to a value of about 7 to 8 billions; now it is less than 1 billion.

Prime Minister Göring; has heard repeatedly, that export business was refused by the Reichminister for Economy. In the future, the departments will be caused by him to re-examine such occurences; perhaps then it will work differently than until now.

Minister Schacht: Increase of our export appears improbable in the near future. Further obligations arise through the Foreign Office, the Reichsbahn, Post Office, Party and other agencies; soon the consular service cannot be paid any more.

The time will come, when we will have no longer any reserves of either raw materials or foreign exchange at our disposal.

Prime Minister Göring: If we have war to-morrow, we must help ourselves by substitutes. Then money will not play any role at all. If that is the case, then we must be ready to create the pre-requisites for that in peace. The account just described could have also been presented, in his opinion, in the meeting this morning.

Minister Schacht: Publication is recommended for only the smallest circle.

Prime Minister Göring: It is necessary to inform the people required for the execution.

Minister Schacht: In his opinion only the ministers, not the state secretaries. In addition, each department must be called in individually.

Prime Minister Göring: The psychological pre-requisites for the correct approach to the work must be created everywhere. The actual work is done by the state-secretaries and the experts. In the future one must go much more into detail; confidence in the persons employed in this is absolute necessity.

Prime Minister Göring: summarizes the explanation by Minister Schacht: In short, demands on the Reichsbank can no longer be covered; only 64 million marks are still available.

Minister Schacht: declares that besides these 64 million Reichsmarks in the private banks, there are another 72 million Gold with the Reichsbank.

Prime Minister Göring: continues with the summary:

The shortage of raw material is known in its extent. A considerable increase is no longer possible, in the opinion of Minister Schacht.

Minister Schacht: The production of raw materials within Germany finds its limitation there, when an increase of prices of export goods is created by it.

Prime Minister Göring: One can separate requirements within Germany and export. Even the smallest details are important. The following appears necessary.

1) Increase of export despite all difficulties.
2) The raw material coverage within Germany.
3) The possibly necessary resettlement of workers and food fundamentals for the execution of all measures.

These problems all affect each other, so that the participation of all departments is necessary.

Appropriate example: Position of the farmer, who does not utilize the available possibility of intensifying of fertilizing, because the capital lost is not bearable for him in case of bad harvests. In such a case, the risk lying with the weather must be partially taken from the farmer by a special organization.

The Reichministry of Finance must also be consulted greatly in reference to th regular budget. Re-awakening of thriftiness in all fields belongs to this program.

Minister Popitz: The final conclusions made by Dr. Schacht are clear and convincing, under the condition that the bases for these conclusions are correct. That

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must be examined. It must be determined again, whether the principles, according to which the present raw material and foreign currency policy has been carried out with such a big success, are unalterable and correct.

The time when perhaps and inflation is feared is unclear; actually it is already here, even if it has a bearable extent.

An increase of export cannot be expected with the present system. However it is to be examined, whether there is not a better system. The basis of the present economic policy is deflationary. However it appears impossible to integrate the deflation into an actually existing inflation. It must be discussed, whether forced economy of export is to be continued.

It is to be examined further, whether the money for rearmament can be drawn out from the remaining economy. In no case may the condition arise, that the Reichminister for Finance and the Reichminister for Economy push the responsibility for the providing of funds to each other.

The difference between 2 billion Reichsmarks, which the Reichsbank believes to be able to raise on a long term basis, and the 8 to 9 billion Reichsmarks required for armament, cannot be covered by taxes. Therefore the following suggestion:

1) The raw material question, which can be solved comparatively simply, must be attended to at once by a special committee.

2) Illuminate critically the export question, so to say, in a scientific manner.

Minister von Krosigk: Economy of foreign exchange in detail is necessary. In that, small things also play a part. Equal saving is necessary in spending money within Germany. In contrast to Minister Popitz, he is of the opinion that expenses for armament must be taken over more and more by the regular budget. Expenses above this budget are to be covered

a) by long term consolidation of annually some 2 billion marks.

b) by short term bills of exchange and similarly.

The financing has succeeded up to now by these two means.

However the danger exists, the short-term bills of exchange can no longer be negotiated, so that flooding of the Reichsbank with MEFO bills would have an increased printing of banknotes as consequence.

Minister Popitz: In this case, printing of bank notes is only necessary if the money is absolutely necessary for payement of wages among other unavoidable things.

Minister von Krosigk: The decisive question for that is, whether inflation would actually happen by printing of banknotes to this extent. He does not believe so. The increase of prices observed so far was not caused by monetary reasons, but can be derived from increase of prices for raw materials and agricultural products. Thus one cannot speak of an inflation.

Prime Minister Göring: does not believe that an inflation would happen from the monetary angle.

Measures which in a state with a parliamentary government would probably bring about inflation, do not have to have the same results in a totalitarian state.

Important for this is the application of an appropriate propaganda, so that the co-operation of the propaganda ministry, promised by the Führer, is of great importance.

Minister Schacht: gives a summary of the holdings of bills of exchange in the Reichsbank at present:

4,353,000,000.--RM bills of exchange

3,731,000,000.--RM of which are in MEFO bills of exchange

2,200,000.--MEFO bills of exchange are deposited in clearing accounts.

More than 5 billions in bills of exchange are deposited thus, that they can be presented immediately in case of disturbances of the money market, caused by any measure.

Therefore any disturbance must be prevented under all conditions.

Prime Minister Göring: agrees to be the "shield" for the measure of financial nature, so that no disturbances would happen.

The regular budget is to take over the current up-keep of the armed forces, but not the costs of the reconstruction.

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Minister Popitz: It is to examined whether the regular budget cannot be relieved from interests and amortization quotas of advance drawings. Even the observing of the international bank law cannot prevent the using of these recognized necessary measures in this direction.

If the economy is started be increased export, naturally the circulation of money will increase and with that the possibility of further financing.

If the money, which had to be put into circulation, is only used for payment of wages, no inflation can take place.

Prime Minister Göring: orders:

1) Determination as rapidly as possible of the basis of payment.

2) Beginning of the execution work in the realm of raw material production within Germany.

3) Examination of the question of the export system.

In the next conference, contemplated for Friday afternoon, the examination of the export system is to take place.

First under his chairmanship (Göring's) the ministers Dr. SCHACHT, Graf SCHWERIN VON KROSIGK and Prof. Dr. POPITZ will consult each other. Then, immediately thereafter, the suggestions voiced there are to be discussed by a board of experts. The following were named for this board:

By Minister Schacht:
Reichsbank Director BRINKMAN
Reichsbank Director BLESSING
Ministerialdirektor Dr. SARNOW
By Minister von Blomberg:
Dr. TRENDELENBURG
By Minister Popitz:
Dr. SPRINGORUM
Dr. SOGEMEIER
Further
Reg. BURGERMEISTER KROOGMANN
Prof. WAYEMANN
and others, who will be appointed by the Prime Minister.

Prime Minister Göring: states that he can expect and demand discipline from the party, so that the protection of the individual auditor, called, is guaranteed.

Close of the conference; 1910.

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TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1301-PS
Continued

Summary of the raw material situation 2 May 1936

	Iron ores		Aluminum		Crude rubber		Cellulose wool		Notes
Total requirement for the armed forces and the industry (estimated)	peace 1936	case of mobil. 1938	peace 1936	case of mobil. 1938	peace 1936	case of mobil. 1938	peace 1936	case of mobil. 1938	
	9.5 million	11 million	105,000	160,000	75,000	85,000	12,000-70,000	depending on import of natural fiber	
Production entire Reich industry	1.8 million		96,000		1000		12,000-70,000		
Deficit	7.7 million	9.2 million	9000	64,000	74,000	84,000	any increase in production would be taken up by the market		
Excess	--	--	--	--	--	--			
Tentative plans for expansion of own production	1.2 million proposal Keppler		----		2400		first increase until end of 1936 70,000 t		

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H1123-0183

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1301-PS
Continued

Prime Minister General Göring
Raw Material and Foreign Exchange Staff

Berlin, 30 May 1936
Behrenstrasse 68-70
Telephone A 2 0048

Journal No...../36 (initial) BG th 2/6
(initial)

Rubber Stamp
Top Secret

To the
Reichminister of War
Generalfeld marschall von BLOMBERG

Berlin

Enclosed, a report of the conference of the council of ministers of 27 May 1936, is forwarded.

By Order
LØB
Lt.Col. in the General Staff

1 Inclosure:

Top Secret
Copy of meeting of Minister on 27 May 36, at 1130 o'clock.

Chairman: Ministerpräsident Generaloberst Göring
Reichskriegsminister Generalfeldmarschall von Blomberg
Reichsbankpräsident und kommissarischer Reichs- und Preussischer Wirtschaftsminister Dr. Schacht
Reichsfinansminister Graf Schwerin von Krosigk
Preussischer Finansminister Prof. Dr. Popitz
Recording Secretary: Lt.Col in the General Staff Löb

Prime Minister Göring: The two sessi ns of the board of experts held so far have brought forth interesting discussions. Naturally, opinions frequently disagree. The experts are invited to state their concepts in writing.

Today, discussion concerning the question of substitute-material. What objections are made to the production of war-raw materials within the Reich?

Minister Schacht: Principly there is nothing to object; a solution of the raw material problem by self-producing is absolutely necessary and agreed with, theoretically.

Difficulties are encountered with regard to:

1) serious monetary strain because of investments. Providing money by taxing capital is impossible. Circulation of money can not be increased beyond a certain amount. Previous measures executed correctly and without danger to monetary value. Further increase seems precarious; matter of confidence. This point of view alone, however, not determining; possible that funds could be drawn from industrial profits.

2) special scruples, regarding the cases where prices for substitute (Ersatz) material are far beyond world-market prices, and therefore the products cannot compete. (for example: tires made from BUNA). Adjustment would further increase the excise tax on exports. Inflation cannot be chosen, as this would immediately upset the state's budget.

It must be attempted to produce those raw materials within Germany which are economically favorable; for other raw materials ready reserves for the case of mobilization (Mobfall). Especially clear is the situation of flax; the complete covering of the requirement is possible; however not with hemp.

Certain raw materials for war must be stocked.

These viewpoints are recognized and followed by the Reich ministry for Economy. The execution is mainly dependent on the question of funds. Therefore, necessity to save in all fields, to make saved funds available for investment.

Prime Minister Göring: All measures are to be considered from the standpoint of an assured waging of war.

Ready reserves must ordinarily be accumulated already in peace in certain

amounts.

It is to be attempted to use cheap imported raw materials for export purposes, expensive raw materials from within Germany. In cases where the price differences are small, probably creation of a settlement is preferred.

Minister Schacht: This settlement can be carried out either by compulsory mixing or by a price settlement by the state of the expensive raw materials.

In any case, price supervision must be introduced again.

Minister Popitz: Placing of the burden of increased prices on the consumer is possible when the difference is only small.

The other possible method is sales monopoly or wholesale monopoly of certain goods.

Minister Schacht: It is recommendable not to influence individual, large fields, for instance textiles, by prices; but to concentrate funds for the monetary subsidation of other fields of raw materials.

Minister von Krosigk: The question cannot generally be judged theoretically, but only practically with the use of individual examples.

Prime Minister Göring: At first, the specially urgent petroleum question is to be treated.

General agreement to that.

Minister von Krosigk: Present experience is that the beginning of new methods of sale or price guarantee by the Reich results thus, that soon new and cheaper production mehtods are found. This recommends a not too sudden expansion of production.

Prime Minister Göring: Waiting for new methods is no longer appropriate. Plan of the Reich forestry office for the utilization of wood is ready. Import of timber must be cut down in any case; strongest demands on German forests to be preferred at present and can be advocated.

It is to be decided, whether at the beginning, a risk bonus over 6% profit is to be granted.

Minister Schacht: turns against higher profits than 6%. Guarantee of interest-bearing is to be preferred, and must be sufficient.

Minister von Krosigk: discusses the advantages of the amortization program.

Minister von Popitz: In contracts many times rapid cancellation is contemplated.

Minister Schacht: At the beginning more consideration is recommended, later stronger concentration, with profit sharing by the Reich.

Minister Popitz: requests that the cancellation periods be re-examined by a special committee.

Prime Minister Göring: The summary is to be prepared for the next committee meeting about:

1) Inventory of German Raw Material possiblities.
2) Form of the present decrease.
3) Mobilization requirement.
4) How shall raw materials be handled? Especially clarifications whether production within Germany is to start already in peace or whether the stocking of reserves is more important.

Subject of petroleum also can be considered concluded, therefore is to be handled immediately.

In the next council of Ministers, discussion of the agricultural question, then Minister Darré and State secretary Backe present.

Minister von Blomberg: In the fuel industry it is to be decided whether conversion to solid fuels should already be carried out in peace, or whether, as in France, it is to be prepared for the mobilization case. If possible and recommendable, increased use of tar coke (Schwelkok), no diesel oil for railroads.

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Prime Minister Göring: Economy also absolutely necessary and to be insisted on in other fields of raw materials.

Minister von Blomberg: Examine as an example substitution of heavy metal by light metal (for instance cans of aluminum): general increase of the use of glass, especially for aerial bombs, maybe also for grenades; use of plastics for wide fields, even as far as transmissions. Certain hopes can be set on China. Therefore prevent political estrangement. Careful advances in the approaching of Japan necessary, at present the recognition of Manchukuo would be disastrous for Mr. Klein's current plans in China.

Prime Minister Göring: Common front of China with Japan against Soviet Russia can probably be produced.

(in green pencil) I did not express myself so specifically BL/

Minister von Blomberg: Japan is doubtful as a factor of military power.

Prime Minister Göring: Furthermore, the danger of Japan's turnabout always exists.

Results of the China affair cannot be viewed clearly because of the unclear inner political situation.

Minister Schacht: always has supported the attempts of Mr. Klein, because he especially hopes for food raw materials from China.

Minister von Blomberg: r recommends further collaboration with the Kaiser Wilhelm Gesellschaft, with whom the Reichministry of War had very good experiences. At its head is the scientific authority; other imminent changes for solution proposed by the party unbearable.

Minister Popitz: Nomination of Geheimrat Bosch is possible for this post, when his resignation from the IG is possible.

Minister Schacht: General complaints about the deterioration of German science; this is also harmful for export, since the missing replacement limits the execution of German engineering missions abroad and thus German orders from abroad.

Minister Popitz: Seconds these complaints. Actions by the party which remove the most important people is unbearable. Explanation by examples.

In the liberal arts, the consequences are not being felt immediately, all the more so in the natural sciences. If service etc should be limited to the first two semesters of study, then full time and freedom for scientific activity.

Prime Minister Göring: In Prussia then, difficulties are partially removed. Influence of the liaison staff not always fortunate. Role of Professor Wagner.

Puts to discussion a taking over of a Spanish tin source, which is being offered from the Swedish side.

Minister Schacht: Basically in agreement, particularly when in a partnership enterprise German achievements will result by deliveries of machines.

Prime Minister Göring: asks Minister Schacht to conduct negotiations in this spirit during his visit in Belgrade relative to Jugoslavia in the near future.

Minister Schacht: The copper mining in Jugoslavia must take place by excluding the French, who sell copper for foreign exchange only.

Prime Minister Göring: During the next ministerial session, the investigation of the problems in the agricultural sector has to be conducted in such a way that direct statements of Minister Schacht/Minister Darré should be made about the single problematic issues.

End of the session 13 o'clock.

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H1123-0186

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1301-PS
Continued

Note initialed (Blomberg?)

initialed: K 2/9 (Keitel)

President SCHACHT called me to him today at 1300 and requested me to forward the following to the Minister of War:

Schacht returned from the Führer with the greatest anxiety, since he could not agree to the economic program planned by the Führer.

The Fuhrer wants to speak at the party convention (Parteitag) about economic policy, and wants to emphasize there, that we now want to get free with all our energy from foreign countries by production in Germany.

Schacht requests urgently, that the Reichminister of War warn the Führer from this step.

If the Führer emphasizes in front of the masses in Nürnberg, he will receive a great amount of applause from the audience, but with it he will bring failure to the entire commercial policy. There is only one thing in our needy position: the promotion of export. Every threat against foreign countries however, will show contrary results.

We have reverses in the field of fuels until the middle of next year, there will not be large amounts in the field of rubber. The Renn-process in the field of ores is having great difficulties.

If we now shout out our decision abroad, to make ourselves economically independent, then we cut our own throats, because we can no longer survive the necessary transitory period.

Also, it must always be pointed out that German materials are at present much too expensive to be used for export, and export alone makes further armament possible.

If the food-basis of the people is not to be endangered, the Führer must refrain from his plan.

President SCHACHT concluded, that he again requests urgently to listen to this warning, and that he forwards it to the minister of war, as he will not participate in to-morrow's conference.

Thomas 2/9 (in blue pencil)

(Translator's note: the following is written in pencil in the original)

THOMAS in his memorandum:

"The missing million in cash must be saved, since there is no more possibility to obtain it by increase of export."

English armament--ore! Our own procurement is a must.

4 Year Plan without antagonizing foreign countries.
Card file ?
Speed of armament ? Yes---

"Extent of armament not sufficient.. Backing by foreign exchange and raw materials is absolutely necessary."

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TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1301-PS
Continued

Top Secret
(rubber stamp)

1st copy
5 Sept 1936

Wi II
File No 66 b 9910 II z-a

Minutes
on a Conference in the Reichministry for Economy
on 3 Sept 1936

Chairman:	Ministerialdirektor Sarnow	) Reichministry for Economy and the competent experts of the Reichministry for Economy and the supervisory agencies
Present:	Ministerialdirektor Dr. Landwehr	)
	Ministerialdirigent Dr. Spitta	)
	Oberregierungsrat Dr. Michals	)
	Major Czimatis	) Reichministry of War, W.A.
	Commander Griebel	)
	Regierungsbaurat Wissmann	)
	Intendanturrat Nierhoff	Reichministry of War, V.A.
	Lt.Col. Ploch	) Reichministry for Air and Supreme Commander of the Air Force
	Col. Witting	)
	Dipl.ing. Bresser	)
	Gen.Direktor Schirner, combined alum. plants	) only during the conference on aluminum
	Dr. Westrick " " "	)
	Dir. Beyer Alum. Sales Corp.	)

Subject:

I. Possibilities of allotment of foreign exchange to the armed forces and economy.

II. Aluminum supply.

I. After extensive study of the connected disadvantages, the Reichministry for economy has dropped the principle that one could desist from exporting all products with more than 40% foreign raw materials. Therefore and additional need for foreign exchange results for the upkeep of the export of 2 million marks with the supervisory board for base metals. Furthermore the allotment of cash foreign exchange to the supervisory board for bast fibres must be increased from 10 million marks to 17 million marks.

Intendanturrat Nierhoff made reports on the need of the Armed Forces of textiles and leather in the year 1937, which has increased considerably from the requirements of the year 1936 (see inclosure). To fulfill these Armed Forces requirements, cash foreign exchange is necessary in the following amounts:

Group of goods	Additional Armed Forces requirements of cash foreign exchange in million of marks
1. Wool	24
shredded wool (Reisswolle)	3
mohair wool	0.75
2. silk	0.5
3. bast fibres	0.25
4. cotton	4
5. leather	22.5
Total	55.00

Accordingly, the following overall picture results:

Amount of cash foreign exchange necessary previously for the upkeep of economy and for the covering of requirements of the Armed Forces.
900 million marks

Amount of cash foreign exchange necessary for the upkeep of export.
248 million marks

Additional requirement of cash foreign exchange necessary for the Armed Forces
146.8 million marks

Available amount of cash foreign exchange
140 million marks

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H1123-0187

II. Aluminum

Report on the requirements of aluminum for the Armed Forces are contained in the summary given to the Reichministry for Economy on 29 Aug.

Major Czimatis explained that the Reichministry of War did not renounce the limitations of the allotments of aluminum to the general industry, as it was said in the letter of the Reichministry for Economy of 21 Aug 1936, but that the demands for full delivery to the Armed forces for the programatic rearmament, espcecially of the Air Force, will be kept up.

The Reichministry for Economy considers the full delivery to industry urgently necessary also in the interest of the Armed Forces, since by a "strangulation" installations important to the Armed Forces (power issues) would also be affected immediately, and one could therefore count on an increased requirement of copper and thus of foreign exchange.

The administration of aluminum by the supervisory board for base metals is being absolutely refused by the Reichministry for Economy.

Generaldirektor Schirner reports that the negotiations for the import of 1000 tons of aluminum from Switzerland against delivery of German clay and pitch-coke are favorable. Also, the payment of processing wages is to be done with clay. However, the import of these 1000 tons is distributed over 6 to 7 months.

1000 tons more can be obtained in a comparitively short time from the Aluminum Ltd from Canada. The negotiations for this are still in process.

Schirner reported that the stocks of aluminum in the plants is so high that he, in case the Reichministry for Air should agree to a temporary decrease of the stocks, could guarantee full delivery for both the Armed Forces and Industry until the opening of the new plants in Töging and Bitterfeld.

Lt.Col. Ploch consents that the stocks be decreased temporarily.

The Reichministry for Economy orders that the supervisory board for base metals first determine by revision the exact size of the stocks of aluminum for the Duren Metal works and the combined Light Metal works (Vereinigten leicht Metall Werke).

However, if difficulties should arise in the delivery to the Armed Forces with aluminum, then the Reichministry for Eonomy is ready to take up negotiations again.

MW (initials in pencil)

Inclosure

Textile and Leather Requirements of the Armed Forces

Raw materials	Requirement in the year 1936 in tons	Requirement in the year 1937 in tons	Required additional cash foreign exchange requirements in millions of marks
sheared wool	7 200	18 152	24
wool scrap (Reisswolle)	1 040	4 900	3
combings	11	42	-
mohair wool	-	260	0.75
wool from tanned hides (Gerberwolle)	761	1 236	-
silk	23	72	0.5
cocoons*	72	72	-
silk yarns*	48	48	-
(*figures by Reichministry for air)			
cotton of which quality cotton Portires and shelter halves (Egypt)	8 600	16 200	
cotton scraps	560	about 4 000	4
artificial silk	310	835	-
cellulose wool	1 080	670	-
cleaned flax (Schwingflachs)	3 600	3 130	-
flax scrap	7 070	4 800	-
jute	2 100	10 500	-
		2 100	-

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H1123-0188

(cont)

Raw materials	Requirement in the year 1936 in tons	Requirement in the year 1937 in tons	Required additional cash foreign exchange requirements in millions of marks
soft hemp and hard fibers	1 100	1 635	0.25 (**)
of which hard fiber		about 200	(**) for 400 tons soft hemp and 200 tons Manila and Sisal
sleek leather	11 000	24 000	"
skins for uppers	7 100	13 900	
tanned leather		4 100	
leather for soles		9 500	22.5 (***)
			(***) for 22 500 tons hides corresponding to 11 200 tons leather
		Total	55.00

It must be considered in the calculation of the foreign exchange requirements for the upkeep of the export of woolen goods, that the wool industry cannot stand more than a 10% decrease of the present amount, if it is to retain its export capability. Instead of Australian wool, one must reach back to about 50% of the available South-African wool for the exports. The wool available through the limitations of value of the clearing agreement is entirely used for export. The calculated amount of foreign exchange and the most urgent requirement within Germany of 12 million marks only applies under the condition that there are until the end of September still 2 million marks in cash foreign exchange available.

One can count for the requirement of the Armed Forces on an amount of 10 000 tons raw wool, based on existing agreement. 24 million marks in cash foreign exchange are required for the additional amount of 8 152 tons with the price basis of 3 000 -marks per ton.

Intendanturrat Nierhoff explained; that a decrease of the demands for quality for the Armed Forces is no longer bearable. Already 20% cellulose wool is being earmarked for uniform cloths, and a mixing of 30% scrap wool for overcoats.

The amount of foreign exchange of 4 million marks for quality cotton is therefore necessary, because one cannot count any more on the hitherto existing compensating transactions--especially with Egypt after circular 237.

The amount of foreign exchange estimated for export of 17 million marks for the supervisory board for bast fibres is distributed as follows:

10 million marks for jute
6 " " " Sisal
1 " " " Manila

The production of hides in Germany is reported as 140 000 tons per year. Even with the basis that the consumption of leather within Germany is decreased to a minimum, the 22 500 ton hides, corresponding to 11 200 tons leather for the Armed Forces, can only be procured with cash foreign exchange (22.5 million marks)

The raw hide requirement has determined individually with consideration for the time required to tan the individual types of leather.

1307

H1123-0189

(in pencil) Top Secret!

Conference at General Field Marshal Goering's at 1000, 14 Oct.38, in the Reich Air Ministry

(in pencil); attention H.G.

General Field Marshal Goering opened the session by declaring that he intended to give directives about the work for the next months. Everybody knows from the press what the world situation looks like and therefore the Fuehrer has issued an order to him to carry out a gigantic program compared to which previous achievements are insignificant. There are difficulties in the way which he will overcome with utmost energy and ruthlessness.

The amount of foreign exchange has completely dwindled on account of the preparation for the Czech Enterprise and this makes it necessary that it should be strongly increased immediately. Furthermore; the foreign credits have been greatly overdrawn and thus the strongest export activity--stronger than up to now--is in the foreground. For the next weeks an increased export was first priority in order to improve the foreign exchange situation. The Reich Ministry for Economy should make a plan about raising the export activity by pushing aside the current difficulties which prevent export.

These gains made through the export are to be used for increased armament. The armament should not be curtailed by the export activity. He received the order from the Fuehrer to increase the armament to an abnormal extent, the air force having first priority. Within the shortest time the air force is to be increased five fold, also the navy should get armed more rapidly and the army should procure large amounts of offensive weapons at a faster rate, particularly heavy artillery pieces and heavy tanks. Along with this manufactured armaments must go; expecially fuel, powder and explosives are moved into the foreground. It should be coupled with the accelerated construction of highways, canals, and particularly of the railroads.

To this comes the Four Years' Plan which is to be reorganized according to 2 points of view.

In the Four Years' Plan in 1st place all the constructions which are in the service of armament are to be promoted and in 2nd place all the installations are to be created which really spare foreign exchange.

The substitutes produced by the Four Years' Plan are to be brought rapidly into circulation. The Reich Ministry for Economy and the other agencies should make suggestions by the beginning of November for rapidly increasing the introduction of the substitutes. The import of materials for which we have substitutes has to be drastically curtailed.

General Field Marshal Goering enlarged then upon the main problem of the session: how can these requirements be fulfilled.

He is faced with unheard difficulties. The treasury is empty, the industrial capacity is crammed with orders for many years. In spite of these difficulties he is going to change the situation under all circumstances. Memoranda were of no help, he desires only positive proposals. If necessary, he is going to convert the economy with brutal methods in order to achieve this aim. The time has come when private enterprise can show whether it has a right for continued existence. If it fails, he is going over to state enterprise without any regard. He is going to make barbaric use of his plenipotentiary power, which was given to him by the Fuehrer.

All the wishes and plans of the state, party and other agencies who are not entirely in this line have to be rejected without pity. Also the ideological problems cannot be solved now, there will be time for them later. He urgently cautions against making promises to the workers which can not be kept by him. The wishes of the labor front cede entirely into the background. The industry has to be fully converted. An immediate investigation of all productive plants is to be initiated in order to determine whether they can be converted for armament and export or whether they are to be closed down. The problem of the machine industry has the first consideration in this respect. There is no place for printing and

*

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H1123-0190

laundry machines and other machines of that kind, they all have to produce machine tools. In the field of machine tools the priorities of the orders are to be investigated, and wherever possible, increase in productive capacity is to be introduced. It follows without saying that work has to be conducted in 3 shifts.

It remains now to decide who is going to carry out this task; the state or the self-administrative industry. He requested a proposal from General director Zangen for the methods to realize these plans. He warns all agencies, particularly the labor front, price controller etc. from interfering with these proposals in any way. He is going to proceed ruthlessly against every interference on the part of the Labor Front. The Labor Front would not receive raw materials and workers for its tasks any more. Similarly all other party requirements have to be set aside without consideration. Foreign workers can continue being employed except in the particularly secret sections of the enterprise. At the present time the plants should not be burdened with unnecessary demands, such as athletic fields, casinos or similar desires of the labor front. Measures proposed by the Labor Front have to be submitted to him for approval.

Raw materials and power are to be subjected to accurate management. Similarly the distribution of men has to be organized in an entirely different way than it has been done until now. The retraining did not function; all agencies failed. The recommitment of the youth into the industry will be organized by him on a very large scale. Large state apprenticeships are to be created; besides, the plants will be obliged to hire a certain number of apprentices. A retraining of hundreds of thousands of people will have to take place. Much more work will have to be performed by women than until now. Above all, the young women have to be employed much more. Work periods of eight hours do not exist any more; wherever necessary, overtime is to be performed, double and triple shifts are a matter of course. Where the workers will protest, as in Austria for example, General Field Marshal Goering will proceed with forced labor; he will create camps for forced labor. The Labor Front should not carry false social ideas among the workers. It is a fact that one generation has driven the cart into the mud through the mutiny of the workers and by being guilty of not having shot these workers on the spot. Therefore we had to put the thing in order again.

Much is to be done at once in the field of transportation. The Ministry for Transportation should submit a request about the construction of rolling stock and about other requirements. The branch-canal near the Hermann Goering Works is particularly important. It cannot continue that the Armed Forces interfere with the car park. If that will continue, he will make a decision, because it is impossible that the people should starve on account of it.

In the agriculture it is of importance to employ foreign workers. Similarly the problem of the agricultural machine has to be promoted. Of particular importance is the erection of storehouses.

The Sudeten land has to be exploited with all the means. General Field Marshal Goering counts upon a complete industrial assimilation of the Slovakia. Czech and Slovakia would become German dominions. Everything possible must be taken out. The Oder-Danube Canal has to be speeded up. Searches for oil and ore h have to be conducted in Slovakia, notably by State Secretary Keppler.

In the 2nd part of his discussion General Field Marshal Goering took up the Jewish problem. The Jewish problem had to be tackled now with all methods, because they have to get out of the economy. However, the wild bustle of commissars as it developed in Austria has to be prevented under all circumstances. These wild actions have to cease and the settling of the Jewish problem should not be regarded as a system of providing for inefficient party members. Thereupon Ministry Councillor Fischboeck was allowed to speak. He revealed that in the beginning there were 25 000 commissars in Austria. Today there are still 3 500 who are useless almost without exception. In Austria the party is of the opinion that Aryanization is a duty of the party and that it is connected with the recompensation of the old party members.

In Austria there is still a total of 2 billions of Jewish property. The large enterprises are being bought up by the Control bank; it is difficult to oust the Jews from the small industrial enterprises.

H1123-0191

General Field Marshal Goering took a strong stand against the opinion that the Aryanization is the duty of the party. It is the duty of the State alone. However, he could not release foreign exchange for shipping away the Jews. In an emergency situation ghettos should be erected in the individual large cities.

State Councillor Schmeer cautioned against more lenient methods in the fight against the Jews; Jewish labor units should be established, then the people would emigrate of their own accord. State Councillor Neumann warned and expressed the opinion that one should use more precaution in this matter, particularly in Austria.

Thereupon the meeting was quite surprisingly closed by General Field Marshal Goering without recording the minutes of the meeting or making decisions.

HG.

1301

H1123-0192

H1123-0193

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1301-PS
Continued

Material
for the Conference with Goering
on 25 Nov 1938
(General Keitel
Brig.Gen. Thomas)

W.Wi Id. 27 Oct 1938

For the consideration of the assignment of tasks to people, state and the Armed Forces, judging of the requirements of raw materials, especially steel, appears necessary.

This is shown as follows, as far as it can be judged from here. The inclosed summary shows that one must count, according to the Fuehrer's directives, on a steel requirement for armament production, which amounts to

1.08 million tons monthly from 1 Jan 1939 on, that is, it must be increased by about 48% of the present contingent. Added to this requirement are the increased demands of the Four Years' Plan, the demands of export and the amount necessary for the upkeep of the production machine of German economy in the amount of

1.83 million tons monthly from 1 Jan 1939 on; thus this results in a total requirement of

2.9 million tons monthly from 1 Jan 1939 on, against which there is only a monthly production of

at present 1.8 million tons monthly.

Furthermore, it must be pointed out, that with the increased use of steel, an increased use of the already scarce non-ferrous metals is necessarily coupled; the latter also are closely associated with the procurement of foreign exchange.

The increased rearmament of the armed forces must further affect deeply the supply requirements of the armed forces, especially munitions and fuels. Therefore, it must be expected that the future requirements of the armed forces will exceed the present plans (accelerated program for powder and explosives, fuel program), which will have an increase of the steel requirements not yet planned as result.

Secret

Summary
of the Iron and Steel Requirement of the Armed Forces and Industry tons per month

	Contingent of the IVth quarter 1938	Contingent of the Ist quarter 1939	Requirement from 1Jan 1939 on	in contrast to the contingent of Ist quarter 1939
I. Armed Forces	584 333	573 133	1 088 300	+ 515 167
II. War economical organization of German industry	306 600	306 600	613 500	+ 306 900
III. Export in case it is possible to reach the stage of beginning of 1938	380 000	380 000	550 000	+ 170 000
IV. Upkeep of the production machine of the German industry.	582 800	582 800	582 800	-
V. Other requirements	83 500	83 500	83 500	-
Total	1 937 233	1 926 033	2 918 100	+ 992 067

1301

Inclosure 1

Secret

Summary
on the Iron and Steel Requirement of the Armed Forces

tons per months

	Contingent of the IVth quarter 1938	Contingent of the Ist quarter 1939	Requirement from 1 Jan 1939 on	-in contrast to the contingent of Ist quarter 1939
Army	300 367	266 000	525 000	-259 000
(for fortifications)	(86 667)	(85 000)	(165 000)	(+ 80 000)
Navy	78 000	74 000	140 500	+ 66 500
(for "Grünewiese")	(-)	(-)	(35 000)	(+ 35 000)
Air Force	166 400	191 133	247 300	+ 56 187
(for fortifications)	(13 333)	(15 000)	(15 000)	(-)
Reich communication measures (RV-Massnahmen)	39 566	42 000	175 500	-133 500
(for increased extension of the Reich railroad)	(-)	(-)	130 000	(-130 000)
Armed Forces Total	584 333	573 133	1 088 300	-515 167

1301

H1123-0194

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1301-PS
Continued

Chief OKW
58a 40 38 top secret
1157/38 top secret

7 Dec 1938

Top Secret

7 copies
7th copy

(in pencil)
To the State Secretary Neumann
Received copy without receipt
K. 12 Dec 38
Documents for the conference at Field Marshal Goering's on 13 Dec 1938 with Supreme Commanders General Keitel, Neumann, Koerner, Gen. Thomas.

To
the Supreme Commander of the Army)
the Supreme Commander of the Navy) one
the Reichs Marshal of the Air Force and) copy each
Supreme Commander of the Air Force)

The Fuehrer and Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces authorized me to inform the Supreme Commander of the following:

The strained financial situation of the Reich makes it necessary that for the rest of the current fiscal year 38/39 the expenses of the Armed Forces, which in the last months under the strain of extraordinary circumstances have undergone a very considerable increase, should be lowered again to a level which would be tolerable for some time.

It will be at the discretion of the Supreme Commander to decide what measures should be taken for this purpose according to the priorities in the armament program. According to the Fuehrer's request

ARMY (the equipping with arms will have first priority, the providing of ammunition and the building of fortifications for the army will be considered in second place only.

NAVY (the building of ships, of ports and docks will have first priority over all other requirements, also over that of providing ammunition.

AIR FORCE (the equipping with arms will have first priority, the providing of ammunition will have to be considered in second place only.

If necessary, the initiation of new enterprises will have to be delayed, the execution of current enterprises and orders will have to be distributed over a longer period of time. The allotted quota of raw materials which will be decreased starting 1 Jan 39, will also compel us to a certain extent to do this. It has to be achieved that

in the Army
in the Navy
in the Air Force

during the period from 1 November 1938 to 31 March 1939 (end of the fiscal year) not more than

(Army): 3.7 billion RM
(used until now 4.9)
(Navy): 650 million RM
(Air Force): 2.5 billion RM

should be expended in the form of cash and delivery treasury scrips.

It is not yet definitively established how much can be allotted for the next fiscal year 1939/40 in the form of cash and delivery scrips. At present, the branches of the Armed Forces cannot expect greater quotas than the following:

5.2 billion RM for the Army
1.4 " " for the Navy
4.9 " " for the Air Force

signed: Keitel

1307

H1123-0195

W H
58 a 40 38 g K
1157/38 g K

Top Secret
Copy

for information

illegible signature

to
the Chief of the Air Force
the Chief of the W Stb

Chief of the War Industry Staff
Adjutant

1 March 1939

Draft

To the adjutant's office of General Field Marshal Goering.

On behalf of Brig. Gen. Thomas I request an appointment for a conference for the general before the departure of the General Field Marshal on following urgent subjects:

1.) The branches of the Armed Forces--particularly the Navy--submitted requests for additional amounts of non-ferrous metals and of steel. General Thomas requests instructions what attitude he should take in regard to this question during the absence of the General Field Marshal.

2.) The General Field Marshal has to make decisions in 2 matters concerning foreign policy.

Illegible
Captain.

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION
OF DOCUMENT NO. 1301-PS

15 November 1945

I, WILLARD EVANS SKIDMORE, Lt. (jg) USNR 391590, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; and that the above is a correct and true translation of Document No. 1301-PS.

WILLARD EVANS SKIDMORE
Lt. (jg), USNR
391590

1301

H1123-0196

H1123-0197

Cited Dec. 5, 1945
Not offered in evidence

PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1439-PS
OFFICE OF U. S. CHIEF OF COUNSEL

PAGE 606. 1939 REICHSGESETZBLATT PART II

DECLARATION CONCERNING THE GERMAN-SLOVAK TREATY OF PROTECTION CONCLUDED BETWEEN THE GERMAN REICH AND THE STATE OF SLOVAKIA, March 24, 1939

Between the German Government and the Slovak Government, a treaty was signed on 18 March 1939 in Vienna and on 23 March 1939 in Berlin extending protection by the German Reich to the State of Slovakia.

The treaty became effective on March 23, 1939; its text is published hereinafter.

Berlin, March 24, 1939.

VON RIBBENTROP
Reich Minister of Foreign Affairs

Treaty of Protection to be extended by the German Reich to the State of Slovakia

The German Government and the Slovak Government have agreed, after the Slovak State has placed itself under the protection of the German Reich, to regulate by treaty the consequences resulting from this fact. For this purpose the undersigned representatives of the two governments have agreed on the following provisions.

ARTICLE 1. The German Reich undertakes to protect the political independence of the State of Slovakia and the integrity of its territory.

ARTICLE 2. For the purpose of making effective the protection undertaken by the German Reich, the German armed forces shall have the right, at all times, to construct military installations and to keep them garrisoned in the strength they deem necessary, in an area delimited on its western side by the frontiers of the State of Slovakia, and on its eastern side by a line formed by the eastern rims of the Lower Carpathians, the White Carpathians and the Javornik Mountains.

The Government of Slovakia will take the necessary steps to assure that the land required for these installations shall be conveyed to the German armed forces. Furthermore the Government of Slovakia will agree to grant exemption from custom duties for imports from the Reich for the maintenance of the German troops and the supply of military installations.

Military sovereignty will be assumed by the German armed forces in the zone described in the first paragraph of this Article.

German citizens who, on the basis of private employment contracts, are engaged in the construction of military installations in the designated zone shall be subject to German jurisdiction.

ARTICLE 3. The Government of Slovakia will organize its military forces in close agreement with the German armed forces.

ARTICLE 4. In accordance with the relationship of protection agreed upon, the Government of Slovakia will at all times conduct its foreign affairs in close agreement with the German Government.

1439

H1123-0198

ARTICLE 5. This treaty shall become effective as of the date of its signature and shall be valid for a period of twenty-five years. The two governments will reach an understanding on the extension of this treaty in due time before the expiration of that period.

In witness whereof the representatives of the two parties have signed the above treaty in duplicate.

Vienna, March 18, 1939. Berlin, March 23, 1939.

For the German Government:

VON RIBBENTROP

For the Slovak Government:

DR. JOZEF TISO
DR. VOJTECH TUKA
DR. F. DURCANSKY

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION
OF DOCUMENT NO. 1439-PS

17 November 1945

I, Ludwig Hartman, T/4, 37446052, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; and that the above is a correct and true translation of Document No. 1439-PS.

LUDWIG HARTMAN
T/4, 37446052

1439

H1123-0199

Exhibit U.S.A. 83
Filed Dec. 3, 1945

TRANSLATION DOCUMENT SECTION
OFFICE OF U.S. CHIEF OF COUNSEL

Top Secret

12 August 1938

Reich Minister for Air and C-in-C
Air Force (initials written in ink)

Draft

General Officers only

General Staff 5.Division.
No. 21/38. Top Secret General Officers only (Ic)

2 Copies
2nd Copy

Access only through officer

Re: Freudenthal Affair
Ref: Abwehr II No. 42/38. Top Secret General Officers only.

A). As Appendix 1 please find enclosed a transaction by Major d.G. Möricke, on which the following comment is made:

1). The report from the Abwehrstelle Breslau still does not prove that the real circumstances are known to the two Sudeten Germans or even widely in Sudeten German circles. Nevertheless there is still no need for Czech authorities to have any knowledge of them.

If the worst comes to the worst it is a question, in eventual remarks made by Macholdt to Pilz, of suppositions which are nevertheless very near to the truth of the matter.

2). For the time being there is no reason for stopping preparations for the Fr. operation.

3). Punishable behaviour on the part of Major Möricke cannot be deduced purely from the Abwehrstelle report. Rather, as far as can be seen from here, has Major Möricke carried out the task allotted to him skilfully and provided good evidence.

B). In the course of further preparations, the following measures are recommended:

1). Not a single word on the matter will be mentioned to informers (V-Leute).

2). The fields will not be purchased through middlemen. Neither will any influence be brought to bear on the owners in order to effect any change in the cultivation of the land according to local custom and the time of the year.

3). In the event of the suspected endangering of our plans, as a result of treachery, then it will be a question of sham reconnoitring of landing grounds in other areas and spreading of rumours as a camouflage.

4). It is worth considering whether Macholdt and Pilz cannot be called back to Germany on some pretext and retained here temporarily.

C). Further to the preparations which have already been carried out, the following proposals have been made by the Luftwaffe:

1). Continual supervision of the state of the agricultural cultivation of the landing grounds in question, in accordance with Appendices 2,3,4.

2). Continual supervision of the area around Freudenthal with regard to whether Czech defence measures against their intended employment are being undertaken.

1532

H1123-0200

3). Reconnoitring of further landing grounds, if possible by 10 September, in the following areas:

a). Freudenthal - Spachendorf - Hof - Braunseifen - Freudenthal,

b). Around Sternberg (up to a radius of 5 km).

c). Around Olmütz (up to a radius of 10 km).

As landing grounds are considered flat open stretches, above all dry meadows and clay strips with a surface area of approximately 500 x 500 m. and larger.

If possible it is requested that photographs similar to Appendices 3 and 4 are brought along.

By Order of

S c h m i d t

Distribution:

Abwehr II.	1st Copy	received with 4 appendices
General Staff 5th Division (Ic)	2nd Copy	13/8 signed ? ?

1536

H1123-0201

Appendix 1 to Reich Minister for Air and C-in-C Air Force. General Staff 5th Division. No. 21/38. Top Secret General Officers only dated 12.8.38.

Top Secret

Berlin 4.8.1938

General Officers only

Access through Officer only

T r a n s a c t i o n

Major of the General Staff Möricke,
Air Attache at the German Legation, Prague states:

I was ordered by the General Staff of the Air Force to reconnoitre the land in the region Freudenthal/Freihermersdorf for landing possibilities.

For this purpose I obtained private lodgings in Freudenthal with the manufacturer Macholdt, through one of my trusted men in Prague.

I had specifically ordered this man to give no details about me to M, particularly about my official position.

I used my official car (Dienst Pkw) for the journey to Fr. taking precautions against being observed.

The manufacturer M. is head of the Sudeten German Glider Pilots in Fr. and said to be absolutely reliable by my trusted man. My personal impression fully confirmed this judgement. No hint of my identity was made to him, although I had the impression that M. knew who I was.

At my request, with which he complied without any question, M. travelled with me over the country in question. We used M's private car for the trip.

As M. did not know the country around Beneschau sufficiently well, he took with him the local leader of the F.S. a Czech reservist of the Sudeten German Racial Group, at the time on leave. He was in uniform. For reasons of camouflage I was entirely in agreement with this - without actually saying so.

As M., during the course of the drive, observed that I photographed large open spaces out of the car, he said "Aha, so your're looking for airfields!" I answered that we supposed that, in the case of any serious trouble, the Czechs would put their airfields immediately behind the line of fortifications. I had the intention of looking over the country from that point of view.

To my question as to when the farmers in this part were generally in the habit of ploughing up the fields he answered: "Always immediately after the harvest."

I thought that in this way he wanted to express the fact that the Czechs would no longer be able to use the fields as airfields even shortly after the harvest.

Before leaving Fr. I bound M. to absolute secrecy as regards what he had seen.

From the conversation between M. and the Leader of the F.S. in Beneschau, whose name I do not know, I noticed that they knew several of the Abwehr informers (V-Leute) in Freudenthal and Beneschau. Both M. and the 2nd companion are minor informers (V-Leute).

1536

H1123-0202

As I have at the moment no incentive to believe that M. has not kept his promise, I can only presume that Pilz is the same person as the leader of the F.S. in Beneschau, who, accompanied us at the time, and a subordinate informer (V-mann) to the informer (V-mann) in the Security Office (Abwehrstelle) at Breslau.

I believe it to be out of the question, for the real purpose of my reconnaissance to be known.

Should measures be invoked against Macholdt or Pilz on the grounds of the report from the Security Office (Abwehrstelle) at Breslau, I urgently request a hearing beforehand.

Möricke

Major d. G.H.

g. w. o.

Schmidt

Maj. d. G.

1536

Appendix 2 to Reich Minister for Air and C-in-C of the Air Force.
General Staff 5th Division.

No. 21/38. Top Secret General Officers only dated 12.8.38.

- Section of map -

General officers only

Access through Officer only

Appendix 3 to Reich Minister for Air etc.....

(photograph)

Landing-ground south of Freudenthal;
taken from southern edge of Freudenthal looking west.

Appendix 4

Sectional picture of airfields a and b (4 photographs).

- - - - - - - - - - - -

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION
OF DOCUMENT NO 1536-PS

31 October 1945

I, PETER FRASER, Capt., K.R.R.C., 76538, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; and that the above is a true and correct translation of Document 1536-PS.

PETER FRASER
Capt., K.R.R.C.
76538

1536

H1123-0203

PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1780-PS
OFFICE OF U S CHIEF OF COUNSEL

Translation of Excerpts from Jodl Diary

1937

4 February:

Decisive conference about the scarcity of raw materials by the Commissioner of four-year plan.

Only 50% of steel and iron available, therefore rationing necessary. Full allotment only for export. Armed forces and constructions for four-year plan must be cut down by about 40%. Therefore, requests for money have to be converted into requirements for raw materials. Three branches of the Armed Forces and L. for R.V. special resources must make up a priority sequence. Until further notice no more orders to be placed with industry so they will have a chance to fill the many orders previously placed with them.

The sentence "Money is an unimportant factor" has come true, even in another sense. The main part is the raw materials.

Bad harvest and (illegible), especially bread grain (Brotgetreide), demand considerable use of foreign currency for the feeding of the people.

31 March:

Report to the Minister about the maneuvers of the Armed Forces. The Field Marshal emphasized the necessity to bring some influence to bear (on the maneuvers) in so far as a special Armed Forces problem has to be dealt with daily. These exercises are to be designated as "Armed Forces Maneuvers" (army, etc.). After two years, a two front war, i.e., two maneuvers, should be presented.

5 November:

Hitler develops his ideas of future development, intentions, and conduct of policy to the Commanders-in-Chief of the Armed Forces, the Army, the Navy and the Air Force.

There is a divergence in the recording of his ideas as made by the Chief of the Armed Forces Office (War Department) (des Chef WA (R Kr. Min)) and by Commander-in-Chief of the Air Force (Directive to the Chief of the General Staff of Air Force). (No minutes were kept).

Intention of L to put ideas on paper and transmit them to the Services (C-in-C, Air Force); furthermore, to incorporate them into mobilization instructions.

1938

11 February:

In the evening and on 12 February General K. with General V. Reichenau and Sperrle at the Obersalzberg. Schuschnigg together with G. Schmidt are again being put under heaviest political and military pressure. At 2300 hours Schuschnigg signs protocol.

13 February:

In the afternoon General K. asks Admiral C. and myself to come to his apartment. He tells us that the Fuehrer's order is to the effect that military pressure by shamming military action should be kept up until the 15th. Proposals for these deceptive maneuvers are drafted and submitted to the Fuehrer by telephone for approval.

1780

H1123-0204

14 February:

At 2:40 o'clock the agreement of the Fuehrer arrives. Canaris went to Munich to the Counter-Intelligence office VII and initiates the different measures.

The effect is quick and strong. In Austria the impression is created that Germany is undertaking serious military preparations.

15 February:

In the evening an official communique about the positive results of the conference at the Obersalzberg is issued.

16 February:

Changes in the Austrian government and general political amnesty.

22 February:

At 1300 hours General K. sees the Fuehrer in order to inform him about the planned advances (vorstosse).

3 March:

The Austrian question is becoming critical. 100 officers shall be dispatched there. The Fuehrer wants to see them personally. They should not see to it that the Austrian Armed Forces will fight better against us, but rather that they do not fight at all.

10 March:

By surprise and without consulting his ministers, Schuschnigg ordered a plebiscite for Sunday, 13 March, which should bring strong majority for the Legitimists in the absence of plan or preparation.

Fuehrer is determined not to tolerate it. The same night, March 9 to 10, he calls for Goering. General v. Reichenau is called back from Cairo Olympic Committee. General v. Schebert is ordered to come, as well as Minister Glaise Horstenau, who is with the District leader (Gauleiter) Burckel in the Palatinate. General Keitel communicates the facts at 1:45. He drives to the Reichskanzlei at 10 o'clock. I follow at 10:15, according to the wish of General v. Viebahn, to give him the old draft.
"Prepare case Otto."

1300 hours: General K informs Chief of Operational Staff (and) Admiral Canaris. Ribbentrop is being detained in London. Neurath takes over the Foreign Office.

Fuehrer wants to transmit ultimatum to the Austrian Cabinet. A personal letter is dispatched to Mussolini and the reasons are developed which force the Fuehrer to take action.

1830 hours: Mobilization order is given to the Command of the 8th Army (Corps Area 3), 7th and 13th Army Corps; without reserve Army.

Air puts 300 JU-52 in readiness for dropping of propaganda pamphlets. In addition, one Pursuit Squadron (Jagdgruppe), 3 bomber groups (Kampfgeschwader) and two companies as airborne troops with transport planes are held ready at civilian airports (Friedensflugplatze) in Bavaria.

Subordinated to the Army are: one commander of the Air Force, 2F, 3H Squadrons, courier squadron, 1 heavy AA Bn., Regt General Goering.

1780

11 March:

Instruction No. 1 of the Fuehrer is given on 11 March at 2:00 without signature; at 1300 hours with his signature.

The Army is joined by the SS Military Units (V.T.) by regiments, 40,000 men of the police and the Totenkopf Unit Upper-Bavaria as second wave.

1700 hours: The Navy has ordered all ships back home.

1800 hours: Schuschnigg has resigned; Seyss-Inquart is chancellor. SA and SS perform duty in uniform. Own movements have commenced. Frontier will not be crossed at the moment. Air Force plans large scale propaganda flights for tomorrow. The police force will be needed in any case and will be mixed with the troops.

1835 hours: Department L. has been informed. Colonel Winkler and Oberfuehrer Petri have also been informed. The Air Force has its doubts if it should initiate the movements that have not yet started.

Decision: yes.

2030 hours: Briefing received from Major General Viebahn that the situation has changed once more. The occupation will take place.

Later undated entry.

After annexation of Austria, the Fuehrer mentions that there is no hurry to solve the Czech question because Austria has to be digested first. Nevertheless preparations for Case Green will have to be carried out energetically; they will have to be newly prepared on the basis of the changed strategic position because of the annexation of Austria. State of preparations (see memorandum L I a of 19 April) reported to the Fuehrer on 21 April.

The intention of the Fuehrer not to touch the Czech problem as yet is changed because of the Czech strategic troop concentration of 21 May, which occurs without any German threat and without the slightest cause for it.

Because of Germany's self restraint, its consequences lead to a loss of prestige of the Fuehrer, which he is not willing to take once more. Therefore, the new order is issued for "green" on 30 May.

22 May:

Fundamental conference between the Fuehrer and K. Henlein (see enclosure).

23 May:

Major Schmundt reports ideas of the Fuehrer. Further conferences, which gradually reveal the exact intentions of the Fuehrer take place with the Chief of the Armed Forces High Command (OKW) on 28 May, 3 and 9 June, see enclosures. (War Diary L)

30 May:

The Fuehrer signs directive Green, where he states his final decision to destroy Czechoslovakia soon and thereby initiates military preparation all along the line. The previous intentions

H1123-0207

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The Fuehrer signs directive Green, where he states his final decision to destroy Czechoslovakia soon and thereby initiates military preparation all along the line. The previous intentions

of the Army must be changed considerably in the direction of an immediate break-through into Czechoslovakia right on D-Day (X-Tag), combined with aerial penetration by the Air Force. Further details are derived from directive for strategic concentration of the army. The whole contrast becomes acute once more between the Fuehrer's intuition that we must do it this year and the opinion of the Army that we cannot do it as yet, as most certainly the Western Powers will interfere and we are not as yet equal to them.

10 August:

The Army chiefs and the chiefs of the Air Force groups, Lt. Col. Jeschonnek and myself are ordered to the Berghof. After dinner the Fuehrer makes a speech lasting for almost three hours, in which he develops his political thoughts. The subsequent attempts to draw the Fuehrer's attention to the defects of our preparation, which are undertaken by a few generals of the Army, are rather unfortunate. This applies especially to the remark of General Wietersheim, in which to top it off he claims to quote from General Adams (die er noch dazu dem General Adams in den Mund legt) that the western fortifications can only be held for three weeks. The Fuehrer becomes very indignant and flames up, bursting into the remark that in such a case the whole Army would not be good for anything. "I assure you, General, the position will not only be held for three weeks, but for three years." The cause of this despondent opinion, which unfortunately enough is held very widely within the Army General Staff, is based on various reasons. First of all, it (the General Staff) is restrained by old memories; political considerations play a part as well, instead of obeying and executing its military mission. That is certainly done with traditional devotion, but the vigor of the soul is lacking because in the end they do not believe in the genius of the Fuehrer. And one does perhaps compare him with Charles XII. And since water flows downhill, this defeatism may not only possibly cause immense political damage, for the opposition between the Generals' opinion and that of the Fuehrer is common talk, but may also constitute a danger for the morale of the troops. But I have no doubt that (?) the Fuehrer will be able to boost the morale of the people in an unexpected way when the right moment comes.

21-26 August:

Visit to Germany of the Hungarian Regent (Reichsverweser). Accompanied by the Prime Minister, the Minister of Foreign Affairs and the Honved Minister v. Raatz (?).

They arrive with the idea, that in the course of a great war, after a few years, and with the help of German troops, the old state of Hungary can be reestablished. They leave with the understanding that we have neither demands from, nor claims against them, but that Germany will not stand for a second provocation by Czechoslovakia, even if it should be tomorrow. If they want to participate at that moment, it is up to them.

Germany, however, will never play the role of arbitrator between them and Poland. The Hungarians agree; but they believe that, when the issue arises, a period of 48 hours would be indispensable to them to find out Yugoslavia's attitude.

6 September:

Chief of General Staff, General of Artillery Halder, has a conference with the Hungarian Chief of General Staff Fischer.

1780

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Before that he is briefed by me on the political attitude of the Fuehrer - especially his order not to give any hint on the exact moment. The same with OQI, General v. Stuelpnagel.

8 September:

General Stulpnagel OQI asks for written assurance that the Army High Command will be informed five days in advance if the plan is to take place. I agree and add that the overall meteorological situation can be estimated to some extent only for two days in advance, and that therefore the plans may be changed up to this moment (D-day-2) (X-2 TAGE).

General Stulpnagel mentions that for the first time he wonders whether the previous basis of the plan is not being abandoned. It presupposed that the Western Powers would not interfere decisively. It gradually seems as if the Fuehrer would stick to his decision even though he may no longer be of this opinion. It must be added that Hungary is at least moody and that Italy is reserved.

I must admit that I am worrying too, when comparing the change of opinion about political and military potentialities, according to directives of 24 June, 5 Nov 37, 7 Dec 37, 30 May 38, with the last statements.

In spite of that one must be aware of the fact that the other nations will do everything they can to apply pressure to us. We must pass this test of nerves, but because only very few people know the art of withstanding this pressure successfully, the only possible solution is to inform only a very small circle of officers of news that causes us anxiety, and not to have it circulate through anterooms as heretofore.

1800 hours to 2100 hours: Conference with Chief of Army High Command and Chief of General Staff of the Air Force (present were Jeschonnek, Kammhuber, Sternburg and myself).

We agree about the promulgation of the D-Day order (X-Befehl) (x-1, 4 o'clock) and preannouncement to the Air Force (D-Day-1, x-1 day, 7 o'clock). The "Y time" has yet to be examined; some formations have an approach flight of one hour.

10 September:

General Halder back from Nurnberg. He reports that the Fuehrer signed decree subordinating the Reich Labor Service to the Army High Command, as of 15 September. Furthermore it was decided that the 13th and 2nd motorized divisions would join the Reichenau Army and their place would be taken by two other divisions (3 words illegible).

11 September:

In the afternoon conference with Secretary of State Jahnke from the Ministry of Public Enlightenment and Propaganda on imminent common tasks.

The joint preparations for refutation (wiederlegung) of our own violations of international law, and the exploitation of its violations by the enemy, were considered particularly important.

15 September:

In the morning conference with Chief of Army High Command and Chief of General Staffs of Army and Air Forces; the question was discussed what could be done if the Fuehrer insists on advancement of the date, due to the rapid development of the situation.

1780

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H1123-0210

16 September:

General Keitel returns from the Berghof at 1700 hours. He graphically describes the results of the conference between Chamberlain and the Fuehrer. The next conference will take place on the 21st or the 22nd in Godesberg.

With consent of the Fuehrer, the order is given in the evening by the Armed Forces High Command to the Army High Command and to the Ministry of Finance, to line up the V.G.A.D. along the Czech border.

In the same way, an order is issued to the railways to have the empty rolling stock kept in readiness clandestinely for the strategic concentrations of the Army, so that it can be transported starting 28 September.

17 September:

Contrary to the previous intention to transfer all Sudeten Germans with previous military training to the Replacement Army, the Fuehrer issues order to unite them into a Sudeten German Free Corps. The Armed Forces High Command puts Lt. Col. Koechling (reporter on youth questions) at the disposal of Konrad Henlein as advisor to Henlein.

19 September:

Order is given to the Army High Command to take care of the Sudeten German Free Corps.

20 September:

England and France have handed over their demands in Prague, the contents of which are still unknown. The activities of the Free Corps start assuming such an extent that they may bring about, and already have brought about consequences harmful to the plans of the Army. (Transferring rather strong units of the Czech Army to the proximity of the border). By checking with Lt. Col. Koechling, I attempt to lead these activities into normal channels.

Toward the evening the Fuehrer also takes a hand and gives permission to act only with groups up to 12 men each, after the approval of the Corps HQ.

21 September:

The motorized reinforcements by the L. take effect.

1130 hours: Telephone call from the Adjutant of the Fuehrer, Captain Engel, (it is submitted during the conference with the Chiefs by Captain Eberhardt). "The Fuehrer has received news five minutes ago that Prague is said to have accepted unconditionally."

1245 hours: Department heads are informed and directive is given to continue preparation for "Green", but nevertheless to get ready with everything necessary for a peaceful penetration. Orders to the Ic and Ib of Navy High Command and Chief of General Staff of the Air Force; General Stumpf to be informed.

22 September:

1920 hours: Ia reports about a telephone call from Godesberg by General von Stulpnagel on behalf of Keitel. Subject: a) Date cannot yet be ascertained (D-Day)(x- Tag); continue preparations according to plan. In case "Green" occurs, it will not be before 30 September. If it occurs sooner, it will probably be improvised.

25 September:

By order of the Fuehrer, two Death Head (Totenkopf) SS battalions have moved into the Panhandle territory near Asch (Ascher Zipfel) to the rear of the Free Corps.

26 September:

Chief of the Armed Forces High Command, acting through the Army High Command, has stopped the intended approach march of the advance units to the Czech border, because it is not yet necessary and because the Fuehrer does not intend to march in before the 30th in any case. Order to approach towards the Czech frontier need be given on the 27th only.

In the evening of the 26th, fixed radio stations of Breslau, Dresden and Vienna are put at the disposal of the Reich Ministry for Popular Enlightenment and Propaganda for interference with possible Czech propaganda transmissions.

Question by department "Foreign Countries" whether Czechs are to be allowed to leave and cross Germany. Decision from Chief of the Armed Forces High Command: yes.

1515 hours: The Chief of the Armed Forces High Command informs General Stumpf about the result of the Godesberg conversations and about the Fuehrer's opinion. In no case will x day be before the 30th.

It is important that we do not permit ourselves to be drawn into military engagements because of false reports, before Prague replied.

A question of Stumpf about Y hour results in the reply that on account of the weather situation, a simultaneous intervention of the Air Force and Army cannot be expected. The Army needs the dawn, the Air Force can only start later on account of frequent fogs.

The Fuehrer has to make a decision for the commanders in chief who is to have priority.

The opinion of Stumpf is also that the attack of the Army has to proceed. The Fuehrer has not made any decision as yet about commitment against Prague.

2000 hours: The Fuehrer addresses the people and the world in an important speech at the Sportpalast..

27 September:

1320 hours: The Fuehrer consents to the first wave of attack being advanced to a line from where they can arrive in the assembly area by 30 September.

28 September:

Stapf (?) reports about a conference with Goering where the latter states that a Great War can hardly be avoided any longer. It may last 7 years, and we will win it.

1700 hours: Tension relaxes. The Fuehrer has decided on a conference with Chamberlain, the Duce and Daladier in Munich.

1780

H1123-0211

29 September:

The pact of Munich is signed. Czechoslovakia as a power is out. Four zones as set forth will be occupied between the 2nd and 7th of October. The remaining part of mainly German character will be occupied by the 10th of October. The genius of the Fuehrer and his determination not to shun even a World War have again won the victory without the use of force. The hope remains that the incredulous, the weak and the doubtful people have been converted and will remain that way.

1939

23 August:

Received order from Armed Forces High Command to proceed to Berlin and take over position of Chief of Armed Forces Executive Office. (WFA).

1100 hours-1330 hours: Discussions with Chief of Armed Forces High Command. X day has been announced for 26 August. Y time has been announced for 0430 hours.

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CERTIFICATE OF PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT NO. 1780-PS.

22 November 1945

I, Ludwig Hartman, T/4, 37446052, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; and that the above is a correct and true translation of excerpts in Document No. 1780-PS.

Ludwig Hartman
T/4
37446052

1780

H1123-0212

H1123-0213

Exhibit U.S.A. 125

Page 1 Filed Dec. 5, 1945

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1874-PS
OFFICE OF U S CHIEF OF COUNSEL

Notes on the Conference Between

General Field Marshal GOERING and the DUCE

in the Presence of Count CIANO

15 April 1939

Page 4, Par. 2

However, the heavy armament of Czechoslovakia shows, in any case, how dangerous this country could have been, even after Munich, in the event of a serious conflict. Because of Germany's action the situation of both axis countries was ameliorated, among other reasons because of the economic possibilities which result from the transfer to Germany of the great production capacity (armament potential) of Czechoslovakia. That contributes toward a considerable strengthening of the axis against the Western powers. Furthermore, Germany now need not keep ready a single division for protection against that country in case of a bigger conflict. This, too, is an advantage by which both axis countries will, in the last analysis, benefit.

Page 5, Par. 2

. . . the action taken by Germany in Czechoslovakia is to be viewed as an advantage for the axis in case Poland should finally join the enemies of the axis powers. Germany could then attack this country from 2 flanks and would be within only 25 minutes flying distance from the new Polish industrial center which had been moved further into the interior of the country, nearer to the other Polish industrial districts, because of its proximity to the border. Now by the turn of events it is located again in the proximity of the border.

Page 6, Par. 2

Furthermore the Fieldmarshal happened to talk about the date at which Germany would be prepared best for a greater test of strength. In this connection he pointed out that Germany at the moment was comparatively weak on the sea because both the new battleships which had been launched recently would be ready for commissioning only next year and two additional battleships would be launched only next year. In the airforce also, regrouping and adaptation of a new bombertype "JU 88", the production of which had yet to begin, was taking place. This new German bomber had such a range that it would be possible to attack not only England herself, but moreover that would push forward into a western direction, in order to bomb the ships which come from the Atlantic to England. Of course, Germany was ready for action, if suddenly some conflict should come up. But if one was considering at what period of time the armament situation was most favorable, both the facts mentioned above - the insufficient armament at sea and the reconversion of the air-force to the new type of bomber - should not be disregarded. Besides in the fall already a monthly production of 280 planes of the "JU 88" and at the end of the year of 350 planes, could be counted upon. On the basis of these calculations he came to the conclusion that in 9 months or one year the situation for the axis, from a military point of view, would be more favorable. On the other hand it was true that the rearmament in England and France had not made very much progress. In many cases, the factories for the production of war material were only in a state of construction. England would most likely not be able to show any results

1874

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worth mentioning before 1942 for her new beginning high pressure rearmament in the air.

Furthermore, the Fuehrer considered it almost out of the question that England and France would not stand together. According to the German point of view, both countries would in any conflict eventually support each other to the utmost. Only if England should execute a complete reversal of her policy, and the costs and risks of her present political line should become too high, she would perhaps adapt herself to confining her efforts to the preservation of the empire and give the authoritarian countries a free hand for the securing of their vital necessities. At the present time England had a weak government which had yielded to the pressure of the leftist circles. England had deviated from her old line in a way that it offers assistance only on the basis of her own judgment of the situation in question from case to case and she had, in completely turning away from her traditional policy of giving support from time to time only on the basis of her own judgment of the situation at the time, now obliged herself in advance to render support, and that under conditions which could be determined by the other partner. It was another question, of course, how England could fulfill her guarantee obligation in fact. How was she going to help Poland or Rumania, for instance? She did not have the possibility of sending troops and could actually fulfill her obligations only by setting ablaze a general war.

All in all, however, it had to be stressed, that the situation of the axis was very strong and that it could defeat all possible opponents in a general conflict.

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION
OF DOCUMENT 1874-PS

13 November 1945

I, CHARLES E. BIDWELL, S/SGT., 13146054, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; and that the above is a true and correct translation of Document 1874-PS.

CHARLES E. BIDWELL
S/Sgt.
13146054

1874

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT NO. 2360-PS
OFFICE OF U. S. CHIEF OF COUNSEL

"FREEDOM AND BREAD"

Munich Edition

Edition 31, Vol. 52

Munich Edition
Munich, Thursday 31 Jan. 1939

VOELKISCHER BEOBACHTER

FIGHTING ORGAN OF THE NATIONAL SOCIALIST MOVEMENT
OF GREATER GERMANY

The Fuehrer before the first Reichstag of Greater Germany.

We are fighting a tremendous battle - we will win this battle altogether!

Adolf Hitler: The German Reich today is stronger than ever.

Page 1, columns 5 and 6 bottom (excerpt):

On the basis of this unbearable provocation which was still further emphasized by a truly infamous persecution and terrorizing of our Germans there I have now decided to solve the Sudeten-German question in a final and radical manner. On 28 May I gave:

1. The order for the preparation of military steps against this state, to be concluded by 2 October.

2. I ordered the forceful and speedy completion of our defensive front in the west.

I, Goetz Mayer, T/5, 33812169, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; and that the above is a true and correct translation of Document No. 2360-PS

Goetz Mayer,
T/5,
33812169

2360

H1123-0215

PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT NO. 2786-PS
OFFICE OF US CHIEF OF COUNSEL

Exhibit U.S.A. 81
Filed Dec. 3, 1945

EXCHANGE OF LETTERS - RIBBENTROP - KEITEL

Letter from General of Artillery KEITEL to VON RIBBENTROP
dated Berlin, 7 March 1938

- Not Translated -

Letter from Ribbentrop to Keitel

Berlin, 4 March 1938

(illegible ink notes)

My honored General:

Enclosed I forward to tou the minutes of a conference with the local Hungarian Ambassador for your confidential cognizance. As you can judge from it, Mr. SZTOJAY suggested that possible war aims against Czechoslovakia be discussed between the German and Hungarian armies.

I have many doubts about such negotiations. In case we should discuss with Hungary possible war aims against Czechoslovakia, the danger exists that other parties as well would be informed about this.

I would greatly appreciate it, if you notify me briefly whether any commitments were made here in any respect.

With best regards and Heil Hitler

Yours very obediently

(No signature)

To the Chief of the Wehrmachtamt
General of Artillery KEITEL

Berlin W 35
Tirpitzufer 72/76

Enclosure of Minutes of Conversation with Sztojay at Berlin, 4 March 1938, signed R (Ribbentrop) is not translated.

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION (PARTIAL) FROM DOCUMENT NO. 2786-PS

Nov. 13, 1945

I, WILLARD EVANS SKIDMORE, Lt. (jg) USNR, 391590, hereby certify that I am thoroughly cohversant with the English and German languages; and that the above is a true and correct translation of the indicated excerpt from Document no. 2786-PS

WILLARD EVANS SKIDMORE
Lt. (jg) USNR
391590

2786

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H1123-0217

Exhibit U.S.A. 95
Filed Dec. 3, 1945

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 2788-PS
OFFICE OF U S CHIEF OF COUNSEL

TOP SECRET
(Instructions for handling omitted)

TOP SECRET
POL I 789 g (N)

SECRET

Notes
on the Conference on 29 March 1938, 1200 hours,
in the Foreign Office
on Sudeten German Questions.

In this conference the gentlemen enumerated in the enclosed list participated.

The Reichsminister started out by emphasizing the necessity to keep the conference which had been scheduled strictly a secret; he then explained, in view of the directives which the Fuehrer himself had given to Konrad Henlein personally yesterday afternoon that there were two questions which were of outstanding importance for the conduct of policy of the Sudeten German Party:

1. The Sudeten Germans must realize that they are backed up by a nation of 15 million which will not tolerate a continued suppression of the Sudeten Germans by the Czechoslovak Government.

2. It is the task of the Sudeten German Party to formulate such demands from the Czechoslovak Government as it deems necessary in order to obtain the privileges desired by it.

The Foreign Minister explained in this connection that it could not be the task of the Reich Government to give Konrad Henlein, whose position as the leader of the Sudeten Germans has been expressly acknowledged and again confirmed by the Fuehrer, detailed suggestions about what to demand from the Czechoslovak Government. It is essential to propose a maximum program, which as its final aim grants full freedom to the Sudeten Germans. It appears dangerous to be satisfied prematurely with the consent of the Czechoslovakian Government; this on the one hand would give the impression abroad that a solution has been found, and on the other hand would only partially satisfy the Sudeten Germans. In any case, caution is the proper thing, because one cannot have any confidence in the assurances at BENES and HODZA according to past experiences. The aim of the negotiations to be carried out by the Sudeten German party with the Czechoslovakian Government is finally this: to avoid entry into the Government by the extention and gradual specification of the demands to be made. It must be emphasized clearly in the negotiations that the Sudeten German Party alone is the party to the negotiations with the Czechoslovakian Government, not the Reich cabinet (REICHSREGIERUNG). The Reich cabinet itself must refuse to appear toward the Government in Prag or toward London and Paris as the advocate or peacemaker of the Sudeten German demands. It is a self-evident prerequisite that during the impending discussion with the Czechoslovak Government the Sudeten Germans would be firmly controlled by Konrad Henlein, would maintain quiet and discipline, and would avoid indiscretions. The assurances already given by Konrad Henlein in this connection were satisfactory.

27 pp

H1123-0218

Following these general explanations of the Reich Minister the demands of the Sudeten German Party from the Czechoslovak Government as contained in the enclosure were discussed and approved in principle. For further cooperation, Konrad Henlein was instructed to keep in the closest possible touch with the Reichminister and the Head of the Central Office for Racial Germans (mit dem Leiter der Volksdeutschen Mittelstelle), as well as the German Minister in Prague, as the local representative of the Foreign Minister. The task of the German Minister in Prague would be to support the demands of the Sudeten German Party as reasonable, not officially, but in more private talks with the Czechoslovak politicians without exerting any direct influence on the extent of the demands of the Party.

In conclusion there was a discussion whether it would be useful if the Sudeten German Party would cooperate with other minorities in Czechoslovakia, especially with the Slovaks. The Foreign Minister decided that the Party should have the discretion to keep a loose contact with other minority groups if the adoption of a parallel course by them might appear appropriate.

Berlin, 29 March 1938.

R (Initial)

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TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 2788-PS
OFFICE OF U S CHIEF OF COUNSEL

List of those present in the conference on
Sudeten German Questions
on Tuesday, 29 March 1938 1200 hours

Present:		
Reichsminister von Ribbentrop	)	
State Secretary von Mackensen	)	
Ministerial Director Weissaecker	)	
Ambassador Eisenlohr - Prag	)	
Ambassador Stiehe	)	
Vortr. Legationsrat von Twardowski	:	FOREIGN
Legationsrat Altenburg	)	OFFICE
Legationsrat Kordt	)	
SS Obergruppenfuhrer Lorenz	)	
Prof. Haushofer	)	Central Office for Racial Germans (VOLKSDEUTSCHE MITTELSTELLE)
Konrad Henlein	)	
Karl Hermann Frank	)	
Dr. Kuenzel	:	SUDETEN GERMAN
Dr. Kreissl		PARTY.

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION
OF DOCUMENT NO. 2788-PS

11 November 1945

I, LUDWIG HARTMAN, T/4, ASN 37446052, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; and that the above is a true and correct translation of the Document No. 2788-PS.

LUDWIG HARTMAN
T/4, ASN 37446052

2788

H1123-0220

Exhibit U.S.A. 94
Filed Dec. 3, 1945

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT NO. 2789-PS
OFFICE OF U. S. CHIEF OF COUNSEL

KONRAD HENLEIN

Hof i. B., 17th of March, 1938

Most honored Minister of Foreign Affairs:

In our deeply felt joy over the fortunate turn of events in Austria we feel it our duty to express our gratitude to all those who had a share in this new grand achievement of our Fuehrer.

I beg you, most honored Minister, to accept accordingly the sincere thanks of the Sudeten Germans herewith.

We shall show our appreciation to the Fuehrer by doubled efforts in the service of the Greater German policy.

The new situation requires a re-examination of the Sudeten German policy. For this purpose I beg to ask you for the opportunity for a very early personal talk.

In view of the necessity of such a clarification I have postponed the Nation-wide Party Congress, originally scheduled for 26th and 27th of March, 1938, for 4 weeks.

I would appreciate if the Ambassador, Dr. Eisenlohr, and two of my closest associates would be allowed to participate in the requested talks.

Heil Hitler.

Loyally yours,

/s/ Konrad Henlein.

To the
Reich Foreign Minister von Ribbentrop,
Berlin.

* * * * *

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT NO. 2789-PS

10 November 1945

I, S/Sgt. CHARLES E. BIDWELL, 13146034, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; and that the above is a true and correct translation of Document No. 2789-PS.

CHARLES E. BIDWELL
S/Sgt., 13146034

2789

H1123-0221

Exhibit U.S.A. 110
Filed Dec. 4, 1945

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 2790 PS
OFFICE OF U.S. CHIEF OF COUNSEL

(initials) R-M-

Copy for the office of RAM (Reich Foreign Minister)

Discussion between the FUEHRER and Professor TUCA and Secretary of State KARMASIN, in the presence of the Reich Foreign Minister in the new Reich Chancellery in Berlin on Sunday, 12th February 1939 between 1700 and 1815 hours.

After a brief welcome Tuca thanks the Fuehrer for granting this meeting. He addresses the Fuehrer with "My Fuehrer" and he voices the opinion that he, though only a modest man himself, might well claim to speak for the Slovak nation. The Czech courts and prison gave him the right to make such a statement. He states that the Fuehrer had not only opened the Slovak question but that he had been also the first one to acknowledge the dignity of the Slovak nation. The Slovakian people will gladly fight under the leadership of the Fuehrer for the maintenance of European civilization. Obviously future association with the Czechs had become an impossibility for the Slovaks from a moral as well as economic point of view. The fact that they still belonged to the Czech state was only possible because of the thought that the present government was only transitory, but he and his colleagues were determined to give in to the pressure of the Slovak people and to bring about an independent Slovakia. The destiny of Slovakia rested with the Fuehrer. Just as he had suffered imprisonment for his convictions, he was equally prepared to sacrifice his life for his ideals. Should there be a rising, the Czechs would immediately try to suppress it with bloodshed, but the mere word of the Fuehrer sufficed to halt these attempts. The same applied to the aspirations of Hungary and Poland, who would be stopped by a single word of the Fuehrer. "I entrust the fate of my people to your care."

F19 054

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION
OF DOCUMENT NO. 2790 PS

22 November 1945

I, ERNST M. COHN, Pfc., 33925738, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; and that the above is a correct and true translation of Document No. 2790 PS.

ERNST M. COHN
Pfc.,
33925738

2790

On the voyage of the "PATRIA" Ambassador AITOLICO explained to me, that he had instructions to request the notification of a contemplated time for German action against Czechoslovakia from the German government. (Originally reads!! that Mussolini had authorized him to request... but has been changed to read as above.

In case the Czechs should again cause a provocation against Germany, Germany would march. This would be tomorrow, in six months or perhaps in a year. However, I could promise him, that the German government, in case of an increasing gravity of the situation or as soon as the Führer made his decision, would notify the Italian Chief of government as rapidly as possible. In any case, the Italian government will be the first one who will receive such a notification.

23 Aug 1938

R (initial)

- - - - - - - - - - - - - -

CERTIFICATE OF PARTIAL TRANSLATION
OF DOCUMENT 2791-PS

10 November 1945

I, WILLARD E. SKIDMORE, Lt (jg) USNR, 391590 hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; and that the above is a true and correct partial translation of Document No. 2791-PS.

WILLARD E. SKIDMORE
Lt (jg) USNR
391590

2791

H1123-0222

H1123-0223

Exhibit U.S.A. 87
Filed Dec. 3, 1945

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT NO. 2792-PS
OFFICE OF U.S. CHIEF OF COUNSEL

Berlin, 18 July 1938

Confidential.

Today the Italian Ambassador asked me to tell him what the British Ambassador had said to me on the 15th of this month. I restated to Attolico the contents of the conversation.

Attolico added to my communication that his compatriots who visited here a short time ago, such as General Russo, General Pariani and others, possibly were of the opinion that France would not intervene militarily in a German-Czech conflict. He, Attolico, did not know what his own government thought about it, but he himself was of the opinion that these compatriots mentioned by him were mistaken, because France in the assumed case would have only the choice between intervention and complete resignation as a great power. The latter would not take place, however.

To the Reich Minister
To the Undersecretary of State
To the Dg. Pol.
To the Director Recht

(The following is a handwritten note)

Only for the Reich Minister:

Attolico further remarked that we had indeed revealed to the Italians our intentions against the Czechs unmistakably. Also as to the date he had information so far that he might go on leave maybe for two months, but certainly not later than that.

As an indication of the attitude of other governments Attolico pointed out that the Rumanian Government had refused to its ambassador in Berlin the leave he applied for.

R.M. 251.

Ambassador Attolico paid me a visit today at 12 o'clock to communicate the following:

He had received another written instruction from Mussolini asking that Germany communicate in time the probable date of action against Czechoslovakia. Mussolini asked for such notification, as Mr. Attolico assured me, in order "to be able to take in due time the necessary measures on the French frontier."

Berlin, 27 August 1938

R

N.N. I replied to ambassador Attolico just as on his former demarche, that I could not impart any date to him, that, however, in any case Mussolini would be the first one to be informed of any decision.

Berlin, 2 September 1938

2792

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION
OF DOCUMENT No. 2792-PS 18 November 1945

I, Willard E. Skidmore, Lt (jg), USNR, 391590, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; and that the above is a true and correct translation of Document No. 2792-PS

Willard E. Skidmore
Lt (jg), USNR
391590

2792

H1123-0224

TRANSLATION DOCUMENT NO. 2793-PS
OFFICE OF U S CHIEF OF COUNSEL

Exhibit U.S.A. 120
Filed Dec. 5, 1945

Confidential Protocol about the economical and financial collaboration between the German Reich and the State of Slovakia.

The signatory plenipotentiaries of the German Reich Cabinets and of the Slovak government agreed today that the German Reich and the Slovak State will most closely cooperate in the economical and financial fields on the basis of following directives.

ARTICLE I.

The collaboration will include particularly:

(1). Increase and control of the Slovak agricultural production under consideration of the market outlets in Germany, i.e., increased pig-raising and milk production.

(2). Development of the Slovak wood industry and forestry by creating long-term industrial plans under consideration of market outlets in Germany.

(3). Investigation, development and utilization of the Slovak natural resources. In this respect the basic principle is, that insofar as they are not needed to meet Slovakia's own requirements, they should be placed in first line at Germany's disposal. The entire soil research (Bodenforschung) will be placed under the Reichagency for soil-research. (Reichsstelle fuer Bodenforschung.) The government of the Slovak State will soon start an investigation to determine whether the present owners of concessions and privileges have fulfilled the industrial obligations prescribed by law and it will cancel concessions and privileges in cases where these duties have been neglected.

(4). Development and control of industrial production considering the German and Slovak life interests and market relationships and collaboration in the field of export of industrial and other products.

(5). Development of the communication and transportation system in Slovakia.

ARTICLE II.

Slovakia will make its own currency and will create a Slovak National bank as a central mint.

Germany will support Slovakia in the creation of a Slovak National Bank and in the development and execution of the foreign exchange policy.

The German Reich Bank will participate in an appropriate manner in the erection of the Slovak National Bank and will send an adviser to the Board of Directors of this bank who will cooperate in every important decision. The Slovak Cabinet will avail itself of this adviser also when drawing up and executing its State budget and will not raise loans without his approval.

The German tender which was brought to Slovakia during the entry of March 1938 will be exchanged at a rate of

1 Czech Crown = 10 Reich pfennigs.

It is planned that the National Bank in Prague will be induced to immediately transfer tender to Pressburg amounting to 350 million Czech crowns in order to alleviate the currency shortage in Slovakia.

ARTICLE III.

The two governments will soon start negotiations to come to an agreement about the regulation of commercial and financial exchange. These agreements will be made on the basis that Germany will take Slovak agricultural, forestry and other goods including natural resources and will deliver instead finished products, unfinished products and investment goods.

Slovakia will make economic negotiations with other states only after the agreement with Germany had been reached and will keep Germany permanently informed about these negotiations.

2793

H1123-0225

Exhibit USA 108
Filed Dec. 4, 1945

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 2794-PS
OFFICE OF U. S. CHIEF OF COUNSEL

Berlin, 29 November 1939

On the question of payments to KARMASIN

Karmasin receives 30,000 Marks from the VDA (Peoples' League for Germans Abroad) until 1 April 1940; from then on 15,000 Marks monthly.

Furthermore, the Central Office for Racial Germans (Volksdeutsche Mittelstelle) has deposited 300,000 Marks for Karmasin with the German Mission in Bratislava (Pressburg) on which he could fall back in an emergency.

Furthermore, Karmasin has received money from Reich Minister Seyss-Inquart; for the present it has been impossible to determine what amounts had been involved, and whether the payments still continue.

Therefore it appears that Karmasin has been provided with sufficient money; thus one could await whether he would put up new demands himself.

Herewith presented to

the Reich Foreign Minister.

/s/ WOERMANN

(Stamped) Has been presented to the R. F. M.

J. Sch.

Slovakia

(New Page)

Berlin, 1 Dec 39

Today the Reich Foreign Minister received State Secretary Karmasin on the latter's request in the presence of Minister Bernard and myself.

After Mr. Karmasin had discussed briefly the communist, Czech and other anti-German influence which were strongly felt in Slovakia, the Reich Foreign Minister issued the following directives:

1. An attempt should be made to place German advisors with further branches of the Slovak administration and economic agencies. Minister Bernard was to draw up and submit a plan. In this matter, one had to proceed with caution, avoiding hurting Slovak feelings. If possible the cards should be played in such a way that the request for advisors is submitted by the Slovaks themselves.

The funds which might be needed for this task must be requested from Minister Bernard. No effort to influence the interior structure of Slovakia should be undertaken from our side.

2. The cultural influence of Germany shall be increased with the cooperation of the German minority (Volksgruppe). No details of this question have been discussed.

2794

H1123-0226

H1123-0227

(New page)

State Secretary Karmasin promised the Reich Foreign Minister on his request that Germany's intention to exercise this influence would be kept secret from the outer world.

The Reich Foreign Minister then requested Mr. Karmasin to establish liaison with Minister Bernard or, in especially important cases, to report to him in person if he had any requests to make.

/s/ WOERMANN

Office of the Foreign Minister

St. S. (State Secretary)
Dg. Pol.
Pol. IV
Dir. Kult.
Dir. W.
Min. Bernard

Slovakia

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION
OF DOCUMENT NO. 2794-PS

24 November 1945

I, Ludwig Hartman, T/4, 37446052, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; and that the above is a correct and true translation of Document No. 2794-PS.

LUDWIG HARTMAN
T/4, 37446052

2794

H1123-0228

Exhibit USA 106
Filed Dec. 3, 1945

PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 2795-PS
OFFICE OF U. S. CHIEF OF COUNSEL

Notes on the discussion between Foreign Minister RIBBENTROP and the Czechoslovak Foreign Minister CHVALKOVSKY in Berlin
21 Jan 39.
(Notes of meeting not translated)

Herewith presented to the Reich Foreign Minister according to instructions. Berlin, 23 January 1939.

(Signed) Dr. Schmidt,
Minister

(Footnote in RIBBENTROP's handwriting)

I mentioned to Chvalkovsky especially that a quick reduction in the Czech army would be decisive in our judgment.

CERTIFICATE OF PARTIAL TRANSLATION
OF DOCUMENT NO. 2795-PS

24 November 1945

I, Ludwig Hartman, T/4, 37446052, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; and that the above is a correct and true translation of Document No. 2795-PS.

LUDWIG HARTMAN
T/4, 37446052

2795

H1123-0229

Exhibit U.S.A. 88
Filed Dec. 3, 1945

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT NO. 2796-PS
OFFICE OF U. S. CHIEF OF COUNSEL

Office R. M. (Dr. Kordt)
Unter Staats Sekretar Woerman-personally
M. D. Gaus-personally

Aboard the "Patria" 23 August 1938 Pras. G. K.

SECRET

While in the forenoon of the 23rd of August the Fuehrer and the Regent (Reichverweser) of Hungary were engaged in a political discussion, the Hungarian Ministers Imredy and Kanya were in conference with Mr. von Ribbentrop; Mr. von Weiszacker also attended the conference. cc.

Von Kanya introduced two subjects for discussion: point 1) the negotiations between Hungary and the Little Entente and 2) the Czechoslovakian problem.

The comments of Kanya in regard to point 1): Negotiations with the Little Entente were mostly of a historical nature and offered really nothing new. In any case they were inadequate to explain sufficiently a communique submitted by Kanya at the end. This communique is to be issued today by the conference of the Little Entente. It would seen that Baron Aper in Budapest and Ambassador Bessenyi in Belgrade have agreed to it. Thus the question whether it would be oppertune was really outdated. Nevertheless, it had to be discussed thoroughly in order to develop the German point of view. Von Ribbentrop described how in his opinion the renunciation of the use of force, which is to be proclaimed again would not have the desired political effect, namely, a protection of Hungary against Yugoslavia especially in the event of a Hungarian-Czech crisis. On the contrary, Hungary would block the road for her intervention in Czechoslovakia and make it more difficult for the Yugoslavs to abandon their Czech confederates. The impartial reader would reason that Hungary was detaching herself from German Czech politics and was waiving her claims for revision, for whoever did not participate would return with empty hands.

The counter arguments of Kanya were little convincing. They led into a discussion of point 2), namely, the attitude of Hungary in case of a German-Czech conflict.

Von Ribbentrop inquired what Hungary's attitude would be if the Fuehrer would carry out his decision to answer a new Czech provocation by force. The reply of the Hungarians presented two kinds of obstacles: The Yugoslavian neutrality must be assured if Hungary marches towards the North and perhaps the East. Moreover, the Hungarian rearmament had only been started and 1 to 2 more years' time for its development should be allowed.

Von Ribbentrop then explained to the Hungarians that the Yugoslavs would not dare to march while they were between the pincers of the Axis Powers. Rumania alone would therefore not move. England and France would also remain tranquil. England would not recklessly risk her Empire. She knew our newly acquired power. In reference to time, however, for the above-mentioned situation, nothing definite could be predicted since it would depend on Czech provocation. Von Ribbentrop repeated that whoever desires revision must exploit the good opportunity and participate.

H1123-0230

The Hungarian reply thus remained a conditional one. Upon the question of von Ribbentrop, what purpose the desired General Staff conferences were to have, not much more was brought forward than the Hungarian desire of a mutual inventory of military material and preparedness for the Czech conflict. The clear political basis for such a conference - the time of Hungarian intervention - was not obtained.

In the meantime, more positive language was used by Von Horthy in his talk with the Fuehrer. He wished not to hide his doubts with regard to the English attitude, but he wished to put Hungary's intention to participate on record. The Hungarian Ministers were and remained, even later, more skeptical since they feel more strongly about the immediate danger for Hungary with its unprotected flanks.

When Von Imredy had a discussion with the Fuehrer in the afternoon, he was very relieved when the Fuehrer explained to him, that, in regard to the situation in question, he demanded nothing of Hungary. He himself would not know the time. Whoever wanted to join the meal would have to participate in the cooking as well. Should Hungary wish conferences of the General Staffs, he would have no objections.

The Hungarian position may be summed up today as follows:

a) Hungary is glad not to have to expect any inquiries of final character.

b) Hungary probably believes that she cannot intervene sooner than two weeks after the start of the conflict.

Signed Weizsacker

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION
OF DOCUMENT NO. 2796-PS

24-11-45

I, LUDWIG HARTMAN, T/4, 37446052, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; and that the above is a correct and true translation of Document No. 2796-PS.

LUDWIG HARTMAN
T/4, 37446052

2796-PS

H1123-0231

Exhibit U.S.A. 89
Filed Dec. 3, 1945

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 2797 - PS
OFFICE OF U S CHIEF OF COUNSEL

Berlin 29. August 1938

The Reichsminister to-day had a new talk with von KANYA upon the latter's request: The Reichsminister confronted von KANYA with the rejoicing of the Czech, French and English Press over the Bled Communique and repeated that abroad this event, especially at this time, was considered as a rupture of German - Hungarian friendship and a renunciation of Hungarian revisionist claims. Mr. von KANYA mentioned the already Known aspects of the legal situation and the fact that the socalled preliminary discussions between Hungary and the Little Entente were of problematic value. Von KANYA wanted to prove again that the excessive Hungarian demands for protection of its minority in Czechoslovakia would prevent the agreement from becoming effective. But even if it became effective, it would never, according to von KANYA, be observed by the other party and thus Hungary would be freed from observing the provisions renouncing the use of force. Von KANYA expects still more precise information from Budapest to what extent the agreement has actually been formulated and the Reichsminister will be informed on that matter. The Reichsminister and von KANYA agreed that much depended upon how the Bled Communique was treated in the Hungarian Press during the coming week.

Concerning Hungary's military preparedness in case of a German - Czech conflict von KANYA mentioned several days ago that his country would need a period of one to two years in order to develope adequately the armed stronth of Hungary.
During to-day', conversation von KANYA corrected this remark and said that Hungary' military situation was much better. His country would be ready , as far as armaments were concerned, to take part in the conflict by October 1st of this year.

signed
(illegible)

To the Reichsminister
Under secretary of State
Mr. Dg. Pol.
Mr. Dir. Recht.

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION
OF DOCUMENT NO. 2797 - PS

---

12 November 1945

I, WOLFGANG E. THORMANN, M/SGT. 33 779 426, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages ; and that the above is a true and correct translation of the Document No. 2797 - PS.

WOLFGANG E. THORMANN

M/SGT 33 779 426.

2797

H1123-0232

Exhibit U.S.A. 118
Filed Dec. 5, 1945

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 2798-PS
OFFICE OF U S CHIEF OF COUNSEL

Conversation between the Fuehrer and Reich Chancellor and the President of Czechoslovakia, Hacha, in the presence of the Reich Foreign Minister von Ribbentrop, and of the Czechoslovakian Foreign Minister, Chvalkowsky, in the Reich Chancellery on 15 March, 1939, 1315 to 1415 hours.

Others present were:

General Field Marshal Goering
General Keitel
Secretary of the State von Weizsäcker
Minister of the State Meissner
Secretary of the State Deitrich
Councillor of the Legation Hewel

President Hacha greets the Fuehrer and expresses his thanks for being received by the latter. He states that he has long wished to become acquainted with the man whose remarkable ideas he has often read and followed. (They are seated) Hacha: He had been unknown until a short time ago. He had never taken part in politics, but had been a legal official in the Vienna Administrative Department, as as such he purposely had not paid any attention to politics, in order to remain impartial to the parties toward whom he had to act as a judge. In 1918 he was called to Prague and in 1925 was appointed President of the Administrative Court of Justice. As such he had had no connection with the politicians, or as he would rather say, to the "politicasters", and very seldom came into contact with them. He must mention at once that he had hardly any relations with the government, and that his communications with the members of the government were restricted to a minimum. He never had been "persona grata". He met with President Masaryk only once a year at a supper for the Judges, and he met Benes even more rarely. The one time he had met the latter, they had had a misunderstanding. Otherwise the whole regime was strange to him, so strange that immediately after the revolution, he had asked himself if it was fortunate for Czechoslovakia to be an independent state. This fell the task fell to me of heading the state. He was an old man. His misgivings were overcome when it was represented to him as a patriotic duty to take over the position. In taking over this position he was faced with the most difficult task of his life, and thus he had been bold enough to ask the Fuehrer to receive him.

He was convinced that the fate of Czechoslovakia was in the hands of the Fuehrer, and he believed that its fate was well cared for in his hands. He had no grounds for complaint in what had recently taken place in Slovakia. He had long been convinced that the various populations in this body-politic cannot live together. Although their language was quite similar, they had developeddifferently and Czechoslovakia was more closely related to Germany than to Slovakia, which leans more toward the Hagyars. The Czechs had had relations only with the Protestant Slovaks while they had repulsed the Catholics. For these reasons a good understanding could never have been reached, and he was glad that matters had developed in this way. He was not alone in this opinion, which surely was shared by 80% of the population.

2798

H1123-0233

Half an hour ago he had received the announcement that the Carpatho-Ukraine had declared itself independent. He believed that the Fuehrer will have none too favorable experiences with the Slovaks. The Fuehrer had probably heard rumors in the last few days that Prague had committed a violation of the constitution. This violation of the constitution would then have to be blamed on him. But he a Jurist knew that the government was dismissed on a strictly legal basis. For the Constitution itself had not been observed by a portion of the Czech Government. In this connection, unfortunately events occurred which he regreted, but which were brought about by application of measures to enforce order. They had not been intentional. But, otherwise, he was not shedding any tears over Slovakia.

But now he came to that which moved him most, the fate of his people. He believed that the Fuehrer was the one who'd understand him if he stated the opinion that Czechoslovakia had the right to want to live a national life. The geographical location of Czechoslovakia naturally required the best relations with Germany. This was the basis of its existence as an independent nation. This conviction was shared by the larger part of the Czech people. There were of course, several exceptions, but it must be considered that the new Czechoslovakia had been in existence for only 6 months. Czechoslovakia had been reproached for still having many adherents of the Benes system. But they are not the ones who are named as such. Only in journalistic circles did this system still have friends. The government was trying, by every means, to shut them up. This was about all that he wished to present.

The Fuehrer replied that he regretted that he had to require this journey of the President. But this morning, after long consideration he became convinced that this journey, in spite of the advanced age of the President could be of great advantage to his country. For it was only a matter of hours until Germany would intervene. The German Reich, on principle, feels no enmity toward any other nations. We are fond of, or at least uninterested in nations that do not wrong us. The German people have no hatred for Czechoslovakia. Czechoslovakia, however, had a very different attitude towards us. The Fuehrer gives various examples to illustrate how this attitude has shown itself in connection with great political events as, for instance, during the occupation of the Rhineland. At that time Czechoslovakia had addressed a note to France saying that Czechoslovakia would be also ready to join in, in the case that France would take military steps against Germany. Czechoslovakia had done so, notwithstanding the fact that the territory in question was originally German. This same attitude she had shown many times, for instance, against Italy during the Ethiopian conflict, etc.. In 1938 the situation had become unbearable. On 28 May he had decided to draw the consequences. He did not feel hostility against any nation but he was the most ruthless defender of the rights of his own people and in this fight he was determined to take any step. In regard to this he was the front soldier who ruthlessly and without scruples stands up and fights for his conviction. His loyal attitude alone was responsible for the remaining part of Czechoslovakia. He took the risk of turning the friendly attitude of Hungary towards him into a hostile one by stopping Hungary's political ambitions and forcing her to solve the problem according to ethnographic principles as Germany did. He did this despite the fact that the craziest economic and tariff situations followed. He took the responsibility for these restrictions not because he could not have acted otherwise but because he was convinced that it was the right thing to do.

For the other countries Czechoslovakia was nothing but a means to an end. London and Paris were not in a position to really stand up for Czechoslovakia.

2798

H1123-0234

Czechoslovakia was a matter of indifference to him.

If Czechoslovakia had kept closer to Germany, it would have been an obligation to Germany but he was glad that he did not have this obligation now. He had no interests whatsoever in the territory east of the little Carpathian Mts. He did not want to draw the final consequences in the autumn because he had believed that it was possible to live together. But even at that time and also later in his conversations with Ch alkowsky he made it clear that he would ruthlessly smash this state if Benesch's tendencies were not completely revised. Chvalkowsky understood this and asked the Fuehrer to have patience. The Fuehrer saw this point of view, but the months went by without any change. The new regime did not succeed in eliminating the old one psychologically. He observed this from the press, mouth to mouth propaganda, dismissals of Germans and many other things which, to him, were a symbol of the total positive. At first he had not understood this but when it became clear to him he drew his consequences because, had the development continued in this way, the relations with Czechoslovakia would in a few years have become the same as six months ago. Why did Czechoslovakia not immediately reduce its army to a reasonable size? Such an army was a tremendous burden for such a state because it only makes sense if it supports the foreign political mission of the State. Since, Czechoslovakia no longer has a foreign political mission such an army is meaningless. He ennumerates several examples which proved to him that the spirit in the army had not changed. This symptom convinced him that the army also would be a source of a severe political burden in the future. Added to this were the inevitable development of economic necessities and, further, the protests from national groups which could no longer endure life as it was.

"This it is that the die was cast on the past Sunday. I sent for the Hungarian ambassador and told him that I am withdrawing my hands from this country". We were now confronted with this fact. He had given the order to the German troops to march into Czechoslovakia and to incorporate Czechoslovakia into German Reich. He wanted to give Czechoslovakia fullest autonomy and a life of her own to a larger extent than she ever had enjoyed during Austrian rule. Germany's attitude towards Czechoslovakia will be determined tomorrow and the day after tomorrow and depends on the attitude of the Czechoslovakian people and the Czechoslovakian military towards the German troops. He no longer trusts the government. He believes in the honesty and straight forwardness of Hacha and Chvalkowsky but doubts that the government will be able to assert itself in the entire nation. The German Army had already started out today, and at one barracks where resistance was offered, it was ruthlessly broken; another barracks had given in at the deployment of heavy artillery.

At 6 o'clock in the morning the Germany army would invade Czechoslovakia from all sides and the German air force would occupy the Czech airfields. There existed two possibilities. The first one would be that the invasion of the German troops would lead to a battle. In this case the resistance will be broken by all means with physical force. The other possibility is that the invasion of the German troops occurs in bearable form. In that case it would be easy for the Fuehrer to give Czechoslovakia at the new organization of Czech life a generous life of her own, autonomy and a certain national liberty.

2798

H1123-0235

We witnessed at the moment a great historical turning-point. He would not like to torture and de-nationalize the Czechs. He also did not do all that because of hatred but in order to protect Germany. If Czechoslovakia in the fall of last year would not have yielded, the Czech people would have been exterminated. Nobody could have prevented him from doing that. It was his will that the Czech people should live a full national life and he believed firmly that a way could be found which would make far-reaching concessions to the Czech desires. If fighting would break out tomorrow, the pressure would result in counter-pressure. One would annihilate one another and it would then not be possible any more for him to give the promised alleviations. Within two days the Czech army would not exist any more. Of course, Germans would also be killed and this would result in a hatred which would force him because if his instinct of self-preservation, not to grant autonomy any more. The world would not move a muscle. He felt pity for the Czech people when he was readying the foreign press. It would leave the impression on him which could be summarized in a German proverb: "The moor has done his duty, the moor may go".

That was the state of affairs. There existed two trends in Germany, a harder one which did not want any concessions and wished in memory to the past that Czechoslovakia would be conquered with blood, and another one, the attitude of which corresponded with his just mentioned suggestions.

That was the reason why he had asked Hacha to come here. This invitation was the last good deed which he could offer to the Czech people. If it would come to a fight, the blood shed would aslo force us to hate. But the visit of Hacha could perhaps prevent the extreme. Perhaps it would contribute to finding a form of construction which would be so far-reaching for Czechoslovakia as she could never have hoped for in the old Austria. His aim was only to create the necessary security for the German people.

The hours went past. At 6 o'clock the troops would march in. He was almost ashamed to say that there was one German division to each Czech batallion. The military action was no small one, but planned with all generosity. He would advise him now to retire with Chvalkowsky.in order to discuss what should be done.

Hacha states that the situation was quite clear to him and that in this case any resistance was senseless. But he would ask the Fuehrer how he would go about, to restrain in four hours all of the Czech people from resisting. The Fuehrer says he should hold council with his men. The now rolling military machine could not be stopped. He should turn to his offices in Prague. It was a great decision but he could see the possibility for a long period of peace between both nations. If the decision would be different he could foresee the destruction of Czechoslovakia.

Hacha asks whether it was the whole purpose of the invasion to disarm the Czech army. This could perhaps also be done in a different manner.

The Fuehrer states that his decision was irrevocable. It was well known what a decision of the Fuehrer meant. He did not see any other possibility for disarmament and asked the other gentlemen whether they shared his opinion which was answered in the affirmative. The only possibility to disarm the Czech army was by the German army.

Today this was for Hacha the hardest step of his life, but he believed that already in a few years this decision would be viewed as comprehensible and in 50 years probably as a blessed one.

2798

H1123-0236

After that both Czechs are retiring.

After the conference between Hacha and Chvalkowsky with our gentlemen at the conclusion of which one had come to an understanding on the wording of the agreement, the gentlemen mentioned at the beginning of this memorandum come once together to a final discussion in the Fuehrer's study.

Once again the military situation is being thoroughly discussed and the General Fieldmarshall describes the situation once more in detail. The Fuehrer thinks that perhaps Hacha's message may have not gotten through to some places where clashes of arms may be expected, but one could by and large figure on an invasion without incidences.

The Fuehrer continues that according to his belief inspite of all the embitterment which could be caused by the invasion and occupation by Germany nevertheless the conviction would slowly dawn that a living together of the two nations for centuries was advantageous. The idea that the two people were compelled to fight each other would disappear. Czechoslovakia was surrounded by Germany and every reasonable person would have to admit that a close living together of the two nations whould be the watchword. Furthermore the problem of denationalisation played no part since such an idea was complete foreign to the Germans and to Nationalsocialist ideology. We don't desire nor aim at denationalisation. The ones should live happily as Czechs and the others as Germans.

Hacha replies that this remark of the Fuehrer was of the greatest importance to him.

The Fuehrer continued that only in economic, military and political matters could no opposition be allowed. Czechia should keep her own head of state, and his principles which he will carry through formed the basis for a pacification of this territory for centuries to come.

Hacha interjected and remarked that in other words this was not a plan for purchasing souls like it was during Austrial rule, and asked whether, economically, a custom's union was planned.

The first point the Fuehrer denied with a smile. The second point was answered in the affirmative by the General Fieldmarshall stating that Germany and Czechia were one territory economically speaking. Furthermore Czechia would receive orders which would certainly double her production.

The Fuehrer said that the Czech people would again economically through the union with Germany because they would become a part of the great German economic territory. He did not want to destroy Czech economy but would enliven it tremendously.

Hacha asked whether detailed directives to that effect had already been prepared.

The Fuehrer replied that this was the responsibility of an economic commission because for him, too, the whole affair had come very suddenly. A few weeks ago he did not know a thing about the entire business. He talked again about the past and the tactics employed by Benes and finally mentioned the 28 May on which date he had announced his decision to act to a small circle. The Fuehrer concluded that this settlement which now would be made was to be final, bearable, and should leave no doubts. In any case the Czechs would obtain more rights than they had ever granted to the Germans within their territory.

Thereupon the agreement was signed by the Fuehrer, the Reich's, for Foreign Affairs, Hacha and Chvalkowsky.

Signed: Hewel

2798

H1123-0237

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION
OF DOCUMENT NO. 2798-PS

21 November 1945.

I, GOETZ MAYER, T/Sgt, AUS, 33,812,169, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; and that the above is a correct and true translation of document No. 2798-PS.

GOETZ MAYER
T/S AUS
33,812,169

2798

H1123-0238

Exhibit U.S.A. 85
Filed Dec. 3, 1945

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 2800-PS
OFFICE OF U. S. CHIEF OF COUNSEL

BERLIN, 18th July, 1938

CONFIDENTIAL

The Italian Ambassador today wanted to know what the British Ambassador had talked to me about on 15th July, 1938. I repeated to Attolico the contents of our talk.

Attolico remarked after my talk that it was quite possible that his fellow-countrymen General Russo, General Pariani and others who were here a short time ago may be of the opinion that France would not intervene in a German-Czech conflict. He, Attolico did not know what his government thought of it but personally he is convinced that his fellow-countrymen already mentioned were mistaken. In such an eventuality France had only the choice between her intervention on her complete abdication as a great power. The latter would not happen.

For the Reichminister only (Handwritten note)

Attolico added that we had made it unmistakably clear to the Italians what our intentions are regarding Czechoslovakia. He also knew the appointed time well enough so that he could take perhaps a two months' holiday now which he could not do later on.

Giving an idea of the attitude of other governments Attolico mentioned that the Roumanian government had refused to grant application for leave to its Berlin Minister.

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION
OF DOCUMENT NO. 2800-PS

24 November 1945

I, Ludwig Hartman, T/4, 37446052, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; and that the above is a correct and true translation of Document No. 3037-PS.

LUDWIG HARTMAN
T/4, 37446052

2800

H1123-0239

Exhibit U.S.A. 109
Filed Dec. 4, 1945

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT NO. 2801-PS
OFFICE OF U. S. CHIEF OF COUNSEL

DISCUSSION

General-Fieldmarshall GOERING with the SLOVAK Minister Dr. DURKANSKY

Also present: the Head of the Propaganda Section of the SLOVAK Government MACH; Leader of the Germans in SLOVAKIA, KARMARSON; Reichsstatthalter SEYSS-INQUART.

To begin with DURKANSKY (Deputy Prime Minister) reads out declaration. Contents:- "Friendship for the Fuehrer; gratitude, that through the Fuehrer autonomy has become possible for the SLOVAKS." The SLOVAKS never want to belong to HUNGARY. The SLOVAKS want full independence with strongest political, economic and military ties to Germany. BRATISLAVA to be capital. The execution of the plan only possible if the army and police are SLOVAK.

An independent SLOVAKIA to be proclaimed at the meeting of the first SLOVAK Diet. In the case of a plebiscite the majority would favour a separation from PRAGUE. Jews will vote for Hungary. The area of the plebiscite to be up to the MARCH, where a large SLOVAK population lives.

The Jewish problem will be solved similarly to that in Germany. The Communist party to be prohibited.

The Germans in SLOVAKIA do not want to belong to Hungary but wish to stay in SLOVAKIA.

The German influence with the SLOVAK Government considerable; the appointment of a German Minister (member of the cabinet) has been promised.

At present negotiations with HUNGARY are being conducted by the SLOVAKS. The CZECHS are more yielding towards the Hungarians than the SLOVAKS.

The Fieldmarshall considers; that the SLOVAK negotiations towards independence are to be supported in a suitable manner. Czechoslovakia without Slovakia is still more at our mercy.

Air bases in Slovakia are of great importance for the German Air Force for use against the East.

- - - - - - - -

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION
OF DOCUMENT NO. 2801-PS

19 November 1945

I, ERNST M. COHN, Pfc, 33925738, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the ENGLISH and GERMAN languages and that the above is a true and correct translation of Document No. 2801-PS.

ERNST M. COHN
Pfc, 33925738

2801

H1123-0240

Exhibit USA 117
Filed Dec. 5, 1945

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT NUMBER 2802 PS
OFFICE OF U.S. CHIEF OF COUNSEL

13. III. 39

CONFERENCE BETWEEN THE FUHRER AND THE SLOVAK PRIME MINISTER TISO

in the study of the Führer in the New Reich Chancery from 18.40 - 19.15 hours, 13 March 1939.

Other Persons Present were:

The Reich Minister for Foreign Affairs,
Minister of State Meissner,
General Keitel
State Secretary Dietrich,
State Secretary Keppler,
Minister Durcansky,

The Führer greets Prime Minister Tiso and describes to him in a long detailed account the developments in Czechoslovakia. Since the Autumn of last year, Germany had experienced two disappointments. One was with regard to Czechoslovakia, partly because of ill-will, partly as for example in the case of Chvalkowsky who out of weakness, could not prevent the development of political circumstances, which were intolerable to Germany. Czechoslovakia had only Germany to thank that she had not been mutilated further. With the greatest forebearance Germany had renounced claims to the islands of German speech (Sprachinsel) lying on her borders in order to assure to Czechoslovakia a normal living space. There had been no thanks for this. No Czech had lost his job in Germany. On the contrary, numerous Czechs had been received by us. Not a hair of these persons' heads had been ruffled, nor had they been insulted or attacked. It was envisaged quite differently on the Czech side. The sternest dismissal measures had been carried out against Germany, thousands had found themselves without means of earning their bread. Everywhere Germans had been provoked or discriminated against. The Germans had been subject to constant surveillance so that their situation was now worse than before the September crisis. This development was not in accordance with the agreements. Until the day before yesterday Germany had striven for an absolutely loyal attitude in the press. It (the press) had been restrained and had not mentioned many things which had happened there in order to maintain a wholesome atmosphere. During this time the Czech press had repeatedly published unfavorable things about Germany, certain organs had not ceased their systematic agitation. Pamphlets and propaganda by word of mouth had been continuous. The momentary situation was described to the Czechs as a temporary affair, time and again hopes based on a change to the disadvantage of Germany had been awakened in the people. The Führer had already spoken of this to Chvalkowsky and reproached him that oil had continuously been thrown on to the fire. Central Europe was a fixed, closed economic area which could only live when fully pacified. It needed pacification. Geographically the situation was made clear by the fact that Bohemia and Moravia were enclosed by Germany, and Germany could never tolerate in her own territory a hot-bed of unrest.

In recent weeks the circumstances had become unbearable. The old spirit of Benes had again been revived. The Czech people had been incited to resistance. Conditions were insecure and tumultous.

2802

H1123-0241

Yesterday incidents in Brünn and Iglau occurred. While we had treated the Czechs in Germany well, the situation in Czechoslovakia was unstable, Germany could no longer permit those conditions. Likewise, German nationals over there were defending themselves, as they did not see why things should be worse now than before.

We had solved the Czech question then according to our world interpretation. If, however, this solution leads to no results, then we have decided absolutely to pursue it to its conclusion, without consideration for this ideological principle.

The second disappointment for us was the attitude of Slovakia. In the past year the Führer had had to face a difficult decision, whether or not to permit Hungary to occupy Slovakia. The Führer had been under a wrong impression as he had of course believed that Slovakia wished to be annexed to Hungary. This error was founded on the fact that Slovakia was further away from Germany and on the importance of the more serious problems which then overshadowed this problem. It was only in the crisis that the Führer was disuaded from this opinion. It was then that he first heard and noted that Slovakia wished to conduct her own affairs.

At Munich the Führer did not play power politics, in his decisions, but took the line of national politics. He did something which alienated some of his friends in Hungary from him, namely against those whose wishes he had carried out this principle for Hungary also. He had repeatedly explained this some months previously.

Now he had sent Keppler as his minister to Pressburg, to whom Sidor had declared that he was a soldier of Prague and would oppose a separation of Slovakia from the Czechoslovak Union. If the Führer had known this earlier, he would not have needed to antagonize his friends Hungary, but on the contrary, let events follow the course they were then taking.

Now he had permitted Minister Tiso to come here in order to make this question clear in a very short time. Germany had no interests east of the Carpathian mountains. It was indifferent to him what happened there. The question was whether Slovakia wished to conduct her own affairs or not. He did not wish for anything from Slovakia. He would not pledge his people or even a single soldier to something which was not in any way desired by the Slovak people. He would like to secure final confirmation as to what Slovakia really wished. He did not wish that reproaches should come from Hungary that he was preserving something which did not wish to be preserved at all. He took a liberal view of unrest and demonstration in general, but in this connection, unrest was only an outward indication of interior instability. He would not tolerate it and he had for that reason permitted Tiso to come in order to hear his decision. It was not a question of days, but of hours. He had stated at that time that Slovakia wished to make herself independent he would support this endeavor and even guarantee it. He would stand by his word s long as Slovakia would make it clear that she wished for independence. If she hesitated or did not wish to dissolve the connection with Prague, he would leave the destiny of Slovakia to the mercy of events, for which he was n longer responsible. In that case he would only intercede for German interests and those did not lie east of the Carpathians. Germany had nothing to do with Slovakia. She had never belonged to Germany.

2802

H1123-0242

The Führer asked the Reich Foreign Minister if he had any remarks to add. The Reich Foreign Minister also emphasized for his part the conception that in this case a decision was a question of hours not of days. He showed the Führer a message he had just received which reported Hungarian troop movements on the Slovak frontiers. The Führer read this report, mentioned it to Tiso, and expressed the hope that Slovakia would soon decide clearly for herself.

Tiso thanked the Führer for his words. He had for some time longed to hear from the Führer himself how he (the Führer) stood in relation to his (Tiso's) people and country and how he regarded the problems. He took note of the statement, and gave the assurance that the Führer could rely on Slovakia. He wished to be excused for the fact that under the impression made by the Führer words he could not clearly express his opinion at that moment or could hardly make a decision. He wished to withdraw with his friend and to think the whole question over at his ease; they would however, show that they were worthy of the Führer's care and interest for their country. With that the conversation was ended.

Signed:

Hewel.

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION
OF DOCUMENT NO. 2802 PS

20 November 1945

I, ENID M. STANDRING, P/O, W.R.N.S., 52012, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; and that the above is a true and correct translation of document Number 2802 PS.

ENID M. STANDRING
P/O, W.R.N.S.,
52012.

2802

Exhibit U.S.A. 116
Filed Dec. 5, 1945

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 2815-PS
OFFICE OF U S CHIEF OF COUNSEL

CZ/15.

In Duplicate

Berlin, 13th March 1939.

Diplogerma.

Prague

Telegram in secret code

With reference to telephone instructions given by Kordt today.

In case you should get any written communication from President HACHA, please do not make any written or verbal comments or take any other action on them but pass them on here by cipher telegram. Moreover, I must ask you and the other members of the Embassy to make a point of not being available if the Czech government wants to communicate with you during the next few days.

(signed) RIBBENTROP

F 12 426. A/CZ/2

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17 November 1945

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION
OF DOCUMENT 2815-PS

I, L. A. Hill, M.C., British Army, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; and that the above is a true and correct translation of Document No. 2815-PS.

L. A. Hill, M. C.
Major, British Army
217840

2815

H1123-0243

H1123-0244

Exhibit U.S.A. 115
Filed Dec. 5, 1945

TRANSLATION FO DOCUMENT 2816-PS
OFFICE OF U S CHIEF OF COUNSEL

H/15. Hungary. F18 367
F18 368

MAGYARORSZAG KORMANYZOJA

Your Excellency,

My sincere thanks

I can hardly tell you how happy I am because this Head Water Region - I dislike using big words - is of vital importance to the life of Hungary.

In spite of the fact that our recruits have only been serving for 5 weeks we are going into this affair with eager enthusiasm. The dispositions have already been made. On Thursday, the 16th of this month, a frontier incident will take place which will be followed by the big blow on Saturday.

I shall never forget this proof offriendship and your Excellency may rely on my unshakable gratitude at all times.

Your devoted friend.

(Signed) HORTHY

Budapest. 13.3.1939.

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION
OF DOCUMENT NO 2816-PS

13 November 1945

I, GOETZ MAYER , T/5, 33812169, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; and that the above is a true and correct translation of Document No 2816-PS.

GOETZ MAYER
T/5, 33812169

2816

Exhibit U.S.A. 111
Filed Dec. 4, 1945

TRANSLATION OF EXCERPTS OF DOC. NO. 2826 PS
OFFICE OF U.S. CHIEF OF COUNSEL

Böhmen und Mähren (Official Periodical of the Reich's Protector of Bohemia and Moravia), Published by State-Secretary SS Group Leader K. H. Frank: Prague, May 1941, page 179

SS Group Leader State-Secretary
K. H. Frank:

The SS on March 15, 1939

A modern people and a modern state are today unthinkable without political troops. To these are allotted the special task of being the advance guard of the political will and the guarantor of its unity. This is especially true of the German folk-groups, which have their home in some other people's state. Accordingly the Sudeten German Party had formerly also organized its political troop, the Voluntary Vigilantes (Freiwilliger Selbstschutz), called "FS" for short. This troop was trained essentially in accordance with the principles of the SS, so far as these could be used in this region at that time. The troop was likewise assigned here the special task of protecting the homeland actively, if necessary. It stood up well in its first test in this connection, wherever in the fall crisis of 1938 it had to assume the protection of the homeland, arms in hand.

After the annexation of the Sudeten Gau, the tasks of the FS were transferred essentially to the German student organizations as compact troop formations in Prague and Brünn, aside from the isolated German communities which remained in the second republic. This was also natural because many active students from the Sudeten Gau were already members of the SS. The student organizations then had to endure this test, in common with other Germans, during the crisis of March 1939.... The calm of German men is to be thanked for the fact that there were no greater disturbances, which would have at least made more difficult the peaceful solution of March 15. Thus the educational work of the SS already found its expression in the course of the preliminary events. The Führer himself has commended the conduct of the German students. After they had formed on 16 March in the first courtyard of the castle, he strode down the line and gave his hand to each wounded student.

In the early morning hours of March 15, after the announcement of the planned entry of German troops in various localities, German men had to act in some localities in order to assure a quiet course of events, either by assumption of the police authority, as for instance in Brünn, or by corresponding instruction of the police president, etc. In some Czech offices, men had likewise, in the early hours of the morning, begun to burn valuable archives and the material of political files. It was also necessary to take measures here in order to prevent foolish destruction ... How significant the many-sided and comprehensive measures were considered by the competent German agencies, follows from the fact that many of the men either on March 15 itself or on the following days were admitted into the SS with fitting acknowledgment, in part even through the Reich's leader of the SS himself or through SS Group Leader Heydrich. The activities and deeds of these men were thereby designated as accomplished in the interest of the SS.

Immediately after the corresponding divisions of the SS had marched in with the first columns of the German Army and has assumed responsibility in the appropriate sectors, the man here placed themselves at once at their further disposition and became valuable auxiliaries and collaborators.....

2826

H1123-0245

H1123-0246

The various detachments of the SS moved into their places of destination in Bohemia and Moravia, according to precise plans. The Waffen SS took part in the forceful securing of the territory and stood the test extremely well. The detachments of the Security Police and of the Security Service (S.D.) stationed throughout the territory, took over the political securing of the area, in order to avoid political disturbances, thus preventing useless bloodshed. They took part in all political happenings in order to be able to recognize any possible sources of danger right away and to be able to take appropriate preventive measures.

The quiet course of events,--even that of the evening of 15 March, which looked somewhat more critical to the outside,--has confirmed the correctness of methods and measures taken. Thus the framework of Security Police and S.D. (Sicherheitsdienst) evolved in the very first days of the Protectorate. The territory of Bohemia and Moravia, and especially Prague, presented a whole series of urgent problems. It was this specific place, which has been picked out by the enemies of National Socialist Germany as the most important point of attack in Middle Europe. Even though the principal elements of the driving powers behind past developments had already left the territory, it was still clear to everybody familiar with conditions that very important elements were still there. Later developments have confirmed this fact. Many things had to be accomplished quickly but nevertheless thoroughly. This was possible, however, only because many of the SS men did not come as entire strangers into this territory. In many cases they had taken interest in conditions here and had intensively studied all questions connected with local problems. At first the offices were installed in different hotels. Direct private telephone and cable installations were created. Thus everything was done to the work from the technical angle, too, within the shortest time.

The results of this work, which were frequently obtained under the most difficult circumstances have shown even then the high standard of training and the cheerful performance of duties by the SS men.

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CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION
OF DOCUMENT NO. 2826-PS

22 November 1945

I, LUDWIG HARTMAN, T/4 37446052, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; and that the above is a correct and true translation of Document No. 2826-PS.

LUDWIG HARTMAN
T/4, 37446052

2826

Exhibit U.S.A. 100
Filed Dec. 3, 1945

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT NO. 2853-PS
OFFICE OF U.S. CHIEF OF COUNSEL

DE-CYPHER

From Foreign Office Berlin 24.9 1905

To Embassy Prague 24.9 2000

Secret Cypher
Bl 2101/2102

Telegram No. 268. Foreign Office, Berlin to German Embassy, Prague on 24.9.1938

According to information received here Czechs have arrested 2 German frontier-policemen, seven customs-officials and 30 railway-officials. As countermeasure all the Czech staff in Marschegg were arrested. We are prepared to exchange the arrested Czech officials for the German officials. Please approach Government there and wire result.

(signed) WOERMANN

HMB/HAB 18 996

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CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION
OF DOCUMENT NO. 2853-PS

I, Evelyn E.F. Glazier, P.O., WRNS, 37371, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; and that the above is a true and correct translation of Document 2853-PS.

EVELYN E.F. GLAZIER
P.O., WRNS, 37371

2853

H1123-0247

H1123-0248

Exhibit U.S.A. 99
Filed Dec. 3, 1945

PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT NO. 2854-PS
OFFICE OF U. S. CHIEF OF COUNSEL

DECIPHERED MESSAGE

Dispatched from the Foreign Office 17 Sept. 15 o'clock 20 min.

Received by the Legation 17 Sept. Secret Cipher. (2762-65)

No. 234 of 17

Most Urgent

I. Request to inform the local government immediately of the following:

The Reich Government has decided that:

(a) immediately as many Czech subjects of Czech descent, Czech speaking Jews included, will be arrested in Germany as Sudeten Germans have been in Czechoslovakia since the beginning of the week.

(b) If any Sudeten Germans should be executed pursuant to a death sentence on the basis of martial law, an equal number of Czechs will be shot in Germany.

* * * * * * * *

(Signed) WOERMANN

CERTIFICATE OF PARTIAL TRANSLATION
OF DOCUMENT NO. 2854-PS

24 November 1945

I, Ludwig Hartman, T/4, 37446052, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; and that the above is a correct and true translation of Document No. 2854-PS.

LUDWIG HARTMAN
T/4, 37446052

2854

H1123-0249

Exhibit U.S.A. 98
Filed Dec. 3, 1945

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT NO. 2855-PS
Office of U.S. Chief of Counsel

Decipherment

From Foreign Office 16 Sept .38 1845 hours.

To Embassy 16 Sept .38 Secret Cipher
page No. 2760

No. 232 of 16 Sept. 38

Tonight 150 subjects of Czechoslovakia of Czech blood were arrested in Germany. This measure is an answer to the arrest of Sudeten Germans since the Fuehrer's speech of 12 September. I request you to ascertain the number of Sudeten-Germans arrested since 12 September as extensively as possible. The number of those arrested there is estimated conservatively at 400 by the Gestapo. Cable report.

Woermann

(Handwritten note follows)

Impossible for me to ascertain these facts as already communicated to the proper agent(Gesch. Träger)

17/9

(signature illegible.)

- -

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION
OF DOCUMENT NO. 2855-PS

15 Nov. 1945.

I, WILLARD EVANS SKIDMORE, Lt(jg) U.S.N.R. 391590, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; and that the above is a corredt and true translation of Document No. 2855-PS.

WILLARD EVANS SKIDMORE
LT(jg) U.S.N.R.
391590

2855

H1123-0250

Exhibit U.S.A. 101
Filed Dec. 3, 1945.

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT NO. 2856-PS
OFFICE OF U S CHIEF OF COUNSEL

Decipherment

From Foreign Office Berlin 24 September 1556 hours
To Embassy Prague 24 September 1800 hours.

Secret Cipher
pages 2795 and 2797

No. 263 of 24 September 1938

To telegrams No. 432 and 435.

Embassy authorized to agree to mutual arrangements for the possible necessary removal from there of 500-600 Reich Germans by special train.

At discretion to agree with the government there the rail-line frontier-place and time of transfer of the people to be returned. Cable report.

Confidential:

Yielding of the Czech hostages arrested here for the prevention of the execution of any sentences passed by military courts against Sudeten-Germans is, of course, out of question.

Woermann

16 November 1945

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION
OF DOCUMENT NO. 2856-PS

I, Willard E. Skidmore, Lt (jg), USNR, 391590, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; and that the above is a true and correct translation of Document No. 2856-PS

Willard E. Skidmore
Lt (jg), USNR, 391590

2856

H1123-0251

Exhibit U.S.A. 97
Filed Dec. 3, 1945

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 2858-PS
OFFICE OF U S CHIEF OF COUNSEL

Page No. 2773. Decoding.

From: Foreign Office, 19.9.38

To: Embassy, 19.9.38, 2330 hrs.

Nr. 244 of the 19.9.38

21 hrs, 36 min.

Secret code method

Decoding office 1000 hrs.

Please inform deputy Kundt, at Konrad Henlein's request, to get into touch with the Slovaks at once and induce them to start their demands for autonomy tomorrow.

(Signed) ALTENBURG

19 026

- - - - - -

17 November 1945

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION
OF DOCUMENT 2858-PS

I, L. A. Hill, M. C., 217840. hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; and that the above is a true and correct translation of Document No. 2858-PS.

L. A. Hill, M. C.
Major, British Army.
217840

2858

Exhibit USA. 107
Filed Dec. 4, 1945

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT NO. 2859-PS
OFFICE OF U.S. CHIEF OF COUNSEL

CABLE - CODE BOOK

CONSUGERMA

DECODED
ILLEGIBLE

PRESSBURG

PRAGUE, 22 Nov. 1938

22005

Delegate Kundt asks to notify State Secretary Karmasin, he would appreciate it if he could personally draw the sum which is being kept for him at the treasury of the embassy.

HENCKE

H 22 XI.

A 22/11

(Translator's note: The words Prague 22 Nov 1938 are crossed out in pencil).

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION
OF DOCUMENT NO.2859-PS

16 November 1945

I, WILLARD E. SKIDMORE, Lt (jg), USNR, 391590, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; and that the above is a true and correct translation of Document No. 2859-PS.

WILLARD E. SKIDMORE,
Lt(jg),USNR, 391590.

2859

H1123-0252

H1123-0253

Exhibit U.S.a. 119
Filed Dec. 5, 1945

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 2860-PS (vide 2861)
OFFICE OF US CHIEF OF COUNSEL

Englisches Blaubuch

Dokumente betreffend die deutsch-polnischen Beziehungen und den Ausbruch der Feindseligkeiten zwischen Grossbritannien und Deutschland am 3. September 1939. London, 1939.

Nr.10

Rede des Staatssekretaers fuer Auswaertige Angelegenheiten im Oberhaus vom 20. Maerz 1939.

Es ist vollkommen zutreffend, dass, wie es der hochwohlgeborene Lord als erster Redner und auch der hochwohlgeborene Marquis gesagt haben, die kuerzlichen Ereignisse alle denkenden Menschen in unserem Lande und weit darueber hinaus aufs tiefste erschuettert haben. Es duerfte vielleicht von Nutzen sein, dass ich dem Haus in aller Kuerze eine kuerze Darstellung gebe, damit wir uns vergewissern koennen, dass unsere Auffassung von dem, was sich tatsaechlich waehrend der letzten Tage abgespielt hat, zutreffend ist. Die deutsche militaerische Besetzung Boehmens und Maehrens begann am Morgen des 15. Maerz und wurde unseres Wissens ohne ernsthaften Zwischenfall durchgefuehrt. Es muss aber bemerkt werden - und diese Tatsache ist sicherlich nicht ohne Bedeutung - dass die Staedte Maehrisch-Ostrau und Witkowitz in Wirklichkeit bereits am Abend des 14. Maerz von deutschen SS-Abteilungen besetzt wurden, waehrend der Praesident und der Aussenminister der Tschechoslowakei sich noch auf dem Wege nach Berlin befanden und bevor irgend eine Besprechung stattgefunden hatte.

CERTIFICAT OF TRANSLATION
OF DOCUMENT 2860-PS

29 November 1945.

I WILLARD E. SKIDMORE, Lt.(jg) USNR, 391590 hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; and that the above is a true and correct translation of Document 2860-PS.

WILLARD E. SKIDMORE
Lt.(jg) USNR
391590

2860

H1123-0254

ORIGINAL OF DOCUMENT 2860-PS
OFFICE OF U S CHIEF OF COUNSEL

BRITISH BLUE BOOK

Documents concerning German-Polish Relations and the Outbreak of Hostilities between Great Britain and Germany on September 3, 1939, London, 1939.

No. 10

Speech by the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs in the House of Lords on March 20, 1939.

It is quite true, as both the noble Lord who spoke first and the noble Marquess have said, that recent events have been a profound shock to all thinking people in this country and very far outside it. It may perhaps be of use if with all brevity I give the House a short narrative in order to make sure we have the setting correct of what has actually passed during the last few days. The German military occupation of Bohemia and Moravia began on the morning of the 15th March, and was completed, as we know, without serious accident. It is to be observed -- that the towns of Mahrisch-Ostrau and Vitkovice were actually occupied by German S. S. detachments on the evening of the 14th March, while the President and the Foreign Minister of Czecho-Slovakia were still on their way to Berlin and before any discussion had taken place.

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2860

H1123-0255

DOCUMENT 2860-PS
OFFICE OF U. S. CHIEF OF COUNSEL

BRITISH BLUE BOOK

Documents concerning German-Polish Relations and the Outbreak of Hostilities between Great Britain and Germany on September 3, 1939, London, 1939.

NO. 10

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2860

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 2861-PS (vide 2860)
OFFICE OF US CHIEF OF COUNSEL

Exhibit U.S.A. 119
Filed Dec. 5, 1945

Britisches Blaubuch

Dokumente betr. deutsch-polnische Beziehungen und den Ausbruch von Feindseligkeiten zwischen Grossbritannien und Deutschland am 3. September 1939. London, 1939.

Nr. 12

Seine Exzellenz, N. Henderson, Britischer Botschafter in Berlin, an Vicomte Halifax.

Berlin, 28. Mai 1939

Exzellenz!

Ich besuchte gestern Feldmarschall Goering fuer eine kurze Zeit in Karinhall.

---

4. Bei dieser Gelegenheit unterbrach mich der Feldmarschall und beschrieb mir den Besuch des Praesidenten Hacha in Berlin. Ich antwortete Feldmarschall Goering, dass es unmoeglich sei, von freiem Willen zu sprechen, da, wie man mir gesagt haette, er doch selber gedroht haette, Prag mit seinen Flugzeugen zu bombardieren, falls Dr. Hacha sich weigern sollte, zu unterschreiben. Der Feldmarschall betritt diesen Tatbestand nicht, erklaerte mir aber, wie die ganze Sache gekommen sei. Nach seiner Darstellung war Dr. Hacha vom Anfang an bereit, alles zu unterschreiben, hatte jedoch erklaert, dass er das verfassungsgemaess nicht tun koennte, ohne sich zuerst an Prag zu wenden. Nach grossen Schwierigkeiten wurde eine Telephonverbindung mit Prag hergestellt und die tschechische Regierung gab ihre Zustimmung, fuegte allerdings hinzu, dass sie nicht garantieren koennte, dass nicht das eine oder andere tschechische Bataillon auf die deutschen Truppen feuern wuerde. Erst dann, sagte er, hatte er Dr. Hacha gewarnt, dass er Prag bombardieren lassen wurde, wenn deutsche Leben verloren gehen wuerden. Als Antwort auf eine Bemerkung von mir, wiederholte der Feldmarschall auch, dass die Besetzung von Witkowitz nur deshalb fruehzeitig erfolgt sei, um den Polen zuvorzukommen; von denen wusste man genau, sagte er, dass sie die Absicht hatten, dieses wertvolle Gebiet bei der erstbesten Gelegenheit zu besetzen.

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION
OF DOCUMENT 2861-PS

29 November 1945.

I WALTER B. SELIGSON, 1st Lt., 01558904 hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; and that the above is a true and correct translation of Document 2861-PS.

WALTER B. SELIGSON
1st Lt.
01558904.

2861

H1123-0256

H1123-0257

BRITISH BLUE BOOK

Documents concerning German-Polish Relations and the Outbreak of Hostilities between Great Britain and Germany on September 3, 1939, London, 1939.

No. 12

Sir N. Henderson, British Ambassador in Berlin, to Viscount Halifax.

Berlin, May 28, 1939.

My Lord,

I paid a short visit to Field-Marshal Goering at Karinhall yesterday . . .

* * * * * * * *

4. At this point the field-marshal interrupted me with a description of President Hacha's visit to Berlin. I told Field-Marshal Goering that it was not possible to talk of free will when I understood that he himself had threatened to bombard Prague with his aeroplanes, if Dr. Hacha refused to sign. The field-marshal did not deny the fact but explained how the point had arisen. According to him Dr. Hacha had from the first been prepared to sign everything but had said that constitutionally he could not do so without reference first to Prague. After considerable difficulty telephone communication with Prague was obtained and the Czech Government had agreed, while adding that they could not guarantee that one Czech battalion at least would not fire on the German troops. It was, he said, only at that stage that he had warned Dr. Hacha that, if German lives were lost, he would bombard Prague. The field-marshal also repeated, in reply to some comment of mine, the story that the advance occupation of Witkowitz had been effected solely in order to forestall the Poles who, he said, were known to have the intention of seizing this valuable area at the first opportunity.

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2861

H1123-0258

PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 2862=PS
OFFICE OF U.S.CHIEF OF COUNSEL.

Exhibit U.S.A. 122
Filed Dec. 5, 1945

Aüszug aus :

Frieden und Krieg

Die Aussenpolitik der Vereinigten Staaten

1931 = 1941

Amtliche Veröffentlichung des State Department, Washington,

D. C., 1943.

No. 126 (auf Seite 454)

Erklärung des stellvertretenden Staatssekretärs (Welles), vom 17. März 1939:

"Die Regierung der Vereinigten Staaten hat verschiedene Male ihre Ueberzeugung dahingehend ausgesprochen, dass der Weltfriede nur durch die internationale Unterstützung eines Programms der Ordnung, dessen Grundlage das Gesetz ist, garantiert werden kann.

"Unsere Regierung, die auf den Prinzipien der menschlichen Freiheit und der Demokratie gegründet und denselben ergeben ist, kann es nicht unterlassen, ihre Entrüstung über Handlungen auszusprechen, die dahin führten, dass die Freiheiten eines freien und unabhängigen Volkes, mit dem die Bevölkerung der Vereinigten Staaten von dem Tage an, da die Republik der Tschechoslowakei ihre Unabhängigkeit erhielt, besonders enge und freundschaftliche Beziehungen gepflogen hat, vorübergehend ausgelöscht worden sind.

"Die Stellung der Regierung der Vereinigten Staaten ist immer wieder klargemacht worden. Sie hat sich nachdrücklich für die Unverletzlichkeit von Verträgen und gegebener Versprechungen , sowie für die Nichteinmischung seitens einer Nation in die inneren Angelegenheiten anderer Nationen ausgesprochen; und sie hat wiederholte Male ihre Entrüstung über die Ausübung einer Politik der Gewalt ausgesprochen.

"Es ist klar, dass Handlungen ungezügelter Gesetzlosigkeit und willkürlicher Gewalt den Weltfrieden und die Grundlagen der Zivilisation bedrohen. Die dringende Notwendigkeit für die Befolgung der von unserer Regierung vertretenen Prinzipien erweist sich als offensichtlich durch die Vorgänge der letzten drei Tage.

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION
OF DOCUMENT No. 2862=PS.

19 November 1945.

I, GOETZ MAYER, T/5, 33812169, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; and that the above is a true and correct translation of Document No. 2862 = PS.

GOETZ MAYER
T/5
33812169.

2862

H1123-0259

2862-PS

Excerpt from:

PEACE AND WAR:

UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY, 1931-1941

Official publication of the Department of State, Washington, D. C., 1943

No. 126 (at p. 454)

STATEMENT BY THE ACTING SECRETARY OF STATE (WELLES), March 17, 1939

"The Government of the United States has on frequent occasions stated its conviction that only through international support of a program of order based upon law can world peace be assured.

"This Government, founded upon and dedicated to the principles of human liberty and of democracy, cannot refrain from making known this country's condemnation of the acts which have resulted in the temporary extinguishment of the liberties of a free and independent people with whom, from the day when the Republic of Czechoslovakia attained its independence, the people of the United States have maintained specially close and friendly relations.

"The position of the Government of the United States has been made consistently clear. It has emphasized the need for respect for the sanctity of treaties and of the pledged word, and for nonintervention by any nation in the domestic affairs of other nations; and it has on repeated occasions expressed its condemnation of a policy of military aggression.

"It is manifest that acts of wanton lawlessness and of arbitrary force are threatening world peace and the very structure of modern civilization. The imperative need for the observance of the principles advocated by this Government has been clearly demonstrated by the developments which have taken place during the past 3 days."

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~~2863~~

H1123-0260

Exhibit U.S.A. 92
For identification
Filed Dec. 3, 1945

2863-PS

Excerpt from Lecture by Konrad Henlein, "The Fight for the Liberation of the Sudetens," delivered in Vienna on 4 March 1941. Quoted from "Four Fighting Years," a publication of the Czechoslovak Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Department of Information, London, 1943. At pp. 29-30.

"National Socialism soon swept over us Sudeten Germans. Our struggle was of a different character from that in Germany. Although we had to behave differently in public we were, of course, secretly in touch with the National Socialist revolution in Germany so that we might be a part of it. The struggle for Greater Germany was waged on Sudeten soil, too. This struggle could be waged only by those inspired by the spirit of National Socialism, persons who were true followers of our Fuehrer, whatever their outward appearance. Fate sought me out to be the leader of the national group in its final struggle. When . . . in autumn, 1933, the leaders of the NSDAP asked me to take over the political leadership of the Sudeten Germans, I had a difficult problem to solve. Should the National Socialist Party continue to be carried on illegally or should the movement, in the interest of the self-preservation of the Sudeten Germans and in order to prepare their return to the Reich, wage its struggle under camouflage and by methods which appeared quite legal to the outside world? For us Sudeten Germans only the second alternative seemed possible, for the preservation of our national group was at stake. It would certainly have been easier to exchange this hard and mentally exhausting struggle for the heroic gesture of confessing allegiance to National Socialism and entering a Czechoslovak prison. But it seemed more than doubtful whether by this means we could have fulfilled the political task of destroying Czechoslovakia as a bastion in the alliance against the German Reich."

2863

H1123-0261

PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 2863-PS
OFFICE OF U.S. CHIEF OF COUNSEL

Auszug aus einem von Konrad Henlein gehaltenen Vortrag, am 4.Maerz1941

"Der Freiheitskampf der Sudetendeutschen "

Citiert aus: "Vier Jahre des Kampfes" eine Veroeffentlichung des Tschechoslowakischen Aussenministeriums, Abteilung fuer Informationen, London 1943 Seite 29/30

Der Nationalsozialismus riss uns Sudetendeutsche bald mit. Unser Kampf war einer anderen Art denn der in Deutschland. Obgleich wir uns in der Oeffentlichkeit anders betragen mussten, standen wir natuerlich im Geheimen mit der Nationalsozialistischen Revolution in Beruehrung damit wir ein Teil davon sein konnten. Der Kampf fuer Grossdeutschland wurde auch auf Sudetendeutschen Boden gefuehrt. Dieser konnte nur von denen gefuehrt werden, die vom Geiste des Nationalsozialismus beseelt waren, Leute die wirkliche Anhaenger unseres Fuehrers waren, ohne Ruecksicht darauf, was sie nach aussenhin erschienen. Das Schicksal hat mich als Fuehrer der Volksgruppe fuer den Endkampf ausgesucht. Als mich im Herbst 1933 die Fuehrer der NSDAP ersuchten, die Leitung der Sudetendeutschen zu uebernehmen, hatte ich eineschwere Aufgabe zu loesen. Soll die Nationalsozialistische Partei weiter illegal bestehen oder soll die Bewegung im Intresse der Selbsterhaltung der Sudetendeutschen und um deren Rueckkehr zum Reich vorzubereiten ihren Kampf verschleiert und mit Methoden die der Aussenwelt legal erschienen fuehren?
Nur die zweite Moeglichkeit schien fuer uns Sudetendeutsche gegeben, denn die Erhaltung unserer Volksgruppe stand auf dem Spiele. Es waere sicherlich leichter gewesen diesen harten und geistig aufreibenden Kampf gegen die heroische Geste der Zugehoerigkeitserklaerung zum Nationalsozialismus und tschechoslowakische Gefaengnishaft einzutauschen. Aber es erscheint mehr als zweifelhaft, ob wir mit diesen Mitteln, die politische Aufgabe die Tschechoslowakei als Hochburg des Buendnisses gegen das Deutsche Reich haetten erfuellen koennen.

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION
OF DOCUMENT 2863-PS

1. December 1945

I, Tec 4 LUDWIG HARTMANN, 37446052, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; and that the above is a true and correct translation of Document 2863-PS.

LUDWIG HARTMANN
Tec 4
37446052

2863

PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT NO. 2906-PS
OFFICE OF U.S. CHIEF OF COUNSEL

(Seal:) Back to the Office of the Reich Minister of Foreign Affairs.

(In ink:)
Distributed 2 Feb

Report on the reception of the Czechoslovak Foreign Minister Chvalkowsky by the Fuehrer and Reich Chancellor on 21 January 1939, between 17 and 18 o'clock.

* * * * * * *

(page 2, l. 9 - l.26.

The Fuehrer: he thanks him for his statements. The foreign policy of a people is shaped by its domestic policy. It is impossible to conduct a foreign policy A and a domestic policy B. That would work for a short time only. From the beginning, the development in Czechoslovakia was leading toward a catastrophe. This catastrophe was prevented by Germany's moderate attitude. If Germany had not been prevented by its National Socialistic principles from annexing foreign nationalities, fate would have had an entirely different course. What is left of Czechoslovakia has been saved by the National Socialistic tendencies and not by Mr. Benes. But he believes that the consequences arising from this situation have not yet been drawn.

* * * * * * *

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION
OF DOCUMENT NO. 2906-PS

18 November 1945

I, WILLARD E. SKIDMORE, Lt(jg), USNR, 391590, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; and that the above is a true and correct partial translation of Document No. 2906-PS.

WILLARD E. SKIDMORE,
Lt(jg),USNR, 391590.

2906

H1123-0262

H1123-0263

Exhibit U.S.A. 114
Filed Dec. 5, 1945

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 2943-PS
OFFICE OF U.S. CHIEF OF COUNSEL

DAS FRANZOESISCHE GELBBUCH.

DIPLOMATISCHE URKUNDEN (1938 - 1939)

Dokumente zu den Ereignissen und Verhandlungen die der Eroeffnung der Feindseligkeiten zwischen Deutschland auf der einen Seite und Polen, Grossbritannien und Frankreich auf der anderen Seite, vorangegangen sind.

Herausgegeben mit Erlaubnis der franzoesischen Regierung.
Reynal und Hitchcock, New York.

Nr. 160. Seite 204.
Der franzoesische Gesandte in Warschau, Léon Noël, an den Aussenminister Georges Bonnet.

Warschau, den 10. Juli 1939.

Der Hauptsekretaer unserer Gesandtschaft hat waehrend seines kurzen Aufenthaltes in Danzig, auf Grund von Informationen unseres Konsuls und Unterredungen mit dem hohen Kommissar des Voelkerbundes, dem polnischen Generalkommissar und gewissen Danziger Behoerden interessante Eindruecke gewonnen, die wie folgt zusammengefasst werden koennen:

1.) Die Wogen der Unruhe, die waehrend einiger Tage in der freien Stadt unverkennbar waren, nehmen merklich ab. Aber um die Bedeutung und Tragweite dieser Abnahme, die ganz relativ ist, schaetzen zu koennen, ist es angebracht, die Tatsache zu betonen, dass die Aufwallung, welche in der freien Stadt zu beobachten war, durch die daran interessierte Propaganda erheblich uebertrieben worden ist und niemals den Charakter organisierter Vorbereitungen fuer eine gewaltsame Aktion hatte.

2.) Soweit feststellbar, hat diese Beruhigung in keiner Weise dazu gefuehrt, dass die methodisch betriebene Militarisierung der freien Stadt verlangsamt wird.

Die Staerke der Polizei ist auf 3000 Mann erhoeht worden. Die Aufstellung des Freikorps wird fortgesetzt. Sein Kern wurde von 300 SS-Maennern aus Ostpreussen gebildet, die auf den Aermeln ihrer Uniform die Worte "Reichswehr Danzig" tragen. Die Kasernen beherbergen viele Tausende angeblich aus Danzig stammende junge Maenner, die aus dem Reich gekommen sind. Das Schmuggeln von Waffen (Gewehr, Maschinengewehre, Flak-Batterien, leichte Panzerwagen, Flugzeuge, usw.) wird fortgesetzt. Eintritt in die Schichau Werft, wo dieses Material ausgeladen wird, ist streng verboten. Alle Schneider und sogar alle Schneiderinnen in der freien Stadt sind ausnahmslos eingesetzt worden, um Uniformen anzufertigen.

Es waere nicht ganz korrekt zu sagen, dass diese Aufruestungsmassnahmen unbedingt auffallen muessen, aber sie sind den Behoerden bekannt. Andererseits sollte ihr Ausmass und selbst ihre Bedeutung nicht uebertrieben werden. Jedenfalls zeigt diese Aufruestung nicht den fieberhaften Charakter von Vorbereitungen mit der Absicht auf einen baldigen gewaltsamen Umsturz. Es handelt sich vielmehr um eine schrittweise Vorbereitung der Aufruestung der freien Stadt, mit der Absicht, eventuellen Moeglichkeiten zu begegnen, die vielleicht den Nationalsozialisten selbst noch nicht ganz klar sind.

H1123-0264

Seite 206.

Alle Leute sind sich jedoch darueber einig, dass die Gefuehle der Danziger Bevoelkerung keine Rolle spielen. Die Bevoelkerung scheint terrorisiert zu sein und spart nicht mit "Heil Hitler"-Rufen.

c) Alle Macht gehoert der Partei und zwar der Gestapo im Rahmen der Partei. Aber die Partei bedeutet dasselbe wie Berlin, das heisst in der Praxis Gauleiter Forster, der als eine Art "Fleischersgeselle" und als jovialer Bursche beschrieben wird, der seit frueher Jugend der Partei angehoert hat und anscheinend das Recht besitzt, persoenlich mit Herrn Hitler zu sprechen, der ihn gerne hat; aber natuerlich ist er nur das Werkzeug des Kanzlers.

Seite 208.

Jedenfalls sind sich die auslaendischen Beobachter in Danzig ueber die Tatsache einig, naemlich darueber, dass es unangebracht ist, den alltaeglichen Zwistigkeiten in der provinziellen Welt der freien Stadt zuviel Bedeutung beizumessen. Diese Beobachter erkennen wohl, dass sie tatsaechlich einen Wert haben moegen, als Andeutungen und als Barometer dienen koennen, aber die endgueltige Entscheidung wird jetzt und auch weiterhin zwischen Berlin und Warschau und zwischen Berlin, London und Paris ausgetragen werden.

gez. Léon Noël

Nr. 337. Seite 372.

Aussenminister Georges Bonnet an den franzoesichen Botschafter Coülondre in Berlin.

Paris, den 1. September 1939
5.55 nachmittags.

Folgendes zur Bestaetigung meines telefonischen Anrufs:

Die britische Regierung hat ihren Kollegen beauftragt, der deutschen Regierung eine dringende Mitteilung zu machen, ueber welche Sir Neville Henderson Sie persoenlich unterrichten wird.

Sie sollen sich diesem Schritte anschliessen.

Im Falle einer Antwort sollen Sie sich auf die Erklaerung beschraenken, dass Sie die Angelegenheit ihrer Regierung unterbreiten werden.

gez. Georges Bonnet.

Nr. 334. Seite 370.

Aussenminister Georges Bonnet an den Schweizerischen Gesandten in Paris Walter Stucki.

2943

Paris, den 1. September 1939.

Herr Gesandter!

Ich bestaetige hiermit den Empfang der Neutralitaetserklaerung der schweizerischen Regierung, von der sie mich heute unterrichtet haben. Ich nehme diese Mitteilung gebuehrend zur Kenntnis.

Die franzoesische Regierung ihrerseits wird es nicht unterlassen, die Neutralitaet der Schweizer Eidgenossenschaft und die Unverletzlichkeit des eidgenoessischen Gebietes auf das strikteste zu beobachten in Uebereinstimmung mit den Vertraegen von 1815 und der sie ergaenzenden Verpflichtungen.

Mit dem Ausdruck der Hochachtung,

Georges Bonnet.

Nr. 365. Seite 399.

Aussenminister Georges Bonnet an den franzoesischen Botschafter in Berlin Coulondre.

Paris, den 3. September 1939
10.20 vormittags

Nach dem Empfang einer Mitteilung der britischen Regierung und nachdem eine Sitzung des franzoesischen Abgeordnetenhauses stattgefunden hatte, hat die franzoesische Regierung gestern nacht in einer Kabinettsitzung folgende Entschluesse gefasst, die ich Ihnen zu uebermitteln habe.
Heute, mittag, 3. September, sollen Sie in der Wilhelmstrasse vorsprechen und die Antwort der deutschen Regierung auf das Schreiben, das Sie am 1.September um 10 Uhr abends ueberreicht haben, verlangen.

Wenn die Antwort auf die in diesem Schreiben enthaltenen Fragen negativ ausfaellt, sollen Sie wiederholt auf die Verantwortlichkeit Deutschlands hinweisen, die Sie bei Ihrer letzten Unterredung hervorgehoben haben und sollen den Reichsaussenminister oder seinen Stellvertreter davon unterrichten, dass die franzoesische Regierung sich auf Grund der deutschen Antwort gezwungen sieht, die Verpflichtungen, die Frankreich Polen gegenueber eingegangen ist und die der deutschen Regierung bekannt sind, ab heute, den 3.September 5 Uhr nachmittags, zu erfuellen.

Von diesem Augenblick an koennen Sie Ihre Paesse verlangen.

Georges Bonnet.

H1123-0265

H1123-0266

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 2943-PS
OFFICE OF U.S. CHIEF OF COUNSEL
(Cont.)

No. 367 Seite 400/401.

Der franzoesische Botschafter in Berlin, Coulendre, an den Aussenminister Georges Bonnet.

Berlin, den 3. September 1939
(Eingang per Telefon um 5.50 nachmittags.)

Ich habe die Ehre, Ihnen untenstehend die Mitteilung zu bestaetigen, welche ich Eurer Exzellenz um ein Uhr nachmittags telefonisch uebermittelt habe.

Herr von Rippentrop kam mittags zurueck. Um diese Zeit wurde ich von dem Herrn Staatssekretaer empfangen, der mir jedoch mitteilte, dass er nicht in der Lage sei zu sagen, ob eine zufriedenstellende Antwort auf meinen Brief vom 1.September erteilt worden sei oder auch nur, ob eine solche Antwort erteilt werden koenne. Er bestand darauf, dass ich Herrn von Ribbentrop persoenlich sehen muesse. Unter diesen Umstaenden ersuchte ich, von dem Aussenminister so bald wie moeglich empfangen zu werden.

Herr von Ribbentrop empfing mich um 12,30 nachmittag.

Ich fragte ihn, ob er mir auf meinen Brief, den ich ihm am 1.September um 10 Uhr abends ueberreicht hatte, eine zufriedenstellende Antwort geben koenne.

Er erwiderte mir folgendes:

"Nach Ueberreichung Ihres Briefes hat die italienische Regierung die deutsche Regierung von einem Vergleichsvorschlag in Kenntnis gesetzt, mit der Bemerkung, dass die franzoesische Regierung damit einverstanden sei. Spaeter jedoch hat Mussolini uns zu verstehen gegeben, dass der in Aussicht genommene Vergleich infolge der britischen Hartnaeckigkeit gescheitert sei. Heute morgen hat der britische Botschafter uns ein Ultimatum ueberreicht, das zwei Stunden spaeter ablief. Wir haben das Ultimatum abgelehnt aus Gruenden, die ich in dem Memorandum auseinandergesetzt habe, das ich dem britischen Botschafter heute aushaendigte und wovon ich Ihnen hiermit eine Abschrift ueberreiche.

H1123-0267

Falls die franzoesische Regierung sich durch ihre Abmachungen mit Polen verpflichtet fuehlen sollten, sich an dem Konflikt zu beteiligen so kann ich das nur bedauern, da wir keine feindseligen Gefuehle gegen Frankreich hegen. Nur wenn Frankreich uns angreift, werden wir gegen es kaempfen und das wuerde ein Angriffskrieg von seiner Seite sein."
Daraufhin fragte ich den Aussenminister, ob ich aus seinen Aeusserungen die Schlussfolgerung zu ziehen habe, dass die Antwort der Reichsregierung auf meinen Brief vom 1. September negativ sei. Er erwiderte:"Ja".
"Unter diesen Umstaenden muss ich Sie im Namen meiner Regierung zum letzten Mal daran erinnern, dass die deutsche Regierung eine schwere Verantwortung uebernommen hat, weil sie ohne Kriegserklaerung Feindseligkeiten gegen Polen eroeffnet hat und dem Vorschlag der Regierungen der franzoesischen Republik und Seiner Majestaet, des Koenigs von Grossbritannien, nicht nachgekommen sei, jede Angriffshandlung gegen Polen zu unterlassen und ihre Streitkraefte unverzueglich aus polnischem Gebiet zurueckzuziehen.
Ich habe die schmerzliche Pflicht, Sie zu benachrichtigen, dass die franzoesische Regierung von heute, dem 3. September, 5 Uhr nachmittags ab unter der Verpflichtung steht, ihre gegenueber Polen uebernommenen Verpflichtungen, die der deutschen Regierung bekannt sind, zu erfuellen."
"Dann" bemerkte Herr von Ribbentrop, "wird Frankreich der Angreifer sein."
Ich erwiderte, dass darueber die Geschichte ihr Urteil faellen werde.

Coulondre.

No. 55 page 67 - 68

Der franzoesische Botschafter in Berlin, Coulondre, an den Aussenminister Georges Bonnet.

Berlin, den 13. Maerz 1939

Waehrend mir noch spaet am Abend des 12. Maerz in der Wilhelmstrasse erklaert wurde, man sei zuversichtlich, dass Chvalkovsky eine zufriedenstellende Loesung der Krise in der Tschechoslowakei finden werde, hat der Propagandaminister heute morgen, wie mein belgischer Kollege mir mitteilt, erklaert, dass sobald irgendwelche Deutschen belaestigt wuerden, das Reich in einer mehr unmittelbaren Weise eingreifen muesse; man lehne es aber ab, zu sagen, worin dieses Eingreifen bestehe.
Die Lage, wie ich sie bei meiner Rueckkehr nach Berlin vorgefunden habe, ist deshalb aeusserst ernst und scheint sich rasch zu entwickeln.
Unter politischen und militaerischen Gesichtspunkten analysiert, ergibt sich folgendes Bild:
Am 11. und 12. Maerz sind militaerische Vorbereitungen in einigen deutschen Garnisonen besonders in der Naehe von Berlin beobachtet worden. Diese Vorbereitungen, welche z.B. in der Tarnung der Nummern an Wagen und an den Regimentsabzeichen der Mannschaften bestanden, sind ein Anzeichen fuer bevorstehende Truppenbewegungen.
Im Laufe derselben Tage wurden deutlich Truppenbewegungen in der Provinz beobachtet, einerseits durch Sachsen und Schlesien in der Richtung auf Gleiwitz, andererseits durch Franken in der Richtung nach Oesterreich.

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Trotz Tarnung war es moeglich, leichte Panzereinheiten aus Norddeutschland zu erkennen als auch einige Flakeinheiten.Andererseits konnten am 12. Maerz keine Vorbereitungen in Oesterreich noerdlich Wienoder in Wien selbst wahgenommen werden. Diese Gegend jedoch ist mit motorisierten Einheiten gut versorgt, insbesondere ist dort die zweite Panzerdivision aufgestellt.
Alles deutet darauf hin, dass Deutschland sehr bald Gewalt gegen die Tschechoslowakei anwenden wird. Obwohl noch keine, auch nur teilweisen Mobilisierungsmassnahmen festgestellt worden sind, so finden doch Truppenbewegungen von Einheiten der stehenden Armee statt, mit dem Ziel entweder den Korridor oder Maehren in die Zange zu nehmen oder das ganze boehmische Viereck einzuschliessen.
Spaetere Nachrichten besagten, dass Stabsoffiziere Berlin morgen frueh, das ist am 14. Maerz, verlassen werden, um an den Operationen teilzunehmen, und auch dass der Schutzstaffel die Vorhut anvertraut worden ist.

Coulondre.

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Der franzoesische Botschafter in Berlin, Coulondre, an den Aussenminister Georges Bonnet.

Berlin, den 13. Maerz 1939

Man kann sich wohl fragen, welche politischen Absichten mit der Kraefteentfaltung, ueber die ich berichtet habe, verfolgt werden. Obgleich das Geheimnis anscheinend gut gewahrt worden ist, kann uns wahrscheinlich doch die Haltung der deutschen Presse genuegend Aufklaerung geben. Schon am 10. Maerz machte eine D.N.B. Meldung bekannt, dass Mgr. Tiso tatsaechlich eine Note an die deutsche Regierung gerichtet habe. Von diesem Augenblick an haben die Zeitungen im Reich fortgesetzt behauptet, dass Mgr. Tiso's Regierung in den Augen Deutschlands die einzige ordnungsmaessige slowakische Regierung sei. Gestern tauschte ein neues Thema auf: Die gewalttaetige Haltung der Tschechen gegen die deutsche Minderheit, welche mit den slowakischen Ertremistengemeinsame Sache machte. Heute aber sind die Streitigkeiten zwischen den Tschechen und Slowaken in der Presse in den Hintergrund getreten, dafuer aber wird Sturm gelaufen gegen das Terrorregime, das die Tschechen angeblich, wie zur Zeit Beneschs, gegen die slowakischen Separatisten und auch gegen die Separatisten in Boehmen und Maehren entfesselt haben. Die Entwicklung der deutschen Haltung gegenueber diesem Nachbar, wie sie sich in den letzten Monaten abgezeichnet hat, nimmt jetzt endgueltige Gestalt an. Es sieht so aus, als ob die Absicht, die Tschechoslowakei zu einem Vasallenstaat herunterzudruecken, dahin geaendert worden ist, sie in ihre nationalen Bestandteile aufzuloesen. Es hat fernerhin den Anschein, dass das Reich die Selbstaendigkeit der Slowakei beguenstigt und die polnischen und ungarischen Ansprueche auf Ruthenien unterstuetzt, das bei einer Trennung von der Tschechoslowakei unweigerlich den Nachbarn anheim fallen muss. Die Zukunft wird zeigen, zu was fuer einem Tauschhandel mit Budapest und Warschau diese Politik fuehren wird. Um diese Politik erfolgreich zu gestalten, muss zunaechst ein Vorwand fuer die Intervention gefunden werden.

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Wie im vergangenen September werden in der deutschen Presse die Verfolgungen angeprangert, welche die deutschen Staatsangehoerigen und die Angehoerigen der deutschen Minderheit in der Tschechislowakei angeblich zu erdulden haben. Wie im September melden die Zeitungen, dass tschechische Truppenkonzentrationen an der deutschen Grenze stattfinden. Wie ich hoere, fuehlt sich die deutsche Bevoelkerung wie im vergangenen Herbst beunruhigt ueber die militaerischen Vorbereitungen und die umlaufenden Geruechte. Man befuerchtet ein unueberlegtes Abenteuer. Aber diese Tatsache scheint heute noch weniger zu bedeuten als im September. Wie ich von Nachrichten aus deutscher Quelle beurteilen kann, rechnen die Fuehrer des Reichs mit keinerlei Widerstand seitens der Tschechen. Ihrer Meinung nach wird das in Aussicht genommene Vorgehen nicht den Rahmen einer polizeilichen Aktion ueberschreiten, und die Art und Weise, wie diese Aktion militaerisch vorbereitet wird, scheint zu bestaetigen, dass dieses wirklich von der deutschen Regierung so erwartet wird.

No. 62 Seite 72 - 73

Der franzoesische Botschafter in Berlin, Coulondre, an den Aussenminister Georges Bonnet.

Berlin, den 14. Maerz 1939

Bezueglich des Besuches, den Mgr. Tiso in Begleitung von Durcansky gestern in Berlin abstattete, habe ich folgende Informationen erhalten:
Gestern morgen um etwa 10 Uhr kam ein Telegram von Berlin in Pressburg an mit einer Aufforderung an Mgr. Tiso, unverzueglich den Fuehrer aufzusuchen. Nach einer Ruecksprache mit den Hauptvertretern der Slowakischen Volkspartei entschied sich Mgr. Tiso, der Aufforderung Folge zu leisten. Im Laufe der Unterredung, die er mit Hitler gegen Abend hatte, erklaerte dieser, dass er die Slowakei vollstaendig frei sehen wolle, dass es aber im uebrigen Sache des slowakischen Volkes sei, sein Schicksal zu bestimmen. Mgr.Tiso und Durcansky verhandelten von 9 Uhr abends bis 3 Uhr frueh mit Herrn von Ribbentrop und anderen hohen Nazi-Beamten und Wuerdetraegern, insbesondere mit Keppler, der anscheinend in der ganzen Sache eine wichtige Rolle spielte.
Sie sollen die Lage unter jedem in Frage kommenden Gesichtspunkt eroertert haben wie auch etwaige Folgen, die sich daraus ergeben koennten; es scheint, dass diese Besprechungen zu der Schlussfolgerung gefuehrt haben, dass die Rettung der Slowaken in einer vollstaendigen Loslosung von Prag liege. Es ist gemeldet worden, dass der slowakische Landtag, welcher urspruenglich heute tagen sollte, aber bis zum 28. vertagt worden war, nun doch heute morgen eine Sitzung haben wird; es ist vorauszusehen, dass er zugunsten der vollstaendigen Unabhaengigkeit des Landes stimmen wird. Die slowakischen Minister sollen von den Nazifuehrern die Zusicherung erhalten haben, dass die Slowakei, wenn selbstaendig, die Freundschaft Deutschlands gemessen werde.

Coulondre.

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No. 65 Seite 75 und 78 - 79

Der franzoesische Botschafter in Berlin, Coulondre,
an den Aussenminister Georges Bonnet.

Berlin, den 14. Maerz 1939

Unmittelbar nach dem Wiener Schiedsspruch, waehrend die deutsche Presse noch den "endgueltigen" Charakter der deutsch - italienischen Loesung feierte, bemerkte ein weitsehender Kenner der Vorgaenge in Mitteleuropa in Berlin: "Die alte Tschechoslowakei hat zwanzig Jahre bestanden, der neue tschechoslowakische Staat wird keine fuenf erleben." Die gegenwaertigen Ereignisse geben ihm insofern Recht, als die Tschechoslowakei vom 2. November 1938 nicht einmal fuenf Monate lang bestanden hat.
Die fuehrenden nationalsozialistischen Zeitungen geben heute abend die Aufloesung des Nachbarstaates als eine vollendete Tatsache bekannt. Der Landtag in Pressburg verkuendet heute frueh die Selbstaendigkeit der Slowakei, und ungarische Truppen haben die Grenze von Karpatho-Russland ueberschritten; als Vergeltung fuer mehr oder weniger provozierte Zwischenfaelle in Iglau, Bruenn und sonstwo haengt die Drohung eines "vernichtenden" Einschreitens der Reichswehr ueber Boehmen und Maehren. Nach noch unbestaetigten Geruechten sollen deutsche Abteilungen an verschiedenen Stellen in tschechisches Gebiet eingedrungen sein.
Es ist verblueffend wieder einmal zu sehen, mit welcher Schnelligkeit und Praezision sich Hitlers politische Plaene verwirklichen, denn es besteht nicht der leiseste Zweifel daran, dass die gegenwaertige Krise mit einem sorgfaeltig vorbereiteten Plan zusammenpasst, diesen Hauptfaeden in Berlin zusammenlaufen. Unsere Botschaft hat kuerzlich verschiedene Mitteilungen erhalten, die keinerlei Ungewissheit ueber diesen Punkt zuruecklassen. Ein angesehener Nationalsozialist, dessen Obliegenheiten ihn in direkte Beruehrung mit dem inneren Kreis um den Fuehrer bringen, hat einem meiner Mitarbeiter am 5. Februar gesagt, wir sollten uns auf eine Entwicklung gefasst machen, die unvermeidlicher Weise zu einer "Aufloesung" der Tschechoslowakei fuehren werde. In diesem Falle, fuegte er hinzu, wuerde die Slowakei selbstaendig werden, Ungarn wuerde Karpatho-Russland annektieren, und das Reich wuerde in der einen oder anderen Form die Kontrolle ueber Boehmen und Maehren erhalten. Dieser Prozess der Aufloesung, die Aufteilung der Tschechoslowakei in drei Teile, ist es, was heute vor sich geht.

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Es handelt sich nur noch darum, die Werkzeuge des Handlens und die Vorwaende zu finden. Es ist ein feststehender Grundsatz der nationalsozialistischen Politik, dass die Staaten, die zerstoert werden sollten, zunaechst von innen unterhoehlt werden. Dieses Mal scheinen die Slowaken die Rolle gespielt zu haben, welche im vergangenen Jahre von den Sudetendeutschen gespielt wurde.

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Hitlers Beauftragte haben insgeheim die unnachgiebigen slowakischen Elemente, insbesondere die Parteigaenger der radikalen Bewegung "Rodebrana" ermutigt und gewisse slowakische Minister wie Mach und Durcansky gegen Prag aufgehetzt und dadurch geschickt erreicht, dass diese Meinungsverschiedenheiten sich zu einer scharfen Krise entwickelten. Wenn ein Umsturzplan in Pressburg vorhanden sein sollte, wie versichert wird, so sprechen gute Gruende dafuer, dass die Deutschen in das Geheimnis eingeweiht waren. Es war nicht ein blosser Zufall, dass Durcansky sofort nach seiner Flucht in Wien Aufnahme fand, wo ihm das Radio zur Fortsetzung seiner tschechenfeindlichen Propaganda zur Verfuegung gestellt wurde.
Es scheint, dass Prag versuchte, den Massnahmen zu begegnen, aber zu spaet. Vielleicht war auch die Politik der Zentralregierung nicht immer vollstaendig klar oder weise. Wenn die tschechischen Fuehrer wiederholt Zeichen ihres guten Willens in Berlin gegeben haben, so scheinen sie doch gleichzeitig geglaubt zu haben, dass sie im Inland eine rein tschechische Politik durchfuehren koennten. Dadurch haben sie alte innere Rivalitaeten wieder belebt und unnoetigerweise das Misstrauen des Reichs erweckt. Einmal ins Rollen gebracht entwickelte sich die Bewegung nach bewaehrtem Muster aus der Zeit des Anschlusses, das waehrend der Krise des vergangenen Jahres noch verbessert wurde. Die Tiso Note erinnert an das Telegram von Seyss-Inquart. Die Vorfaelle in Iglau, Bruenn und anderen deutschsprechenden Gemeinden wurden dazu benutzt, um den tschechoslowakischen Konflikt im gegebenen Augenblick in einen deutsch-tschechischen Konflikt zu verwandeln. Man findet in den Berliner Zeitungen dieselben Ueberschriften wie im August 1938 und fast dieselben Berichte: die schwangere Frau, die niedergeschlagen und getreten wird, das "Deutschtum" in Gefahr, weil ein Student der deutschen Minderheit misshandelt worden ist, und in den Ueberschriften der heutigen Nachtangaben findet sich das Schlussmotiv eines "Blutbades" das gesuehnt werden muesse. Inzwischen sind Mgr.Tiso und Durcansky in dramatischer Weise zum Fuehrer gegangen wie vordem Herr Henlein.
Man kann jetzt noch nicht wissen, wie weit der fast verzweifelte Versuch, der jetzt von dem Praesidenten der tschechoslowakischen Republik und dem Ministerpraesidenten in Berlin gemacht wird, die deutsche Haltung maessigen und die staatliche Zusammengehoerigkeit des Landes sicherstellen wird. Es ist zu befuerchten, dass die beiden Staatsmaenner nur aus Prag gekommen sind, um die Entscheidungen des Fuehrers gutzuheissen.

Coulondre.

No. 66 Seite 79, 80 - 81

Der franzoesische Botschafter in Berlin, Coulondre, an den Aussenminister Georges Bonnet.

In einem vorangegangenen Brief habe ich den Ursprung und die Entwicklung der Krise geschildert, die zur Spaltung und wahrscheinlich zur Aufteilung der Tschechoslowakei fuehren muss.

Ich kann mich daher jetzt darauf beschraenken, die politische Lage, wie sie gegenwaertig in Berlin aussieht, kurz darzustellen.
Das wichtigste Ereignis ist die heute vormittag in Pressburg erfolgte Unabhaengigkeitserklaerung der Slowakei, die ihre Beziehungen zu Prag geloest und auf diese Weise die Struktur des tschechoslowakischen Bundesstaates zertruemmert hat. Es ist fraglich, ob nicht die aussergewoehnliche Schnelligkeit, mit der die innerpolitischentschechoslowakische Krise gewachsen ist, sogar die Fuehrer des Reichs in Erstaunen gesetzt hat, aber es ist kaum zu bezweifeln, dass die slowakische Unabhaengigkeitserklaerung im letzten Augenblick auf deutschen Druck wenn nicht auf direkten Befehl von Berlin hin erfolgte. Tatsaechlich wurde die Entscheidung, den slowakischen Landtag heute morgen zusammenzurufen, dessen Tagung fuer heute bestimmt, aber bis zum 28. verlegt war, waehrend des Besuches gefasst, den Mgr. Tiso gestern in der Reichshauptstadt abstattete.
Aus Andeutungen, die ich ueber die Unterhaltungen Mgr. Tisos in Berlin habe erhalten koennen, hat es den Anschein, dass die Fuehrer des Reichs und der Fuehrer selbst ihre Absicht klar zu erkennen geben haben, dass eine vollstaendige freie Slowakei geschaffen werden sollte. Nur unter dieser Bedingung sind die Freundschaft und der Schutz der Nazifuehrer, die fuer den neuen Staat unerlaesslich sind, zugesichert worden. Die Slowakei muss daher als ein Vasallenstaat des Reichs betrachtet werden.

Im Gefolge der Streitigkeiten zwischen den Tschechen und Slowaken kann man seit dem letzten Sonntag ein ploetzliches Wiederaufleben des Hetzfeldzuges in seiner giftigsten Form feststellen, den die deutsche Presse im vergangenen September gegen die Tschechoslowakei entfesselte. Die Tschechen werden wiederum beschuldigt, dass sie nicht nur gegen die Slowakei sondern einsbesondere auch gegen Angehoerige der deutschen Minderheit und deutsche Reichsangehoerige Gewalt anwenden. Die Zeitungen geben bekannt, dass das Leben dieser Deutschen in Gefahr sei, dass die Lage unertraeglich sei, und dass es notwendig sei, den Brandherd der Unruhe, den Prag heute im Herzen Europas darstelle, so schnell wie moeglich zu ersticken. Sie gehen sogar so weit zu behaupten, dass die tschechische Regierung mobilisiere.

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Heute vormittag haben Beamte des Reichspressedienstes die Sache mit den Vertretern der auslaendischen Presse besprochen und erklaert, dass die Lage "unertraeglich" sei, sie haben durchblicken lassen, dass erste Ereignisse zu erwarten seien.

Inzwischen hat das deutsche Oberkommando um Boehmen und Maehren herum (das heisst in Schlesien, Sachsen, Bayern und Oesterreich) eine betraechtliche Zahl von Truppen konzentriert, die zum groessten Teil aus motorisierten Abteilungen bestehen, die jetzt auf den Befehl warten, die Grenze zu ueberschreiten. Es besteht die allgemeine Auffassung, dass dieser Befehl im Laufe des morgigen Tages erteilt werden wird. Es wird sogar davon gesprochen, dass die deutschen Truppen Prag besetzen werden. Wie gesagt wird, haben sie bereits die Grenze in der Gegend von Maehrisch Ostrau ueberschritten.

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Der franzoesische Botschafter in Berlin, Coulondre, an den franzoesischen Aussenminister, Georges Bonnet.

Der deutsche Zynismus ist ueberdies mit vollendeter Geschicklichkeit gepaart. Infolge der bemerkenswerten Herrschaft ueber Menschen und Ereignisse ist das Reich in einiger Verlegenheit, seinen Gewalthandlungen gegen die Tschechen den Anschein der Legalitaet zu geben.

Die offizielle deutsche Version ist, dass die Tschechoslowakei von selbst zerfallen ist. Man sagt, dass die Slowakei durch ihren Bruch mit Prag die Bundesrepublik in 3 Teile gespalten habe.

Was Boehmen und Maehren anbetrifft, so lautet die Version, die Prager Regierung habe, da sie nicht imstande war, die Ordnung aufrecht zu erhalten und das Leben der deutschen Minderheit zu schuetzen, die Sorge fuer diese Provinzen ohne Zwang und aus freiem Willen den Haenden des Fuehrers anvertraut.

Solche Behauptungen koennen niemanden taeuschen.

Es kann kein Zweifel darueber bestehen, dass der slowakische Separatismus das Werk deutscher Agenten oder von Slowaken war, die direkt unter Berliner Leitung standen, Der Chef der Propaganda-Abteilung in der Pressburger Regierung, Mach, ein besonders eifriger Fanatiker, war gut bekannt wegen seiner Ergebenheit zum Reich.

Der Minister fuer Transportwesen, Durcansky, der haufige Besuche in Deutschland machte, war auch nur ein Werkzeug in den Haenden der Nazis, insbesondere des "Fuehrers", der 120000 Deutschen in der Slowakei, Karmasin. Mgr. Tiso, ein nicht sehr energischer Mann, obgleich als Geistlicher durch das Anwachsen der Nazi-Weltanschauung in seinem Lande beunruhigt, war unfaehig den separatistischen Tendenzen, die von den Nazis ermutigt wurden, entgegenzutreten.

Die Prager Regierung setzte ihn wegen dieser schwaechlichen Haltung am 10. Maerz ab, Dieser durchgreifende Schritt gegen Mgr. Tiso und sein Hilferuf an die deutsche Regierung lieferten den deutschen Machthabern den Vorwand, auf welchen sie nur gewartet hatten, um in den Streit zwischen Tschechen und Slowaken einzugreifen.

Nach Empfang der Note von dem abgesetzten Praesidenten, liessen deutsche offizielle Kreise ihre Auffassung bekannt werden, dass nur Mgr. Tisos Regierung rechtmaessig sei, und dass Prag durch die Ernennung eines neuen Ministerpraesidenten die Verfassung verletzt habe. Im selben Augenblick begannen die Berliner Zeitungen die

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Schreckensherrschaft auszumalen, welche in Pressburg von den Tschechen gegen die slowakischen Autonomisten und ihre deutschen Kameraden entfesselt worden sei.

Vom 12. an wurde der Ton der Berliner Presse erregter. Jetzt waren es nicht mehr nur Zusammenstoesse in der Slowakei, sondern auch in Boehmen und Maehren. Im Laufe von 24 Stunden liessen die Berliner Zeitungen die Leiden der Slowaken in den Hintergrund verschwinden und klagten mit den Ausdruecken heftigsten Abscheus die Brutalitaeten an, die in der Tschechoslowakei gegen die Deutschen begangen wuerden, sei es dass es sich um Angehoerige der voelkischen Minderheit oder um Reichsangehoerige handelte. Nach den deutschen Zeitungen zu urteilen, die nicht nur die gleiche Sprache, sondern auch dieselben Ausdruecke gebrauchten wie im vergangenen September, war das Leben von 500000 Deutschen in der Tschechoslowakei in dringendster Gefahr. Die Tschechen, in denen der alte Hussitengeist und der Hass gegen das Deutschtum wieder erwache, haetten aufs neue die Jagd auf Menschen organisiert. Die Lage werde unertraeglich.

Tatsaechlich war die oeffentliche Ordnung weder in der Slowakei noch in Boehmen und Maehren gestoert worden, ausgenommen in Pressburg, wo Unruhen durch den deutschen Selbstschutzdienst und die Hlinka-Garde, die von Deutschland mit Waffen versehen wurde, angefacht worden waren. So z. B. konnte der britische Konsul sich ueberzeugen und an seine Gesandtschaft in Prag berichten, dass in Bruenn, wo nach der deutschen Presse deutsches Blut vergossen worden sei, vollkommene Ruhe herrsche. Die Geschichten, welche von den Berliner Zeitungen unter flammenden Schlagzeilen veroeffentlicht wurden, waren ueberdies sehr fadenscheinig und aehnten ein paar Staubkoernern, die mit hoellischen Blasebaelgen aufgewirbelt werden.

Die deutschen Fuehrer, welche unablaessig die Anstrengungen vereitelt hatten, welche in Frag gemacht wurden, um eine neue slowakische Regierung zu schaffen, riefen Mgr. Tiso am Abend des 13. nach Berlin. In der Nacht vom 13. zum 14. hatte er zusammen mit dem Fuehrer, der seinen entschiedenen Willen zum Ausdruck brachte, dass "eine vollkommen freie Slowakei" geschaffen werde. Die Proklamation der slowakischen Unabhaengigkeit solle unverzueglich erfolgen. Am selben Abend noch wurden die 60 Mitglieder des Landtages fuer den folgenden Tag nach Pressburg einberufen, und die slowakische Unabhaengigkeit, die in Berlin beschlossen worden war, wurde einstimmig von ihnen angenommen. Vom Nachmittag des 14. an war die deutsche Presse in der Lage zu erklaeren, dass die Tschechoslowakei in Stuecke zerfallen sei, dass es sich im Zustand vollkommener Aufloesung befinde, dass die Kommunisten wieder aufgetaucht seien und zusammen mit tschechischen Chauvinisten Deutsche verfolgten und misshandelten, insbesondere in Bruenn und Iglau. Deutsches Blut, so wurde berichtet, fliesse im Strom. Deutschland, sagte man, koenne nicht laenger eine solche Sachlage erdulden.

Unterdessen waren 14 fast vollstaendig aus motorisierten Einheiten bestehende Divisionen an den Grenzen von Boehmen und Maehren konzentriert worden. Am Nachmittag des 14. betraten deutsche Truppen tschechisches [illegible] Gebiet und besetzten Maehrisch-Ostrau.

Bevor den Truppen der Einmarschbefehl erteilt wurde, musste jedoch irgend etwas gefunden werden, um ihm den Anschein des Rechts zu verleihen. Der Praesident der tschechoslowakischen Republik, Hacha, und der Aussenminister, Chvalkovsky, kamen nach Berlin und wurden vom Fuehrer in Gegenwart von Ribbentrops und des Feldmarschalls Goering empfangen. In brutalster Weise erklaerte der

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Fuehrer, dass Verhandlungen garnicht in Frage kaemen. Die tschechischen Staatsmaenner wuerden ersucht die Berliner Entscheidungen zur Kenntnis zu nehmen und sich ihnen zu beugen. Jeder Versuch eines Widerstandes wuerde zerschlagen werden. Jeder Widerstand gegen die deutschen Truppen werde durch Flugzeug-Bombenangriffe beseitigt werden. Das Reich habe beschlossen, Boehmen und Maehren zu annektieren. Prag wuerde am naechsten Tag um 10 Uhr besetzt werden. Praesident Hacha, ein Mann in hohem Alter und von schwacher Gesundheit, brach ohnmaechtig zusammen. Feldmarschall Goerings eigene Aerzte greifen ein und bringen ihn mit Einspritzungen zu sich. Dann unterzeichnet der alte Mann die ihm vorgelegte Urkunde, wonach die tschechische Regierung das Schicksal Boehmens und Maehrens "mit vollem Vertrauen" in die Haende des Fuehrers legt.

Am naechsten Morgen, dem 15., erreichen die ersten motorisierten Truppenteile Prag um 9 Uhr. Am Nachmittag betritt der Fuehrer das kaiserliche Schloss auf dem Hradschin und befiehlt sogleich das Aufziehen der Hakenkreuzflagge. Die Tschechoslowakei hat aufgehoert zu bestehen.

Am folgenden Tage, dem 16., verordnete der Fuehrer die Einverleibung Boehmens und Maehrens in das Reich und gibt ihnen die Form eines Protektorats mit einer Art von Selbstverwaltung unter der Aufsicht eines "Protektors" im Namen Deutschlands, der seinen Sitz in Prag hat.

Am selben Tage bittet Mgr. Tiso, Haupt des neuen sogenannten unabhaengigen slowakischen Staates, den Fuehrer, die Slowakei unter seinen Schutz zu nehmen. Der Kanzler erklaert sich sofort bereit. Tatsaechlich ist die slowakische Unabhaengigkeit nun vorbei. Das Land, das durch den Wiener Schiedsspruch verstuemmelt, seiner fruchtbarsten Gegenden beraubt und auf eine Gebirgsgegend beschraenkt wurde, kann keinesfalls auf eine unabhaengige Existenz hoffen.

Nr. 77, Seite 96-97.
Der franzoesische Botschafter in Berlin, Coulondre, an den franzoesischen Aussenminister, Georges Bonnet.

Berlin, den 17. Maerz 1939.

In Bezug auf die Umstaende, unter denen Hacha und Chvalkovsky gezwungen wurden, den Vertrag zu unterzeichnen, durch den das Schicksal Boehmens und Maehrens in die Haende des Fuehrers gelegt wurde, moechte ich die folgende Darstellung unterbreiten, die mir aus verlaesslicher Quelle zugegangen ist.

Am Nachmittag des 14. teilte die deutsche Gesandschaft in Prag dem Palais Czernin mit, dass es im Hinblick auf die Verschlechterung der Lage angeraten sei, dass der Praesident und der Aussenminister nach Berlin gingen.

Hacha und der Minister, die mit militaerischen Ehrenbezeugungen empfangen worden waren, wurden sofort nach ihrer Ankunft zu der Reichskanzlei gebracht, wo Hitler, Feldmarschall Goering, von Ribbentrop und Keppler auf sie warteten.

Die Urkunde, die unterzeichnet werden sollte, lag bereits in endgueltiger Fassung auf dem Tisch, ebenso auch ein Memorandum ueber die zukuenftige Verfassung der Verwaltung von Boehmen und Maehren.

Der Fuehrer erklaerte sehr kurz, dass dies nicht die Zeit fuer Verhandlungen sei, dass die tschechischen Minister gerufen

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worden seien, um von den Entscheidungen Deutschlands Kenntnis zu nehmen, dass diese Entscheidungen unwiderruflich seien, dass Prag am naechsten Morgen um 9 Uhr besetzt werden wuerde, dass Boehmen und Maehren in das Reich einverleibt und ein Protektorat bilden wuerden, und dass jeder, der Widerstand versuche, "zertreten" werden wuerde. Damit vollzog der Fuehrer seine Unterschrift und verliess den Raum. Dies war ungefaehr um 12.30 a. m.

Dann spielten sich erschuetternde Vorgaenge zwischen den tschechischen Ministern und den drei Deutschen ab.

Mehrere Stunden lang protistierten Dr. Hacha und Choalkovsky gegen die ihnen angetane Vergewaltigung, erklaerten, dass sie die ihnen vorgelegte Urkunde nicht unterzeichnen koennten und wiesen darauf hin, dass sie fuer immer von ihrem Volk verflucht werden wuerden, wenn sie es taeten. Mit aller ihm zu Gebote stehenden Energie focht Dr. Hacha gegen den Status eines Protektorats, das den Tschechen auferlegt werden sollte, unter Hinweis darauf, dass weisse Voelker noch niemals dazu erniedrigt worden seien.

Die deutschen Minister waren erbarmungslos. Sie jagten Dr. Hacha und Choalkovsky buchstaeblich um den Tisch herum, auf dem die Urkunden lagen, schleuderten diese fortgesetzt vor sie hin und drueckten ihnen die Feder in die Hand, waehrend sie unablaessig wiederholten, dass wenn sie ihre Weigerung fortsetzten, Prag von Flugzeugen bombardiert werden und die Haelfte der Stadt im Laufe von zwei Stunden in Truemmern daliegen wuerde, und das wuerde nur der Anfang sein. Hunderte von Bombenflugzeugen warteten nur auf den Befehl zum Abflug, und sie wuerden diesen Befehl um 6 Uhr morgens erhalten, wenn die Unterschriften von ihnen nicht geleistet wuerden.

Praesident Hacha war in einen solchen Zustand der Erschoepfung, dass er mehrmals aerztliche Hilfe in Anspruch nehmen musste von Aerzten, die nebenbei bemerkt, seit dem Beginn der Verhandlung dienstbereit waren. Als die tschechischen Minister erklaerten, dass sie eine solche Entscheidung nicht ohne die Zustimmung ihrer Regierung treffen koennten, erhielten sie zur Antwort, dass eine direkte Telefonverbindung mit dem Kabinett, das grade in Prag eine Sitzung habe, vorhanden sei, und dass sie sich sofort mit ihm in Verbindung setzen koennten. Tatsaechlich war eine solche Telefonverbindung in tschechischem Gebiet von Angehoerigen der deutschen Minderheit ohne Kenntnis der Behoerden gelegt worden.

Dr. Hacha, der einen vollstaendigen Zusammenbruch nahe war, und nur mit Hilfe von Einspritzungen aufrecht erhalten wurde, entschloss sich um 4:30 morgens, den Tod im Herzen, seine Unterschrift zu geben. Beim Verlassen der Reichskanzlei sagte Choalkovsky: "Unser Volk wird uns verfluchen, und doch haben wir ihm das Leben gerettet. Wir haben es von einen entsetzlichen Blutbad bewahrt.

Coulondre.

Nr. 79, Seite 99-100.

Der franzoesische Botschafter in Berlin, Coulondre, an den Aussenminister Georges Bonnet.

Berlin, den 18. Maerz 1939.

Nach Mitteilungen aus bester Quelle hat sich die tschechoslowakische Tragoedie scheinbar wie folgt entwickelt:

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 2943-PS
OFFICE OF U S CHIEF OF COUNSEL
(cont.)

Die Nazifuehrer fanden den Widerstand der Tschechoslowakei gegen ihre Stellung unter Vormundschaft, die ihr im Dezember angeboten worden war, unerfreulich, und entwarfen einen Plan, der, wie die Deutschen sich ausdrueckten, das Land wirksam daran verhindern sollte, je wieder eine Bedrohung des Reiches darzustellen. Aber Chvalkovsky gelang es nicht, Prag zur Annahme dieses Plans zu ueberreden, der auch schon fast einem Protektorat gleichkam. Daraufhin beschloss Berlin, sich dieses zu ungefuegigen Werkzeugs zu entledigen. Von Februar an hat die Botschaft auf gewisse charakteristische Anzeichen in dieser Beziehung hingewiesen.

Dies war die Sachlage, als vor etwa 3 Wochen den oesterreichischen Fuehrern, Seyss-Inquart und Buerckel persoenlich anbefohlen wurde, die Bewegung zugunsten ihrer Unabhaengigkeit in der Slowakei anzufachen. Das Wiener Radio nahm daran teil. Die tschechische Regierung war erschreckt ueber die Schnelligkeit, mit der die Bewegung zunahm und setzte Mgr. Tiso ab, den sie als zu nachgiebig betrachtete. Hitler hatte auf diesen Missgriff nur gewartet. Es scheint, dass er erst dann, das heisst ungefaehr am 9. Maerz, die Entschluesse fasste, die zum Verschwinden der Tschechoslowakei fuehrten. Mgr. Tiso wurde nach Berlin beordert. Der Fuehrer unterrichtete ihn von dem bevorstehenden Einfall in Boehmen und Maehren und beauftragte ihn unter Androhung, dass die Slowakei sonst das gleiche Schicksal erleiden wuerde, sofort die Losloesung dieses Staates von Prag vorzunehmen.

Um zu vermeiden, dass die Slowakei von Deutschland annektiert wuerde, beeilten sich die Ungarn und Polen, die Unabhaengigkeit dieses Staates am 14. Maerz, dem Tage der Proklamation, anzuerkennen; Deutschland, das die ganze Geschichte angestiftet hatte, hielt sich von einem solchen Schritt zurueck, schickte aber Truppen, um Pressburg zu besetzen. Unter Zwang gesetzt, ersuchte Mgr. Tiso den Fuehrer telegraphisch um Schutz, der auch sofort gewaehrt wurde. Die deutschen Truppen setzten ihren Marsch durch die Slowakei fort, aber auf Vorstellungen Polens hin, beschloss Berlin, sie auf die Waaglinie zurueckzuziehen.

Coulondre.

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION
OF DOCUMENT NO. 2943-PS

21 November 1945

I, PAUL M. FREEDMAN, S/SGT., 33799122, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; and that the above is a true and correct translation of Document 2943-PS.

PAUL M. FREEDMAN
S/SGT.
33799122

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EXCERPTS FROM DOCUMENT 2943-PS
OFFICE OF U S CHIEF COUNSEL

THE FRENCH YELLOW BOOK

Diplomatic Documents 1938-1939

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NO. 55
(At Page 67)

M. Coulondre, French Ambassador in Berlin,
to M. Georges Bonnet, Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Berlin, March 13, 1939.

While at the Wilhelmstrasse, as late as in the evening of March 12, they professed to be confident that M. Chvalkovsky would find a satisfactory solution for the crisis within Czechoslovakia, the Minister for Propaganda, according to information obtained this morning by my Belgian colleague, now declares that from the moment Germans are molested, the Reich will have to intervene in a more direct manner, but in what manner they decline to say.

The situation as I found it on my return to Berlin is, therefore, an extremely serious one, and seems to be developing rapidly.

Analysed in its political and military factors, it appears in the following light:

On March 11 and 12 military preparations were noticed in certain German garrisons, and particularly in those near Berlin. These preparations, which consisted for instance in camouflaging the numbers on the cars and the men's regimental badges, are an indication of impending troop movements.

In the course of the same days, troop movements were definitely observed in the provinces, on one side through Saxony and Silesia in the direction of Gleiwitz, on the other in Franconia in the direction of Austria.

In spite of camouflage it was possible to identify light armoured units coming from Northern Germany, as well as certain anti-aircraft units. On the other hand, on March 12 no preparations could be noticed in Austria north of Vienna, or in Vienna itself. That region, however, is well provided with mechanised units, the second Armoured Division especially, which is now in line.

Everything suggests that Germany will very soon resort to force against Czechoslovakia. Although no actual measures of mobilisation, even partial, have yet been noticed, movements of troop units belonging to the standing army are taking place with the object either of gripping the corridor or Moravia in a vice, or of surrounding the entire Bohemian Quadrilateral.

It appears from more recent information that, on the one hand Staff officers are to leave Berlin tomorrow morning, March 14, in order to take part in the operation, and also that the Black Militia would be entrusted with vanguard duties.

COULONDRE.

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NO. 57
(At Page 68)

M. Coulondre, French Ambassador in Berlin,
to M. Georges Bonnet, Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Berlin, March 13, 1939.

One may well wonder what political designs are to be realised by the display of force which I have reported. Though the secret appears to have been well kept, it seems, nevertheless, that the attitude of the German Press is sufficient to enlighten us.

As early as March 10 a D. N. B. dispatch made it known that Mgr. Tiso had actually addressed a note to the German Government. From that moment the newspapers of the Reich have been maintaining that the only regular Slovak Government for Germany was that of Mgr. Tiso. Yesterday, a new element appeared: the violent attitude adopted by the Czechs towards the German minority who made common cause with the Slovak extremists. But today the quarrels between Czechs and Slovaks are relegated to the background in the Press, which is clamorously denouncing the regime of terror which the Czechs are supposed to have unleashed, as in M. Benes' time against the Slovak separatists as well as those of Bohemia and Moravia. The evolution in the German attitude towards the neighbouring country, which had become noticeable in the last few months, is now taking definite shape. It certainly looks as if the policy of reducing Czechoslovakia to a vassal state was giving way to that of separating of its component nationalities. It also appears that the Reich, while favouring the independence of Slovakia, is supporting the Polish and Hungarian claims on Ruthenia, which, if it secedes from Czechoslovakia, must inevitably fall into the hands of its neighbours. The future will show what sort of bartering with Budapest and Warsaw such a policy will involve. For the time being, in order that this policy should succeed, there must be a pretext for intervention. As in September last, the German Press denounces the persecutions alleged to have been suffered by German nationals, or by members of the German minority in Czechoslovakia. As in September, the newspapers announce that concentrations of Czech troops are taking place near the German frontiers. The German population, from what I hear, feels, as it did last autumn, a certain uneasiness caused by military preparations and by current rumours. They fear some rash adventure. But this factor appears to be even less decisive than it was in September. The leaders of the Reich, judging by news that reaches me from German sources, are not reckoning with any resistance whatsoever from the Czechs. The intended action, in their opinion, will not overstep the bounds of a police operation, and it appears, by the manner in which this operation is being prepared on the military side, that such are actually the German Government's anticipations.

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NO. 62
(At Page 72)

M. Coulondre, French Ambassador in Berlin,
to M. Georges Bonnet, Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Berlin, March 14, 1939.

With regard to the visit which Mgr. Tiso, accompanied by M. Durcansky, made to Berlin yesterday, I have gathered the following information.

A telegram from Berlin inviting Mgr. Tiso to go to the Fuhrer without delay was received at Bratislava at about ten o'clock yesterday morning.

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After conferring with the principal leaders of the Slovak People's Party, Mgr. Tiso decided to obey this summons. In the course of the interview which he had with Herr Hitler towards the end of the afternoon, the latter declared that he desired to see a completely free Slovakia, and that in other respects it rested with the Slovak people to choose their own destiny. Mgr. Tiso and M. Durcansky conferred from nine p. m. until three a. m. with Herr von Ribbentrop and various Nazi high officials and dignitaries, in particular with Herr Keppler, who appears to have played an important part in the whole affair.

They are said to have examined every aspect of the situation and any further developments which might result from it, and the conclusion arrived at through these discussions appears to be that the salvation for the Slovaks can only lie in complete separation from Prague.

It is announced that the Slovak Diet, whose sitting was to take place today but had been postponed until the 28th, will now sit this morning; it is anticipated that it will vote in favour of complete independence for the country. The Slovak Ministers are said to have received from the Nazi leaders an assurance that Germany's friendship will be given to an independent Slovakia.

COULONDRE.

NO. 65
(At Page 75)

M. Coulondre, French Ambassador in Berlin,
to M. Georges Bonnet, Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Berlin, March 14, 1939.

Immediately after the Vienna Award, while the German Press was celebrating the "final" nature of the German-Italian solution, a far-sighted observer of affairs in Central Europe stated in Berlin: "The old Czechoslovakia has lasted twenty years, the new Czechoslovak State will not last five." Events which are now taking place have proved him right inasmuch as the Czechoslovakia of November 2, 1938, did not even last five months.

This evening, leading newspapers of the National-Socialists are announcing as an accomplished fact the disruption of the neighbouring State. The Diet of Bratislava proclaimed this morning the independence of Slovakia, Hungarian troops have crossed the frontier of Sub-Carpathian Russia; and, in reprisal for incidents more or less provoked, at Iglau, Brunn and elsewhere, the threat of a "crushing" intervention of the Reichswehr hovers over Bohemia and Moravia. According to rumours as yet unconfirmed, German detachments have penetrated Czech territory at several points.

It is striking to note once again the rapidity and precision with which Hitler's political plans have been accomplished, for it is beyond any question of doubt that the present crisis is in accordance with a carefully preconceived plan of which Berlin holds the principal strings. This Embassy has recently collected various information which leaves no uncertainty on this point. On February 5 a National-Socialist of standing, whose duties call for direct contact with the Fuhrer's immediate circle, told one of my collaborators to be prepared for developments in which a "dislocation" (Auflosung) of Czechoslovakia would be unavoidable. In this case, he added, Slovakia would become independent, Hungary would annex Sub-Carpathian Russia, and the Reich would, in one form or another, obtain control of Bohemia and of Moravia. It is this process of disruption, this dissection of Czechoslovakia, into three pieces, which is being brought about today.

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It remained, then, only to find means of action and pretexts. It is an established dogma of National-Socialist policy to undermine from inside the States which are to be destroyed. The Slovaks appear to have played this time the part played by the Sudetens last year. By secretly encouraging the uncompromising Slovak elements, notably the partisans of the Radical movement "Rodobrana", and by stirring up against Prague certain Slovak Ministers such as M. Mach and M. Durcansky, Hitler's agents cunningly caused this variance to degenerate into an acute crisis. If there were, as has been started, any project of a Putsch at Bratislava there are good reasons for believing that the German authorities were in the secret. It was not simply by chance that M. Durcansky, as soon as he was able to escape, took refuge in Vienna, where the radio was put at his disposal to allow him to carry on his anti-Czech campaign.

Prague appears to have tried to forestall this measure, but too late. Perhaps, also, the policy of the Central Government was not always perfectly clear or wise. If the Czech Leaders have expressed ample signs of good will towards Berlin, it seems that they have believed that at the same time they could continue inside their country a policy which was purely Czech. In doing this, they have revived old internal jealousies and needlessly aroused the suspicions of the Reich. This movement, once started, developed according to the prescription, tried out at the time of the Anschluss and improved during last year's crisis. The Tiso note recalls the Seyss-Inquart telegram. The incidents which took place at Iglau, Brunn and other German-speaking centres were used to transform at a given moment the Czechoslovak conflict into a German-Czech conflict. One finds again in the Berlin papers the same headlines as in August 1938, and almost the same statements: the pregnant woman struck down and trampled upon, the "Deutschtum" in danger, because a student of the German minority was ill-treated and in the headings of tonight's papers the final motive of a "Blutbad" which must be avenged. In the meantime, Mgr. Tiso and M. Durcansky have gone in a dramatic way to the Führer, as Herr Henlein had previously done.

It is still too early to know to what extent the almost desperate effort now being made in Berlin by the President of the Czechoslovak Republic and his Prime Minister will modify the German attitude and safeguard the federal unity of the country. It is to be feared that the two statesmen only came from Prague to ratify the Fuhrer's decisions.

COULONDRE.

NO. 66
(At Page 79)

M. Coulondre, French Ambassador in Berlin,
to M. Georges Bonnet, Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Berlin, March 14, 1939.

In a previous letter I have set forth the origin and growth of the crisis which must lead to the division and perhaps to the partition of Czechoslovakia. I will therefore confine myself now to summing up the political situation as it appears in Berlin at the present moment.

The most important point is the proclamation in Bratislava this morning of the independence of Slovakia, which has now severed its ties with Prague and thus broken up the framework of the Czechoslovak Federal State. One may wonder whether the internal Czechoslovak crisis has not, by the rapidity of its growth, surprised even the leaders of the Reich, but one can hardly doubt that at the last moment the proclamation of Slovak independence was the outcome of pressure, if not of a direct order, from Berlin.

H1123-0282

It was, as a matter of fact, during the course of the visit paid yesterday by Mgr. Tiso to the capital of the Reich that the decision was taken to convoke this morning the Slovak Diet whose meeting, originally fixed for today, had been postponed till the 28th.

From indications which I have been able to gather concerning the interviews Mgr. Tiso had in Berlin, it would seem that the Reich leaders and the Fuhrer himself had shown clearly their determination that a completely free Slovakia should be created. It is only upon this condition that the friendship and protection of the Nazi leaders, indispensable to the new State, will be granted. Slovakia, therefore, must be regarded as a vassal of the Reich.

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Following upon the quarrels between Czechs and Slovaks one can notice since last Sunday a sudden revival, in its most virulent form, of the campaign which the German Press launched last September against Czechoslovakia. The Czechs are once more accused of using violence not only against the Slovaks but also against others, and especially against members of the German minority and citizens of the Reich. The newspapers are proclaiming that the lives of these Germans are in danger, that the situation is intolerable, and that it is necessary to smother as quickly as possible the focus of trouble which Prague has become in the heart of Europe. They have even gone to the length of asserting that the Czech Government is mobilising.

This morning officials of the Reich press-service, in discussing the subject with the representatives of foreign news agencies, declared that the situation was "unbearable", and let it be understood that grave developments must be expected.

In the meantime the German High Command has concentrated around Bohemia and Moravia (that is to say, in Silesia, in Saxony, in Bavaria and in Austria) considerable numbers of troops, consisting for the most part of mechanised units, which are now awaiting the order to cross the frontier. The general impression is that this order will be given some time tomorrow. It is even stated that Pilsen will be occupied by German troops. They are said already to have crossed the frontier in the region of Morawska-Ostrawa.

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NO. 73
(At Page 88)

M. Coulondre, French Ambassador in Berlin,
to M. Georges Bonnet, Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Berlin, March 16, 1939.

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German cynicism has, moreover, been accompanied by consummate skill. With a remarkable control of men and events, the Government of the Reich has been at pains to give an appearance of legality to the violence done to the Czechs.

The official German thesis is that Czechoslovakia fell to pieces of itself. Slovakia, it is declared, in breaking with Prague, split the Federal Republic into three pieces.

As for Bohemia and Moravia, it was freely and of its own volition that the Prague Government, unable to maintain order and to protect the

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H1123-0283

lives of the German minority, placed the care of these provinces - so runs the argument in the Fuhrer's hands.

Such arguments can deceive no one.

There can be no doubt that Slovak separatism was the work of German agents or of Slovaks controlled directly from Berlin. M. Mach, head of the propaganda department of the Bratislava Government and a most ardent extremist, was well-known for his entire devotion to the Reich. M. Durcansky, Minister of Transport, who made frequent visits to Germany, was also a mere tool in Nazi hands, particularly in those of M. Karmasin, the "Fuhrer" of the 120,000 Germans in Slovakia. As for Mgr. Tiso, a man of little energy, although as a priest he was worried by the growth of Nazi ideology in his country, he was incapable of opposing the separatist tendencies encouraged by Germany. It was on account of this weakness that the Prague Government dismissed him on March 10. This rigorous measure against Mgr. Tiso and the latter's appeal for assistance to the Reich Government supplied the German rulers with the excuse for which they had been waiting to interfere in the quarrel between the Czechs and the Slovaks.

On receipt of the note from the dismissed President, German official circles let it be known that in their view Mgr. Tiso's Government alone had a legal character, and that, by appointing a new Prime Minister, Prague had violated the Constitution. From this moment the Berlin newspapers began to denounce the terror unleashed in Bratislava by the Czechs against the Slovak autonomists and their German comrades.

From the 12th onwards the tone of the Berlin Press became more violent. Now it was not only a question of clashes in Slovakia, but also in Bohemia and Moravia. Within twenty-four hours the Berlin papers had relegated to the background the sufferings of the Slovaks and denounced with every sign of the keenest resentment the brutalities to which Germans in Czechoslovakia were subjected, whether they were members of the racial minority or citizens of the Reich. To judge from the German papers, which used not only the same language but exactly the same expressions as in September last, the lives of the 500,000 Germans in Czechoslovakia were in the most serious danger. The Czechs, in whom the old Hussite spirit and the hatred of Germanism was re-awakening, had once more organised man-hunts. The situation was becoming intolerable.

Actually, with the exception of Bratislava, where unrest had been fomented by the German Self-Protection Service and by the Hlinka Guards, who had been armed by Germany, public order had been disturbed neither in Slovakia nor in Bohemia and Moravia. At Brunn, for example, where, according to the German Press, German blood had been shed, the British Consul was able to see and report to his Minister in Prague that there was complete calm. The stories published by the Berlin newspapers under inflammatory titles were, furthermore, very thin in content, much like a few grains of dust whirled along by some infernal bellows.

On the evening of the 13th the German leaders, who had unremittingly counteracted the efforts of Prague to establish a new Slovakian Government, summoned Mgr. Tiso to Berlin. During the night of the 13th-14th, together with M. Durcansky, he had a long interview with the Fuhrer, who expressed his determination to see the creation of "an entirely free Slovakia". The proclamation of Slovak independence should follow without delay. That same evening, the 60 members of the Diet were summoned for the next day at Bratislava, and Slovak independence, decided in Berlin, was unanimously voted by them. From the afternoon of the 14th, the German Press was in a position to declare that Czechoslovakia had fallen to pieces, that she was in a state of complete decay, that the Communists had reappeared and, together with Czech chauvinists, were hunting and ill-treating the Germans, notably at Brunn and Iglau. German blood - so it was reported - was flowing in torrents. Germany - it was said - could no longer tolerate such a state of affairs.

H1123-0284

Meanwhile, 14 divisions, composed almost entirely of mechanized units, had been concentrated on the frontiers of Bohemia and Moravia. On the afternoon of the 14th, German troops entered Czech territory and occupied Morawska-Ostrawa.

Before giving the troops the order to march to the invasion of Czech territory, it was necessary to find some semblance of a justification. M. Hacha, President of the Czechoslovak Republic and M. Chvalkovsky, Minister for Foreign Affairs, arrived at Berlin where they were received by the Fuhrer in the presence of Herr von Ribbentrop and Field-Marshal Goering. Brutally, the Fuhrer states that there is no question of negotiation. The Czech statesmen are asked to acquaint themselves with the decisions of Berlin and to bow to them. Any sign of resistance will be crushed. Any opposition to the German troops will be put down by means of aerial bombardment. The Reich has decided to annex Bohemia and Moravia. Prague will be occupied on the following day at 10 o'clock. President Hacha, a man of great age and in failing health, collapses and faints. Field-Marshal Goering's own doctors intervene and bring him round with injections. Then the old man signs the document presented to him, by which the Czech Government places the destiny of Bohemia and Moravia "with full confidence" in the hands of the Fuhrer.

The next day, the 15th, at nine o'clock in the morning, the first mechanised troops reach Prague. During the afternoon, the Fuhrer enters the Imperial Castle of Hradschin and immediately orders the swastika to be hoisted. Czechoslovakia is no more.

The following day, the 16th, the Fuhrer decrees the incorporation of Bohemia and Moravia within the Reich and constitutes them a Protectorate with some sort of self-administration, under the control of a "Protector" representing Germany and residing at Prague.

The same day, Mgr. Tiso, head of the new so-called independent Slovak State, asks the Fuhrer to take Slovakia under his protection. The Chancellor accepts at once. In fact, Slovak independence is at an end. Mutilated by the Vienna Award, robbed of its most fertile lands and reduced to a mountainous region, the country cannot in any case hope for an independent existence.

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NO. 77
(At Page 96)

M. Coulondre, French Ambassador in Berlin,
to M. Georges Bonnet, Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Berlin, March 17, 1939.

On the subject of the circumstances in which M. Hacha and M. Chvalkovsky were constrained to sign the treaty by which the fate of Bohemia and Moravia passed into the Fuhrer's hands, I think I should report the following account, which I heard from a reliable source.

During the afternoon of the 14th, the German Legation in Prague made it known to the Czernin Palace that, in view of the deterioration in the situation, it might be useful if the President and the Minister for Foreign Affairs would go to Berlin.

Immediately on arrival, M. Hacha and his Minister, who were received with military honours, were taken to the Chancellery where Herr Hitler, Field-Marshal Goering, Herr von Ribbentrop and Herr Keppler were waiting for them.

H1123-0285

The document to be signed lay waiting on the table, in its final form, as well as a memorandum relating to the future Statute for the administration of Bohemia and Moravia.

The Fuhrer stated very briefly that the time was not one for negotiation but that the Czech Ministers had been summoned to be informed of Germany's decisions, that these decisions were irrevocable, that Prague would be occupied on the following day at 9 o'clock, Bohemia and Moravia incorporated within the Reich and constituted a Protectorate, and whoever tried to resist would be "trodden underfoot" (zertreten). With that, the Fuhrer wrote his signature and went out. It was about 12:30 a. m.

A tragic scene then took place between the Czech Ministers and the three Germans.

For hours on end Dr. Hacha and M. Chvalkovsky protested against the outrage done to them, declared that they could not sign the document presented to them, pointed out that were they to do so they would be for ever cursed by their people. Dr. Hacha, with all the energy at his command, fought against the Statute of Protectorate which it was intended to impose on the Czechs, observing that no white people was reduced to such a condition.

The German ministers were pitiless. They literally hunted Dr. Hacha and M. Chvalkovsky round the table on which the documents were lying, thrusting them continually before them, pushing pens into their hands, incessantly repeating that if they continued in their refusal, half Prague would lie in ruins from aerial bombardment within two hours, and that this would be only the beginning. Hundreds of bombers were awaiting only the order to take off, and they would receive that order at six in the morning if the signatures were not forthcoming by them.

President Hacha was in such a state of exhaustion that he more than once needed medical attention from the doctors, who, by the way, had been there ready for service since the beginning of the interview. The Czech Ministers having stated they could not take such a decision without the consent of their Government, they received the answer that a direct telephonic line existed to the Cabinet of Ministers then in session at Prague and that they could get in touch immediately. It is a fact that such a line had been laid down in Czech territory by members of the German minority, without the knowledge of the authorities.

At 4:30 in the morning, Dr. Hacha, in a state of total collapse, and kept going only by means of injections, resigned himself with death in his soul to give his signature. As he left the Chancellery, M. Chvalkovsky declared: "Our people will curse us, and yet we have saved their existence. We have preserved them from a horrible massacre."

COULONDRE.

NO. 79
(At Page 99)

M. Coulondre, French Ambassador in Berlin,
to M. Georges Bonnet, Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Berlin, March 18, 1939.

According to information that I have gathered from the best sources, the development of the Czechoslovak drama seems to have been as follows:

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H1123-0286

The Nazi leaders, displeased at the resistance offered by Czechoslovakia to her new position of tutelage last December, worked out a scheme which, as the Germans put it, would effectively prevent this State from ever again becoming a menace to the Reich. But M. Chvalkovsky did not succeed in persuading Prague to accept this plan, which must already have almost amounted to a Protectorate. It was decided in Berlin to break this too unmanageable tool. From the month of February onwards, this Embassy drew attention to certain characteristic signs in this respect.

It was in these circumstances that the leaders of Austria, Seyss-Inquart and Burckel, were personally ordered about three weeks ago to fan the agitation in Slovakia in favour of its independence. The Vienna wireless station took part in this. The Czech Government, frightened by the speed with which the movement was growing, dismissed Mgr. Tiso, who was considered to be too conciliatory. Herr Hitler was waiting for this mistake. It is only then, that is to say about March 9, that he seems to have taken the decisions which led to the disappearance of Czechoslovakia. Mgr. Tiso was summoned to Berlin. The Fuhrer informed him of the coming invasion of Bohemia and Moravia and charged him, under threat of seeing Slovakia suffer the same fate, with bringing about the immediate separation of that country from Prague.

In order to prevent Germany's seizure of Slovakia the Hungarians and Poles hastened to recognize the independence of that country on the day of its proclamation, March 14; Germany, the instigator of the whole thing, abstained from so doing but sent troops to occupy Bratislava. Under pressure, Mgr. Tiso telegraphed to the Fuhrer asking for protection, which was immediately granted. The German troops continued their march into Slovakia, but, on representations from Poland, Berlin decided to withdraw them to the line of the Vaag.

COULONDRE.

NO. 160
(At Page 204)

M. Leon Noel, French Ambassador in Warsaw,
to M. Georges Bonnet, Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Warsaw, July 10, 1939.

In the course of a short stay in Danzig, the First Secretary of this Embassy, from information given him by our Consul and also from conversations with the High Commissioner for the League of Nations, the Polish Commissioner-General and certain Danzig authorities, has gathered some interesting impressions, which may be summarised as follows:

(1) The wave of unrest which has been apparent for some days in the Free City is appreciably on the ebb. But, in order to estimate the significance and the extent, which is entirely relative, of this regression, it is apposite to emphasize the fact that the effervescence which had been observed in the Free City was considerably exaggerated by interested propaganda and never presented the character of organised preparations for violent action.

(2) In so far as can be ascertained, this appeasement has in no way slowed down the militarisation of the Free City, which is being methodically carried out.

The strength of the police force has been raised to 3,000 men. The formation of the Free Corps is being continued. Its nucleus was created out of 300 S. S. men from East Prussia, who wear on the sleeves of their uniforms the words "Reichswehr Danzig". The barracks contain several thousands of young men who have come from the Reich, but are said to be of Danzig origin.

2943

H1123-0287

Smuggling of arms (rifles, machine-guns, anti-aircraft batteries, light tanks, aircraft, etc.) continues. Entrance to the Schichau dockyard, where this material is disembarked, is strictly forbidden. All the tailors and even all the dressmakers of the Free City without exception have been requisitioned for making uniforms.

It would be incorrect to say that these measures of rearmament are ostentatious, but they are known to the authorities. On the other hand, their rate, or even their importance, should not be exaggerated. In any case, this rearmament does not present the feverish character of such measures as would be taken with a view to an early coup de force. It is a question rather of a progressive preparation for the militarisation of the Free City, with a view to guarding against possibilities which perhaps do not as yet present themselves in a very definite way even to the National-Socialists themselves.

* * * * * * * *

In any case, there is one fact about which foreign observers in Danzig are unanimous. It is that it is proper not to attach too much importance to the daily vicissitudes in the little provincial world of the Free City. They may indeed, these observers recognize, possess their value as pointers and serve as a barometer; but the final issue lies, and will continue to lie, between Berlin and Warsaw, and between Berlin, London and Paris.

LEON NOEL.

NO. 337
(At Page 372)

M. Georges Bonnet, Minister for Foreign Affairs,
to M. Coulondre, French Ambassador in Berlin.

Paris, September 1, 1939. 5.55 p.m.

The following is in confirmation of my telephone call:

The British Government have instructed your colleague to present to the German Government an urgent communication of which Sir Nevile Henderson will himself inform you. You should associate yourself with this step.

You should confine yourself, if a reply is given, to stating that you will refer the matter to your Government.

GEORGES BONNET.

NO. 344
(At Page 376)

M. Coulondre, French Ambassador in Berlin,
to M. Georges Bonnet, Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Berlin, September 1, 1939.

(Received by telephone at 11 p. m.)

I took the steps prescribed in Your Excellency's instructions in an interview with Herr von Ribbentrop at 10 p. m.

The Minister for Foreign Affairs, after remarking that my communication was identical with that which had just been handed to him by my British colleague, replied as follows:

H1123-0288

"There has not been, on the German side, any aggression against Poland. It is Poland that, for months, has resorted to continual provocation by stifling the economic life of Danzig, ill-treating minorities and incessantly violating the frontiers.

"The Fuhrer has endured this provocation with the greatest patience, in the hope that Poland would again revert to reason. But the very opposite has been the case. Poland, which has been mobilizing for months, decreed general mobilization last night. The Poles have made three attacks on German territory. In such circumstances there can be no question of German aggression.

"I am handing your communication to the Fuhrer and will let you know his answer as soon as it reaches me."

In accordance with Your Excellency's instructions by telephone, I confined myself to telling Herr von Ribbentrop that I would report his answer to my Government.

My colleague and I had asked to be received together. Herr von Ribbentrop preferred to receive us separately.

COULONDRE.

NO. 365
(At Page 399)

M. Georges Bonnet, Minister for Foreign Affairs,
to M. Coulondre, French Ambassador in Berlin.

Paris, September 3, 1939. 10.20 a.m.

Last night, following a communication made to us by the British Government, and following the meeting of the French Chamber of Deputies, the French Government at a Cabinet meeting took the following decisions, which I have been charged to transmit to you.

You should present yourself to-day, September 3, at noon, at the Wilhelmstrasse and ask for the German Government's reply to the communication which you handed in at 10 p. m. on September 1.

If the reply to the questions contained in that communication is in the negative, you should recall the responsibility of Germany which you evoked during your last interview, and you should notify to the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Reich or to his representative that the French Government find themselves, by reason of the German reply, compelled to fulfill as from to-day, September 3, at 5 p. m., the engagements which France entered into towards Poland, and which are known to the German Government.

As from that moment you may ask for your passports.

GEORGES BONNET.

NO. 367
(At Page 400)

M. Coulondre, French Ambassador in Berlin,
to M. Georges Bonnet, Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Berlin, September 3, 1939.

(Received by telephone at 5.50 p. m.)

I have the honour to confirm as here below the communication which I made to Your Excellency by telephone at 1 p. m.

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H1123-0289

Herr von Ribbentrop returned at noon. I was received at this hour by the State Secretary, but the latter informed me that he was not in a position to tell me whether a satisfactory reply had been made to my letter of September 1, nor even whether such a reply could be given thereto. He insisted that I should see Herr von Ribbentrop himself. In these circumstances I asked to be received by the Minister of Foreign Affairs at the earliest possible moment.

I was received by Herr von Ribbentrop at 12.30 p. m.

I asked him whether he could give me a satisfactory reply to my letter which I had handed to him on September 1 at 10 p. m.

He replied to me as follows:

"After the delivery of your letter, the Italian Government notified the German Government of a proposed compromise, stating that the French Government was in agreement. Later, Signor Mussolini intimated to us that the contemplated compromise had failed owing to British intransigence. This morning the British Ambassador handed us an ultimatum, due to expire two hours later. We rejected it for the reason which is explained in the memorandum which I handed to the British Ambassador today and of which I give you a copy.

"If the French Government feels bound by its commitments to Poland to enter into the conflict, I can only regret it, for we have no feeling of hostility towards France. It is only if France attacks us that we shall fight her, and this would be on her part a war of aggression."

I then asked the Minister for Foreign Affairs if I was to infer from his utterances that the reply of the Government of the Reich to my letter of September 1 was in the negative. "Yes", he replied.

"In these circumstances I must, on behalf of my Government, remind you for the last time of the heavy responsibility assumed by the Government of the Reich by entering, without a declaration of war, into hostilities against Poland and in not acting upon the suggestion made by the Governments of the French Republic and of His Britannic Majesty to suspend all aggressive action against Poland and to declare itself ready to withdraw its forces promptly from Polish territory.

"I have the painful duty to notify you that as from to-day, September 3, at 5 p. m., the French Government will find itself obliged to fulfil the obligations that France has contracted towards Poland, and which are known to the German Government."

"Well," Herr von Ribbentrop remarked, "it will be France who is the aggressor."

I replied to him that history would judge of that.

COULONDRE.

H1123-0290

NO. 368
(At Page 401)

M. Georges Bonnet, Minister for Foreign Affairs,
to all the Heads of Diplomatic Missions accredited to Paris.

Paris, September 3, 1939.

Your Excellency,

In conformity with Article 2 of Convention III of The Hague, dated October 18, 1907, I have the honour to send you herewith the notification relative to the State of War existing between France and Germany.

GEORGES BONNET.

H1123-0291

Exhibit U.S.A. 103
Offered for identification Dec. 3, 1945
Rejected as evidence Dec. 3, 1945

DOCUMENT NO. 3029-PS
OFFICE OF U S CHIEF COUNSEL

Nurnberg, Germany
20 November 1945

Eidesstattliche Erklaerung
von
ALFRED HELMUT NAUJOCKS

Ich, ALFRED HELMUT NAUJOCKS, mache unter Eid und nach vorheriger Einschwoerung folgende Erklaerung:-

1. Im September 1938 habe ich im Amte III des SD gearbeitet. (Aus dieser Abteilung, die damals Amt III genannt wurde, wurde spaeter Amt VI geschaffen). Im Laufe meiner Arbeit hatte ich zwischen Berlin, Hof und Muenchen zu reisen.

2. Waehrend meiner Anwesenheit in Hof, das in der Naehe der tschechischen Grenze gelegen ist, besuchte ich die SD Dienstabteilung, einen Nachrichtendienst, welcher dort eroeffnet wurde. Dies Dienstabteilung hatte die Aufgabe alle politischen Nachrichten, die von der tschechoslovakischen Grenze ausgingen zu sammeln und nach Berlin weiterzuleiten. Ununterbrochene direkte telegraphische Verbindung bei Tag und bei Nacht war zwischen Hof und dem Amt III des SD in Berlin hergestellt. Wenn ich mich richtig erinnere, war der Leiter des Amtes Hof ein Herr Daufeldt. Der Leiter des Amtes III in Berlin war damals Jost und sein Assistant war Filbert.

3. Der groesste Teil der Nachrichten, die wir sammelten kam vom Freikorps Henlein, welches sein Hauptquartier in einem Schloss bei Dondorf ausserhalb Bayreuth hatte. Die Entfernung zwischen Hof und Bayreuth ist nicht sehr gross, und wir hatten taeglich Zugang zu allen Nachrichten, die vom Freikorps erhalten wurden. Es bestand ein ununterbrochener Verbindungsdienst mit dem tschechischen Gebiet durch Meldelaeufer. Die Auswertung dieser Nachrichten wurden in Berlin gehandhabt und kam in die Haende Heydrichs und Himmlers.

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H1123-0292

DOCUMENT NO. 3029-PS
CONT'D.

4. Ich erinnere mich, dass das Freikorps unaufhoerlich Beschwerden machte, weil es nicht genuegend Waffenvorrete erhalten haette. Briefliche und direkt telegraphische Unterhandlungen fanden ein paar Tage lang mit Berlin statt, bis es ziemlich viel Aergernis erregte. Darauf wurden die Waffen vom Herr beigestellt, aber ich glaube nur in kleinen Mengen.

5. Hof war der Mittelpunkt fuer alle Nachrichten, die vom SD ueber die tschechoslovakische Frage gesammelt wurden. Der SD hatte Agenten an der Grenze in jeder Stadt. Die Namen dieser Vertrauensleute wurden nach Hof berichtet und 2 Automobile fuhren jeden Tag die Grenze entlang um die Nachrichten zu sammeln, die aufgedeckt worden waren. Ausserdem erinnere ich mich noch, dass 2 oder 3 Kompanien der SS-Totenkopfabteilungen in der Naehe von Asch ihren Standort hatten.

Die oben angefuehrten Tatsachen sind der Wahrheit entsprechend. Dies Erklaerungen sind von mir freiwillig und ohne jeden Zwang abgegeben worden und ich habe dieselben durchgelesen und unterschrieben.

(Signed) Alfred Helmut Naujocks
ALFRED HELMUT NAUJOCKS

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 20 day of November 1945 at NURNBERG, Germany.

(Signed) John B. Martin

JOHN B. MARTIN
Lt. (jg) USNR

3029

H1123-0293

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 3029-PS
OFFICE OF U S CHIEF OF COUNSEL

Nurnberg, Germany
20 November 1945

Translation of Affidavit of

ALFRED HELMUT NAUJOCKS

I, ALFRED HELMUT NAUJOCKS, being first duly sworn, depose and state as follows;-

1. In September 1938 I was working in Amt III of the SD. (The department which was then called Amt III later became AMT VI). In the course of my work I traveled between Berlin, Hof and Munich.

2. While in Hof, which is on the Czech border, I paid repeated visits to the SD Service Department, that is, Intelligence Office, which has been established there. This Service Department had the task of collecting all political intelligence emanating from the Ozechoslovak border districts and passing it on to Berlin. Continuous day and night teleprinted communications had been established from Hof direct to Amt III of the SD in Berlin. To the best of my recollection the head of the Hof office was Daufeldt. The head of Amt III in Berlin at this time was Jost and his assistant was Filbert.

3. The bulk of the intelligence we collected came from Henlein Free Corps, which had its headquarters in a castle at Dondorf, outside Bayreuth; the distance between Hof and Bayreuth is not very great, and we had daily access to all intelligence received by the Free Corps. There was a continuous liaison maintained with Czech territory by runners. Exploitation of this intelligence was carried out every day in Berlin and was placed before Heydrich and Himmler.

4. I remember that the Free Corps made continuous complaints that they had not received sufficient supply of arms. Negotiations by letter and teleprint message went on for a number of days with Berlin until it became quite a nuisance. After that arms were supplied from the army, but I believe it was only a small quantity.

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H1123-0294

5. Hof was the center for all intelligence collected by the SD on the Czechoslovak question. The SD had agents all along the border in every town. The names of these agents were reported to Hof, and two motor cars toured the border every day to collect the intelligence which had been unearthed. In addition, I remember that two or three companies of the SS-Totenkopf units were stationed in the neighborhood of Asch.

The facts stated above are true: this declaration is made by me voluntarily and without compulsion; after reading over this statement I have signed and executed the same at NURNBERG, Germany this 20th day of November 1945,

(Signed) Alfred Helmut Naujocks

ALFRED HELMUT NAUJOCKS

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 20th day of November 1945 at NURNBERG, Germany.

(Signed) John B. Martin

JOHN B. MARTIN
Lt. (jg) USNR

I, Paul Richfield, Civilian, do hereby certify that I am a qualified translator of the German language; that the attached translation is a true and correct translation of the above statement; this 20th day of November 1945 at NURNBERG, Germany.

(Signed) Paul Richfield

PAUL RICHFIELD

H1123-0295

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 3030-PS
OFFICE OF U. S. CHIEF OF COUNSEL

Nurnberg, Germany
20 November 1945

Translation of Affidavit of

ALFRED HELMUT NAUJOCKS

I, ALFRED HELMUT NAUJOCKS, being first duly sworn, depose and state as follows:-

1. From 1934 to 1941 I was a member of the SD. In the winter of 1939 I was stationed in Berlin, working in Amt VI, Chief Sector South East. Early in March, four or five days before Slovakia declared its independence, Heydrich, who was chief of the SD, ordered me to report to Nebe, the chief of the Reich Criminal Police. Nebe had been told by Heydrich to accelerate the production of explosives which his department was manufacturing for the use of certain Slovak groups. These explosives were small tins weighing approximately 500 grams.

2. As soon as forty or fifty of these explosives had been finished, I carried them by automobile to a small village called Engerau, just across the border from Pressburg in Slovakia. The Security Police had a Service Department in this village for the handling of SD activities. I turned over the explosives to this office and found there a group of Slovaks including Karmasin, Mach, Tuka and Durcansky. In fact, three of these people then present later became ministers in the new Slovak government. I was informed that the explosives were to be turned over to the Hlinka Guards across the border in Slovakia and were to be used in incidents designed to create the proper atmosphere for a revolution.

3. I stayed in Engerau for a day and a half and then returned to Berlin.

4. One or two weeks later I met in Berlin the same Slovak delegation, including Mach, Tuka, Durcansky and Karmasin, which I had seen in Engerau. They had flown to Berlin for a conference with Goering.

H1123-0296

Heydrich asked me to look after them and to report to him what developed during the conference with Goering. I reported this conference in detail to Heydrich. It dealt principally with the organization of the new Slovak state. My principal recollection of the conference is that the Slovaks hardly got a word in because Goering was talking all the time.

The facts stated above are true; this declaration is made by me voluntarily and without compulsion; after reading over the statement I have signed and executed the same at NURNBERG, Germany this 20th day of November 1945.

(Signed) Alfred Helmut Naujocks

ALFRED HELMUT NAUJOCKS

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 20th day of November 1945 at NURNBERG, Germany.

(Signed) John B. Martin

JOHN B. MARTIN
Lt. (jg) USNR

I, Paul Richfield, Civilian, do hereby certify that I am a qualified translator of the German language; that the attached translation is a true and correct translation of the above statement; this 20th day of November 1945 at NURNBERG, Germany.

(Signed) Paul Richfield

PAUL RICHFIELD

3030

DOC. NO. 3030 PS

Eidesstattliche Erklaerung
von
ALFRED HELMUT NAUJOCKS

Nurnberg, Germany
20 November 1945

Ich. ALFRED HELMUT NAUJOCKS, mache unter Eid und nachvorheriger Einschwoerung folgende Erklaerung:-

1. Von 1934 bis 1941 war ich Mitglied der SD. Im Winter 1939 war ich in Berlin stationiert wo ich im Amte VI, Hauptabteilung Sued-Ost gearbeitet habe. Anfangs Maerz, vier oder fuenf Tage bevor die Slovakei ihre Unabhaengigeit erklaerte, wurde ich von Heydrich, dem Leiter der SD beauftragt, mich bei Nebe, Leiter der Reichskriminalpolizei zu melden. Nebe hatte den Auftrag von Heydrich erhalten, die Erzeugung von Explosivstoffen, die seine Abteilung fuer die Verwendung von gewissen slovakischen Gruppen herstellte, zu beschleunigen. Diese Explosivstoffe bestanden aus kleinen Bleckkannen, die circa 500 Gramm wogen.

2. Sobald 40 oder 50 dieser Sprengmittel hergestellt waren, nahm ich sie mit meinem Automobil zu einer kleinen Stadt namens Engerau, gerade an der slovakischen Grenze bei Pressburg. Die Sicherheitspolizei hatte eine Dienstabteilung in diesem Ort um die Aktivitaet des SD unternehmen zu koennen. Ich uebergab die Sprengmittel diesem Bureau und fand eine Gruppe von Slovaken vor, der unter anderem Karmasin, Mach, Tuka und Durcansky angehoerten. Tatsaechlich wurden drei der anwesenden Maenner spaeter Minister in der neuen slovakischen Regierung. Man teilte mir mit, dass diese Sprengmittel spaeter den Hlinka Truppen jenseits der slovakischen Grenze uebergeben werden sollten und diese fuer Zwischenfaelle benuetzt werden sollten, um die geeignete Atmosphaere fuer einen Umsturz zu schaffen.

3. Ich blieb in Engerau eineinhalb Tage und kehrte nach Berlin zurueck.

4. Ein oder zwei Wochen spaeter traf ich in Berlin die slovakische Delegation, der Mach, Tuka, Durcansky und Karmasin, die ich in Engerau gesehen hatte, angehoerten. Sie waren nach Berlin zu einer Konferenz mit Goering geflogen. Ich wurde von Heydrich gebeten mich um sie zu kuemmern und ihm ueber die Ereignisse warhrend der Konferenz mit Goering zu melden. Ich berichtete Heydrich genau ueber diese Konferenz. Sie befasste sich hauptsaechlich mit dem Aufbau des neuen slovakischen Staates. Meine Haupterinnerung an diese Konferenz besteht darin dass die Slovaken kaum eine Gelegenheit zum Sprechen hatten, weil Goering ununterbrochen sprach.

Die oben angefuehrten Tatsachen sind der Wahrheit entsprechend. Diese Erklaerungen sind von mir freiwillig und ohne jeden Zwang abgegeben worden und ich habe dieselben durchgelesen und unterschrieben.

/s/ ALFRED HELMUT NAUJOCKS

Subscribed and sworn to before me at NURNBERG/Germany this 20th day of November 1945.

/s/ JOHN B. MARTIN
Lt.(j.g.) USNR

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H1123-0297

H1123-0298

Exhibit U.S.A. 102
Offered Dec. 3, 1945
Objection to admission in evidence upheld Dec. 3, 1945

DOCUMENT NO. 3036 PS
OFFICE U.S. CHIEF OF COUNSEL

Eidesstattliche Erklaerung
von
Gottlob Berger

Ich, Gottlob Berger, mache unter Eid und nach vorheriger Einschwoerung folgende Erklaerung:-

1. In Herbst 1938 hatte ich den Rang und Titel eines Oberführers der SS. In der Mitte des Monats September wurde ich zum Verbindungsoffizier mit Konrad Henlein's Sudetendeutschen Freikorps bei ihrem Hauptquartier in einem Schlosse bei Dondorf ausserhalb Bayreuth, ernannt. In dieser Stellung war ich fuer den ganzen Verbindungsdienst zwischen Reichsfuehrer SS Himmler und Henlein verantwortlich und es war meine Hauptaufgabe Sudetendeutsche auszuwaehlen, die fuer die Mitgliedschaft der SS oder VT (Verfuegungstruppe) in Betracht kamen. Ausser mir waren noch ein Obergruppenfuehrer der NSKK, dessen Namen ich vergass, und S.A. Obergruppenfuehrer Max Juettner taetig. Ausserdem erschien Admiral Canaris, Fuehrer der OKW Abwehr, fast jeden zweiten Tag in Dondorf und besprach sich mit Henlein.

2. Im Laufe meiner offiziellen Taetigkeit in Henlein's Hauptquartier wurde ich mit der Zusammensetzung und der Taetigkeit des Freikorps vertraut. Drei Gruppen wurden unter der Leitung Henleins gebildet: eines im Gebiet. Eisenstein, Bayern; eines im Gebiet. Bayreuth; eines im Gebiet. Dresden; und moeglicher Weise ein viertes in Schlesien. Diese Gruppen sollten nur aus Fluechtlingen aus dem Sudetenland, die die Deutsche Grenze ueberschritten hatten, zusammengesetzt sein,aber in Wirklichkeit enthielten sie auch Reichsdeutsche mit frueherem Dienst in der SA u. NSKK. Diese Deutschen bildeten das Rueckgrat des Freikorps. Auf dem Papier hatte das Freikorps eine Staerke von 40,000. Seine wirkliche Staerke ist mir unbekannt, aber ich glaube, dass sie viel kleiner ist als die Papierzahl. Das Korps war mit Manlicher-Schoenauer Gewehren aus dem Heeresgeraeteparks in Oesterreich bewaffnet. Meiner Auffassung nach, wurden ungefaehr 18,000 Gewehre an die Leute unter Henlein's Fuehrung verteilt, ausserdem standen Henlein eine Anzahl von Maschinengewehren, (Gewehre u. M.G. waren nur bedingt gebrauchsfähig, infolge schlechter Munition),Handgranaten und 2 erbeutete Tank Abwehr Geschuetze zur Verfuegung. Ein Teil der Henlein gelieferten Ausruestung, hauptsaechlich Tornister, Kuechengeraete und Decken, wurde von der SA bereitgestellt.

3. In den Tagen vor dem Abschluss des Viermaechtepaktes in Muenchen hoerte ich von zahlreichen Vorfaellen, bei welchem das Freikorps Henlein in Scharmuetzeln mit tschechischen Spaehtruppen der Sudetengrenze entlang verwickelt war. Diese Operationen unterstanden der Fuehrung Henleins der wiederholt von seinem Hauptquartier an die Front ging, um direkte Fuehrung seiner Leute zu uebernehmen.

Die oben angefuehrten Tatsachen sind der Wahrheit entsprechend; Diese Erklaerungen sind von mir freiwillig und ohne jeden Zwang abgegeben worden und ich habe dieselben durchgelesen und unterschrieben.

/s/ Gottlob Berger
GOTTLOB BERGER

Subscribed and sworn to before me at Nurnberg, Germany this 22nd day of November 1945.

/s/ Smith W. Brookhart, Jr.
SMITH W. BROOKHART, JR.
Lt. Col., IGD.

3036

H1123-0299

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 3036-PS
OFFICE OF U. S. CHIEF OF COUNSEL

AFFIDAVIT OF GOTTLOB BERGER

I. GOTTLOB BERGER, under oath and being previously sworn make the following statement:

1. In the fall of 1938 I held the rank and title of Oberfuehrer in the SS. In mid-September I was assigned as SS Liaison Officer with Konrad Henlein's Sudeten German Free Corps at their headquarters in the castle at Dondorf outside Bayreuth. In this position I was responsible for all liaison between the Reichsfuehrer SS Himmler and Henlein and, in particular, I was delegated to select from the Sudeten Germans those who appeared to be eligible for membership in the SS or VT (Verfuegungs Truppe). In addition to myself, Liaison Officers stationed with Henlein included an Obergruppenfuhrer from the NSKK, whose name I have forgotten, and Obergruppenfuhrer Max Juettner, from the SA. In addition, Admiral Canaris, who was head of the OKW Abwehr, appeared at Dondorf nearly every two days and conferred with Henlein.

2. In the course of my official duties at Henlein's Headquarters I became familiar with the composition and activities of the Free Corps. Three groups were being formed under Henlein's direction: One in the Eisenstein area, Bavaria; one in the Bayreuth area; one in the Dresden area, and possibly a fourth group in Silesia. These groups were supposedly composed of refugees from the Sudetenland who had crossed the border into Germany, but they actually contained Germans with previous service in the SA and NSKK (Nazi Motor Corps) as well. These Germans formed the skeleton of the Free Corps. On paper the Free Corps had a strength of 40,000 men. I do not know its actual strength, but I believe it to be considerably smaller than the paper figure. The Corps was armed with Mannlicher-Schoenauer rifles from Army depots in Austria. It was my understanding that about 18,000 rifles were issued to men under Henlein's command. In addition, small numbers of machine guns,* hand grenades, and 2 captured anti-tank guns were placed at Henlein's disposal. Part of the equipment furnished to Henlein, mostly haversacks, cooking utensils, and blankets, were supplied by the SA.

3. In the days preceding the conclusion of the four-power pact at Munich I heard of numerous occasions on which the Henlein Free Corps was engaged in skirmishes with Czech patrols along the border of the Sudetenland. These operations were under the direction of Henlein, who went forward from his Headquarters repeatedly in order to take direct command of his men.

The facts stated above are true; this declaration is made by me voluntarily and without compulsion; after reading over this statement I have signed and executed the same.

(Signed) Gottlob Berger

*(Rifles and machine guns were of doubtful serviceability due to inferior ammunition).

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H1123-0300

Subscribed and sworn to before me at Nurnberg, Germany, this 22nd day of November 1945.

(Signed) Smith W. Brookhart, Jr.

SMITH W. BROOKHART, JR.
Lt. Col., IGD

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION
OF DOCUMENT NO. 3036-PS

22 November 1945

I, Ludwig Hartman, T/4, 37446052, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; and that the above is a correct and true translation of Document No. 3036-PS.

LUDWIG HARTMAN
T/4, 37446052

3036

H1123-0301

Exhibit U.S.a 96
Filed Dec 3, 1945

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 3059-PS
OFFICE OF U. S. CHIEF OF COUNSEL

SECRET

MEMORANDUM

The Sudeten German Party has been subsidized by the Foreign Office regularly since 1935 with certain amounts, consisting of a monthly payment of 15000 Marks; 12000 Marks of this are transmitted to the Prague Legation for disbursement, and 3000 Marks are paid out to the Berlin representation of the party (Bureau Buerger). In the course of the last few months the tasks assigned to the Bureau Buerger have increased considerably due to the current negotiations with the Czech Government. The number of pamphlets and maps which are produced and disseminated has risen; the propaganda activity in the press has grown immensely; the expense accounts have increased especially because due to the necessity for continuous good information, the expenses for trips to Prague, London, and Paris (including the financing of travels of Sudeten German deputies and agents) have grown considerably heavier. Under these conditions the Bureau Buerger is no longer able to get along with the monthly allowance of 3000 Marks if it is to do everything required. Therefore, Mr. Buerger has applied to this office for an increase of this amount, from 3000 Marks to 5500 Marks monthly. In view of the considerable increase in the business transacted by the Bureau, and of the importance which marks the activity of the Bureau in regard to the cooperation with the Foreign Office, this desire deserves the strongest support.

Herewith submitted to the Dept: Pers(onnel) with a request for approval. It is requested to increase the payments with retroactive effect from 1 August.*

Berlin, 19 August 1938

/s/ WOERMANN

*Volksdeutsche Mittelstelle (Central Office for Racial Germans) will be informed by the Political Dept. (handwritten marginal note).

(2 letters illegible). Mr. Schmidt, V(olks)D(eutsche) M(ittel) St(elle), has been informed by me today on the current payments of the Foreign Office to the Sudeten German Party. (Initial illegible) 24 Aug. (Handwritten note).

DECISION

1. The payments to the Bureau Buerger will be increased to 5500 Marks monthly until further notice, effective 1 August of this year.

2. Mr. A. R. Herold, for information and further action.

3. Herewith returned to
Section Politics IV
Berlin, 23 August 1938
/s/ DRUCKMANN (?)

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION
OF DOCUMENT 3059-PS

26 November 1945

I, Ludwig Hartman, T/4, 37446052, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; and that the above is a correct and true translation of Document No. 3059-PS.

LUDWIG HARTMAN
T/4, 37446052

3059

H1123-0302

Exhibit U.S.a. 93
Filed Dec. 3, 1945

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 3060-PS
OFFICE OF U. S. CHIEF OF COUNSEL

Prague, 16 March 1938

Foreign (Office), Berlin
Cipher Cable (Secret Proced.)
No. 57 of 16 Mar.
With reference to cable order No. 30 of 14 March.

Rebuff to Frank has had a salutary effect. Have thrashed out matters with Henlein, who recently had shunned me, and with Frank separately and received following promises:

1. The line of German Foreign Policy as transmitted by the German Legation is exclusively decisive for policy and tactics of the Sudeten German Party. My directives are to be complied with implicitly.

2. Public speeches and the press will be coordinated uniformly with my approval. The editorial staff of "Zeit" (Time) is to be improved.

3. Party leadership abandons the former intransigent line which in the end might lead to political complications and adopts a line of gradual promotion of Sudeten German interests. The objectives are to be set in every case with my participation and to be promoted by parallel diplomatic action. Laws for the protection of nationalities (Volksschutzgesetze) and "territorial autonomy" are no longer to be stressed.

4. If consultations with Berlin agencies are required or desired before Henlein issues important statements on his program, they are to be applied for and prepared through the Mission.

5. All information of the Sudeten German Party for German agencies is to be transmitted through the Legation.

6. Henlein will establish contact with me every week, and will come to Prague at any time if requested.

I now hope to have the Sudeten German Party under firm control, as this is more than ever necessary for coming developments in the interest of foreign policy. Please inform ministries concerned and Mittelstelle (Central Office for Racial Germans) and request them to support this uniform direction of the Sudeten German Party.

(Initial illegible),

(Five names and initials omitted)

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION
OF DOCUMENT 3060-PS

26 November 1945

I, LUDWIG HARTMAN, T/4, 37446052, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; and that the above is a correct and true translation of Document No. 3060-PS.

LUDWIG HARTMAN
T/4, 37446052

3060

Exhibit U.S.A. 121
Filed Dec 5 1945

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT NO. R-100
OFFICE OF U. S. CHIEF OF COUNSEL

Information given to the Supreme Commander of the Army by the Fuehrer on 25 March 1939.

Danzig Problem

L. will return from Warsaw on Sunday, 26 March. He was commissioned to ask whether Poland would be prepared to come to some terms with regard to Danzi Danzig. The Fuehrer left Berlin during the night of 25 March, he does not wish to be here when L. returns. R.(Ribbenthrop) shall negotiate at first. The Fuehrer does not wish, though, to solve the Danzig problem by the use of force, He would not like to drive Poland into the arms of Gt. Britain by doing so.

A military occupation of Danzig would have to be taken into considerat-ion only, if L. gives a hint that the Polish Government could not take the responsibility toward their own people to cede Danzig voluntarily and the solution would be made easier for them by a fait accompli.

Problem Poland.

For the time being, the Fuehrer does not intend to solve the Polish question. However, it should now be worked on. A solution in the near future would have to be based on especially favorable political condit-ions. In that case Poland shall be knocked down so completely that it need not be taken into account as a political factor for the next decades. The Fuehrer has in mind as such a solution, a borderline advanced from the Eastern border of East-Prussia to the Eastern tip of Upper Silesia. Evacuation and resettlement are questionsthatrremain open. The Fuehrer does not want to go into the Ukraine. Possibly, one could establish a Ukrainian State. But these questions also remain open.

Slovak question.

How long the Fuehrer considers himself bound by the Treaty concluded with Slovakia, is open to doubt. The Supreme Commander of the Army has the impression as if the Fuehrer wanted to free himself of this obligation when the time comes, and that he will use Slovakia as an asset for bargaining between himself, Poland and Hungary. For the time being, however, brakes should be put on Hungary.

The Fuehrer agrees to the border line proposed(line of the river Waag). In case that Slovakia should be divided, the Eastern border(line of the Neutra river) should be the border including Bratislava. For Bratislava possibly plebiscite, the Fuehrer does not expect difficulties because the town is not tending toward Hungary.

Engerau shall become a permanent garrison.

Col. Gen. Keitel shall inform Slovak Government via Foreign Office that it would not be allowed to keep or garrison armed Slovak units(Hlinka Guards) on this side of the border formed by the river Waag. They shall be transferr-ed to the new Slovak territory. Hlinka Guards should be disarmed.

Slovak shall be requested via Foreign Office to ddeliver to us against payment any arms we want and which are still kept in Slovakia. This request is to be based upon agreement made between Army and Czech troops. For this payment these millions should be used which we will pour anyhow into Slovakia.

Czech Protectorate.

H. Gr.(translator's note: probably Army groups) shall be asked again whether the request shall be repeated again for the delivery of all arms within a stated time limit and under the threat of severe penalties.

We take all war material of former Czechoslovakia without paying for it. The guns bought by contract before 15 February though shall be paid for.

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Officers of the Czech Army shall be cared for. This has to be done in accordance with the discussions between General Reinecke, Colonels Wagner and Burgsdorf of the Supreme Command of the Army. The pensions shall warrant a goodstandard of life, so as to prevent discontent. Maybe we shall take over the payment of the pensions or of a part of them -- so to speak as instalment on the captured war loot. Negotiations should be conducted on this basis.

The problems should be solved, at least on general lines, before the cession of the executive power. Supreme Command of the Army has proposed the limit of 6 April for the cession of executive. Fuehrer agrees.

H. (translator's note: Hacha) shall be requested to change his residence, to a place where he can do no harm. The respective request, though, is to come from Hacha.

If the Czechs intend to establish a labor service, the problem should be dealt with in a dilatory manner. The Czech people shoul not be strenghtaned by such concentrations. The settlement of this question falls under German jurisdiction.

A certain financial sovereignty shall be granted to the Czech State; maybe similar to that of Bavaria in former times. Fuehrer does not yet see clear with regard to the adjustment of debts. Conversion into Mark will be made in due time.

Bohemia-Moravia have to make annual contributions to the German treasury. Their amount shall be fixed on the basis of the expenses earmarked formerly for the Czech Army.

Page 3 Fuehrer does not object to the removal of the military forces after disarmament has been completed. He should not like, though, to prejudice the Polish problem which is not yet cleared up.

He wishes to be asked again with regard to this on Monday.

At the time, when Neurath takes over, there should be a few more troops than shall remain permanently. He assents, therefore, to dislocation.

Fuehrer will have a talk with Friderici ? etc., Supreme Command of the Army before Neurath takes over.

England - France.

RRelations seem to have cooled off a bit because France perceived that Gt. Britain intends to harness her to her own waggon.
Gt. Britain is said to have told France she should comply with the Italian desires regarding the Mediterranean.

Balkans.

Fuehrer wishes to make armament deals with the Balkans countries. But only against payment in foreign exchange or goods of similar currency value. Becker shall report on equalization of calibres and Skoda.
(Original has been written by hand by Lt. Col. Siewert. first General Staff oOfficer). Corrictness certified:
Signed (illegible) Col. of the General Staff.

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION
OF DOCUMENT NO. R-100 Nov. 18,1945

I, FRED NIEBERGALL, 2nd .Lt., Inf., O-133 55 67, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the German and English languages; and that the above is a true and correct translation of document no. R-100.

FRED NIEBERGALL
2nd, Lt. Inf.
O-133 55 67

R-100

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT NO. R-133
OFFICE OF US CHIEF OF COUNSEL

Exhibit U.S.a. 124
Filed Dec. 5, 1945

SECRET

Berlin 27 July 1939

LF 1
Az. 57 h LF 1 No. 3398/39 secret

Note
on a conference on 25 July 1939 with the General Field Marshal in Westerland.

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(illegible notations)

Present: Generaloberst Milch
State Secretary Koerner
" " Neumann
" " Dr. Landfried
" " v. Burgsdorf
Lt. Col (Gen Staff) Hünermann
Col (Gen Staff) Ploch
Min. Rat Mueller
Air Chief Staff Engineer Tschersich
Air Staff Engineer Diederichs
Ob. Reg. Rat v. Wedelstedt and Lt Col. Conrad
Generalmajor Thomas

1) In a rather long statement the field marshal explained that the incorpation of Bohemia and Moravia into the German economy had taken place, among other reasons, to increase the Germ German War potential by exploitation of the industry there. Letters, as the decree of the Reich Minister for Economics - S 10 402/39 of 10 July 39 - as well as a letter with similar meaning to the JUNKERS firm, which might possibly lower the kind and extent of the armament measures in the Protectorate are contrary to this principle. If it is necessary to issue such directives, this should be done only with his consent. In any case, he insists, in agreement with the directive by Hitler, that the war potential of the Protectorate is definitely to be exploited in part or in full and is to be directed towards mobilization as soon as possible.

Since, with full use of the industry of the Protectorate difficulties of money transfer would exist until the change to the same currency, a way out must be found for that. According to the declaration of state secretary Dr. Landfried the same procedure as in Slovakia might be applied, i.e. "Deposit of Reich treasury notes to cover the amounts of Kronen which are not balanced. But anyway, the change Reichsmark is planned for 1 April 1940."

2) As regards the question of leaving foreign currency of export firms in the Protectorate, which was brought up by a letter of the Reich protector to the field marshal because of a sale of the firm Walter, the field marshal consented to its remaining in the Protectorate, provided it is used 100% for the furtherance of the German war potential. In this connection State Secretary v. Burgsdorf explained that two weeks ago a supervisory office for foreign currency traffic had been established in the Protectorate, whose activity could direct the use of foreign exchange. State Secretary Dr. Landfried proposed further to appoint a plenipotentiary for the Czech National Bank who should regulate the foreign exchange allotment for armament purposes only. State Secretary v. Bergsdorf was doubtful about this regulation.

3) In order to arrange the mutual merchandise traffic for armament purposes with the lease possible friction, the field marshal emphasized the necessity of leaving this merchandise free of duty.

4) The field ... first of all the followin...

R-133

4) The Field Marshal underscored first of all the following principle for export questions:

a) Investigation concerning necessity of secrecy
b) " of the receiving country
c) " of "what is offered"
d) " of the own need for the merchandise to be given

The offer to Italy regarding delivery of 88mm AA was outlined by the Field Marshal as follows:

Delevieries are only permissible to a certain extent after reaching the peak of capacity ordered for our purposes. It is necessary that Italy deliver to us the raw materials necessary for Italian deliveries, i. e. some what more than is necessary for production.

Concerning the various countries the Field Marshal consented to the work on the following contracts on the basis of the talk by Ministerialrat Müller, and made the following decisions resp:

a) Bulgaria:
Delivery of Czech planes (about 148 and ground equipment) is to be made quickly. The contract for German equipment (10 Me 109 and 10 DO 215) can be worked on in 4-6 weeks, since Bulgaria can not be excluded from this equipment because of the deliveries to Rumania and Yugoslavia.

b) Rumania and Yugoslavia:

The Field Marshal was first informed that the Czech equipment is refused and that, due to the situation, the ordering countries can not suffer postponement of the date delivery to Spring 1940. Because of the special agreement concerning petroleum deliveries, the Field Marshal therefore permitted the planned contract with Rumania, i.e. delivery of the samples, which was announced already earlier to the Field Marshal, will begin in Autumn of this year.

The field marshal makes the contract with Yugoslavia dependent on the answer to certain questions which had remained unanswered by the prince regent and the Yugoslav government resp. Concerning these he would write to the prince regent personally. They concern the fact that Yugoslavia did not leave the League of Nations, and fortification works at the Italian and German frontiers in the presence of French officers. However, he was not apposed to deliver at first 5 Me 109 to show our basic willingness. For the rest, the Field Marshal expressly empowered the Ministerialrat Müller, to instruct the Yugoslav military attach in Berlin that his consent to the contract would have to depend on the reply to certain questions which he would transeint by letter to the prince regent.

c) Turkey:
The Field Marshal made no negative decision regarding the delivery of five Me 109 to Turkey till the final clearance of the situation. His declarations about that were to be understood thus: that the delivery could be made if it seemed opportune according to the situation.

Finally, the field marshal stated about the treatment of exports generally that the buying countries should be informed that the political situation had changed very markedly, and they would have to understand that Germany would now have

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to look out for itself first. The recurring lately expressed objections by foreign countries about offers of English Spitfires etc. should be answered in the vein that we are not angered by such bugs, and that we could only recommend making them

(signed) MULLER

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CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION
OF DOCUMENT NO. R-133

13 November 1945

I, ERNST M. COHN Pfc, 33925738, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; and that the above is a true and correct translation of Document No. R-133.

ERNST M. COHN
Pfc. 33925738

R-133

TRANSLATION OF EXCERPTS FROM DOC. R-150
OFFICE OF U. S. CHIEF OF COUNSEL

Exhibit U.S.A. 82
Filed Dec. 3, 1945

EXCERPTS FROM:

PLAN STUDY 1938

Top Secret
By officer's hand only

To: Air Force Group Command 3
Az. Plst. 38/Ia op
No.450/38 Top Secret
Top Secret Matter of 2 June 1938

38 copies
copy No. 16

Plan Study 1938

Main Part III

Instruction for Deployment and Combat
"Case Red"

Place Names according to
Gea Survey Map 1: 1,000,000

R-150

H1123-0308

Arrangement of Main Part III "Case Red" of Plan Study 1938

Preface

Part A — General principles for combat in the event of "Case Red"
Part B — Air attack against the West
Part C — Instructions for deployment and first employment of air defense forces in the event of "Case Red"
Part D — Instructions for signal communications service in the event of "Case Red"
Part E — Formations of Air Force Group 3 which in the event of "Case Red" are to be attached to the Army, and airdromes in the area of Air Force Group 3 which are to be taken over by the Army
Part F — Instructions concerning supply
Part G — Instructions for preparation of marches and railroad movements
Part H — List of signals and method of transmission
Part J — Deadlines
Part K — Supply with target information and maps

Enclosure 1 — First employment of ground crew companies
" 2 — French Air Force: Deployment areas, ground organization, supply installations.
" 3 — French deployment routes: Targets for interference.
" 3a — French deployment routes: Stretches in open country favorable for cutting
" 4 — First priority power and transformer stations, oil refineries, oil depots, disembarkation ports
" 5 — "Case Red", "Air Defense Red"
" 6 — Air Force Group 3 - telephone communications (Net Ludwig)
" 7 — Air Force Group 3 - teleprinter communications (Net Ludwig)
" 8 — Air Force Group 3 - telegraph communications (Net Ludwig)
" 9 — Survey map of networks for leadership and command; radio communications
" 10 — Flight control and radio navigation
" 11 — Static ground network for flight signals and employment of flight signal companies in Air Force Group 3, including Tyrol and Vorarlberg, with attachment "List of places with their numbers"

Preface

1. In order to elaborate the preparations for "Case Red", formations will base individual maneuvers and field discussions on assignments corresponding to this case of action. They will bear in mind the restrictions prescribed in Main Part I, Part B I, Article 5.

2. The officers of attack formations and reconnaissance groups F must be familiar with the possible priority targets; they will also inform themselves about all targets within the combat area which are of interest to the Air Force.

3. Necessary reconnaissance on the subject of air defense will be assigned to the troops as individual reconnaissance tasks for the air defense target file and will be treated as top secret matter. The troops must not be able to deduce from the assignments a picture of the total deployment planned.

Part A

General Principles for Combat in the event of "Case Red"

I. The Enemy

1. Military-political situation:

Opening move of War:

H1123-0309

If war threatens between France and Germany, it is expected that hostilities will be started by France.

France will
a) either interfere in the struggle between the Reich and Czechoslovakia in the course of "Case Green", or
b) start hostilities simultaneously with Czechoslovakia.
c) It is possible but not likely that France will begin the fight, while Czechoslovakia still remains aloof.

It may be assumed that France will begin the war with her Air Force, probably without a declaration of war.

England's entry into the war and the employment of English air forces, even from continental bases, must be reckoned with.

Belgium's participation is uncertain.

It is doubtful whether France and England will respect a possible Belgian neutrality.

It is unlikely that France will respect the neutrality of Luxembourg.

German formations will not fly over Belgian and Luxembourg territory until they receive specific orders from the Supreme Command of the Air Force.

(Follow speculations as to the probable deployment and strategic plan of the French Air Force.)

(P. 8)
11. Intention of the Commanding General and of the Commander of Air Force Group 3

a. Combat area: The whole area of France

(follows delineation of combat area of Air Force Group 3 as against that of Air Force Group 2)

Combat (including reconnaissance, but excluding contact with enemy formations which have carried out attacks in form of raids) will not be started until the Supreme Commander of the Air Force has given the signal: "Western frontier clear for flight".

(P. 9)
b. Intention:

Regardless of whether France enters the war as a result of "Case Green" or whether she makes the opening move of the war simultaneously with Czechoslovakia, in any case the mass of the German offensive formations will, in conjunction with the Army, first deliver the decisive blow against Czechoslovakia.

Until the main forces employed in the Southeast become available, it will be the task of Air Force Group 3 to prevent France from obtaining complete freedom of action in the air. For this purpose, attacks will be carried out continuously, in varying strength and in irregular sequence; air defense will be mobile and will be concentrated on focal points. In addition it may be necessary in exceptional cases to relieve Army Group West through concentrated use (translator's note: of the Air Force) at threatened parts of the front or through attacks against the deploying French armies, the deployment routes and the supply service.

It is intended to use parachute sabotage troops, which will be assigned by the Supreme Command of the Air Force from case to case, for the purpose of destroying suitable targets, against which bombing raids cannot guarantee decisive success.

By means of simulated activities on as many peacetime airports as possible and on other airdromes known to the enemy, further by installing new dummy airdromes and by distributing our own forces in small units over a wide area, we intend to create a deceptive impression of great fighting strength and to split up the enemy's combat forces.

Later phase:

(P. 10)
If stronger forces are assigned in the course of the operations, the main task will be:

To break up the French flying formations on their airdromes, to destroy their supply depots and the vital installations on the airdromes.

In addition, preparations will be made for:

aa. Attacks against power and transformer stations which are indispensable for the supply of power to the armament industries in and around Paris (the most important stations which are to be destroyed first are marked on Enclosure 4)

bb. Attacks against the French fuel supply, especially the refineries and oil depots (for the most important installations see Enclosure 4)

cc. Attacks against (translator's note: troops and cargoes) unloading in the French Mediterranean Ports (see Enclosure 4)

These attacks, as well as attacks on airdromes and supply depots in the Paris zone will not be carried out until a specific order is received from the Supreme Commander of the Air Force.

(P. 45)
24. Preparatory measures for employment against the West of further aggressive air forces freed from service in the Southeast.

a. As the enterprise against Czechoslovakia progresses, aggressive air forces freed from service in the Southeast will, in the event of "Case Red", be transferred to the West and employed against France with as much sudden force (schlagartig) as possible.

Depending on the development of the situation in the Southeast, the transfer of reinforcements to the West may become possible already a few days after "Case Red" starts.

The strength of these forces cannot be determined exactly beforehand. The following are the maximum forces which may be counted upon (additional to the forces already employed in the West by the Commanding General of Air Force Group 3):

3 Air Division Commanders with, on the average:
2 combat "geschwader", 1 dive-bomber group and 1 reconnaissance "Staffel" or Group (F) each.

(Therefore total strength roughly up to 30 combat and dive-bomber Groups)

For combat objectives of the Commanding General of Air Force Group 3 after receipt of reinforcements, see Part A, Article 11.

H1123-0311

Part J

Deadlines

15 July 1938: Luftgau Commands will:
Report that the preparations ordered in Plan Study 1938 Main Part III for the event of "Case Red" have been completed (cf. Article 2 of covering letter (Anschreiben) of Decree Lw. Gruppenkommando 3 Az. Plst.38/Ia op No.450/38 Top Secret 2 June 1938 concerning Plan Study 1938).

15 July 1938: Luftgau Commands will:

Effect changes of distribution of Air defense forces in accordance with Part C Article 16 a,

Submit marching orders in accordance with Part C Article 16 e and f,

Report that the issue of assignment orders has been completed, in accordance with Part C Article 16 e and f

1 August 1938)
1 November 1938) Report concerning substitute field airdromes, in accordance with Part E Article 8, by Luftgau
1 March 1939) Commands VII, XII and XIII.

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION
OF EXCERPTS OF DOC. R-150

19 November 1945

I, GOETZ MAYER, T/5, 33812169, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; and that the above is a correct and true translation of excerpts from Doc. R-150.

GOETZ MAYER,
T/5, 33812169.

H1123-0312

[1] TRADUCTION. — TRANSLATION.

No. 1296. — ARBITRATION TREATY [2] BETWEEN GERMANY AND CZECHOSLOVAKIA, DONE AT LOCARNO, OCTOBER 16, 1925.

Official text in French. This Treaty was registered with the Secretariat, in accordance with its Article 22, on September 14, 1926, the date of its entry into force.

THE PRESIDENT OF THE GERMAN EMPIRE and THE PRESIDENT OF THE CZECHOSLOVAK REPUBLIC;

Equally resolved to maintain peace between Germany and Czechoslovakia by assuring the peaceful settlement of differences which might arise between the two countries;

Declaring that respect for the rights established by treaty or resulting from the law of nations is obligatory for international tribunals;

Agreeing to recognise that the rights of a State cannot be modified save with its consent;

And considering that sincere observance of the methods of peaceful settlement of international disputes permits of resolving, without recourse to force, questions which may become the cause of division between States;

Have decided to embody in a treaty their common intentions in this respect, and have named as their Plenipotentiaries the following:

THE PRESIDENT OF THE GERMAN EMPIRE:

Dr. Gustav STRESEMANN, Minister for Foreign Affairs;

THE PRESIDENT OF THE CZECHOSLOVAK REPUBLIC:

Dr. Edouard BENEŠ, Minister for Foreign Affairs;

Who, having exchanged their full powers, found in good and due form, are agreed upon the following Articles:

PART I.

Article 1.

All disputes of every kind between Germany and Czechoslovakia with regard to which the Parties are in conflict as to their respective rights, and which it may not be possible to settle amicably by the normal methods of diplomacy, shall be submitted for decision either to an arbitral tribunal or to the Permanent Court of International Justice [3], as laid down hereafter. It is

[1] Communiquée par le Ministère des Affaires étrangères de Sa Majesté britannique. [1] Communicated by His Britannic Majesty's Foreign Office.

[2] The ratifications were deposited at Geneva, September 14, 1926.

[3] Vol. VI, page 379; Vol. XI, page 404; Vol. XV, page 304; Vol. XXIV, page 152; Vol. XXVII, page 416; Vol. XXXIX, page 165; Vol. XLV, page 96; and Vol. L, page 159, of this Series.

TC 14

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agreed that the disputes referred to above include, in particular, those mentioned in Article 13 of the Covenant of the League of Nations.

This provision does not apply to disputes arising out of events prior to the present Treaty and belonging to the past.

Disputes, for the settlement of which a special procedure is laid down in other conventions in force between the High Contracting Parties, shall be settled in conformity with the provisions of those Conventions.

Article 2.

Before any resort is made to arbitral procedure or to procedure before the Permanent Court of International Justice, the dispute may, by agreement between the Parties, be submitted, with a view to amicable settlement, to a permanent international commission, styled the *Permanent Conciliation Commission*, constituted in accordance with the present Treaty.

Article 3.

In the case of a dispute the occasion of which, according to the municipal law of one of the Parties, falls within the competence of the national courts of such Party, the matter in dispute shall not be submitted to the procedure laid down in the present Treaty until a judgment with final effect has been pronounced, within a reasonable time, by the competent national judicial authority.

Article 4.

The Permanent Conciliation Commission mentioned in Article 2 shall be composed of five members, who shall be appointed as follows, that is to say : the High Contracting Parties shall each nominate a commissioner chosen from among their respective nationals, and shall appoint, by common agreement, the three other commissioners from among the nationals of third Powers ; those three commissioners must be of different nationalities, and the High Contracting Parties shall appoint the president of the commission from among them.

The commissioners are appointed for three years, and their mandate is renewable. Their appointment shall continue until their replacement, and in any case until the termination of the work in hand at the moment of the expiry of their mandate.

Vacancies which may occur as a result of death, resignation or any other cause shall be filled within the shortest possible time in the manner fixed for the nominations.

Article 5.

The Permanent Conciliation Commission shall be constituted within three months from the entry into force of the present Treaty.

If the nomination of the commissioners to be appointed by common agreement should not have taken place within the said period, or, in the case of the filling of a vacancy, within three months from the time when the seat falls vacant, the President of the Swiss Confederation shall, in the absence of other agreement, be requested to make the necessary appointments.

Article 6.

The Permanent Conciliation Commission shall be informed by means of a request addressed to the president by the two Parties acting in agreement, or, in the absence of such agreement, by one or other of the Parties.

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H1123-0314

The request, after having given a summary account of the subject of the dispute, shall contain the invitation to the commission to take all necessary measures with a view to arriving at an amicable settlement.

If the request emanates from only one of the Parties, notification thereof shall be made without delay to the other Party.

Article 7.

Within fifteen days from the date when one of the High Contracting Parties shall have brought a dispute before the Permanent Conciliation Commission, either Party may, for the examination of the particular dispute, replace its commissioner by a person possessing special competence in the matter.

The Party making use of this right shall immediately inform the other Party ; the latter shall in that case be entitled to take similar action within fifteen days from the date when the notification reaches it.

Article 8.

The task of the Permanent Conciliation Commission shall be to elucidate questions in dispute, to collect with that object all necessary information by means of enquiry or otherwise, and to endeavour to bring the Parties to an agreement. It may, after the case has been examined, inform the Parties of the terms of settlement which seem suitable to it, and lay down a period within which they are to make their decision.

At the close of its labours the commission shall draw up a report stating, as the case may be, either that the Parties have come to an agreement and, if need arises, the terms of the agreement, or that it has been impossible to effect a settlement.

The labours of the commission must, unless the Parties otherwise agree, be terminated within six months from the day on which the commission shall have been notified of the dispute.

Article 9.

Failing any special provision to the contrary, the Permanent Conciliation Commission shall lay down its own procedure, which in any case must provide for both Parties being heard. In regard to enquiries, the commission, unless it decides unanimously to the contrary, shall act in accordance with the provisions of Chapter III (International Commissions of Enquiry) of The Hague Convention [1] of the 18th October, 1907, for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes.

Article 10.

The Permanent Conciliation Commission shall meet, in the absence of agreement by the Parties to the contrary at a place selected by its president.

Article 11.

The labours of the Permanent Conciliation Commission are not public except when a decision to that effect has been taken by the commission with the consent of the Parties.

Article 12.

The Parties shall be represented before the Permanent Conciliation Commission by agents, whose duty it shall be to act as intermediaries between them and the commission ; they may more-

[1] *British and Foreign State Papers*, Vol. 100, page 298.

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over be assisted by counsel and experts appointed by them for that purpose, and request that all persons whose evidence appears to them useful should be heard.

The commission on its side shall be entitled to request oral explanations from the agents, counsel and experts of the two Parties, as well as from all persons it may think useful to summon with the consent of their Government.

Article 13.

Unless otherwise provided in the present Treaty the decisions of the Permanent Conciliation Commission shall be taken by a majority.

Article 14.

The High Contracting Parties undertake to facilitate the labours of the Permanent Conciliation Commission, and particularly to supply it to the greatest possible extent with all relevant documents and information, as well as to use the means at their disposal to allow it to proceed in their territory and in accordance with their law to the summoning and hearing of witnesses or experts, and to visit the localities in question.

Article 15.

During the labours of the Permanent Conciliation Commission each commissioner shall receive salary, the amount of which shall be fixed by agreement between the High Contracting Parties, each of which shall contribute an equal share.

Article 16.

In the event of no amicable agreement being reached before the Permanent Conciliation Commission the dispute shall be submitted by means of a special agreement either to the Permanent Court of International Justice under the conditions and according to the procedure laid down by its statute or to an arbitral tribunal under the conditions and according to the procedure laid down by The Hague Convention of the 18th October, 1907, for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes.

If the Parties cannot agree on the terms of the special agreement after a month's notice one or other of them may bring the dispute before the Permanent Court of International Justice by means of an application.

PART II.

Article 17.

All questions on which the German and Czechoslovak Governments shall differ without being able to reach an amicable solution by means of the normal methods of diplomacy the settlement of which cannot be attained by means of a judicial decision as provided in Article 1 of the present Treaty, and for the settlement of which no procedure has been laid down by other conventions in force between the Parties, shall be submitted to the Permanent Conciliation Commission, whose duty it shall be to propose to the Parties an acceptable solution and in any case to present a report.

The procedure laid down in Articles 6-15 of the present Treaty shall be applicable.

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Article 18.

If the two Parties have not reached an agreement within a month from the termination of the labours of the Permanent Conciliation Commission the question shall, at the request of either Party, be brought before the Council of the League of Nations, which shall deal with it in accordance with Article 15 of the Covenant of the League.

GENERAL PROVISIONS.

Article 19.

In any case, and particularly if the question on which the Parties differ arises out of acts already committed or on the point of commission, the Conciliation Commission or, if the latter has not been notified thereof, the arbitral tribunal or the Permanent Court of International Justice, acting in accordance with Article 41 of its statute, shall lay down within the shortest possible time the provisional measures to be adopted. It shall similarly be the duty of the Council of the League of Nations, if the question is brought before it, to ensure that suitable provisional measures are taken. The High Contracting Parties undertake respectiv ly to accept such measures, to abstain from all measures likely to have a repercussion prejudicial to the execution of the decision or to the arrangements proposed by the Conciliation Commission or by the Council of the League of Nations, and in general to abstain from any sort of action whatsoever which may aggravate or extend the dispute.

Article 20.

The present Treaty continues applicable as between the High Contracting Parties even when other Powers are also interested in the dispute.

Article 21.

The present Treaty, which is in conformity with the Covenant of the League of Nations, shal not in any way affect the rights and obligations of the High Contracting Parties as Members of the League of Nations and shall not be interpreted as restricting the duty of the League to take whatever action may be deemed wise and effectual to safeguard the peace of the world.

Article 22.

The present Treaty shall be ratified. Ratifications shall be deposited at Geneva with the League of Nations at the same time as the ratifications of the Treaty concluded this day between Germany, Belgium, France, Great Britain and Italy.

It shall enter into and remain in force under the same conditions as the said Treaty.

The present Treaty, done in a single copy, shall be deposited in the archives of the League of Nations, the Secretary-General of which shall be requested to transmit certified copies to each of the High Contracting Parties.

In faith whereof the above-mentioned Plenipotentiaries have signed the present Treaty.

Done at Locarno, the sixteenth October, nineteen hundred and twenty-five.

(L. S.) *(Signed)* Gustav STRESEMANN.
(L. S.) *(Signed)* Dr. Eduard BENEŠ.

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N° 1296. — TRAITÉ D'ARBITRAGE [1] ENTRE L'ALLEMAGNE ET LA TCHÉCOSLOVAQUIE, FAIT A LOCARNO, LE 16 OCTOBRE 1925.

Texte officiel français. Ce traité a été enregistré par le Secrétariat, conformément à son article 22, le 14 septembre 1926, jour de son entrée en vigueur.

LE PRÉSIDENT DE L'EMPIRE ALLEMAND et LE PRÉSIDENT DE LA RÉPUBLIQUE TCHÉCOSLOVAQUE,

Egalement résolus à maintenir la paix entre l'Allemagne et la Tchécoslovaquie en assurant le règlement pacifique des différends qui viendraient à surgir entre les deux pays ;

Constatant que le respect des droits établis par les traités ou résultant du droit des gens est obligatoire pour les tribunaux internationaux ;

D'accord pour reconnaître que les droits d'un Etat ne sauraient être modifiés que de son consentement ;

Et considérant que la sincère observation des procédés de règlement pacifique des différends internationaux permet de résoudre sans recourir à la force les questions qui viendraient à diviser les Etats,

Ont décidé de réaliser dans un traité leurs intentions communes à cet égard et ont nommé pour leurs plénipotentiaires, savoir :

LE PRÉSIDENT DE L'EMPIRE ALLEMAND :

Le Dr Gustav STRESEMANN, ministre des Affaires étrangères ;

LE PRÉSIDENT DE LA RÉPUBLIQUE TCHÉCOSLOVAQUE :

Le Dr Edouard BENEŠ, ministre des Affaires étrangères ;

Lesquels, après avoir échangé leurs pleins pouvoirs reconnus en bonne et due forme, sont convenus des dispositions suivantes :

PREMIÈRE PARTIE.

Article premier.

Toutes contestations entre l'Allemagne et la Tchécoslovaquie, de quelque nature qu'elles soient, au sujet desquelles les Parties se contesteraient réciproquement un droit, et qui n'auraient pu être réglées à l'amiable par les procédés diplomatiques ordinaires seront soumises pour jugement soit à un tribunal arbitral soit à la Cour permanente de Justice internationale [2], ainsi qu'il est prévu ci-

[1] Les ratifications ont été déposées à Genève, le 14 septembre 1926.

[2] Vol. VI, page 379 ; vol. XI, page 404 ; vol. XV, page 304 ; vol. XXIV, page 152 ; vol. XXVII, page 416 ; vol. XXXIX, page 165 ; vol. XLV, page 96 ; et vol. L, page 159, de ce recueil.

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après. Il est entendu que les contestations ci-dessus visées comprennent notamment celles que mentionne l'article 13 du Pacte de la Société des Nations.

Cette disposition ne s'applique pas aux contestations nées de faits qui sont antérieurs au présent traité et qui appartiennent au passé.

Les contestations pour la solution desquelles une procédure spéciale est prévue par d'autres conventions en vigueur entre les Hautes Parties contractantes seront réglées conformément aux dispositions de ces conventions.

Article 2.

Avant toute procédure arbitrale ou avant toute procédure devant la Cour permanente de Justice internationale, la contestation pourra être, d'un commun accord entre les Parties, soumise à fin de conciliation à une commission internationale permanente, dite *Commission permanente de conciliation*, constituée conformément au présent traité.

Article 3.

S'il s'agit d'une contestation dont l'objet, d'après la législation intérieure de l'une des Parties, relève de la compétence des tribunaux nationaux de celles-ci, le différend ne sera soumis à la procédure prévue par le présent traité qu'après jugement passé en force de chose jugée rendu, dans les délais raisonnables, par l'autorité judiciaire nationale compétente.

Article 4.

La commission permanente de conciliation prévue à l'article 2 sera composée de cinq membres, qui seront désignés comme il suit, savoir: les Hautes Parties contractantes nommeront chacune un commissaire choisi parmi leurs nationaux respectifs et désigneront, d'un commun accord, les trois autres commissaires parmi les ressortissants de tierces Puissances; ces trois commissaires devront être de nationalités différentes et, parmi eux, les Hautes Parties contractantes désigneront le président de la commission.

Les commissaires sont nommés pour trois ans, leur mandat est renouvelable. Ils resteront en fonctions jusqu'à leur remplacement; et, dans tous les cas, jusqu'à l'achèvement de leurs travaux en cours au moment de l'expiration de leur mandat.

Il sera pourvu, dans le plus bref délai, aux vacances qui viendraient à se produire par suite de décès, de démission ou de quelque autre empêchement, en suivant le mode fixé pour les nominations.

Article 5.

La commission permanente de conciliation sera constituée dans les trois mois qui suivront l'entrée en vigueur du présent traité.

Si la nomination des commissaires à désigner en commun n'intervenait pas dans ledit délai ou, en cas de remplacement, dans les trois mois à compter de la vacance du siège, le Président de la Confédération suisse sera, à défaut d'autre entente, prié de procéder aux désignations nécessaires.

Article 6.

La commission permanente de conciliation sera saisie par voie de requête adressée au président par les deux Parties agissant d'un commun accord ou, à défaut, par l'une ou l'autre des Parties.

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La requête, après avoir exposé sommairement l'objet du litige, contiendra l'invitation à la commission de procéder à toutes mesures propres à conduire à une conciliation.

Si la requête émane d'une seule des Parties, elle sera notifiée par celle-ci sans délai à la Partie adverse.

Article 7.

Dans un délai de quinze jours à partir de la date où l'une des Hautes Parties contractantes aurait porté une contestation devant la commission permanente de conciliation, chacune des Parties pourra, pour l'examen de cette contestation, remplacer son commissaire par une personne possédant une compétence spéciale dans la matière.

La Partie qui userait de ce droit en fera immédiatement la notification à l'autre Partie; celle-ci aura, dans ce cas, la faculté d'agir de même dans un délai de quinze jours à partir de la date où la notification lui sera parvenue.

Article 8.

La commission permanente de conciliation aura pour tâche d'élucider les questions en litige, de recueillir à cette fin toutes les informations utiles par voie d'enquête ou autrement et de s'efforcer de concilier les Parties. Elle pourra, après examen de l'affaire, exposer aux Parties les termes de l'arrangement qui lui paraîtrait convenable et leur impartir un délai pour se prononcer.

A la fin de ses travaux, la commission dressera un procès-verbal constatant, suivant le cas, soit que les Parties se sont arrangées et, s'il y a lieu, les conditions de l'arrangement, soit que les Parties n'ont pu être conciliées.

Les travaux de la commission devront, à moins que les Parties en conviennent différemment, être terminés dans le délai de six mois à compter du jour où la commission aura été saisie du litige.

Article 9.

A moins de stipulation spéciale contraire, la commission permanente de conciliation réglera elle-même sa procédure qui, dans tous les cas, devra être contradictoire. En matière d'enquêtes, la commission, si elle n'en décide autrement à l'unanimité, se conformera aux dispositions du titre III (Commissions internationales d'enquête) de la Convention[1] de La Haye du 18 Octobre 1907 pour le règlement pacifique des conflits internationaux.

Article 10.

La commission permanente de conciliation se réunira, sauf accord contraire entre les Parties, au lieu désigné par son président.

Article 11.

Les travaux de la commission permanente de conciliation ne sont publics qu'en vertu d'une décision prise par la commission avec l'assentiment des Parties.

Article 12.

Les Parties seront représentées auprès de la commission permanente de conciliation par des agents ayant mission de servir d'intermédiaires entre elles et la commission; elles pourront, en

[1] DE MARTENS, *Nouveau Recueil général de Traités*, troisième série, tome III, page 360.

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outre, se faire assister par des conseils et experts nommés par elles à cet effet et demander l'audition de toutes personnes dont le témoignage leur paraît utile.

La commission aura, de son côté, la faculté de demander des explications orales aux agents, conseils et experts des deux Parties, ainsi qu'à toutes personnes qu'elle jugerait utile de faire comparaître avec l'assentiment de leur gouvernement.

Article 13.

Sauf disposition contraire du présent traité, les décisions de la commission permanente de conciliation seront prises à la majorité des voix.

Article 14.

Les Hautes Parties contractantes s'engagent à faciliter les travaux de la commission permanente de conciliation et, en particulier, à lui fournir dans la plus large mesure possible, tous documents et informations utiles, ainsi qu'à user des moyens dont elles disposent pour leur permettre de procéder sur leur territoire et selon leur législation à la citation et à l'audition de témoins ou d'experts et à des transports sur les lieux.

Article 15.

Pendant la durée des travaux de la commission permanente de conciliation, chacun des commissaires recevra une indemnité dont le montant sera arrêté, d'un commun accord, entre les Hautes Parties contractantes qui en supporteront chacune une part égale.

Article 16.

En défaut de conciliation devant la commission permanente de conciliation, la contestation sera soumise par voie de compromis soit à la Cour permanente de Justice internationale dans les conditions et suivant la procédure prévues par son statut, soit à un tribunal arbitral dans les conditions et suivant la procédure prévues par la Convention de La Haye du 18 octobre 1907 pour le règlement pacifique des conflits internationaux.

A défaut d'accord entre les Parties sur le compromis et après un préavis d'un mois, l'une ou l'autre d'entre elles aura la faculté de porter directement par voie de requête la contestation devant la Cour permanente de Justice internationale.

PARTIE II.

Article 17.

Toutes questions sur lesquelles le Gouvernement allemand et le Gouvernement tchécoslovaque seraient divisés sans pouvoir les résoudre à l'amiable par les procédés diplomatiques ordinaires, dont la solution ne pourrait être recherchée par un jugement, ainsi qu'il est prévu par l'article premier du présent traité et pour lesquelles une procédure de règlement ne serait pas déjà prévue par d'autres conventions en vigueur entre les Parties, seront soumises à la commission permanente de conciliation qui sera chargée de proposer aux Parties une solution acceptable et, dans tous les cas, de présenter un rapport.

La procédure prévue par les articles 6 à 15 du présent traité sera appliquée.

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Article 18.

Si, dans le mois qui suivra la clôture des travaux de la commission permanente de conciliation les deux Parties ne se sont pas entendues, la question sera, à la requête de l'une ou de l'autre Partie, portée devant le Conseil de la Société des Nations, qui statuera conformément à l'article 15 du Pacte de la Société.

DISPOSITIONS GÉNÉRALES.

Article 19.

Dans tous les cas et notamment si la question, au sujet de laquelle les Parties sont divisées, résulte d'actes déjà effectués ou sur le point de l'être, la commission de conciliation ou, si celle-ci ne s'en trouvait pas saisie, le tribunal arbitral ou la Cour permanente de Justice internationale statuant conformément à l'article 41 de son statut, indiqueront, dans le plus bref délai possible, quelles mesures provisoires doivent être prises. Il appartiendra au Conseil de la Société des Nations, s'il est saisi de la question, de pourvoir de même à des mesures provisoires appropriées. Chacune des Hautes Parties contractantes s'engage à s'y conformer, à s'abstenir de toute mesure susceptible d'avoir une répercussion préjudiciable à l'exécution de la décision ou aux arrangements proposés par la commission de conciliation ou par le Conseil de la Société des Nations, et, en général, à ne procéder à aucun acte de quelque nature qu'il soit susceptible d'aggraver ou d'étendre le différend.

Article 20.

Le présent traité reste applicable entre les Hautes Parties contractantes, encore que d'autres Puissances aient également un intérêt dans le différend.

Article 21.

Le présent traité conforme au Pacte de la Société des Nations ne portera aucune atteinte aux droits et obligations des Hautes Parties contractantes en tant que membres de la Société des Nations et ne sera pas interprété comme restreignant la mission de celle-ci de prendre les mesures propres à sauvegarder efficacement la paix du monde.

Article 22.

Le présent traité sera ratifié. Les ratifications en seront déposées à Genève à la Société des Nations en même temps que les ratifications du traité conclu en date de ce jour entre l'Allemagne, la Belgique, la France, la Grande-Bretagne et l'Italie.

Il entrera et demeurera en vigueur dans les mêmes conditions que ledit traité.

Le présent traité, fait en un seul exemplaire, sera déposé aux archives de la Société des Nations, dont le Secrétaire général sera prié de remettre à chacune des Hautes Parties contractantes des copies certifiées conformes.

En foi de quoi les plénipotentiaires susnommés ont signé le présent traité.

Fait à Locarno, le seize octobre mil neuf cent vingt-cinq.

(L. S.) *(Signé)* Gustav STRESEMANN.
(L. S.) *(Signé)* Dr Edvard BENEŠ.

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No. 3.

Extract from Statement made by the Prime Minister to the House of Commons on September 28 announcing the Reichschancellor's reply to the Message which he had sent to him that morning.

"I HAVE something further to say to the House yet. I have now been informed by Herr Hitler that he invites me to meet him at Munich to-morrow morning. He has also invited Signor Mussolini and M. Daladier. Signor Mussolini has accepted, and I have no doubt M. Daladier will also accept. I need not say what my answer will be."

No. 4.

AGREEMENT CONCLUDED AT MUNICH ON SEPTEMBER 29, 1938.

GERMANY, the United Kingdom, France and Italy, taking into consideration the agreement, which has been already reached in principle for the cession to Germany of the Sudeten German territory, have agreed on the following terms and conditions governing the said cession and the measures consequent thereon, and by this agreement they each hold themselves responsible for the steps necessary to secure its fulfilment:—

1. The evacuation will begin on the 1st October.

2. The United Kingdom, France and Italy agree that the evacuation of the territory shall be completed by the 10th October, without any existing installations having been destroyed and that the Czechoslovak Government will be held responsible for carrying out the evacuation without damage to the said installations.

3. The conditions governing the evacuation will be laid down in detail by an international commission composed of representatives of Germany, the United Kingdom, France, Italy and Czechoslovakia.

4. The occupation by stages of the predominantly German territory by German troops will begin on the 1st October. The four territories marked on the attached map(1) will be occupied by German troops in the following order: the territory marked No. I on the 1st and 2nd of October, the territory marked No. II on the 2nd and 3rd of October, the territory marked No. III on the 3rd, 4th and 5th of October, the territory marked No. IV on the 6th and 7th of October. The remaining territory of preponderantly German character will be ascertained by the aforesaid international commission forthwith and be occupied by German troops by the 10th of October.

(1) See sketch map based on the original. The sketch map illustrating the Reichschancellor's memorandum of September 23 (see Cmd. 5847), is also reproduced.

5. The international commission referred to in paragraph 3 will determine the territories in which a plebiscite is to be held. These territories will be occupied by international bodies until the plebiscite has been completed. The same commission will fix the conditions in which the plebiscite is to be held, taking as a basis the conditions of the Saar plebiscite. The commission will also fix a date, not later than the end of November, on which the plebiscite will be held.

6. The final determination of the frontiers will be carried out by the international commission. This commission will also be entitled to recommend to the four Powers, Germany, the United Kingdom, France and Italy, in certain exceptional cases minor modifications in the strictly ethnographical determination of the zones which are to be transferred without plebiscite.

7. There will be a right of option into and out of the transferred territories, the option to be exercised within six months from the date of this agreement. A German-Czechoslovak commission shall determine the details of the option, consider ways of facilitating the transfer of population and settle questions of principle arising out of the said transfer.

8. The Czechoslovak Government will within a period of four weeks from the date of this agreement release from their military and police forces any Sudeten Germans who may wish to be released, and the Czechoslovak Government will within the same period release Sudeten German prisoners who are serving terms of imprisonment for political offences.

ADOLF HITLER.
NEVILLE CHAMBERLAIN.
ÉDOUARD DALADIER.
BENITO MUSSOLINI.

Munich,
September 29, 1938.

Annex to the Agreement.

His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom and the French Government have entered into the above agreement on the basis that they stand by the offer, contained in paragraph 6 of the Anglo-French proposals of the 19th September,(1) relating to an international guarantee of the new boundaries of the Czechoslovak State against unprovoked aggression.

(1) See Cmd. 5847.

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When the question of the Polish and Hungarian minorities in Czechoslovakia has been settled, Germany and Italy for their part will give a guarantee to Czechoslovakia.

ADOLF HITLER.
NEVILLE CHAMBERLAIN.
ÉDOUARD DALADIER.
BENITO MUSSOLINI.

Munich,
September 29, 1938.

Declaration.

The Heads of the Governments of the four Powers declare that the problems of the Polish and Hungarian minorities in Czechoslovakia, if not settled within three months by agreement between the respective Governments, shall form the subject of another meeting of the Heads of the Governments of the four Powers here present.

ADOLF HITLER.
NEVILLE CHAMBERLAIN.
ÉDOUARD DALADIER.
BENITO MUSSOLINI.

Munich,
September 29, 1938.

Supplementary Declaration.

All questions which may arise out of the transfer of the territory shall be considered as coming within the terms of reference to the international commission.

ADOLF HITLER.
NEVILLE CHAMBERLAIN.
ÉDOUARD DALADIER.
BENITO MUSSOLINI.

Munich,
September 29, 1938.

Composition of the International Commission.

The four Heads of Government here present agree that the international commission provided for in the agreement signed by them to-day, shall consist of the Secretary of State in the German Foreign Office, the British, French and Italian Ambassadors accredited in Berlin, and a representative to be nominated by the Government of Czechoslovakia.

ADOLF HITLER.
NEVILLE CHAMBERLAIN.
ÉDOUARD DALADIER.
BENITO MUSSOLINI.

Munich,
September 29, 1938.

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[17982 10/38] Wt. 3632/2267 750 3/39 F.O.P. 18833 Gp. 340

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T.C.27.

GERMAN ASSURANCE TO CZECHOSLOVAKIA, MARCH 11, 1938.

T.C.29

[R 2524/162/12] No. 76.

M. Masaryk to Viscount Halifax.—(*Received March* 12.)

My Lord, *London, March* 12, 1938.

I HAVE reported to my Government the interview which you were good enough to grant me to-day.

I have in consequence been instructed by my Government to bring to the official knowledge of His Majesty's Government the following facts: Yesterday evening (the 11th March) Field-Marshal Göring made two separate statements to M. Mastny, the Czechoslovak Minister in Berlin, assuring him that the developments in Austria will in no way have any detrimental influence on the relations between the German Reich and Czechoslovakia, and emphasising the continued earnest endeavour on the part of Germany to improve those mutual relations.

In the first statement the field-marshal used the expression: "Ich gebe Ihnen mein Ehrenwort."

In the second statement Field-Marshal Göring asserted that, having given his own word previously, he was now able to give the word of the head of the State, who had authorised him to take over temporarily his official duties. He then repeated the above assurances.

To-day (the 12th March) Field-Marshal Göring asked M. Mastny to call on him, repeated yesterday's assurances and added that the German troops, marching into Austria, have strictest orders to keep at least 15 kilom. from the Czechoslovak frontier; at the same time he expressed the hope that no mobilisation of the Czechoslovak army would take place.

M. Mastny was in a position to give him definite and binding assurances on this subject, and to-day spoke with Baron von Neurath, who, among other things, assured him on behalf of Herr Hitler that Germany still considers herself bound by the German-Czechoslovak Arbitration Convention concluded at Locarno in October 1925.

M. Mastny also saw to-day Herr von Mackensen, who assured him that the clarification of the Austrian situation will tend to improve German-Czechoslovak relations.

The Government of the Czechoslovak Republic wish to assure His Majesty's Government that they are animated by the earnest and ardent desire to live in the best possible neighbourly relations with the German Reich. They cannot, however, fail to view with great apprehension the sequel of events in Austria between the date of the bilateral agreement between Germany and Austria (11th July, 1936), and yesterday (11th March, 1938).

I have, &c.

JAN MASARYK.

T.C. 28

[English Translation]

GERMAN ASSURANCE TO CZECHOSLOVAKIA

OF 26th SEPTEMBER, 1938

I have little to explain. I am grateful to Mr. Chamberlain for all his efforts, and I have assured him that the German people want nothing but peace; but I have also told him that I cannot go back beyond the limits of our patience.

I assured him, moreover, and I repeat it here, that when this problem is solved there will be no more territorial problems for Germany in Europe. And I further assured him that from the moment when Czechoslovakia solves its other problems, that is to say when the Czechs have come to an arrangement with their other minorities peacefully and without oppression, I will no longer be interested in the Czech State. And that, as far as I am concerned, I will guarantee it. We don't want any Czechs! But I must also declare before the German people that in the Sudeten German problem my patience is now at an end. I made an offer to Herr Benes which was no more than the realisation of what he had already promised. He now has peace or war in his hands. Either he will accept this offer and at length give the Germans their freedom, or we will get this freedom for ourselves.

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T. C49

(Translation.)

Text of the Agreement between the Führer and Reichs Chancellor Adolf Hitler and the President of the Czecho-Slovak State, Dr. Hacha.

THE Führer and Reichs Chancellor to-day received in Berlin, at their own request, the President of the Czecho-Slovak State, Dr. Hacha, and the Czecho-Slovak Foreign Minister, Dr. Chwalkowsky, in the presence of Herr von Ribbentrop, the Foreign Minister of the Reich. At this meeting the serious situation which had arisen within the previous territory of Czecho-Slovakia, owing to the events of recent weeks, was subjected to a completely open examination. The conviction was unanimously expressed on both sides that the object of all their efforts must be to assure quiet, order and peace in this part of Central Europe. The President of the Czecho-Slovak State declared that, in order to serve this end and to reach a final pacification, he confidently placed the fate of the Czech people and of their country in the hands of the Führer of the German Reich. The Führer accepted this declaration and expressed his decision to assure to the Czech people, under the protection of the German Reich, the autonomous development of their national life in accordance with their special characteristics. In witness whereof this document is signed in duplicate.

ADOLF HITLER. DR. HACHA.

VON RIBBENTROP. DR. CHWALKOWSKY.

Berlin, March 15, 1939.

T.C. 50.

[English Translation]

PROCLAMATION OF THE FUEHRER

TO THE GERMAN PEOPLE

15th MARCH 1939

To the German People -

Only a few months ago Germany was compelled to protect her fellow-countrymen, living in well-defined settlements against the unbearable Czechoslovakian terror regime; and during the last weeks the same thing has happened on an ever increasing scale. This is bound to create an intolerable state of affairs within an area inhabited by citizens of so many nationalities.

These national groups, to counteract the renewed attacks against their freedom and life, have now broken away from the Prague Government. Czechoslovakia has ceased to exist.

Since Sunday at many places wild excesses have broken out, amongst the victims of which are again many Germans. Hourly the number of oppressed and persecuted people crying for help is increasing. From areas thickly populated by German-speaking inhabitants, which last autumn Czechoslovakia was allowed by German generosity to retain, refugees robbed of their personal belongings are streaming into the Reich.

Continuation of such a state of affairs would lead to the destruction of every vestige of order in an area in which Germany is vitally interested, particularly as for over 1,000 years it formed a part of the German Reich.

In order definitely to remove this menace to peace and to create the conditions for a necessary new order in this living space, I have to-day resolved to allow German troops to march into Bohemia and Moravia. They will disarm the terror gangs and the Czechoslovakian forces supporting them, and protect the lives of all who are menaced. Thus they will lay the foundations for introducing a fundamental re-ordering of affairs which will be in accordance with the 1,000 year-old history and will satisfy the practical needs of the German and Czech peoples.

BERLIN, 15th March 1939 (Signed) ADOLF HITLER

TC 50

H1123-0328

H1123-0329

[English Translation]

ORDER OF THE FUEHRER TO THE GERMAN

ARMED FORCES

15th MARCH 1939.

Czechoslovakia is in dissolution. In Bohemia and Moravia terror against German follow-countrymen reigns. From 15 March 1939 onwards formations of the German Army and Air Force will enter Czech territory in order to safeguard lives and property of all inhabitants of the country.

I expect every German soldier to consider himself not as an enemy of the inhabitants of the territory to be occupied, but only as an instrument for carrying out the German Reich Government's decision to restore a satisfactory order in that territory. But should resistance be offered anywhere, it will immediately be crushed with all means.

For the rest, remember that you set foot on Czech soil as representatives of Greater Germany.

The Fuehrer and Supreme C-in-C of the Armed Forces

(Signed) ADOLF HITLER

TC 50

H1123-0330
C51

[C 3398/19/18] No. 145.

Sir N. Henderson to Viscount Halifax.—(Received March 18.)

(No. 102. Saving.)
(Telegraphic.) *En clair.* *Berlin, March 16, 1939.*

MY telegram No. 120.

Following is the text of a decree, dated 16th March, issued by Herr Hitler regulating the status of the Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia :—

"For ten centuries the Bohemian-Moravian lands belonged to the living space of the German people. Force and lack of understanding arbitrarily tore them from their old historical surroundings and finally created a source of permanent unrest by incorporating them within the artificial edifice of Czecho-Slovkia. From year to year the danger that a new, appalling menace to European peace would emanate, as had happened once before in the past, from this living space, increased. For the Czecho-Slovak State, and those in power there, had not succeeded in properly organising the existence side by side of the national groups arbitrarily united within its boundaries, and had thereby failed to awaken the interest of all concerned in the maintenance of their common State. It has thereby proved its inmost incapacity to exist and has for this reason now also fallen into actual dissolution.

"The German Reich, however, cannot tolerate permanent disturbances in these territories that are so all-important to its own peace and security and also so important to the general well-being and universal peace. Sooner or later the Reich, as the Power most interested and affected, by history and geographical position, would have to suffer the most serious consequences. Self-preservation, therefore, requires that the German Reich should be determined to intervene decisively in favour of the restoration of a basis for a reasonable Central European order and should take the requisite measures. For it has already proved in the course of its historical past of a thousand years that it alone, thanks to its greatness and to the qualities of the German people, is called upon to solve these tasks.

"Filled with the earnest desire to serve the true interests of the peoples domiciled in this living space, to guarantee the individual national life of the German and of the Czech peoples, to benefit peace and the social welfare of all, I therefore decree the following, in the name of the German Reich, as the basis for the future existence in common of the inhabitants of these territories :—

"ARTICLE I.

"1. The territories which formed part of the former Czecho-Slovak Republic and which were occupied by German troops in March 1939 belong henceforth to the territory of the German Reich and come under the latter's protection as the "Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia."

"2. In so far as the defence of the Reich demands, the Leader and Chancellor shall take measures differing from the above in respect of individual parts of these areas.

"ARTICLE II.

"Inhabitants of the protectorate of German race shall become German nationals and German citizens in accordance with the provisions of the Reich Citizenship Law of the 15th September, 1935 (*Reichsgesetzblatt I*, Ts. 1146). The provisions with regard to safeguarding German blood and German honour shall therefore also apply to them. They shall be subject to German jurisdiction.

"2. The remaining inhabitants of Bohemia and Moravia shall be nationals of the Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia.

"ARTICLE III.

"1. The Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia is autonomous and self-administering.

"2. It shall exercise its sovereign rights within the scope of the protectorate in consonance with the political, military and economic importance of the Reich.

"3. These sovereign rights shall be represented by its own organs, authorities and officials.

"ARTICLE IV.

"The head of the autonomous administration of the Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia shall enjoy the guard and honours of the head of a State. The head of the protectorate must possess, in order to exercise his functions, the confidence of the Leader and Chancellor of the Reich.

"ARTICLE V.

"1. As trustee of Reich interests the Leader and Chancellor of the Reich shall nominate a 'Reich Protector in Bohemia and Moravia.' His seat of office will be Prague.

"2. The Reich Protector, as representative of the Leader and Chancellor of the Reich and as Commissioner of the Reich Government, is charged with duty of seeing to the observance of the political principles laid down by the Leader and Chancellor of the Reich.

"3. The members of the Government of the protectorate shall be confirmed by the Reich Protector. The confirmation may be withdrawn.

"4. The Reich Protector is entitled to inform himself of all measures taken by the Government of the protectorate and to give it advice. He can object to measures calculated to harm the Reich and, in case of danger, issue ordinances required for the common interest.

"5. The promulgation of laws, ordinances and other legal announcements and the execution of administrative measures and legal judgments shall be annulled if the Reich Protector enters an objection.

"ARTICLE VI.

"1. The foreign affairs of the protectorate, especially the protection of its nationals abroad, shall be taken over by the Reich. The Reich will conduct foreign affairs in accordance with the common interest.

"2. The protectorate shall have a representative accredited to the Reich Government with the title of a 'minister.'

"ARTICLE VII.

"1. The Reich shall accord military protection to the protectorate.

"2. In the exercise of this protection the Reich shall maintain garrisons and military establishments in the protectorate.

"3. For the maintenance of internal security and order the protectorate may form its own organisations. The composition, strength, numbers and arms shall be decided by the Reich Government.

"ARTICLE VIII.

"The Reich shall control directly the transport, post and telegraph systems.

"ARTICLE IX.

"The protectorate shall belong to the customs area of the Reich and be subject to its customs sovereignty.

"ARTICLE X.

"1. The crown is legal tender, together with the reichsmark, until further notice.

"2. The Reich Government shall fix the ratio of one to the other.

"ARTICLE XI.

"1. The Reich can issue ordinances valid for the protectorate in so far as the common interest requires.

"2. In so far as a common need exists, the Reich may take over branches of administration and create its own Reich authorities therefor as required.

"3. The Reich Government may take measures for the maintenance of security and order.

"ARTICLE XII.

"The law at present existing in Bohemia and Moravia shall remain in force so long as it does not conflict with the principle of the assumption of protection by the German Reich.

"ARTICLE XIII.

"The Reich Minister of the Interior shall issue, in agreement with the other Ministers concerned, the administrative and legal regulations for the execution and amplification of this decree.

"HITLER. "RIBBENTROP.
"FRICK. "LAMMERS.

"*Prague, March 16.*"

T.C 52

Protest by the British Government against the Annexation of Czechoslovakia

[C 3318/19/18] No. 143.

Viscount Halifax to Sir N. Henderson (Berlin).

(No. 68.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Foreign Office, March* 17, 1939.

PLEASE inform German Government that His Majesty's Government desire to make it plain to them that they cannot but regard the events of the past few days as a complete repudiation of the Munich Agreement and a denial of the spirit in which the negotiators of that agreement bound themselves to co-operate for a peaceful settlement.

His Majesty's Government must also take this occasion to protest against the changes effected in Czecho-Slovakia by German military action, which are, in their view, devoid of any basis of legality.

TC 52

H1123-0331

H1123-0332

[English Translation] T.C.53.

PROTEST BY THE FRENCH GOVERNMENT OF 17th MARCH, 1939 AGAINST THE GERMAN VIOLATION OF THE MUNICH AGREEMENT

M. Georges Bonnet, Minister for Foreign Affairs, to M. Coulondre, French Ambassador, Berlin

Paris, 17th March 1939.

Please ask for an audience of the Minister for Foreign Affairs to transmit to him the note of which I enclose the text. (A similar démarche has been ordered for your British Colleague).

"By a letter dated March 15th 1939, his Excellency the German Ambassador communicated to the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the French Republic, at the command of his Government, the text of an agreement concluded on the night of March 14/15 between the Fuehrer and Chancellor and the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Reich on the one hand, and the President and the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Czechoslovak Republic on the other hand.

"In the same communication it was stated that at 6 o'clock in the morning German troops had crossed the Czechoslovak frontier and that the necessary measures had been taken to prevent any resistance and any bloodshed, and to permit of an orderly and peaceful completion of the occupation and pacification of the territory.

"The French Ambassador has the honour to inform the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Reich of the formal protest made by the Government of the French Republic against the measures which the communication of Count de Welzeck records.

"The Government of the Republic consider in fact that, in face of the action directed by the German Government against Czechoslovakia, they are confronted with a flagrant violation of the letter and the spirit of the agreements signed at Munich on September 9, 1938.

"The circumstances in which the agreement of March 15 have been imposed on the leaders of the Czechoslovak Republic do not in the eyes of the Government of the Republic legalize the situation registered in that agreement.

"The French Ambassador has the honour to inform his Excellency the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Reich that the Government of the Republic cannot recognize, under these conditions, the legality of the new situation created in Czechoslovakia by the action of the German Reich".

(Signed) GEORGES BONNET

H1123-0333

RI DOCUMENTS

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